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SYNOPSIS  
This thesis analyses Australian policies and attitudes towards 
Indonesia from 1965 to 1980. It commences with a brief outline of 
relations between Australia and Indonesia before 1965. This is 
followed, with a view to providing a background to the subsequent 
phases of the relationship, by a survey of Indonesia's domestic and 
international policies under the 'New Order'. 
The thesis then canvasses Australia's rapprochement with 
Indonesia following the coup in 1965. In doing so, it examines the 
significance of Australia's international environment in 
determining official attitudes towards Indonesia, as well as issues 
related to the Australia-Indonesia relationship. With Britain's 
withdrawal from the region and a vast reduction in the role of the 
United States, it is argued that, because of its proximity and 
strategic importance to Australia, Indonesia received particular 
attention in Australian thinking about foreign policy and its 
relations with the neighbouring countries of South-East and East 
Asia. This was especially the case insofar as fears for our 
national security continued to dominate Australia's approach to 
foreign and defence policy. Hence -- and a major theme of this 
thesis -- the development of a 'special relationship' was pursued 
vigorously by the major Australian political parties. It became, 
however, an increasingly significant and volatile component of 
Australian foreign policy, because attitudes were developed and 
policies resolved within an atmosphere of increasing dispute. 
This thesis proceeds to consider evolving policies and 
attitudes to the Australia-Indonesia relationship within the 
context of specific foreign policy problems confronting Australia 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. While Australia's West New Guinea 
policy is examined, of catalytic influence was the mounting 
domestic criticism of Australia's relations with the Suharto 
government, and, in particular, the Indonesian Government's 
domestic policies, which were seen to be marked by debilitating 
corruption and an increasing suppression of all opposition, as well 
as by a widening gap between the rich and poor. Such issues were 
well documented in Australia, and they steadily alienated many 
observers. It is argued that these developments in Indonesia 
strengthened the position of opponents of the 'special 
relationship', with the debate compelled to widen as continuing 
sensitivities in the Indonesian political system gave rise by the 
mid-1970s to the 'Malari Affair', the closure of newspapers, 
student arrests, charges of corruption in high places and the 
Pertamina scandal. Nevertheless, more immediate and tangible 
interest prevailed, and the new Whitlam Labor government remained 
committed to Australia's very close association with Indonesia. 
Finally, this study examines Australian policy towards 
Indonesia in the face of heightening domestic criticism during the 
East Timor crisis. Throughout the 1975-80 period, the issue was a 
constant reminder of the extent of Australia's entrenched 
commitment to the 'special relationship'. It is argued that 
attempts by the Australian political parties to resolve disputes 
generated by this policy, significantly affected Australian 
attitudes toward the Australia-Indonesia relationship as a whole. 
Australia's policy consequently came under siege, with the 
government under criticism, not only from Indonesia, but also from 
significant sections of Australian society. Many groups and 
individuals in Australia began to question the central plank of 
Australia's South-East Asian policy the maintenance of a 'special 
relationship' with Indonesia, particularly if it meant acceding to 
the latter's wishes on all issues. Indeed, assessments began to be 
made on its effectiveness and its cost. In essence, a sense of 
vulnerability infused a more serious, if not sophisticated, 
interest in the basis for Australian policy towards Indonesia. 
Throughout this thesis it is argued that the cultivation of 
Indonesia's friendship has grown from a vague notion that Australia 
has had to keep on good terms with its neighbour. This stemmed 
from Australia's historical obsessions with security and the 
vi 
persistently argued official view that Indonesia is the linchpin of 
Southeast Asian Security. However, the tendency to overstress the 
security aspect of our association or to think in terms of some 
need for a 'special relationship' with Indonesia, out of a concern 
about Indonesia's potential to wield power and influence within the 
region, was doing little other than directing Australian policy 
makers towards a cul-de-sac of uncertain bilateralism. 
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NOTE ON SOURCES 
When work was initiated on this study, it seemed appropriate 
to explore, as far as public records would allow, Australian 
policies and attitudes towards Indonesia during the period 
1965-1980. To serve this purpose, a classical 'traditional' method 
of political and historical analysis of post-coup developments was 
envisaged. This involved an examination of documents, personal and 
official papers and memoirs, and was supplemented by interviews, 
where possible. However, in terms of material for a doctoral 
thesis, the post-coup period is only a partially documented topic. 
Archival practice in Australia does not allow access by researchers 
to official files or privileged information. As any meaningful 
attempt to examine Australian foreign policy, generally, depends on 
this information, it became clear that there was a need to narrow 
the focus onto the circumstances under which Australia-Indonesia 
relations developed during the period under review. Also because 
it is a topic about which there are highly diverse and 
controversial interpretations, it was decided to focus a 
substantial part of the thesis on those interpretations. 
Where possible I have drawn upon government publications, 
parliamentary debates, biographies, memoirs and academic writings. 
This thesis has depended also on a careful reading of the press 
(utilizing the extensive resources of the International Relations 
and Political Science Departments of the Australian National 
University). Interviews also proved to be useful. In fact, these 
two research tools were utilized to reinforce each other. Over the 
years I have interviewed with officials within relevant Departments 
in Canberra, MPs (including former foreign ministers and Prime 
Ministers) parliamentary staff, journalists, representatives of 
interest groups, businessmen and members of foreign embassies, as 
well as Australian missions overseas. 
Clearly, many people with an interest in Australian foreign 
policy generally, and Australia's relations with Indonesia, in 
particular, have been sought. Many of those who were interviewed 
were public servants, and the majority preferred that the interview 
material not be attributed to them. Wherever possible, however, 
published evidence was sought to corroborate the information they 
gave me. Hence, with regard to public sources and private 
information, I have attempted to interlock the information into a 
'corroborative framework'. Integral here were secondary sources 
which were broad in both origin and content. Hence, secondary 
sources are evident throughout the thesis. However, as historical 
research was not a major aim they have been interspersed with 
primary ones. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Australia-Indonesia Relationship 
This thesis is a study of Australia's relationship with the 'New 
Order' Government in Indonesia and covers the period from 1965 to 
1980. While it has been observed that Indonesia in recent years 
has been '...the crucible of Australian foreign policy...', 1 
throughout the period under review, the relationship has been a 
major source of dispute in Australia, with tensions and incidents 
transcending the diplomatic and political spadework so assiduously 
conducted by successive Liberal and Labor Governments. 
Moreover, the 1965 to 1980 period ended as it began, with 
caution as the hallmark of Australia's Indonesia policy. This 
caution followed in the wake of some of the most dramatic examples 
of Australia's total inability to influence important neighbourhood 
developments, including the West New Guinea takeover in 1962, 
Indonesia's 'confrontation' of the projected state of Malaysia in 
1963, and the incorporation of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia in 
1975. All had a common theme: marked concern at the public level 
paralleled visible differences of opinion among policy makers. 2 
It is an examination of this theme with which this thesis is 
primarily concerned. 
On one level the study evaluates the conduct of government-to-
government relations and, drawing some implications from the policy 
experiences of a decade and a half of cooperation and conflict, 
explains why the anxieties that afflicted Australia in the early to 
mid-1960s came once again to the fore when the Timor issue 
manifested itself, evoking at the policy level old fears and 
antagonisms; why the distinctive features of Australian foreign 
policy towards Indonesia in the mid to late 1970s bore a remarkable 
Renouf, A., A Frightened Country, Macmillan, South 
Melbourne, 1979, p.399. 
2 	Brown, C. P. , "Australia-Indonesian Relations", Australia and 
Asia: The Capricornia Papers, Centre for the Study of 
Australian-Asian Relations, Paper No.10, July 1980, p.71. 
2 
resemblance to government policy of the earlier period, 1 reflecting 
caution, restraint, and the determination to avoid decisions that 
might set Australia upon a collision course with its nearest Asian 
neighbour. On another level, the study focuses on the political 
process within which Australia's Indonesia policy has been 
formulated. 
The real challenge in writing about the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship lay in exploring one major anomaly, as stated by C.P. 
Brown: 
while Australian political and diplomatic leaders have 
stressed so frequently and as strongly the necessity of 
serving and maintaining good relations with Indonesia, in fact 
Australia-Indonesia relations, at least at the public level, 
have been dominated by disagreement, and by failures on both 
sides to understand the attitudes, feelings and policies of 
the other. 2 
To understand this claim it is important to grasp the essentially 
complex nature of the relationship itself. Two middle powers 
differentiated by divergent centuries-long experiences and 
separated by contrasting socio-cultural perspectives, yet thrust 
into political proximity as a consequence of factors such as 
geography, ideology, changes in their respective foreign policies 
and the changing balance of power in the Southeast Asian region, 
could hardly avoid being plunged into a competitive relationship. 
One of the consequences of this condition, and wherein lies 
the key to any understanding of the paradox identified by Brown, is 
the juxtaposition between the pressures arising from the changing 
nature of Australia's immediate strategic environment and those 
arising from divergent views within Australia of the implications - 
- in historical circumstances such as those in which Australia 
found itself in the late 1960s -- of Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia. These aspects emerge as themes linking the three parts 
of the study. Since the Menzies era in Australian political 
history ended, debate over Australian foreign policy has been 
dominated by the changing face of international politics in the 
East and Southeast Asian regions. Intrinsic to this debate in the 
1960s, and also a major source of dispute, was the dismantling of 
1 	Refer to Viviani, N.M., "Australian Attitudes and Policies 
Towards Indonesia, 1950-1965", Ph.D. thesis, Department of 
International Relations, ANU, 1973, esp. Chs. 6 through 8. 
2 	Brown, C.P., "Australia-Indonesia Relations", 1980, p.71. 
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British and American Southeast Asian strategies. By the 1970s, 
changing power configurations saw the emergence of a new 
polarization of forces in the strategic balance. 1 During the 
course of both decades, Australia was compelled to define 
distinctive security interests of its own aside from the interests 
of its more powerful allies, and those of its neighbours. 	For 
different reasons, these developments brought realism to a foreign 
policy debate dominated, since 1945, by cold war abstractions and 
theorising on the relative merits of power politics, international 
organizations and regional relations. 
Differing perceptions on the part of policy makers and the 
community of Australia's relations with, and role in, the region, 
were central to this debate. Of particular concern, as a corollary 
of the changing nature of power relations, were the costs and 
benefits to Australia of its relationship with Indonesia. Within 
Australia, relations with Indonesia have been at times a major 
source of conflict: for the Australian policy maker it portrayed an 
endeavour to frame a foreign policy based on an acceptance of 
Indonesia as a reconcilable feature of Australia's external 
environment; while for the Australian community a deep divergence 
in attitudes -- one based particularly on differing ideologies in 
foreign policy -- centred on a concern for the modus operandi in 
the fostering of the Australia-Indonesia relationship. 
Inevitably, this relationship has variously been described as 
ambivalent, competitive, ambiguous, asymmetrical and successful. 
Thus, while one of the aims of this inquiry is to consider how 
attitudes are assimilated into the foreign policy-making process, 
an attempt will be made also to find an answer to the more general 
question of how foreicln policy analysts and observers set about  
analysing the bases of Australian foreign policy in respect of  
Indonesia. In establishing a pattern as to how analysts 
experienced, defined and accommodated this particular element of 
See Bull,H., (ed.), Asia and the Western Pacific: Towards 
a New International Order, Nelson, Melbourne, 1975, passim; 
Beddie, B.D., (ed.), Advance Australia - Where?, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1975, passim; Camilleri, J.A., 
and Teichmann, M., Security and Survival: The New Era in 
International Relations, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1973; 
Albinski, H.S., Australian External Policy Under Labor, 
Queensland University Press, St. Lucia, 1977, esp. chs. 1, 
2 and 3. 
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Australia's external environment, some broader points of issue will 
be precipitated. For example, what were the key elements of the 
relationship, as perceived by analysts, as it developed over the 
several distinct phases in the late 1960s and 1970s? Moreover, 
what criteria are used in determining guidelines for policy making? 
What account is taken of community attitudes? Whose interpretations 
accounted for the true nature of the relationship, and who can 
sustain credibility or tenability in the face of divergent 
analysis? Finally, how do we make these judgments in view of a 
policy-making environment entirely unprecedented in the history of 
Australian foreign policy? 
Looking back over the 1965-80 period, four distinct periods 
emerge. The first covers the early years from late 1965 to mid-
1968, when the Australian Government avoided making any major 
commitments to the political leadership in Indonesia. This period 
was characterised by Government resistance to persuasion from 
within and outside Australia to provide substantial economic 
assistance to Indonesia. In the second period, from mid-1968 to 
early 1974, Indonesia emerged as a significant feature of 
Australian re-assessments of regional security issues in the wake 
of the British and American announcements of phased military 
withdrawals from mainland Southeast Asia. It was only when doubts 
were cast upon the security of Australia's alignments with these 
powers that Australian Governments were prepared to deepen their 
relations with Indonesia. The significant place which Indonesia 
had in Australia's foreign policy was reflected in Australia's 
response to the West New Guinea (WNG) issue and in the emergence, 
by the turn of the decade, of a virtually bipartisan policy on 
Indonesia. The Government's continuing interest and concern in 
Asia, however, was taken up through much of this period with 
military and strategic considerations and, as a result, early 
opportunities to consolidate in the economic and trade areas with 
Indonesia were lost to Australia. 
In the third period, from 1974 to early 1978, the collapse of 
Portuguese rule in Timor embroiled the relationship in controversy, 
giving rise at the height of the crisis to a direct conflict 
between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's foreign policy 
principles towards Indonesia. Initial Fraser Government 
condemnation of the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia -- 
due in part to Australian domestic opinion -- gave way under the 
5 
weight of longer term diplomatic, military and strategic 
considerations and, in the period following, the issue was the 
subject of declining official and public interest, promoting the 
climate for a thaw in Australia-Indonesia relations. 
Public approval of the 'New Order' Government had undergone a 
fragile growth throughout the periods under review. At first, 
Australian Government attitudes and policies attracted only 
sporadic comment from the wider community, other than that which 
emerged in the context of changes arising from the British and 
American decisions to withdraw from the region. Australia's WNG 
policy and its attitude toward Indonesia's 'Act of Free Choice' in 
the late 1960s, as well as towards human rights issues, focused 
domestic opinion on the nature of the Suharto Government and, by 
the early 1970s, its internal policies. Important themes are the 
co-existence of an uneasiness about Indonesia's potential as a 
threat, with a concern for its welfare and stability; and a number 
of contentious issues arising from the increasingly authoritarian 
nature of the 'New Order' Government. 
By the mid-1970s, when the major focus of public policy had 
centred on developments in East Timor, dissenting domestic opinion 
had concentrated on moral and humanitarian issues such as political 
prisoners, and these issues converged as East Timor became the 
subject of intense and highly politicized controversy. 
Mode of Examination  
For the purposes of analysis, it will be helpful to use a 
'level-of-analysis' framework l -- a methodology highly relevant to 
In 1961, Professor J.D. Singer introduced the notion of 
'levels of analysis'. He argued that the level of analysis 
at which the scholar views the world is important 
conceptually and methodologically in the study of world 
politics and proposed two broad levels: the international 
system and the nation-state levels of analysis. Within this 
framework, he emphasized a major distinction used when 
looking for influences on foreign policy: 
(i) those that are internal or domestic, arising from 
within the nation-state, and 
(ii) those that are external, originating in the world 
outside the state's boundaries. (Singer, J.D., "The 
Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", 
in Knorr, Klaus and Verba, Sydney (eds.), The 
International System, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J., 1961, pp.77-92). 
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the analysis of a complex bilateral relationship such as this one. 1 
Using this structure, foreign policy can be explained on three 
levels: the systemic, nation-state and the decision-making 
process. The systemic level-of-analysis, according to Holsti 
(1983), explains the behaviour of individual States: 
in terms of the state of the whole system (balanced or 
imbalanced2 ) and the presence or absence of one 
aggressive state and a balancer. This type of analysis 
makes no reference to personalities, domestic pressures, 
or ideologies within states. Foreign-policy behaviour is 
conceived as a reaction to the external environment the 
state of balance among all the units in the system. 
This argument, as originally formulated by Singer, 4 was supported 
by East and Gregg (1967) who conducted a study of over eighty 
countries and concluded that their 'actions in the international 
system are systematically rather than randomly associated with 
1 	Singer did not discuss a regional level of analysis. At the 
time, the international system was dominated by the global 
rivalries and issues of the Cold War, overshadowing rapidly 
emerging regionalist trends. The importance of regional 
sub-systems was analysed by Oran Young in his "Political 
Discontinuities in the International System," World 
Politics, April 1968. See also arguments put forward by 
Haas, E.B., "The United Nations and Regionalism", 
International Relations, November 1970; and Canton, L., and 
Spiegel, S., "International Regions: A Comparative Approach 
to Five Subordinate Systems", International Studies  
Ouarterly, December 1969. The problem of identifying 
specific regional sub-systems is examined by Thompson, W.R., 
"The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a 
Propositional Inventory", International Studies Quarterly, 
December 1969. 
2 	A reference to Holsti's earlier discussion on the classical 
theory of balance of power. 
3 	Holsti, K.J., International Politics: 	A Framework for 
Analysis, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1983, p.15. 
4 	In Singer's words, 'the systemic level of analysis ... 
permits us to examine international relations in the whole 
with a comprehensiveness that is, of necessity, lost when 
our focus is shifted to a lower, and more partial level'. 
(Singer, J.D., 	"The Level-of-Analysis Problem in 
International Relations", reprinted in 	Rosenau, J.N., 
(ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy: a reader 
in research and theory, The Free Press, New York, 1969, 
p.22.) 
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their ... international situation'. 1 Further, they found evidence 
to suggest that these actions, whether resulting in cooperation or 
conflict, were associated more with variations in the 
international, rather than domestic, situation. 2 
Those who employ this approach in the study of international 
relations usually 'postulate a high degree of uniformity in the 
foreign policy operational codes of our national actors. By 
definition, we allow little room for divergence in the behaviour of 
our parts when we focus on the whole'. 3 The nature and behaviour 
of States are, thus, characterised by a homogeneity; they share 
the pursuit of power, and as Holsti argues, to understand their 
external behaviour, is not to know anything about the internal 
structure, the domestic environment nor of the personalities of the 
leaders of particular States. Thus, in: 
eschewing any empirical concern with the domestic and 
internal variations within the separate nations, the 
system-oriented approach tends to produce a sort of 
'black box' or 'billiard ball' concept of the national 
actors. 4 
East, M.A., and Gregg, P.M., "Factors Influencing 
Co-operation and conflict in the International System", 
International Studies Quarterly, 11 (1967), p.265. 
2 	Jensen and Cohen found conflicting evidence when analysing 
this proposition in the context of a specific policy. In 
a post-Second World War analysis of the defeated States 
(Germany, Italy and Japan), Jensen found the domestic 
environment became an increasingly more important variable 
in influencing the foreign and defence policy processes in 
these three countries (Jensen, L., "Post-war Democratic 
Politics: national-international linkages in the defense 
policy of the defeated states", in Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), 
Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and 
International Systems, The Free Press, New York, 1969, 
p.322.) Cohen, however, conducted a comparative case study 
of Soviet and US leaders, and concluded that the external 
environment had been a socializing influence on them, 
particularly in relation to nuclear restraint and the 
limitations of power (Cohen, B.C., in Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), 
Linkage Politics, pp.139-141). Similar conclusions were 
also reached by Holsti and Sullivan in relation to France 
and China. See Holsti, O.R., and Sullivan, J.D., 
"National-international linkages France and China as 
nonconforming alliance members", in Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), 
Linkage Politics, pp.147-195. 
3 	Singer (in Rosenau, J.N., 1969), "The Levels-of-Analysis 
Problem in International Relations", p.23. 
4 	Ibid. 
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According to Singer, in order to understand their behaviour, it is 
necessary only to appreciate the characteristics which they all 
share and the situation in which they find themselves. 
In contrast, the nation-state and decision-making levels of 
analysis emphasize the role of these domestic and internal 
variations. 1 Those who favour these approaches2 consider 'the 
systemic model ... usually eventuates in rather gross comparisons 
based on relatively crude dimensions and characteristics', 3 and 
argue that states are highly individualistic entities, responsive 
to domestic pressures and the personalities and politics of those 
who lead them. Moreover, it is considered that the advantage in 
using the nation-state level of analysis is that it 'permits 
significant differentiation among our actors in the international 
system'. 4 Further, it overcomes the assumption implicit in the 
systemic level of analysis that the foreign policy behaviour of the 
nation-state is in direct response to the forces at work in the 
international environment. 5 Thus, the nation-state 
level-of-analysis has much to commend it. As Holsti explains: 
Wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomatic manoeuvers, 
isolation, and the many goals of diplomatic action can be 
viewed as the results of domestic political pressure, 
national ideologies, public opinion, or economic and 
social needs... governments do not react just to the 
external environment or to some mythical balance or 
imbalance. Their actions also express the needs and 
While Singer's distinction was valuable, James Rosenau was 
to later broaden this 'schema', identifying six levels: (1) 
the individual decision makers, and their characteristics; 
(2) the roles these decision makers occupied; (3) the 
structure of the government; (4) The society within which 
they function; (5) the relationship between the 
nation-states (within which they operate) and other 
international actors; and (6) the global system. (See 
Rosenau, J.N., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, The 
Free Press, New York, 1971, Chapter 5.) 
2 	See East and Gregg (1967), and Jensen(1969). 
3 	Singer (in Rosenau, J.N. International Politics and Foreign 
Policy), "The Level-of-Analysis Problem", p.24. 
4 
5 
Ibid. 
It is acknowledged, however, that as the nation-state level 
of analysis focuses on the internal factors and conditions 
involved in the formulation of foreign policy decision 
making, its utility is limited to the bases of foreign 
policy action and not international interaction. 
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values of their own population and political leaders. 1 
Finally, bureaucratic organizations 2 and the actions and behaviour 
of those in the decision-making process, whether a Prime Minister 
or a bureaucrat, are deemed important. Past theoretical work has 
focused to a great extent on decision-making variables 3 , as well as 
on the impact on such variables as crisis situations 4 , the nature 
1 
2 
Holsti 	K.J., 	International 	Politics: 	A Framework for 
Analysis, p.15. 
Knorr, 	K. 
Approaches 
and 
to 
See Vital, 	D., 	"Back to Machiavelli, 	in 
Rosenau, 	J.N., 	(eds.), 	Contending International Politics, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. and Guildford, 1969, esp. p.153; Alison, 
G.T., Essence of Decision, Little, Brown, Boston, 1971; 
Halperin, M.H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
Brookings Institute, Washington, 1974. An application of 
the concepts to events in 1914 was done by Williamson in 
Lauren, P.G., (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History,  
Theory and Policy, Collier-Macmillan and New York Free 
Press, London, 1979. For criticisms of this theory see 
Krasner, S.D., "Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison 
Wonderland)", Foreign Policy, No.7 (summer) 1972, pp.159- 
179; Also Freedman, L. "Logics, Politics and Foreign Policy 
Processes: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model", 
International Affairs, Vol.52, No.3, 1976, pp.434-449, and 
Wallace, W. and Paterson, W.E., (eds.), Foreign Policy 
Making in Western Europe, Praeger, New York, 1978. 
3 	See for example, Snyder, Richard C., et al. (eds.), Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making, The Free Press, New York, 1962; and 
Frankel, J., The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of 
Decision-Making, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963. 
See also Rosenau, J.N., The Scientific Study of Foreign 
Policy, London, Frances Pinder and New York, Nichols, 1980; 
and Bloomfield, L.P., The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern 
Primer, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. and London, 
1982; Clarke, M. and White, B., An Introduction to Foreign 
Policy Analysis: The Foreign Policy System, Ormskirk and 
Northridge, G.W. and Heskoth, A., 1981; Jensen, L., 
Explaining Foreign Policy, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, and Hemel Hempstead, 1982. 
4 	See for example, Siverson, R.M., "International Conflict and 
the perception of Injury: the case of the Suez crisis", 
International Studies Ouarterly, 1970 (14), pp.157-165; 
and Zaninovitch, M.G., "Pattern Analysis of Variables within 
the International System: The Sino-Soviet example", Journal  
of Conflict Resolution, 1962 (6), pp.253-268. 	See also 
Brechner, M., Decisions in Crisis: 	Israel '67 and '73, 
University of California Press, London & Berkley, CA, 1980; 
Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1974; and Brechner, M., (ed.), Studies in 
Crisis Behaviour, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New 
1 0 
of the issues% and the decision-maker's images of foreign policy2 . 
Essentially, however, what concerns us here is how decision makers 
go about: 
defining purposes, choosing among courses of action, and 
utilizing national capabilities to achieve the objectives 
in the name of the state. This level of analysis focuses 
upon the ideologies, motivations, ideals, perceptions, 
values or idiosyncracies of those who are empowered to 
make decisions for the state. 3 
The thesis will therefore draw together evidence of the attitudes 
and approaches of major decision makers in the context of 
Australian opinion on the Indonesian relationship. However, the 
study is not a detailed decision-making analysis. 
While each major unit of analysis provides a different focus 
of the factors influencing the external behaviour of a State, the 
relative importance and utility of each approach must be 
addressed. 4 Conversely, the level of analysis which provides the 
Jersey, 1979. 
See Touval, S., "Africa's frontiers: Reaction to Colonial 
Legacy", International Affairs (London), 1966 (42); and 
Holsti, O.R., "Individual Differences in 'definition of the 
situation'", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1970 (14). 
2 	See for example, Jervis, R., "Hypotheses on Misperception", 
World Politics, 1968 (20), pp.454-479. See also by the 
same author: Perceptions and Misperceptions in 
International Politics, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. & Guildford, 1976. While 'images' were 
emphasized by K.E. Boulding in 1961 (The Image: Knowledge 
in Life and Society, University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, MI, 1961), H & M Sprout more recently link a concern 
for perceptions with a more general analysis of causation, 
in particular the inter-relationship between endogenous 
perceptions and exogenous constraints such as those deriving 
from geopolitics (The Ecological Perspective in Human 
Affairs, Greenwood Press, London and Westport, CT, 1979). 
3 	Holsti, K.J., International Politics: 	A Framework for 
Analysis, p.16. 
4 . 	While we will hold firmly to these levels of analysis, it 
must be acknowledged that considerable attention has been 
focused on other 'actors' in the global international 
system. 'Transnationals', especially multinational 
corporations have received attention as major players on the 
international stage. They are considered important because 
of their membership and resources, and their consequent 
ability to intervene in the internal affairs of host 
countries, as well as to affect interstate relations. (See 
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most useful perspective from which to explain or understand 
politics between States (in this instance, relations between 
Australia and Indonesia) must be addressed. Singer considered: 
For a staggering variety of reasons the scholar may be 
more interested in one level than the other at any given 
time and will undoubtedly shift his orientation according 
to his research needs. So the problem is really not one 
of deciding which level is most valuable to the 
discipline as a whole and then demanding it be adhered to 
... Rather, it is one of realizing that there is this 
preliminary conceptual issue and that it must be 
temporarily resolved prior to any research undertaking.' 
Yet, just as each level makes a contribution, each also fails to 
account for certain aspects of the overall picture that must be 
considered. While it is at odds with Singer's view that the 
scholar should preselect the particular level of analysis he or she 
Huntington, Samuel P., "Transnational Organizations in World 
Politics", World Politics, April 1973; Ball, George W., 
(ed.), Global Companies: The Political Economy of World 
Business, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975; and 
David Apter, D.E., and Goodman, Louis Wolf, (eds.), The 
Multinational Corporation and Social Change, Praeger, New 
York, 1976). 
Other units of study (outside the organized political 
communal structure) with a role within nations include 
churches, ethnic minorities, the press, and economic 
interest groups (farmers, industries). For an anlysis of 
the reaction against the traditional 'states-as-sole-actors 
approach' - an approach in which all significant events and 
changes in the international scene are attributed to the 
policies of national governments - see Wolfers, Arnold, "The 
Actors in International Politics" in Fox, William T.R., 
(ed.) Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1959. 
Finally, another area of analysis that focuses on 
relationships in the global international system, and is 
closely related to systems theory, has been interdependence. 
Interdependence, according to Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph 
S. Nye has two dimensions -- sensitivity and vulnerability. 
The former 'involves degrees of responsiveness within a 
policy framework - how quickly do changes in one country 
bring costly changes in another, and how great are the 
costly effects'. Vulnerability according to Keohane and Nye 
'can be defined as an actor's liability to suffer costs 
imposed by external events even after policies have been 
altered'. Interdependence, with these two dimensions, can 
be social, political, economic or ideological in nature. 
See Keohane, R.O., and Nye, Joseph S., Power and 
Interdependences: World Politics in Transition, Little 
Brown, Boston, 1977. Esp. pp.9-13. 
1 	Singer (in Rosenau, J.N., International Politics and Foreign 
Policy), "The Level-of-Analysis Problem", p.28. 
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wishes to use, an analysis of Australia's foreign policy will not 
be a complete, and therefore informed one, if it embraces only the 
attitudes and values of Australia's Prime Minister or Foreign 
Minister. Nor is it sufficient to analyze Australia's economic and 
social needs. The net must be cast more widely, to embrace 
considerations related to other aspects of the State's internal 
environment, as well as the main characteristics of the external 
environment. 1 
Consequently, each level of analysis, while not mutually 
exclusive, is appropriate to this study, and depending on the type 
of problems to be analysed, will be employed at different times. 
At the same time, however, Singer's words of caution are worth 
bearing in mind: 
if the case for one or another of the possible levels of 
analysis cannot be made with any certainty, one must 
nevertheless maintain a continuing awareness of their 
use. We may utilize one level here and another there, 
but we cannot afford to shift our orientation in the 
midst of a study ... when we do in fact make an original 
selection or replace one with another at appropriate 
times, we must do so with a full awareness of the 
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive implication of 
such choice. 2 
The point to emphasize is that while such an argument is 
understandable in view of the intellectual burdens imposed by a 
multi-level perspective, it is increasingly losing its validity 
because international politics now reflects a complex interaction 
of global and State components. In essence, it is hoped that by 
using such a perspective this thesis will provide some 
understanding of one of 'the fundamental conditions and processes 
1 	Holsti, K.J., International Politics: 	A Framework for 
Analysis, Chapter 12. Holsti evaluates the influences on 
foreign policy of ideology, beliefs, values, attitudes and 
images in relation to the internal environment. Further he 
examines the roles of bureaucratic needs, values and 
traditions, social needs, national attributes and public 
opinion. In considering the external environment he 
analyses the effects other countries' objectives and actions 
have on a country's external behaviour, as well as 
international economic and other trends (population growth, 
food supply) that have an influence. He then concludes 
with an analysis of the relationships between all these 
aspects, assessing the relative importance of these 
different components. 
2 	Singer (in Rosenau, J.N., International Politics and Foreign 
Policy), "The Level-of-Analysis Problem", p.28. 
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of international politics - how people and governments behave in 
their external relations'. 1 
A Preliminary Framework 
Implicit in the questions posed earlier are a number of 
themes, each requiring different levels of analysis. By adopting 
two broad levels -- the international system and the nation-state 
(and the process of opinion-making therein) -- this study will 
amplify a major distinction used when looking for influences on 
foreign policy: those that are internal or domestic, coming from 
within the nation-state, and those that are external, originating 
in the environment beyond the State's boundaries. However, 
extending this, the assumption in this thesis is that foreign 
policy has a distinct and strong basis in the domestic political 
system, as well as being subjected to external constraints. 
Therefore, this study has two main themes. The first argues 
that Australian foreign policy making has become as affected by the 
domestic political environment as by international constraints, and 
that an understanding of these factors is necessary to any full 
understanding of the substance and direction of Australia's 
Indonesian policy in the period under review. The second surveys 
the extent and intensity of the relationship between non-government 
and community attitudes, and the policy maker. While primary 
attention in this study will be given to an exposition of the 
historical record (within the framework outlined below), the 
analysis is also designed to relate the experiences arising from 
the Australian-Indonesian relationship to these broader themes. 
Intrinsic to these perspectives will be the need to 
reconstruct the formulation and conduct of Australian policy 
towards Indonesia during the 1965-80 period (as far as public 
record will allow). This will be illustrated by focusing on the 
questions at issue, drawing conclusions about the characteristic 
style of Australian policy in general, and the changing context 
within which the policy was made. Furthermore, as the issues 
raised in this thesis were the subject of highly politicized and 
emotional controversy, it seemed important to examine the 
institutional context within which attitudes and opinions were 
Holsti, K.J., International Politics: 	A Framework for 
Analysis, P.21. 
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formed and expressed (for example, the Australian Parliament). In 
view of this, and given the development of opinion throughout the 
period under review, it seemed desirable not to separate the issues 
but to consider them as part of an historical process. 
Inevitably, part of the account of developments is repeated 
and the amount of space given to an opinion of a particular group 
or individual may not necessarily reflect the importance of its 
influence within the community or on policy making. 1 However, by 
taking such an approach, we are able to fully examine such 
opinions, and to make an assessment as to whether they are 
influenced by group membership or other factors. It also enables 
assessments to be made about the interaction of domestic opinion on 
these issues (apart from the aspect of policy making). Against 
this background, the study will seek to weigh the influence of the 
attitude of the policy maker, the impact of domestic opinion and 
the exigencies of the actions of other States in evaluating the 
making of policy decisions and their effectiveness in the domestic 
and international environments. 
Structure and Organization 
Accordingly, this thesis is divided into three parts. The 
first, utilizing the systemic level of analysis, stresses the 
influence of the international system on Australia's foreign policy 
behaviour in the 1960s. However, it begins by describing the 
historical origins and persistence of the importance of Indonesia 
to Australia, moving to account for the underlying motivations for 
the changes in Australia's political and diplomatic relations with 
the new Suharto government. It then turns to a sketch of the 
consolidation of the Indonesian government (Chapter One), focusing 
predominantly on the domestic context. The intention here is quite 
limited in that it does not seek nor purport to give a rounded 
history of Indonesia under the 'New Order'. Rather, we will focus 
on particular aspects of Indonesia's evolving socio-economic and 
political life under the 'New Order' Government, and what this 
means for Indonesia's attitudes to the world. But in doing so, it 
serves two further purposes. First, it provides an overview of the 
This is reduced by drawing opinions and attitudes together 
at the end of each relevant chapter, and relating them to 
each other. 
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major sources of growing discontent within Australia toward the 
Suharto government. Second, it offers an insight into Indonesia's 
policy objectives and actions, bearing in mind that in terms of the 
utility of the systemic level of analysis, such objectives and 
actions are instrumental in 'set[ting] an agenda of foreign policy 
problems between two or more governments': 
The remainder of Part One (Chapters Two and Three) examines, 
principally from secondary sources, the course and conduct of 
Australian foreign policy as it related to the region during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. The changing nature of power relations 
in the region during this period served to nurture increasing 
doubts on the part of Australian policy makers as to the tenability 
of Australia's traditional security alliances, and Indonesia's 
strategic importance in Australia's regional perspective was 
substantially enhanced. To a large degree it explains these 
processes not only in systemic terms but also in terms of the place 
of the nation and its interests within the international and 
regional system, and in particular the key decision makers -- their 
perceptions, motivations, and ideologies -- and the structures to 
which they belong. This section includes a brief examination of 
the effect of such factors, particularly in the formulation and 
conduct of Australia's West New Guinea policy. 
In Part Two of the thesis the nation-State level of analysis 
is taken further and the political process within which Australia's 
Indonesia policy has been formulated, is explored. Chapter Four 
examines the views of the Australian press while, in Chapter Five, 
attention is focused on the role of the Parliament and the major 
political parties. Finally, Chapter Six examines the views and 
impact of other elements of domestic opinion. 
In Part Three both the systemic and nation-State levels of 
analysis are utilized. It opens with a brief treatment of what 
amounted, by the early 1970s, to a new era in world politics. A 
brief assessment is made of the changes, as well as of Australia's 
responses to them, under both conservative and labor governments. 
In Chapter Seven, they are then related to an examination of 
Australian government policy toward Indonesia during the East Timor 
crisis. On the systemic level, events in East Timor and 
1 	Holsti, K.J., International Politics: 	A Framework for 
Analysis, p.348. 
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Indonesia's policy responses provide an important context to an 
examination of the character and direction of Australian policy 
utilizing the nation-State level of analysis. Accordingly, the 
thesis returns to an analysis of the political processes during 
this later period. Chapters Eight and Nine examine the roles of 
the Press and Parliament, while Chapter Ten deals with the part 
played by other elements of domestic opinion during the conduct of 
Australia's East Timor policy. 
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PART ONE 
INDONESIAN REHABILITATION AND AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY INTERESTS  
In August 1965 -- the twentieth anniversary of the proclamation of 
Indonesian independence -- J.A.C. Mackie said of international 
relations in Southeast Asia: 
Most Asian countries have long been familiar with a world 
in which the political and moral issues to be faced have 
not been simple, but blurred and complex. We Australians 
have long been shielded from this kind of world, but now 
we are having to learn how to live in it. We cannot turn 
our backs on our neighbours or pretend to be indifferent 
to them and their problems. Only by actively fostering 
better understanding and mutual respect can we hope to 
build up the spirit of good-neighbourly friendship which 
inspired the happier early phase of Australian-Indonesian 
relations. 1 
Up to that time, the short history of Australian-Indonesian 
relations presented a blurred and complex picture. It was one of 
conflict and cooperation, of distrust and goodwill, and of 
self-centred apathy and lively interests. For both Australia and 
Indonesia it had been a learning experience -- to live with a 
neighbour who was too significant to be simply ignored, and too 
different to be readily understood. The emergence of Indonesia as 
a sovereign state in 1949, after a bloody and bitter post-war 
struggle with their long-term colonial masters, suddenly introduced 
a situation for both Australia and Indonesia for which there was no 
close historical precedent. 2 
On the one hand, mainly concentrated on the eastern side of a 
huge dry continent, there were over ten million people of 
predominantly European origin. On the other, there were some 
eighty million Asians of diverse origins spread over more than 3 
000 tropical islands. In the mid-1940s, all Australia and 
Indonesia had in common was propinquity -- they were yet to have a 
common border. Ideally, the following twenty years should have 
been spent in a continuous procedure of contact, exploration, 
The Age, 17 August 1965. 
2 	See George, M., Australia and the Indonesian Revolution, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1980. 
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learning and building. Instead, in the mid-1960s, Australia found 
that the task of constructing a viable Australian-Indonesian 
relationship had scarcely begun. 
By then, two political events had dominated the affairs of the 
region after Indonesia's independence. The first was Indonesia's 
campaign to secure West Irian, which lasted more than ten years and 
was conducted at various levels of intensity. Over this period, 
Australia stood by uncomfortably, uncertain of itself and its 
turbulent neighbour in a strange new situation. 1 It was a period in 
which much of the goodwill that Australia had gained in the late 
1940s by championing Indonesian's right to freedom, was slowly 
eroded. Similarly, in Australia the consensus was growing that in 
backing Indonesia, it had misdirected its support. 2 
However, the West Irian issue did not cause irreparable harm 
to Australia's relationship with Indonesia. With the settlement of 
that issue, Australia and Indonesia now had the opportunity to join 
in the process of learning to live together. But this was not to 
be. In a very short time, the former was faced with a far more 
testing sample of the latter's assertiveness in the form of its 
'confrontation' against Malaysia -- a fellow member of the 
Commonwealth -- between 1963 and 1965. In military terms, 
Indonesian hostilities were far short of total war, but clearly 
required and produced a military response from Australia in support 
of British and Malaysian efforts to restrain Indonesia. 3 
However, while Australia's policy towards Indonesia over the 
difficult 'confrontation' period consisted essentially of a 
This is well portrayed by T.B. Millar in his study 
"Australian Defence, 1945-65", in Greenwood, G. and Harper, 
N., (eds.),  Australia in World Affairs, 1961-65, Cheshire, 
Melbourne, 1968, pp.278-282. 
2 	Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War: 	External  
Relations 1788-1977, Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1978, p.229; and Bull, H., "Asia in the 
Seventies: An Australian View", in McCarthy, G., (ed.), 
Foreign Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies, 
AIPS, 1973, pp.46-47. 
3 	Angel, J., "Australia and Indonesia", in Greenwood, G. and 
Harper, N., (eds.),  Australia in World Affairs, 1966-1970, 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974, p.380. For a full analysis of 
this period see Mackie, J.A.C., Konfrontasi, The Indonesia 
-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966, Oxford University Press, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1974. 
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measured but unequivocal military response to Indonesian 
aggression, it was tempered by quiet efforts to ensure that 
existing links between Australia and Indonesia were not destroyed. 
Colombo Plan cooperation was maintained, continuing the intake of 
Indonesian students into Australia, as well as the Australian road 
building and telecommunication projects in Indonesia; an agreement 
was signed to mark the border between West Irian and Papua New 
Guinea; Qantas continued to operate services through Jakarta; and 
full diplomatic contacts were maintained. Further, to complete a 
curious picture (and while it reflected a desire on Australia's 
part to remain on good terms with the right-wing military 
leadership in Jakarta), officers from the Australian and Indonesian 
armies continued attending each others' staff colleges up until 
early 1965. 
The astonishing thing was that, despite the fact that armed 
hostilities had taken place so early in this coexistence, there had 
not been a diplomatic rupture. 1 This restraint reflected both an 
intelligent awareness of the facts of geographical life, and an 
acknowledgement in strategic terms of the absence, at least in the 
short term, of an unbalanced power relationship. 2 This policy 
continued until an attempted coup in Jakarta, on 30 September 1965, 
paved the way for its abandonment in mid-1966. Australia welcomed 
the change in government in Indonesia because it was evidence of a 
change in the ideology of that country. This ideological change 
was seen as the beginning of a diminution of the threat to 
Australia's security that Sukarno's aggressive nationalism and 
alignment with communism had appeared to pose. 
From here, the developments which created and sustained the 
conditions for an improvement in the Australian-Indonesian 
relationship can be traced. Although, publicly, Australia adopted 
Beddie, B.D., "Australian Policy Towards Indonesia", 
Australian Outlook, Vol.22, No.2, August 1968, p.136. 
Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia at the time, K.C.O. 
Shann recalled the lengths to which Australian diplomacy 
went when he recounted the story of when both he and 
President Sukarno engaged in social discussion 'over cups 
of tea', as Australian and Indonesian troops fought in the 
jungles of Borneo (Harris, personal interview with K.C.O. 
Shann, Canberra, November 1980). 
2 	Beddie,B.D., "Australian Policy Towards Indonesia", pp.136- 
139. 
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a very low key response to the changed circumstances, the 
Indonesian questions facing Australian foreign policy makers, and 
the concern of Chapter Two, were of high priority: should 
Australia disregard Indonesia as a possible military threat and 
concentrate its efforts solely on positive measures of assistance 
and cooperation? Should Australia make every effort to consolidate 
a distinctive Australia-Indonesia relationship? If so, how could 
it be done? Indeed, it was recognized at the time that there was 
not going to be any easy or quick way of achieving an Indonesian 
awareness of Australia and Australian aims and objectives. 
Moreover, the significant differences in culture between the two 
countries made the task infinitely more complex and challenging. 
Chapter Two also presents a closer examination of the 
pressures on Australian foreign and defence policies created by the 
changing geo-strategic environment. The requirement for improved 
relations with Indonesia emerges as a corollary to such pressures 
and surfaces as a major factor in the conduct of Australian policy 
on the West New Guinea issue. As set out in Chapter Three, 
Australia's WNG policy clearly reflected, by 1970, where 
Australia's foreign policy interests lay. 
To fully appreciate the post-1965 phase of Australia-Indonesia 
relations, however, it is necessary to outline the consolidation of 
the Suharto regime within Indonesian society. While the 
government's foreign policy has not been neglected, emphasis falls 
on the domestic context with a view to charting the policies that 
resulted in the Indonesian military embedding itself at all major 
levels of Indonesian society, whether social, economic or 
political. The focus is on these aspects of Indonesia's domestic 
policy in order to bring attention not only to the bases of 
particular issues in Australia's relationship with Indonesia, but 
also to the major sources of growing discontent within Australia. 
Although such discontent (the focus of Part Two) was spawned toward 
the end of the 1960s and embraced the whole canvass of military 
involvement in Indonesian society, it was, ironically, the conduct 
of Indonesia's external policy in relation to the key issue of East 
Timor that provided the major catalyst for disapproval of the 
Indonesian regime within Australia. The process of adjustment to 
Indonesia's claim to East Timor paralleled that which was evident 
in its earlier claim to WNG (an examination of this issue is 
detailed in Part Three). Where the satisfactory outcome to the WNG 
question highlighted the international pressures at work, and the 
limitations within which Australian foreign policy had to work -- 
compelling Australia to review its own interests and those of its 
neighbours and friends -- the East Timor issue reflected more the 
domestic context of such a process and it emerged as an equally 
potent constraint on the satisfactory conduct of Australia's 
Indonesia policy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SUHARTO, THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 
Introduction  
Central to any serious study of the main considerations that should 
govern Australia's policies towards Indonesia is the need for an 
appraisal of the kind of regime the 'New Order' in Indonesia really 
is. With a view, then, to developing a sense of how Government and 
society have been evolving in Indonesia since the mid-1960s, it is 
useful to sketch some particular aspects of its political, economic 
and social life under the 'New Order'. This sketch will also 
describe Indonesia's attitudes to the world. It is not intended to 
give a contemporary history of Indonesia's external policies but 
rather to focus on those aspects which seem to bear on regional 
security and Indonesia's perceptions of its role in Southeast Asia. 
Since Independence, Indonesia's foreign policy has been 
characterized by the need to overcome an intrinsic vulnerability. 
This derives from 'an abiding concern for the integrity of a state 
beset by social diversity and physical fragmentation', 1 as well as 
a conviction that its vast resources and strategic location would 
attract the interests of external powers. Running counter to this 
sense of vulnerability, though, has been a 'continuous sense of 
regional entitlement based on pride in revolutionary achievement, 
size of population, land and maritime dimensions, natural resources 
and strategic location'. 2 
While this paradox has been a major characteristic of 
Indonesia's world outlook, a strong line of continuity is also 
evident. While Indonesia's external policies throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s have reflected phases marked by contrasts of style and 
external relationships, its policies have also reflected a 
continuing concern with national and territorial integrity, as well 
Leifer, Michael, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, George Allen 
and Unwin, London, 1983, p.173. 
2 	Ibid. See also Leifer, Michael, "Attitudes to the World", 
in Palmier, Leslie, (ed.), Understanding Indonesia, Gower 
Publishing Company, Vermont, 1985, pp.102-107. 
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as with the prospect of external intervention in the management of 
regional affairs. Underlining this outlook has been a strategic 
perspective that relates to the security of the archipelagic state. 
This perspective has been sustained through decades of political 
change in Indonesia, and was to find expression in Indonesia's 
confrontation with Malaysia and its national claims on West New 
Guinea and East Timor. 
The Coup 
On 30 September 1965 an attempted coup took place in 
Indonesia. Although the full circumstances of the gruesome 
sequence of events -- which started with the kidnapping and 
assassination of six prominent Indonesian army generals -- remain 
obscure, it ruptured the existing political balance between 
President Sukarno, the army and the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) , at that time one of the most powerful communist parties 
outside the Communist orbit. The ensuing breakdown of Indonesia's 
political and legal processes gave rise to a wave of anti-communist 
proscriptions that continued well into 1966, and resulted in deaths 
which, according to official statistics and various estimates, were 
between 87 000 and one million respectively. 
President Sukarno had dominated the Indonesian Nationalist 
movement for almost four decades and had been proclaimed President 
for life but, in the aftermath of these events, he lost effective 
power in March 1966, and was formally deposed in March 1967. 
Sukarno died in June 1970 without any public disclosure by the 
Indonesian authorities of the role he had played in what is still 
referred to in Indonesia as the 'Gestapu Affair'. 2 Meanwhile, 
Partai Komunis Indonesia. 
2 	Differing interpretations of these events show clearly that 
the motivations for the coup are too complex to be referred 
to simply as an 'abortive Communist coup'. For analyses of 
the coup see Lev, Daniel, "Indonesia 1965: the year of the 
coup", Asian Survey, February 1966, pp.103-110; Wertheim, 
W.F., "Indonesia before and after the Untung coup", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.39, No.102, Spring-Summer 1966, pp.115-127; 
van der Kroef, Justus M., "Gestapu in Indonesia", Orbis, 
No.2.,Summer 1966, pp.458-487; Weatherbee, D.E., 
"Interpretations of Gestapu the 1965 Indonesian coup"' World 
Affairs, Vol.132, No.4, March 1970, pp.308-316; (Weatherbee 
focuses on five further analyses of the coup, viz. Pauker, 
Guy J., The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of 
Indonesia, Santa Monica, Cal., 1969 (Rand Memorandum, RN 
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amidst the wreckage of Guided Democracy, General Suharto 
established his 'New Order', became Indonesia's second President in 
March 1968, and moved toward major changes in both the country's 
domestic policies and the orientation of its foreign policies. 
Internally, the PKI was dissolved and 'Indonesian socialism' 
was abandoned in favour of an economic policy directed toward 
salvaging Indonesia's economy. This included dismantling the 
machinery and controls of the guided economy system, the 
rescheduling of debts to foreign creditors and attracting foreign 
aid and investment. Externally, the 'Jakarta-Peking Axis', which 
was proclaimed by Sukarno in August 1965, was severed, and 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China were 
suspended. 1 Suharto's foreign policy aimed to reverse the 
aggressive, expansionist image Indonesia had acquired during 
confrontation. Indonesia did not wish to become aligned with any 
of the great power blocs but rather sought to return to the 'active 
and independent' foreign policy which it had adopted in 1945 and 
had nominally maintained in the following years. 2 The policy came 
to be known as 'friends and neighbours' policy in that it sought 
the friendship and economic support of the larger powers and also 
to be a 'good neighbour' to the countries in its immediate region. 3 
During the first eighteen months after the coup, 4 the new 
5753PR0); Roeder, 0.G., The Smiling General, Jakarta, 1969; 
Uri Ra'Anan, The Politics of the Coup D'etat: five case 
Studies (New York, 1969); Brackman, Arnold C., The 
Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York, 1969). See also 
Pauker, Guy, "The Gestapu Affair of 1965: Reflections on 
the Politics of Instability in Indonesia", Southeast Asia, 
Vol.1, No.1, 1/2 Winter-Spring 1972, pp.43-58; Wanu, K., 
"Indonesia: Interpreting the Coup", Australian Left Review, 
December 1970 - January 1971, pp.57-69; Wertheim, W.F., 
"Suharto and the Untung Coup... The Missing Link", Journal  
of Contemporary Asia, Vol.1, No.2, Winter 1970, pp.50-57. 
Mozingo, D., Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949-1967, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1976, p.249 ff. 
2 	Grant, B., Indonesia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 
1964, p.134. 
3 	Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967 Yearbook, p.217. 
4 	For a full account of this period see Crouch, Harold, The 
Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1978, p.135 ff; Sundhaussen, Ulf, The Road to 
Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945 - 1967, Oxford 
University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, pp.207-219 and ch.VI; 
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regime moved cautiously to restore order and stability in the 
economic and political spheres. Suharto's central political 
problem was to chart a course between the entrenched Sukarnoists 
and anti-Sukarnoists within the military and civilian population, 
while engineering the downfall of Sukarno, and the end of the PKI 
as a political force in Indonesia. 1 In the economic sphere, 
Suharto faced the daunting task of restoring stability to an 
economy over which the Sukarno Government had lost almost all 
control. Against this background, and the ensuing violence in both 
the countryside and the streets of Jakarta and Jogjakarta, 2 on 11 
March 1966, Suharto secured the authority to restore order and 
reactivate government functions. From this point on, Suharto's 
power was rapidly consolidated. 
Despite the magnitude of the national tragedy unfolding before 
him, involving nothing less than the political and economic 
collapse of Indonesia, Sukarno clung tenaciously to the threads of 
political power and, in the face of persistent efforts on the part 
of his opponents to pressure him to voluntarily step down, 
attempted to re-establish his authority. 3 In the months leading to 
the change of regime in March 1966, debate revolving around 'a new 
definition of the presidential line of succession', 4 reached major 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, Asia Pacific 
Press, Singapore, 1971, pp.17-58. 
1 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, pp.141-142. 
2 	van der Kroef, J.M., "Indonesia: The Battle of the 'Old' 
and the 'New Order'", Australian Outlook, Vol.21, No.1, 
April 1967, pp.25-26, p.30. 
3 	van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, considered 
there were three well-defined stages in Sukarno's 
'accelerating glide into ignominy': from 30 September 1965 
until 11 March 1966, when Sukarno gave Suharto the power to 
stabilize the domestic situation; from Suharto's assumption 
of this power until 10 January 1967, when Sukarno defended 
himself in a statement to the People's Provisional 
Consultative Assembly (MPRS) against rising criticism; 
between the time of that statement and 12 March 1967, when 
the MPRS revoked Sukarno's powers and placed Suharto in 
power as 'Acting' President. The year following, ending 
with Suharto's investiture as President, was considered by 
van der Kroef to have been 'but an epilogue to this story 
of Sukarno's fall', p.17. 
4 	Pauker, G.J., Indonesia: The Year of Transition", Asian 
Survey, Vol.VII, No.2, February 1967, p.142. 
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proportions, both at the official and public levels. At the 
forefront were the politicians and the students, while the top 
military leaders waited and manipulated in the wings. Political 
manoeuvring marked Sukarno's actions, as he fought to prove that 
the attempted coup was a minor incident in the ongoing Indonesian 
revolution and that he was still in control. Moves, and 
countermoves finally embroiled the military, while Sukarno's 
opponents and supporters aggressively built up their respective 
campaigns. 1 Such events represented the struggle between the 'Old 
Order' and the 'New Order', and led to the signing on 11 March 1966 
of the Presidential Letter of Instruction that empowered Suharto 
'to guarantee security, tranquility and stability for the smooth 
functioning of Government 1 . 2 
With his new powers, Suharto quickly pursued a number of major 
courses of action. 3 The PKI was immediately outlawed. Attempts by 
pro-Sukarnoist civilians and stubborn elements of the military to 
protect Sukarno's position were thwarted by some astute 
manoeuvering, including purges of the military, bureaucracy and the 
PNI, massive arrests and the threat of force by Suharto loyalists. 
Leading figures of the 'Old Order' years and of the September 30 
movement were dealt with through a series of trials, 'the most 
formidable weapon employed to erode Sukarno's political position... 
achiev[ing] the aim for which they had been primarily held, namely 
to discredit Sukarno and reduce the support for him'. 4 
Other components of the new regime's political strategy 
involved the reactivation of withered governmental institutions, 
and the introduction of a series of decrees during late June and 
July 1966, which created a framework for a political party based on 
the rule of law, and indicated a desire on the part of the regime 
to prepare Indonesia for constitutional government. Apart from 
ratifying the March 11 delegation of powers to General Suharto, two 
of the most significant decrees ratified by the People's 
Sundhaussen, U., The Road to Power, p.227 ff. 
2 	Kompas, 14 March 1966, quoted in van der Kroef, J.M., 
"Indonesia: The Battle of the 'Old' and 'New Order'", p.22. 
3 	Sundhaussen, U., The Road to Power pp.237-238, pp.245-246. 
4 	Ibid., p.246 and p.247. 
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Provisional Consultative Assembly (MPRS) -- the highest 
constitutional body and by now much changed in composition and 
outlook by the new political tide, due to the arrest of many of its 
members and the appointment of new members by Suharto -- related to 
Indonesia's foreign policy and the Assembly's direction that 
Suharto's new Cabinet urgently address issues arising from 
Indonesia's political instability and economic desolation. 1 For 
all intents and purposes, the military had assumed affective 
leadership of Indonesia. 2 
Hereafter, the Suharto regime consolidated a course of 
economic and political stabilization, which was underwritten by a 
suitable orientation in foreign policy (see below). It enlisted 
the advice of some of Indonesia's most highly qualified economists, 
known as 'technocrats', 3 who, in conjunction with outside 
governments and agencies, addressed Indonesia's immense economic 
problems. Indeed the 'New Order' had inherited a wrecked economy. 
It was marked by rising prices, exhausted foreign exchange reserves 
and a debt repayment in 1966 almost equal to expected export 
earnings. 4 Moreover, chronic inability to import essential 
materials, due to an inability to finance such materials had had 
disastrous effects on industry. Exports were in a downward spiral 
and the infrastructure of roads, harbours and marketing facilities 
had deteriorated. 5 Further, endemic corruption, inefficiency and 
Sundhaussen, U., The Road to Power, p.239, noted that when 
the MPRS assembled on 20 June 1966 it called for the 
establishment of a government to be called the Ampera 
(Message of the People's Suffering) Cabinet 'with political 
stabilization, economic rehabilitation, the presentation of 
an independent foreign policy, and the preparation for 
general elections as its four main objectives'. 
2 	Ibid., p.252. 
3 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, Fontana, Melbourne, 1980, 
pp.75-76. 
4 	Pauker, G.J., "Indonesia's Convalescence", Paper presented 
for publication in the October 1967 issue of the journal The 
Round Table, mimeo.: The Rand Corporation, p.7. 
5 	In the month following the coup, as Sukarno and the PKI 
fought for their political lives, there was very little 
attention given by the government to the economy, van der 
Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.160. For detailed 
accounts of the state of the economy see FEER, 21 July 1966, 
pp.107-110 and Penny, D.H., "Survey of Recent Developments", 
28 
an increase in smuggling, were commensurate with the fall in 
purchasing power of the Civil Service salaries. 1 However, the new 
regime's capacity to respond to the increasing need to mobilize 
domestic resources to redress these dilemmas was constrained by the 
vested economic and political interests of politically powerful 
groups. Hence, the government turned to assistance from overseas 
and moved to stabilize the economy with measures it considered were 
well within its capacity, in both political and economic terms. 2 
These measures were formulated initially by economists from 
the University of Indonesia and rooted in the IMF philosophy that 
development could only be achieved on the prerequisites of 
stabilization and liberalization. Accordingly, the government's 
initial economic goals concentrated on the 'stabilization' and 
'rehabilitation' of the Indonesian economy. This meant putting a 
brake on inflation, which in 1966 was running at 650 percent, 
restoring international solvency and rehabilitating the eroding 
infrastructure. While the new programme was dependent on the 
inflow of capital and consumer goods from overseas, it also meant 
that the government needed to sharply reduce expenditure, adhere 
strictly to a balanced budget and to pursue tight-money policies, 
with a view to restoring international confidence in Indonesia's 
economic future. 3 
On 4 April 1967, Adam Malik announced that Indonesia would 
return to the United Nations. Thereafter, events moved rapidly. 
Indonesia rejoined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
introduced new legislation to attract both foreign and domestic 
capital. Japan offered US$30 million in emergency credits and 
proposed an international conference for the purpose of creating a 
consortium to assist Indonesia. On 19 July 1967 in Tokyo, 
Indonesia's non-communist creditors met to discuss the rescheduling 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No.3, February 
1966, pp.1-26; Panglaykim, J. and Arndt, H.W., "Survey of 
Recent Developments", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, No.4, June 1966, pp.1-35. 
Penny, D.H. and Thalib, Dahlan, "Survey of Recent 
Developments", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
No.6, February 1967, P.2. 
2 	van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.163. 
3 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.320. 
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of Indonesia's external debts, which at that time amounted to 
nearly US$3 billion. At a second meeting of the 'Tokyo Club', on 
19 September, these creditors, with the enormous resources needed 
to underwrite Indonesia's stabilization efforts, agreed to 
reschedule Indonesia's debts. The meeting also saw the creation of 
the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). It met regularly 
over the next five years and served as a mechanism through which 
loans and grants were raised to assist in Indonesia's economic 
recovery, while monitoring its economic performance. 
The outcome of these meetings, as well as other bilateral 
talks between Indonesia and her creditors, proved beneficial to the 
Indonesian economy, enabling Jakarta to overcome, by the early 
1970s, the huge debt inherited from the Sukarno Years. 1 These 
large increases in resources, with two-thirds of the aid coming 
from the USA and Japan saw a return to a more normal economy by 
late 1968, and it enabled the Suharto government to realistically 
pursue its new economic approach, effectively controlling 
inflation, correcting the balance of payment deficit and promoting 
the rapid development of the modern sector of the economy. 
While the ending of confrontation paved the way for a revision 
of Indonesia's foreign economic relations, signs of encouragement 
from the west were, at first, limited. With the signing of the 
Bangkok Agreement, 2 the pace of reconciliation in economic 
relations accelerated. But the call for, and establishment of, a 
multilateral framework for the provision of aid was driven not only 
by the prospect of economic opportunity but also by major political 
considerations. With the war in Vietnam still continuing, the 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia since Sukarno, p.165. 
2 	In May 1966, a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Malik 
met with Malaysian representatives to work out a formal 
agreement for the normalization of relations between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The Bangkok talks did not reach 
complete agreement, as neither side could agree to the 
concessions the other required. The impasse was broken in 
late July when the two countries agreed to take note (in a 
secret annex to the Bangkok Agreement) of Indonesia's 
stipulation that general elections in Sabah and Sarawak 
precede diplomatic relations. The Agreement was signed on 
11 August 1966 in Jakarta, as was the secret annex. As it 
turned out, diplomatic relations were established before the 
holding of elections. See Weinstein, F.B., Indonesian 
Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence, pp.337-340; 
and Mackie, J.A.C, Konfrontasi, p.320. 
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changes in the domestic situation in Indonesia provided the 
opportunity to promote compensatory stability in the region. In 
this context, IGGI emerged as a political symbol to serve that end. 
However, the convergence between America's interests and those 
of Indonesia's economic policy makers, and Indonesia's acceptance 
of IGGI's generous terms and conditions, gave rise to 'a patently 
demeaning economic association', 1 with Indonesia's foreign policy 
elite considering that such foreign aid (and investment), while 
clearly needed, was a threat to Indonesia's economic and political 
independence. 2 In the late 1960s, however, criticisms of such a 
situation were muted, as the Indonesian Government moved steadily 
to restore stability to the economy. However, by the early 
1970s,widespread apprehension and discontent about the 'New Order' 
Government's foreign economic policies had gained momentum. It 
focused domestic attention on Indonesia's increased dependence on 
foreign capital and assistance, government disregard for indigenous 
businesses, as well as widening dissatisfaction with the 
Government's First Five Year Development Plan (REPELITA I, 1969- 
74). 
REPELITA I  
In mid-1966, the Suharto Government had established a National 
Planning Body (NPB), and assigned it the task of drafting a five-
year plan for the period 1969-73. In late 1968, the NPD's 
Chairman, Dr Widjojo Nitisastro, 3 predicted that 1969 would see a 
substantial advance in funds devoted to development. 4 Within a 
year, while the Suharto Government still placed a high priority on 
stabilization, there was a discernible shift in policy towards 
1 	Leifer, Michael, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p.116. 
2 	See Weinstein, Franklin B., Indonesian Foreign Policy and 
the Dilemma of Dependence, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1976, pp.253-287. 
3 	The Dean of the Faculty of Economics of the University of 
Indonesia, and to join the Cabinet in 1971. See Crouch, H., 
The Army and Politics, p.242. 
4 	Allison, J.M., "Indonesia: Year of the Pragmatists", Asian 
Survey, Vol.IX, No.2, February 1969, p.135. 
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development goals. 1 Whether this new emphasis was a response to 
growing domestic criticisms that government policy had been too 
strictly limited to monetary regulation instead of development, or 
simply reflected an effort to maintain momentum toward their 
original goal -- of transition from rehabilitation to development - 
- it ushered in the much heralded Five Year Plan, which was 
inaugurated on 1 April, 1969. 2 
The Plan called for investment priorities during the next five 
years to centre on agricultural improvement, a rehabilitation of 
the country's infrastructure, export expansion and import 
substitution, and mining and industry. 3 According to Professor 
W.W. Rostow, during a private visit to Indonesia the same year, 
Indonesia was now ready for an economic 'take of f'. 4 The 
rehabilitation and expansion of the rice sector emerged as the main 
priority for economic planners because of its central role in 
achieving economic stability. On the industrial side during this 
period, cement, chemicals and fertilizers were underwritten by 
public investment, while there was a heightened activity by foreign 
1 	Allison, J.M., "Indonesia: The End of the Beginning", Asian 
Survey, Vol.X, No.2, February 1970, p.149, p.14. See also 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.173. 
2 	REPELITA (REntjana PEmbangunan LIma TAhun) was the third of 
Indonesia's development plans (Five Year Plan: 1956-60 and 
Eight Year Plan: 1961-69) was considered, in early 1969 to 
be 'more realistic and less ambitious... launched at a time 
when economic conditions are better than they have been for 
many years and are still improving'. Penny, D.H., and 
Thalib, Dahlan, "Survey of Recent Developments", Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.V, No.1, March 1969, 
p.l. 
3 	van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.171 ff. 
4 	This was a reference to the third of five stages of growth 
in W.W. Rostow's theory of the stages of economic growth (in 
Rostowian history this lasts for about twenty years). The 
two major influences in the construction of growth models 
as a basis for supplemental theories had been Rostow and the 
Harrod-Domar model, so named after two economists who 
developed in independently of each other before and after 
the Second World War. (See Harrod, R.F., "An Essay in 
Dynamic Theory", Economic Journal, April 1939, and Domar, 
E.D., "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment", 
Econometrica, April 1946). W.W. Rostow's theory first 
appeared in 1956 (see "The Take-off into Self-sustained 
Growth", Economic Journal, March 1956, and The Stages of 
Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, 1961). 
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and domestic investors in the extrative (timber, minerals and 
petroleum) and import-substituting (textiles, food processing) 
industries. 
While Professor H.W. Arndt at first argued that 'The 
Indonesian economy has turned the corner', 1 he was to later concede 
that 'priming the pump of economic development after years of 
stagnation is proving a slow and difficult business... ,•2  Indeed 
there were difficulties, with fundamental and interrelated problems 
-- deriving from unemployment, government controls and corruption 
and tax evasion -- becoming the main focus of criticism over the 
next few years, as 'Indonesia seemed to be increasingly caught 
between the potentially revitalizing effects of huge capital 
injections and the drag of steady population growth and structural 
economic impediments'. 3 Nevertheless, given the disarray of the 
economy in the 1960s, the 'New Order' government achieved 
considerable success during this period. Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was increasing at a rate of 7 percent per annum, while by the 
early 1970s, gross domestic investment and the country's balance 
of payments situation was buoyed by the inflow of foreign capital. 
Consolidation of the Military-Civilian Relationship 
In addition to these attempts at economic reform, purges of 
the military were by 1969 virtually complete, and the armed forces 
were effectively centralised under Suharto's control, bringing to 
an end the interservice rivalries that marked Sukarno's 'Old 
Order'. 4 In 1970, Suharto, now President -- the ambiguities 
surrounding his position being removed on 11 March 1968 -- and 
Minister of Defence and Security and commander of the armed forces, 
1 	Arndt, H.W., "Survey of Recent Developments", Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.V, No.2, July 1969, p.l. 
2 	Ibid., Vol.V, No.3, November 1969, p.l. 
3 	van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.181. 
4 	Under President Sukarno, the four services -- army, 
airforce, navy and police -- operated virtually autonomously 
because Sukarno expected the latter to balance the army. 
However, until the coup in 1965, the armed forces had been 
rent by personal, political and interservice rivalries which 
civilians, including Sukarno, had exploited. (See Crouch, 
H., The Army and Politics, pp.28-33, pp.51-55, pp.79-82, 
pp.228-241). By 1968, General Suharto had established 
reasonably firm control over the officer corps. 
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pursued policies that safeguarded the loyalty of his officers. 
First, he offered high rewards for loyalty, including political and 
statutory positions of power and material well-being. Second, in a 
process that began in late 1969, he overhauled the command 
structure of the armed forces. Finally, he detained and discharged 
officers for pro-communist activities. 
Of this whole process, Crouch commented: 1 
In confronting the challenge posed by the PKI's potential 
for revival, Suharto used unrelenting and often brutal 
repression. But in consolidating his control over the 
armed forces, he followed the Javanese principle of alon 
alon asal kelakon in moving step by step against 
successive groups of rivals [in]... the army 
headquarters, [and] ... potential rivals among the 
regional commanders. 
Having established full control over the entire armed forces, 
Suharto then moved on to deal with the political parties which, 
despite heavy pressure, had continued to enjoy a measure of 
independence and remained as potential rallying points for civilian 
opposition to the regime. 
To place the regime's strategy on the Indonesian political 
structure in perspective, it is important first to take stock of 
moves by Suharto to consolidate the civilian-military relationship. 
Although the military dominated the government after 1966, Suharto 
embarked on a course that sought to establish a pattern of linkages 
between the military and civilian elements in Indonesian society. 
While this served practical administrative purposes, it was also 
intended to create a favourable image -- one based on legitimacy -- 
among those countries in the West that were contributing to the 
rebuilding of the Indonesian State. 
An important element in this manoeuvring was to change the 
character of the Cabinet through a series of reshuffles over the 
ensuing years, by diminishing the number of military members and 
increasing the civilian representation. Although the political 
parties retained nominal representation in the Cabinet, the Cabinet 
became technocratic in nature, with its civilian members performing 
civil service functions within a political framework established by 
the generals. Thus, any scope for civilian Ministers to exercise 
real power was limited by their lack of political backing.2 
1 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.228. 
2 	van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.81. 
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Meanwhile, the army's grip on government tightened with the 
mobilization of its representatives into key departments in Defence 
and Security, Internal Affairs and important economic departments. 1 
With the domination of the central government accompanied by a 
similar growth in army representation in regional administration, 
the army controlled the government machinery at all levels. 
Clearly, the civilian-military relationship favoured the military 
in terms of political, economic and administrative power. 
The emergence of the army to such a position of dominance in 
government became a central fact of Indonesian political life, with 
perhaps the promise that army rule may accommodate a stable 
political climate. In this context, however, civilian political 
opinion considered as the military did that if the regime's 
political framework for the future was successful, it would, in 
seeking popular acceptance, rest on and include civilian groups. 
Thus, as J.A.C. Mackie argued: 
The loose coalition of ... elements which supported the 
New Order elements in the Army in the struggle against 
the Old Order throughout 1966 hoped for a return to a 
more democratic style of politics in which they would 
play an important role as the civilian partners in the 
army... At that stage Suharto needed the backing of 
civilian elements in his political tussle with Sukarno 
and therefore relied heavily in 1966 on... the promise of 
elections within two years as a means of giving more 
constitutional and democratic appearance to the new 
regime.... 2 
Crouch, rather more succinctly, added: 
Anxious to avoid giving the impression that they had 
usurped President Sukarno's powers illegally and wanting 
to win party support against the President, the army 
leaders were not in a strong position to withstand 
pressure from the parties to hold general elections.... 3 
However, four problems crystallized for the military. The first 
related to the political behaviour and conduct of Indonesia's 
parties where, in the past, compromise elevated less important, but 
politically popular, issues above those related to other areas of 
public life, most notably the economy. The military held and, 
McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, pp.114-116. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "The Golkar Victory and Party - Aliran 
Alignments" in Oey Hong Lee, (ed.) Indonesia After the 1971  
Elections, Hull Monographs on Southeast Asia No.5, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1974, p.63. 
3 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.248. 
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indeed, continued to hold, an unfavourable view of this historical 
weakness in the multi-party system. 1 Second, if the regime was to 
hold an election, the PNI and NU parties, 2 both strong bastions of 
the 'Old Order' element, could possibly attract traditional sources 
of support in Java, including former PKI supporters. 3 Both these 
problems had the potential to undermine the 'New Order's' economic 
stabilization programme. Third, elements within the military were 
expressing a concern that the PKI, through vote-hungry political 
and religious organizations, could make a comeback. 4 The fourth 
problem centred on how the army could manipulate the electoral and 
political arrangements to ensure the emerging role of the military 
in Indonesian society if an election were held. 
By the end of 1967, debate and divisions within the 'New 
Order' over the strategy it should adopt towards the government and 
the army on the one hand and the old parties on the other, whom 
they saw as the main adversary, gave rise to schisms, and the 
eventual breakdown of the 'Old Order'. This process was nurtured 
by systematic purges and checking between the larger parties (PNI 
and NU) without destabilizing the party-aliran nexus in Indonesian 
politics, 5 and presaged the government's decision in early 1968 to 
postpone the elections until 1971. 
Notwithstanding the precedents and excuses for indefinite 
postponements, now part of Indonesian history, the decision to 
conduct the election in 1971 was announced in November 1969. 
Suharto was however, concerned that support for the nine existing 
political parties would more or less correspond with primordial 
loyalties (religious affiliations, ethnic divisions or aliran, 
according to locality). To ensure control over the Parliament and 
Alfian, A., "Trends in Indonesian Politics" in Yong Mun 
Cheong (ed.), Trends in Indonesia: Proceedings and 
Background Paper, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 
1972, pp.54-55; Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.244. 
2 	Respectively the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partia 
Nasional Indonesia) and the Muslin Scholars' League 
(Nahadatul Ulama). 
3 
4 
5 
Mackie, J.A.C., "The 
Alignments". p.63. 
van der Kroef, J.M., 
Mackie, J.A.C., "The 
Alignments", pp.63-64 
Golkar Victory and Party - Aliran 
Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.221. 
Golkar Victory and Party - Aliran 
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regional assemblies, and prodded by non-party 'technocrats', now 
entrenched in positions of influence, including seats in 
Parliament, he elevated Golkar l as the standard-bearer for his 
government. While this strategy was designed to see the non-party 
technocrats hold and gain seats, even a balance of power, in the 
Parliament, the structure of Golkar was fragile, and there was 
little confidence at the beginning that it could draw electoral 
support. 2 
During the next twelve months, however, the Suharto regime 
moved 'to create conditions in which political party adherents of 
all sorts felt it to be in their interests to switch their vote to 
the Golkar'. 3 This included mobilizing civil servants to throw 
their support behind Golkar; wooing the Muslim parties at the 
leadership (Kiyais) and grassroots (pesantrens) levels; and 
intimidation at all levels, but particularly directed toward the 
village leaders (lurah). 4 From early 1971, through to the last 
month of campaigning in June, the Golkar movement had gained 
considerable momentum. However, 'through excessive pressure and 
political 'overkill", 5 the regime had created conditions which 
caused the political parties great difficulties. This included the 
screening of candidates and voter lists, the placing of limitations 
on campaigning and on the naming of certain doctrines (including 
Sukarnoism and Marxism), as well as restrictions on any questioning 
of the Pantja Sila or the government's Repelita. 
Sekber Golkar (Golongan Karya), the Joint Secretariat of the 
Functional Group, was created in 1964 by the army to check 
the influence of the PKI. 
2 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.264. 
3 	Ibid., p.267. 
4 	Mackie, "The Golkar Victory", p.68, considered the question 
of intimidation was 'a highly controversial one in which it 
is impossible for an outsider to know all the facts', while 
Crouch, The Army and Politics, p.268, argued strongly that 
all the party members, including former PKI supporters, were 
subjected to intimidation. This included 'the arrest of 
local leaders alleged to have infringed electoral 
regulations, visits by local officials and military men, and 
raids on houses of party activists in Central Java in 
unsuccessful attempts to find arms'. 
5 	Mackie, J.A.C., "The Golkar Victory", p.67. 
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It can be seen that, throughout the five-year period leading 
to the election in 1971, Indonesia's 'New Order' and the 
coagulation of Suharto's power base was characterized by a web of 
military/civilian alliances. At one time or another, religious 
groups (Muslim and Christian), intellectuals, civil servants and 
students supported the political role of the military. This 
connexion, originally rooted in an anti-communist strategy, went 
through a transition which saw the military emerge as the stronger, 
as it moved to maintain Indonesia's domestic security and provide 
economic stability. Its legitimacy was predicated on its role as 
the guardian of national unity and was reinforced by its image as a 
modernizing force, capable of guiding Indonesia toward self-
sustaining economic growth. This received expression in an army-
administrator-economist elite, with the army as the dominant 
partner. 1 
By 1972, the Repelita, introduced to stimulate output in both 
the subsistence and export sectors of the Indonesian economy, and 
to promote the injections of large capital for future growth, had 
yielded results in both the modern and subsistence sectors. Gross 
National Product (GNP) was growing at six percent per year, export 
figures had been boosted and agriculture (in particular, rice) had 
been stimulated. Inflation was under control and the confidence of 
foreign investors and aid donors was strong. But public policy was 
determined by the military-power base of the 'New Order' and their 
economist advisers. It was basically an administrative framework 
embracing only a peripheral level of popular participation. The 
governing elite perceived the appropriate role of political 
participation to be that of passive approval or legitimation 
through controlled symbolic acts. The General Election of 3 July 
1971, was intended to be just such an act of symbolic legitimation. 
Pressures on the Indonesian State  
The Indonesian passage to consolidation was not without its 
problems. Clashes between the regime's programmes and the web of 
interests and emotions that made up Indonesia's complex society, 
stimulated a tide of debate that ultimately found expression in 
Britton, P., "The Indonesian Army: 	'Stabiliser and 
Dynamiser'", in Mortimer, R., (ed.), Showcase State, Angus 
& Robertson, Sydney, 1973, p.84. 
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instances of social strife and political conflict. On another 
level, corruption was more widespread in Indonesia than ever 
before, and of particular concern to Suharto. He embarked on a 
public campaign in late 1967, which included the launching of a 
special team, headed by the Attorney General, Sugih Arto, to combat 
corruption. However, this proved ineffective l and impelled 
significant sections of Indonesian society, including the student 
organizations to keep the issue of corruption to the forefront of 
public consciousness. While corruption in government was the 
dominant theme of many of their protests and demonstrations, rising 
prices and civil rights were to emerge, with increasingly anti-
militarist.overtones, to become the important issues in the student 
movement over the next four years. 2 
Instances of social and political conflict manifested 
themselves in Indonesia during this period at two levels. First, 
the Chinese community was exposed to endless harassment, 
extortions, and in a few instances, to outbursts of violence. 
Recognizing the harm such excesses did to Indonesia's reputation 
overseas and the importance of Indonesia's Chinese to economic 
recovery in Indonesia, the Suharto government moved to find a 
solution to the perplexing problem of such anti-Chinese activities. 
In 1967, Suharto, as Acting President, appointed a State Committee 
for Chinese Affairs. Although relations with China were 'frozen 1 , 3 
over the ensuing years Suharto made moves to bring the local 
Chinese back into the Indonesian fold and pressed for their 
assimilation into the national culture. This included promoting 
For a discussion of this short-lived campaign and its 
outcome, See Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.296. See 
also Pauker, G.J., "Indonesia: The age of Reason?", Asian 
Survey, Vol.VIII, No.2, February 1968, p.138. 
2 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.309 ff. 
3 	Prior to an outbreak of anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in 
mid-1967, Foreign Minister Adam Malik had successfully 
argued to Suharto that the relationship with China be 
maintained. However, the riots convinced Suharto and others 
in the government 'that the expected long-term benefit of 
maintaining diplomatic relations was outweighed by their 
politically destablising consequences in the short run'. 
Hence, relations were 'frozen', a term coined by Malik to 
leave the diplomatic door open. Malik was never, as he 
wished, able to 'normalize' relations with The People's 
Republic of China. Crouch, H., the Army and Politics, 
p.333, 
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the adoption of Indonesian citizenship to those Chinese who had not 
already done so and calling on Parliament to revise the dual 
citizenship agreement between Indonesia and China. 1 Second, 
outbursts of animosities between Moslems and Christians was eroding 
hope of religious tolerance following the turbulent events of 1965- 
66. Again the government was vigorous in its response, and Suharto 
publicly condemned a number of incidents that had erupted in 1967. 2 
However, ensuing efforts to initiate dialogue fell away under the 
weight of further incidents which continued into the 1970s. 3 
While the regime was generally successful in maintaining 
internal security throughout the country, there was a significant 
resurgence in the 1966-68 period of Communist activities in 
Indonesia. The PKI again made its presence felt with extensive 
reorganizing activities and isolated acts of violence in Central 
and East Java, climaxing in the establishment of a strong redoubt 
in South Blitar. This was destroyed in July and August 1968, 
following a progressive build up of Indonesian army operations 
during the year. 4 
The fact that remnants of the PKI were still active and 
necessitated a public show of force on the part of the Indonesian 
army did not help the government in relation to another contentious 
issue -- that of political prisoners. In 1969, as the press and 
public debate centred on the prospects of a general election in 
1971 and Suharto was concluding his sweep of the entire military 
organization, public reaction began smouldering at the August 
announcement that over two thousand communist prisoners would be 
settled on Buru Island in the Moluccas. While this reflected a 
government response to international pressures, domestic pressures 
were also compelling. Incidences of the persecution and deaths of 
political prisoners compelled Suharto to initiate a publicity 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno. p.238. 
2 	The Makassar incident on 1 October 1967, was the most 
conspicuous. 
3 	See Coppel, Charles A., "China and the Ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia", in Fox, J.J., (et al), Indonesia: Australian 
Perspectives, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1980, pp.730-733. 
Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.224. See also van der 
Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, ch.5. 
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campaign aimed at accustoming the Indonesian people to the idea of 
releasing large number of prisoners. This coincided with reports 
that over one quarter of the 116 000 communists detained following 
the coup would be released by the end of 1969. 1 
While the government seemed predisposed to releasing prisoners 
and was considering a variety of schemes to facilitate their return 
to society (and the public's response was generally favourable), 
incidents of persecution continued to preoccupy the government. 
Incidents of this kind, together with continuing PKI activity, 
presented as many difficulties for the government in proceeding 
with their plans, as it did for the released prisoners. 2 Despite 
all its problems, however, and as we noted earlier, the Suharto 
regime maintained its momentum toward consolidation 'through the 
militarization of the bureaucratic administration, the purging, 
centralization and integration of the four armed services, and the 
reduction of the political parties and mass organizations to 
sterility and powerlessness'. 3 
Yet, in significant ways, the 'New Order' was beginning to 
display characteristic attitudes and norms that marked the colonial 
period under Dutch rule. Ricklefs considered: 
Like the Dutch period, and unlike the Japanese and Guided 
Democracy periods, the new order sought to control rather 
than mobilise the population; it believed that the 
government's primary responsibilities to its subjects 
could be fulfilled through economic development and 
welfare policies. 4 
However, while the Suharto regime was successful into the early 
1970s in areas where the Dutch had failed (education, health and 
welfare), it was unable to remove Indonesia's basic poverty. On a 
more negative level, the regime was increasingly becoming 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.115; 
Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.225; Allison, J.M., 
"Indonesia: The End of the Beginning?", p.147. 
2 	Allison, J.M., "Indonesia: The End of the Beginning?", 
p.147. 
3 	Ward, K., "Indonesia's Modernization: 	Ideology and 
Practice", in Mortimer, R., (ed.), Showcase State, p.68. 
See also H.W. Arndt's analyses extending over the period 
June 1966 to July 1974 in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies. 
4 	Ricklefs, M.C., A History of Modern Indonesia, Macmillan, 
London, 1981, p.272. 
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predisposed to imprisonment on a much larger scale, as well as the 
torture of prisoners. These elements, coupled with the 
proliferation of corruption in State and private financing, and the 
concentration of power into the hands of a small elite, compelled 
Crouch to conclude: 
popular frustration and discontent continued to spread, 
while the government showed no signs of being capable of 
tackling the basic long-term problems of growing 
unemployment, overpopulation, and poverty. Despite the 
government's achievement of political 'stability', it had 
no program to cope with the inevitable growth of popular 
discontent which it faced, except to rely on the 
instruments of repression. 1 
Thus, by the 1970s, domestic opposition had emerged as a new factor 
in Indonesian political life under the 'New Order', as the rising 
expectations of those who had opposed Sukarno or suffered from his 
policies were dissipated. Student groups, once the driving force 
in launching an anti-communist and anti-Sukarno coalition and in 
bringing the Suharto administration into power in 1966, now 
expressed dissatisfaction at corruption, restrictions on personal 
freedoms and graduate unemployment. By 1973, student complaints 
and actions against the 'rigid and unresponsive' government found 
support among Indonesian intellectuals and the Indonesian press, 
which had hitherto refrained from all but the most circumspect of 
criticism. 2 In the commercial arena, Indonesian entrepreneurs 
experienced and suffered from the tight credit and high interest 
rates demanded by the government's stabilization policies, and from 
the competition of foreign and locally domiciled Chinese firms 
which increasingly received government favour. 
The legitimacy of the Suharto regime was increasingly called 
into doubt as knowledge of political patronage and corruption 
widened. 3 Political patronage in particular became a major target 
Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.351. 
2 	Sampson, A.A., "Indonesia 1973: A Climate of Concern", 
Asian Survey, Vol.XIV, No.2, February 1974, pp.164-165. 
3 	Indonesians distinguished between low-level corruption, to 
which few objected, the high-level corruption of the elite, 
which was intensely disliked. Throughout the economy, this 
form of corruption highlighted the entrenched position of 
political patronage in Indonesian society. Harold Crouch, 
in observing its intensity, argued that Suharto: 
In full control of the government machinery... 
dispersed patronage widely, with the result that his 
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of civilian resentment, with the state-owned oil corporation, 
Pertamina, and its head, Ibnu Sutowo, becoming the main focus of 
debate in the mid-1970s. 1 As the years passed, many specific 
causes of complaint stimulated opposition in Indonesia to the 
Suharto regime. 2 While the government's response was to offer 
investigations and cosmetic measures, those at the apex remained 
immune to these procedures. Essentially, corruption and militarism 
were to remain major sources of civilian dissatisfaction. 3 
Meanwhile, the Suharto government became irrevocably 
entrenched in the political structure through the success of 
Golkar. Turned into a large-scale machine for winning the 
parliamentary election in 1971, it secured a decisive victory, 
leadership gained a broad base of support. While his 
closest confidants continued to be his old colleagues 
from the Diponegoro division and the West Irian 
campaign, the other divisions were well represented in 
the military elite (Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, 
pp.236-237). 
And continued: 
These 'political' and 'financial' generals exercised 
great influence over the patronage system. They played 
a major role in determining appointments in both the 
military hierarchy and the government administration 
[and]... with the implementation of policy, 
particularly in such fields as foreign investment, the 
allocation of construction contracts, and the opening 
of other business opportunities that had implications 
for the smooth functioning of the patronage machine. 
Thus, many officers were beholden to them for important 
appointments or profitable business opportunities.... 
(Ibid., p.308). 
McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, ch.7. 
2 	For example, in 1972, the envisioned Indonesia Disneyland 
project, the 'Mini Affair', headed by Suharto's wife, Tien 
Suharto, and funded by the government, was the target of 
demonstrations and student-sponsored discussion groups which 
focused on its extravagance and probity; the controversial 
marriage bill introduced in 1973; the ill effects of 
foreign aid, and the government's overall development 
strategy, which was the subject of the 'Petition of October 
24', which conveyed student concern over other issues such 
as rising prices, abuse of power, unemployment and the lack 
of public participation in government decision making. 
3 	See Crouch, Harold, "The New Order: 	The Prospect for 
Political Stability", Unpublished paper, Department of 
Political Science, the National University of Malaysia 
(Mimeo: n.d.). Crouch examines other sources of 
instability. 
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receiving 62.8 percent of the votes cast. Golkar won absolute 
majorities in all except three provinces, securing 227 seats, while 
the NU and PNI parties secured only 18 percent (58 seats) and 6.93 
percent (20 seats) respectively. 1 Golkar's ideological message 
rested on modernization and development, while its candidates 
contrasted Golkar's pragmatism with what they termed the 
ideological bankruptcy of the political parties. The GOLKAR 
campaign was aided by a military and civilian bureaucratic effort 
from the national to village levels -- a process which opened it to 
charges of coercion, open intimidation and 'bulldozer tactics'. 2 
Whatever the admixture of coercion and voluntary support, GOLEAR's 
victory was unarguable and interpreted as providing electoral 
legitimation to the physical fact of military predominance. 
Conversely, the already small influence of the political parties 
was even further limited. On one level, Golkar's election victory 
in 1971 and later in 1977, together with power of appointment, 
enabled the government to control the vast majority of both the 
People's Representative Council (DPR) 3 and the People's 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) 4 throughout the period under review. 
On another level, Golkar's organizational structure permitted 
the regime to build an alliance with the bureaucracy, in opposition 
to civilian politicians. While military men remained the main 
arbiters of power at the top, day-to-day administration became a 
shared bureaucratic-military concern. Thus, a system of 
government, which maintained the dominance of the established 
military and bureaucratic elite, while serving its social, 
political and financial interests, was institutionalized. 
See Van Marle, A., "Indonesian Electoral Geography Under 
Orla and Orba", in Mackie, J.A.C., Indonesia After the 1971 
Elections, Table 4, pp.58-59. For an analysis see Mackie, 
J.A.C., Indonesia After the 1971 Elections, pp.70-75. 
2 	See Peter McCawley, The Sunday Review, 21 March 1971. See 
also his pieces in The National Times, 10-15 May 1971, and 
2-7 August 1971. McCawley was then a Ph.D student in the 
Department of Economics, RSPS, ANU. 
3 	Dewan Perwakilan Raykat - the Lower House of the parliament. 
4 	Majelis Permusyawaratan Raykat (MPR) - the Upper House of 
the Parliament which meets every five years to elect the 
President and decide State policy. 
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Indonesia's International Outlook 
An integral component in this process in Indonesia was its 
foreign policy. Clearly, Suharto's domestic policies were a 
product of a perceived need to stabilize Indonesian society, at all 
levels, before it could secure the confidence of those countries 
willing to offer economic assistance and investment. Although slow 
to respond initially, Western powers soon committed themselves to 
programmes involving enormous injections of aid. In the ensuing 
years these programmes, along with substantial investment, expanded 
at a rate commensurate with the changes in the direction of 
Indonesia's foreign policy. Integral here was Indonesia's move 
away from the political orientations that marked the Sukarno era 
and toward a new 'pragmatism' in its views on international and 
regional affairs. 
Since its early independence, Indonesia's foreign policy has 
found expression in the maxim 'independent and active'. 1 It 
expressed a desire to have more than a passive role in global 
events -- as well as to play a significant part in regional peace 
and security -- and derived from values and attitudes that have 
sustained 'a continuing suspicion of large power motives and 
policies in general [and]... a strong indigenous nationalism'. 2 
Even under the 'New Order', this longstanding distrust of external 
powers was to be sustained, although moderated by an evident 
'pragmatism', in relations with America and Japan. Nevertheless, 
the independent and active formula was to remain a prominent ideal, 
if expressed mainly in symbolic form. 3 
At first, however, such pragmatism was itself, tempered by an 
attempt to avoid appearing to move entirely into the Western camp. 
This was first evidenced in a statement by the new Foreign 
Minister, Mr Adam Malik, to the Indonesian Parliament and press on 
4 April 1966, in which he declared that Indonesia would pursue an 
Dependence, pp.161-205. 
Franklin B., Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of 
see Weinstein, 
2 	Morrison, Charles E., and Astri Suhrke, (eds .), Strategies 
of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian 
States, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1978, 
p.198. 
For a discussion on the nature of this idiom, 
3 	Leifer, Michael, "Attitudes to the World", in Leslie Palmier 
(ed.), Understanding Indonesia, p.105. 
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independent and active foreign policy and adjust itself 
continuously: 
to the various developments in the international world 
and the situation and requirements of Indonesian national 
strength and of the Indonesian Revolution.... 
Malik continued: 
The Government will review and re-evaluate the steps 
taken in the field of foreign policy by the former 
Government. Without reducing efforts to unite all forces 
in the world which are anti-imperialists, anti- 
colonialist and anti-neo-colonialist... the Government 
will endeavour widest possible cooperation with the 
international world, politically, socially and in the 
cultural field. 1 
Thereafter, events moved quickly. In May 1966 Suharto considered 
confrontation should be settled quickly. 2 while plans were made for 
a delegation, made up essentially of elements of the KOGM 
(Operational Command to Crush Malaysia), to make a goodwill visit 
to Malaysia. This took place on 27 May, presaging announcements 
before the end of the month that Indonesia would join the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 3 and that Malik had met with 
Malaysian Deputy Premier, Tun Abdul Razak, in Bangkok, where they 
agreed in principle to an end to confrontation. Razak returned 
this visit on 11 August 1966 where this principle was formalized. 
These overtures gave rise to a two year period in which 
Indonesia not only moved to restore balance to its independent, 
active foreign policy -- including most significantly the 
abandonment of links with The People's Republic of China -- but 
also to, correspondingly, draw foreign aid and investment capital. 
There was however, a strong degree of ambiguity in early Indonesian 
foreign policy pronouncements, reflecting a process of slow and 
deliberate disengagement from the trappings of the Sukarno era. To 
Adam Malik, Statement, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy as based 
on the Pantja Sila Principles", Department of Information, 
Jakarta, 1966. Quoted in part in Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Yearbook (1967), p.217. 
2 	Straits Times, 2 May 1966. 
3 	Made by the Vice-Premier for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Sultan Hamengku Buwono. See Pauker, G., "Indonesia: The 
Year of Transition", p.149. 
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illustrate, Malik's statement in April 1966, and one by Suharto l 
four months later, were threaded with a new pragmatism, yet they 
retained some of the idealistic themes that were promulgated during 
the Sukarno period. While this ambiguity could be explained in 
terms of the unsettled, domestic situation and the Indonesian 
leadership's concern for 'the people's wishes', it slowly faded as 
the Suharto regime consolidated its domestic power base, and as 
Malik was resisted by power-brokers within it. 
For Malik was a strong link to the Sukarno period and he 
continued to embrace some of the rhetoric and ideals that had 
underwritten the 'Old Order' foreign policy. While his appointment 
in March 1966 to the deputy prime ministership and to the position 
of Foreign Minister reflected Suharto's wish to maintain the 
appearance of continuity with the past, Malik resisted moves that 
he considered would heavily entrench Indonesia with those Communist 
or non-Communist states that could give massive amounts of aid. 
This found its critics, particularly from those who, fearing 
internal, though externally supported, communist subversion, placed 
security consideration above everything else. 2 Thus, while Suharto 
and these elements within the regime continued to pay lip-service 
to continuing Indonesia's struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism, they also moved to reconstruct Indonesia's relations 
with the West, recognized by Suharto to be the only possible source 
of financial aid of the extent Indonesia planned to pursue. 3 In 
such circumstances, the responsibility for the winding down of 
confrontation was taken from Malik and placed in the hands of 
elements from within the military sympathetic to this dilemma, most 
notably Ali Murtopo. 4 Once the confrontation issue was settled, 
Malik regained control of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, 
Suharto summarized the basic principles of Indonesia's 
foreign policy in his State Address: To conduct an 
independent and active foreign policy in the best interests 
of the nation, and to 'continue the struggle against 
imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and 
manifestations'. Far Eastern Economic Review, 1968 
Yearbook, pp.195-196. 
2 	Horn, R.C., 'Indonesia's Response to Changing Big Power 
Alignments', Pacific Affairs, p.332. 
3 	Sundhaussen, U., The Road to Power, p.239. 
4 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.332. 
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this underlying conflict was to remain a constant element in policy 
making up to, and straddling, the East Timor crisis. 
In the meantime, relations with China had been maintained 
until internal pressures forced the government to 'freeze' them in 
October 1967. Subsequent relations between the two countries were 
underlined by a marked hostility, with China particularly bitter 
over Indonesia's treatment of its Chinese residents. 1 The thaw in 
international attitudes toward the communist power at the turn of 
the decade found Malik open to the idea of normalizing relations. 2 
For Malik, such an achievement would not only broaden Indonesia's 
contacts with the great powers, but also provide greater 
• flexibility on the international stage, while reaffirming 
Indonesia's 'independent and active' foreign policy. However, 
hardline elements in the military -- which had always harboured a 
deep suspicion and resentment of China's alleged complicity in the 
coup -- continued to be intrinsically suspicious of the potential 
for communist subversion. This distrust, fuelled by domestic 
resentment particularly on the part of the traditionalist-oriented 
Muslims, straddled the early 1970s when detente saw a convergence 
between China and the USA, with the former taking a seat at the 
United Nations. 
The constraints that were so strongly evident in Indonesia's 
relationship with China were not as pronounced in its dealings with 
the Soviet Union. Although Indonesia's 'independent and active' 
foreign policy enabled it to broaden its political contacts, it was 
the Soviet Union's status as a creditor that sustained the 
Indonesian - USSR link in the late 1960s. At that time, the Soviet 
Union's willingness to maintain a residual relationship with 
Indonesia coincided with the latter's desire to dilute the pro-
Western nature of its foreign economic and political policies. 
Thus, 'The relationship with the Soviet Union, however uneasy, was 
cultivated up to a point because it served as an important symbol 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, pp.184-189. 
2 	Far Eastern Economic Review, 1970 Yearbook, p.51. Evidence 
of Malik's desire to restore normal diplomatic relations 
dates back to 1970. See van der Kroef, J.M., "Before the 
Thaw: Recent Indonesian Attitudes toward China", Asian 
Survey, No.13, May 1973, pp.513-530. 
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of non-alignment'. 1 However, the Soviet Union's growing global 
role -- which by the late 1960s encompassed the Indian Ocean and 
maritime Southeast Asia -- aroused Indonesia's distrust, and it 
hampered any further development of the relationship at this time. 
Indeed, the Soviet's proposal in late 1968 of a new collective 
security system in Asia, while rejected by all Asian capitals, met 
with a particularly cool response from Indonesia. On Indonesia's 
part, it reflected not only an historical suspicion of external 
powers but also a slowly emerging policy, if not proclivity, 
towards consolidating 'national resilience'. 2 In this context a 
strong economy and ideology was of greatest importance in 
Indonesia's national defence policy. For Suharto, military pacts 
were of no use to Indonesia or any other member of ASEAN, 3 and he 
was no less moved by the impending withdrawal of the British and 
the Americans from the region than by the increasing Soviet profile 
in it. 4 
The United States, however, rapidly became a strong source of 
strength and support to Indonesia, where civil aid for economic 
stabilization and growth played a major role in consolidating a 
favourable domestic political situation. This relationship, 
Leifer, Michael, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p.126. 
2 	At the opening Address of the Conference on Regionalism in 
Southeast Asia on 22 October 1974, President Suharto 
concluded: 
'National resilience' is... needed to guarantee the 
process of nation building [it] ... means more than just 
conventional defence and security capabilities and is 
not merely related to military force alone, nor is it 
in any way connected with aggressive motives against 
any country. 'National Resilience' means, internally: 
the ability .to ensure the necessary social changes 
while keeping one's own identity, with all its 
vulnerability, and externally, it is the ability to 
face all external threats, regardless of their 
manifestations (Address by the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia, in Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia, CSIS, Jakarta, 1975, p.8). 
This perception and interpretation of regional security is 
examined in relation to those held by the other ASEAN states 
in Shee Poon-Kim, A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977, Institute 
of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang University, 
Occasional Paper Series, No.69, April 1977, pp.193-194. 
3 	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
4 	van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, pp.193-194. 
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however, was not only economic in nature, for it increasingly 
displayed powerful military characteristics, especially after the 
re-organization of Indonesia's military forces at the end of 1969. 
In the words of Harold Crouch: 
In the early years of the New Order, the aid-giving 
countries as a group had believed that Indonesia could 
not afford new military supplies, but the success of the 
economic stabilization program strengthened the hand of 
the military men, keen to acquire new armament. American 
aid for the Army's 'civil mission' activities had been 
resumed in 1967 with the supply of road-building 
equipment... but President Nixon's visit to Indonesia in 
1969, American military assistance expanded. 1 
While Indonesia moved cautiously but decisively throughout this 
period to consolidate a leading role in the management of regional 
order -- through the establishment of ASEAN (1967), convening the 
Jakarta Conference on Cambodia (1970), adopting Malaysia's ZOPFAN, 2 
and, later, a willingness to participate in the International 
Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), designed to 
supervise the cease-fire in South Vietnam 3 -- its growing economic 
and military links seemed to compromise its stance on "non-
alignment". Moreover, regional security developments in the mid-
1970s saw Indonesia attach increasing importance to the western 
strategic net. However, as Nishihara viewed this situation, tying 
it into Suharto's concept of 'National Resilience': 
While the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia might make 
the nations of the region aware of the importance of 
self-reliance, such withdrawal might induce another great 
power to fill the 'vacuum'. In order to avoid the 
predominance of any single power, Indonesia would like to 
see the competitive presence of plural forces playing 
themselves off against one another. Thus, while 
Indonesia may not join any military alliance, it does not 
mind seeing the other members of ASEAN being protected by 
a friendly superpower, that is the US. Indeed, in an . 
official technical sense, Indonesia is the only non-
aligned ASEAN member. 4 
By the early 1970s, then, Indonesia's prestige and its role in the 
1 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.337. 
2 	ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) was adopted 
by the ASEAN bloc to promote neutrality and to keep the 
region free of great power involvement. 
3 	That Indonesia should play such a role, was suggested by 
President Nixon when he visited Jakarta in July 1969. 
4 	Nishihara, M., Regional Security Developments, p.51. 
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region had benefited from the changes arising from great power 
detente. The conservative political orientation of the 'New Order' 
leadership, together with practical considerations in international 
politics, saw a devolution of responsibility, rather than power, 
from the major western powers to Indonesia in terms of maintaining 
a certain degree of regional order within non-Communist Southeast 
Asia. 
The Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Nexus  
While economic progress was relatively impressive and 
political stability appeared to provide the grounds for optimism -- 
with natural resources (essentially oil) gaining international 
recognition in the early to mid-1970s -- there were growing 
criticisms both inside and outside Indonesia that such economic 
growth was being achieved at the cost of growing inequalities at 
all levels of Indonesian society: This criticism focused, in 
particular, on the Suharto Government's overall development 
strategy. It was argued that this strategy embraced economic 
policies which elevated the position of the foreign investor over 
that occupied by indigenous entrepreneurs, 2 and that it was 
mismanaged and eroded by corruption. 3 All these factors were 
considered to be major reasons behind the government's failure to 
confront the country's (especially rural) poverty and 
unemployment. 4 By extension, this criticism concluded that such 
factors were not reformable mistakes or malfunctions, but intrinsic 
features of the structure of the 'New Order' government as a 
Legge, J.D., Indonesia Since Independence (Third Edition), 
Prentice-Hall, Sydney, 1980, pp.176-178. 
2 	Crouch, H., The Army and Politics, p.310. See also Robison, 
R., "Culture, Politics, and Economy in the Political History 
of the New Order", in Anderson B. and Kahin, A., (eds.), 
Interpreting Indonesian politics:• Thirteen Contributions  
to the Debate, Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Interim 
Report Series, No.62, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1982, 
pp.131-148, esp. p.148. 
3 	See Mortimer, R., (ed.), Showcase State, chs. 3 and 5. 
4 	For a discussion of these issues see Sundrum, R.M. and 
Booth, A.E., 'Income Distribution in Indonesia: Trends and 
Determinants', in Fox, J.J. (et al), Indonesia: Australian 
Perspectives, pp.455-485. 
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whole. While the rise of the 'New Order' was tied directly to the 
linkages that had been made with foreign economic assistance and 
investment, the narrowly-held base of wealth, upon which the 
government projected growing international and regional power and 
prestige, still meant little in national and domestic terms. 
1974 marked the beginning of a period in which genuine 
dissatisfaction with this situation became more acute, erupting 
into open rioting at the time of the visit of the Japanese Prime 
Minister (Tanaka) to Jakarta in January 1974. Throughout the 
previous eight years, Japan loomed predominantly in Indonesia's 
economic revival, absorbing a major part of Indonesia's raw 
materials and providing investment and technical assistance. 2 By 
the early 1970s, growing resentment over foreign nomination focused 
increasingly on Japan's economic role. While the riots reflected 
divisions and factional rivalry within the upper echelons of the 
'New Order' government, 3 the conditions that led to the 
disturbances were only to be exacerbated by the subsequent drop in 
foreign investment and the encroaching world recession. 
Straddling this domestic turmoil was a period that saw 
Indonesia's 'independent and active' foreign policy -- concreted in 
anti-communism and strongly inclined toward the USA -- come under 
stress, with the American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 and the 
subsequent communist victory in 1975. 4 This period also gave rise 
For an attempt to place these judgements in a broader 
historical perspective see Mackie, J.A.C., "Indonesia Since 
1945 - Problems of Interpretation" in Interpreting 
Indonesian Politics, pp.117-130. Mackie argues, that any 
honest attempt to explain the policies pursued by the 
Suharto Government should use 'a more pluralistic and 
historically grounded approach ... not the superimposing of 
externally derived explanatory models or irrelevant ethical 
stands', p.118. 
2 	See van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, pp.165- 
166 and pp.203-204. 
3 	An important element in these riots was competition between 
two of the military's most powerful figures, General 
Sumitro, Chief of the Command for the Restoration of 
Security and Order (Kopkamtib)and Deputy Commander of the 
Armed Forces, and Major General All Murtopo, the head of 
Aspri. 
4 	Dipoyudo, Kirdi, "Changes and Trends in the Indonesian 
Foreign policy" in Suryadinata, Leo and Siddique, Sharon, 
(eds.), Trends in Indonesia II, Institute of Southeast Asian 
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to events in Portugal and Timor which, coupled with developments 
in Indo-China, enhanced old fears of vulnerability and subversion. 
For Indonesia, then, by the mid-1970s, domestic and international 
dimensions were converging, and there were: 
many points of substance upon which opposition could 
seize [in particular] the manner in which the former 
Portuguese colony in East Timor was incorporated into the 
Republic... Resentment of the repression of dissident 
voices and Islam's growing sense of isolation [and]. ..the 
growing dissatisfaction with the regime's economic 
policies. 1 
By the late 1970s, widening dissatisfaction with the government 
found increasingly volatile expression in student and intellectual 
circles, and in the press. 2 This gave rise to a concomitant 
repressiveness on the part of the government which, while 
reflecting an increasing sense of vulnerability, reflected that the 
'New Order' government 'no longer commanded the kind of consensus 
which had supported it in the late 1960s and early 1970s'. 3 
Conclusion  
As we have seen, the emergence to power in the mid-1960s of 
the 'New Order' government brought together an informal and loose 
coalition of groups from within Indonesian society. This coalition 
-- which comprised of students, intellectuals, and members of the 
Islamic and army leaderships -- at first provided the 'New Order' 
leadership with the basis to preserve the appearance of 
constitutional democracy. With the passage of time, this broad 
basis of support for the regime dwindled, and many of its initial 
Studies, Singapore, 1981, pp.127-128. 
Legge, J.D., Indonesia Since Independence, p.175. 
2 	Incidents included, in late 1977, large-scale street 
demonstrations in Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya over the 
role of the military in Indonesia's political life. These 
culminated in mass marches on Hero's Day (10 November) and 
Human Rights Day (10 December). Student Councils that year 
also called for the right to criticize the government's 
economic policies. In 1978, the students attacked the 
government over corruption, the dominance of foreign capital 
in the economy and the impotence of the Indonesian 
Parliament in a publication called The White Book of the  
1978 Student's Struggle. It also criticized growing 
inequalities in Indonesian society and the wealth and 
lifestyle of Suharto. 
Legge, J.D., Indonesia Since Independence, p.180. 
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supporters became its opponents. This gave rise to a sense of 
vulnerability on the part of the government, and to a commensurate 
increase in its repression and authoritarianism. By the mid-1970s, 
the consensus which had sustained the Suharto Government in the 
preceding years had gradually evaporated, leaving military power as 
the regime's major source of authority. 
Where this sense of vulnerability arose from an historical 
concern with Indonesia's social diversity and its bearing on the 
integrity of the Indonesian State, similarly, a sense of 
vulnerability to external intervention has been a common and 
consistent feature of Indonesia's international outlook. Yet, 
since Independence, Indonesia's foreign policy has been 
characterized by the phrase 'independent and active', and it has 
been employed at different times to indicate a desire for an active 
role in both global and regional developments. Since the mid-1960s 
however, the 'New Order' government has sought to project an image 
of a moderate, non-aligned government, development-oriented, and a 
cornerstone of stability in the Southeast Asian region. The latter 
took on significant dimensions following the British and American 
military withdrawals from the region, and as the Soviets expanded 
their strategic interests in the archipelago. By the mid-1970s, 
the region had been subjected to adverse changes. These, together 
with developments in East Timor, only served to confirm the 
regime's continuing concern for the integrity of the archipelagic 
state, and its adherence to a strategic perspective that has been 
in existence since Indonesia's Independence. 
The following two chapters concentrate on the Australian 
Government's approach to Indonesia's 'New Order'. They trace the 
major assumptions as to what Australia's interests required and the 
methods it employed to accommodate those interests at a time of 
unprecedented change in the international environment. The press-
ures on Australian foreign policy emanated both from changes in 
Indonesia itself and the regional environment, and from Australia's 
changing views of its national interests vis-a-vis Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INDONESIAN REHABILITATION, REGIONAL COHESION AND THE PRIMACY 
OF SECURITY: AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC REORIENTATION AND  
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH INDONESIA 
Introduction  
This chapter covers the period from 1965 to early 1970, and it 
outlines how, in diplomatic, economic and security terms, Australia 
developed its Indonesia policy under the Liberal-Country Party (L-
CP) government. It brings official Australian attitudes towards 
Indonesia into perspective, as well as the measures employed to 
accommodate the Government's policy goals. For convenience, 
Australia's policy reorientation is divided into two broad periods: 
the first from late 1965 to mid-1968; and the second from mid-1968 
to 1970. 
The official Australian reaction to events taking place in 
Indonesia following the coup was initially cautious, reflecting a 
concern not to exacerbate tensions in Indonesia, as well as an 
uncertainty as to the direction Indonesia was likely to take. With 
the end of confrontation, signs emerged that a fundamental change 
had occurred in the Indonesian political outlook, and that this 
could pave the way for an improvement in Australia-Indonesia 
relations. It might also provide new opportunities for regional 
cooperation. 
While the Australian Government throughout the first period 
displayed sensitivity and realism in its attempts to consolidate 
goodwill and cooperation -- emphasizing the wider importance of 
economic and national development in the region -- security factors 
were of principal consideration. In this situation, while there 
were greater opportunities for increased contact at the political 
and commercial levels, the Australian Government's continuing 
interest and concern in Asia was taken up with military and 
strategic considerations. As a result, and a major theme in this 
Chapter, early opportunities to consolidate in the economic and 
political areas were missed. By 1968, however, the changing 
strategic situation in the region compelled the Australian 
Government to revise Australia's security policy, and its attendant 
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foreign and defence policy priorities. Fundamental to the latter 
was the evolving relationship with Indonesia and these developments 
are examined here. 
To this point, the gains made in Indonesia's steady recovery 
seemed to have justified Australia's rather patient diplomacy 
throughout the two years following the emergence of the 'New 
Order'. In effect Australia had successfully sown the seeds for a 
measured consolidation of relations into the 1970s. There 
remained, however, a tension at the heart of Australia's policy 
during the second period, and this theme is examined here also. 
The tension was based on a strong desire to see Indonesia as a 
stronger Southeast Asian power, but not one that would dominate the 
region. However, the imperatives of developments in the broader 
strategic arena -- now casting a shadow over the security afforded 
Australia by its traditional alliances -- compelled Australia to 
overcome this ambivalence, and to accelerate its diplomatic 
processes 
The 'New Order' Interregnum 
In looking back to the coup, events of such major historical 
impact and fraught with so much tragedy were bound to generate 
emotional and divergent interpretations among observers. However, 
'the Australian reaction to these events was one of public pleasure 
and studied governmental discretion'. 1 On 19 October 1965, Paul 
Hasluck, 2 the Minister for External Affairs, made an impassive and 
much-delayed statement to the House of Representatives on the 
situation in Indonesia, setting the tone for subsequent official 
responses: 
It would be... inappropriate for me to offer conjecture 
about the future course of events and their possible 
outcome... These happenings remind us again that 
Indonesia is still under great internal stress in its 
search for a form of government and society best suited 
to its own conditions. We in Australia are gravely 
disturbed at seeing our nearest neighbour, Indonesia, 
shaken in this way, for we sincerely hope that Indonesia 
can be blessed with stability and prosperity and being 
realistic we know... that any other state of affairs 
Gelber, H.G., "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, 
January-June 1967", Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Vol. 13, No.3, December 1967, p.317. 
2 	Later, Sir Paul Hasluck. 
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could only serve the interests of those who seek to 
profit from unrest, discontent and turmoil.... 
Moreover, Hasluck expressed concern at the lack of economic 
progress in Indonesia and forecast further political and social 
unrest if this situation was not remedied in the near future. On 
the nature of past, and the prospects for future relations, and 
engaging in the valuable exercise of looking beyond immediate 
problems facing Australian diplomacy, Hasluck looked to the future 
and outlined a theme to be repeated by government spokesmen many 
times in the following year: 
While we in Australia are determined in our support of 
Malaysia against Indonesian confrontation, we have tried 
to keep open the doorway to such cooperation with our 
neighbour, and if that one occasion of conflict is 
removed there are many ways in which we could work 
together for mutual benefit.... 1 
The Opposition's response to Hasluck's careful assessment of the 
Indonesian situation was in substantial harmony with that of its 
leader, Arthur Calwel1, 2 who endorsed Hasluck's view that 
Indonesia was severely in need of domestic construction and 
development. Calwell also shared Hasluck's desire to refrain from 
'delivering judgement on those events, fraught though they are with 
the most important consequences for the whole region, and for 
Australia'. Moreover, he believed that they were fundamentally 
internal matters and were, therefore, to be dealt with only by the 
people of Indonesia. 3 
Despite this, however, the Opposition proposed a sharper 
perception of events in Indonesia than that which was present in 
any public government assessments at the time. According to 
Calwell: 
Instability, economic backwardness and poverty are the 
things upon which communism thrives and these things will 
exist while the resources of a nation are channelled into 
external adventures and while the population is diverted 
from its domestic problems by the creation of an 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD), House 
of Representatives (hereafter H.R.), Vol.48, p. 1914, 19 
October 1965. 
2 	The Labor Member for Melbourne (Victoria), and Leader of the 
Opposition from 7 March 1961 until 8 February 1967 when he 
was replaced by his deputy, E.G. Whitlam (the Labor Member 
for Werriwa, New South Wales). 
3 	CPD, H.R. Vol.48, p.1916, 19 October 1965. 
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atmosphere of permanent crisis.... 1 
Alternatively, while not disagreeing with the central tenet of 
Hasluck's observations, K.E. Beazley2 took the Government to task 
over the Minister's insinuation that Australia would give economic 
aid to Indonesia if she ceased her policy of confrontation. 
Beazley insisted that it was a mistake for Australia's Department 
of External Affairs to hold the view that Australia could divert 
Indonesian policy by an incentive of monetary grants. The Labor 
frontbencher emphasized that instead, Australia needed to project a 
'genuine concern about the Indonesian people'. He predicted that 
this concern, fortified by economic aid, would secure good 
relations. Furthermore, Beazley was compelled to add that 
Australians: 
underestimate the genuineness of ways of thinking... 
which are passionate convictions in those areas. When 
they talk of neo-colonialism and so on, this seems very 
mistaken from our point of view. We have never really 
been on the receiving end of colonialism... Where this 
has been done to other nations they absolutely hate it, 
and the countries at the giving end of colonialism have 
never appreciated how the people on the receiving end 
feel.... 
The Australian Government thereafter refrained from issuing any 
further statements in the Parliament, preferring instead a low-key 
address given by Hasluck to the Victorian branch of the Liberal 
Speakers Group in mid-November. 3 Although the Minister focused 
attention on the ideological drift inherent in the coup and the 
Indonesian people's demonstration against communism, he advocated 
caution in any judgements as to who would achieve full political 
power. As the Age had forewarned and a view shared by Hasluck: 
We may feel relieved that Indonesian nationalism has 
scored a triumph over international communism but we 
should not assume that any dominant group in Indonesia is 
content with the situation as it stands. President 
Ibid., p.1917. 
2 	The Labor Member for Freemantle (Western Australia), later 
Minister for Education in the Whitlam Government. Ibid., 
pp.2128-2129. 
3 	Paul Hasluck ; "Australia Under Challenge", Address given to 
a Conference organized by the Liberal Speakers Group of 
Victoria, 14 November 1965. Current Notes on International  
Affairs (hereafter CNIA), Vol.36, No.11, November 1965, 
p.715. 
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Sukarno maintains his position as leader of a 
revolutionary movement, and this is supported by all the 
adherents of 'guided democracy', including the army.... 1 
This cautious approach was echoed by the Indonesian Ambassador to 
Australia, Major-General Kosasih when he emphatically stated that: 
The most important thing is to let us alone. Do not 
interfere with our internal problems.... Indonesia has a 
special attitude to Australia -- you helped us in 1945 
and that means very much to us, but do not spoil it.... 2 
However, Hasluck was, at this stage, conscious of Indonesia's 
desire not to be interfered with. When he toured Southeast Asia in 
late December 1965, the Minister did not include Jakarta in his 
itinerary, the ostensible reason given, much to the consternation 
of the Australian press, 3 was that he 'was not in the region'. 4 
Essentially it was a reflection of the cautious, non-interference 
stance taken by the Australian Government on events taking place in 
post-coup Indonesia. 
However, although real and based upon genuine diplomatic and 
political interest, all this was only part of an increasingly 
complex picture. Initial Australian reaction to the coup in 
Indonesia had two characteristics. First, there was a gap between 
official and public appreciation of the situation, and second, the 
issue was seen primarily in security terms. Yet, it must be 
recognised that a number of elements constrained the Australian 
Government from moving to a more positive attitude towards 
Indonesia. For a start, it was not clear as to where the authority 
lay in Jakarta. Nor was it clear the degree of control that was 
being exercised by President Sukarno as head of State, over 
domestic policy, and his Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, over 
foreign policy. For this reason, there were no political leaders 
in clear focus with whom the Australian Government could, with 
credence, discuss future relations. 
Similarly, even if the Australian Government had wished to 
1 	The Age, 9 October 1965. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 3 November 1965. 
3 	Most of the Australian press called for more positive 
gestures of interest in the Indonesian nation (See Chapter 
Four). 
4 	The Australian, 29 December 1965. 
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give positive support to the non-communist forces in Indonesia, it 
was not clear how this could be done. As Canberra could not assume 
the generals to be pro-Western, there was a possibility they would 
resist or, alternatively, be politically embarrassed by an 
expression of Australian support. Finally, it was uncertain whether 
the new regime taking shape in Indonesia was one with which 
Australia would wish to have particularly close relations. Apart 
from the fact that (nominally at least) Indonesia was continuing to 
'confront' Malaysia, there was no evidence that a more or less army 
dominated government would be able to effectively tackle the 
economic problems that Hasluck indicated had to be overcome before 
there could be long-term stability in Indonesia. In addition, there 
was concern in Canberra that the anti-communist campaigns launched 
in Indonesia were being conducted with an enthusiasm that presaged 
the coming of an unprecedented element of violence into Indonesian 
politics. 
For all these reasons, the making of policy towards Indonesia 
during this early period had been a difficult exercise, and one 
fraught with political dangers. In such circumstances, whatever 
the tone of Hasluck's public statements, there is evidence to 
suggest it was clearly understood that the virulent wave of 
anti-communism which engulfed Indonesia had nothing to do with 
pro-Westernism and that patient diplomatic spadework was seen to be 
the key to developing any new relationship. 
For the Australian Government, events on 11 March 1966 brought 
a momentous sequel to the coup with the army, headed by General 
Suharto, emerging as the most powerful force in the country. In 
his first official decree, issued in Sukarno's name, Suharto banned 
the PKI and, in recognition of Sukarno's personal popularity and 
value as a focus for Indonesia's national sentiment, retained 
Sukarno as figurehead President. Suharto then embarked on three 
courses of action during 1966 to consolidate this power: the 
establishment of special military tribunals (Mahmilub) in order to 
expose and punish those implicated in the coup; the resuscitation 
of Indonesia's political institutions; and the 'normalization' of 
Indonesia's international relations, with particular emphasis on 
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economic foreign policy. 1 
Nevertheless, while the proven resilience of President Sukarno 
and Subandrio made Canberra understandably hesitant about negating 
them as political factors in the Jakarta power game, the critical 
questions for Canberra in regard to Indonesia were related to the 
direction that these policies would take under the military, and 
whether or not it would be able to carry them out. To survive, the 
Australian Government believed the new regime would have to make a 
determined assault against internal disorders. As foreign 
adventures would hinder such action, it seemed likely that 
confrontation would fade as a physical fact, although for 
Indonesian domestic reasons it would probably remain as a declared 
policy. Therefore, while the signs looked hopeful, Indonesia had 
yet to prove to policy makers in Canberra that it had the strength 
and the leaders to face the reality of this situation. 2 
Yet, there were still calls by the Australian press for the 
Australian Government to take an immediate stand, and offer its 
goodwill to the regime. In its editorial, the Sydney Morning 
Herald called on the Australian Government to take up the 
initiative, cease its 'pussy footing' approach towards Indonesia, 
and to make its intentions clear that, once Indonesia had abandoned 
its policy of confrontation towards Malaysia, Australia would 
provide assistance to Indonesia in its massive task of 
reconstruction. 3 The Australian, although cynical, favoured 
Hasluck's policy of non-interference: 
Sensibly, Australia has refrained so far from delivering 
official sermons about the situation in Indonesia since 
the attempt at a coup last October... This is quite 
surprising, really, in view of our inability to adopt 
more detached and objective attitudes to events and 
affairs elsewhere in Asia. Perhaps our impartiality over 
Indonesia is the result of the lack of a hard-and-fast 
American policy towards Indonesia to which we would be 
bound to some extent, given our willingness to adopt 
almost without question the policies of our great and 
See Pauker, G.J., "Indonesia: The Year of Transition", 
pp.145-150 for a fuller analysis of this power shift. See 
also Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 1967 Yearbook, 
pp.213-219, pp.221-225. 
2 	Harris, personal interview with K.C.O. Shann, Canberra, 
November 1980. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 March 1966. 
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powerful friends.... 1 
The Australian's Southeast Asia correspondent, Peter Hastings, also 
argued that Hasluck's 'circumspect' 2 refusal to comment on the 
development in Indonesia's power struggle was correct. Hastings 
quite correctly believed that those in Australia who called on 
Hasluck to pressure Indonesia into ending its policy of 
confrontation in exchange for Australian assistance, displayed a 
complete lack of understanding of Indonesia's historical 
sensitivities to outside interference. Moreover, a right-wing, 
anti-communist Indonesia did not approximate a right-wing 
Australia, and events immediately following the attempted coup 
proved such an assumption to be groundless. On the other hand, if 
Suharto and his followers were pro-Western, which was not yet 
clear, then nothing could have been more embarrassing to them and 
their task than to be publicly exhorted to great efforts by the 
External Affairs Minister of Australia -- a strong critic of 
confrontation and a member of ANZUS and SEAT0. 3 
Against the background of such persuasive views it seemed 
likely that Hasluck's low-key comments were sensibly designed to, 
equally, dash extravagant Australian expectations, and to reflect 
the view that Canberra did not want to commit itself to a position 
to which it could be held. However, a conclusion to confrontation, 
later announced in September 1967, and the anti-communism of the 
Suharto Government continued to be major factors in Australia's 
search for closer relations with Indonesia. While the ending of 
confrontation was subsequently stated as the turning point in 
Australia's policies towards Indonesia, Hasluck's sustained 
position seemed to indicate that the anti-communism of the Suharto 
government could well have been at least as important as 
confrontation in influencing Australian Government policy. For its 
1 	The Australian, 15 April 1966. 
2 	Hasluck, P., "Australia's Foreign Policy", CNIA, 
No.3, p.132. 
3 	The Australian, 15 March 1966. 	Hastings noted General 
Suharto had indicated strongly 'that we are not leading the 
revolution to the right' and Nasution, in a post 
counter-coup statement called for an intensification of 
confrontation and for extreme vigilance against 
'Necolim'[sic] countries, which he portrayed as 
'deliberately encircling Indonesia with Imperialist bases'. 
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part, the Indonesian Government was now intent on restoring a 
balance to Indonesia's foreign policy. As already noted, 1 this was 
intended to attract Western aid and investment, as well as to 
bridge cleavages that had opened up in her bilateral relationships; 
in particular with Australia. 2 By early June, Australia had 
indicated it 'warmly welcomed' hopeful signs of a peaceful 
settlement of the confrontation issue. 3 
In August 1966, Hasluck went to Indonesia for 'broad 
discussions, extending over a range of matters of common interest 
in Australia-Indonesia relations as well as regional and 
international affairs'. 4 However, Hasluck's visit was more than 
just a diplomatic gesture to a new regime. It was, first and 
foremost, a positive sign that the government's political experts, 
believing that a formal end to confrontation was near at hand, had 
judged that the time was right to explore the nature of future 
political and economic relations between the Australian and 
Indonesian governments. Thus, in the context of these recent 
events and the nature of Australian foreign policy towards 
Indonesia over the previous year, Hasluck timed his visit 
carefully, and in line with the prudent course he had followed in 
the eleven months since the attempted coup. 
However, while Hasluck was careful at home to project the 
purpose of his visit only in broad terms, he was more positive when 
he settled down to private discussion with the new regime in 
Jakarta. He had talks with Malik, Suharto, Sukarno and senior 
economic planners, and discussions centred on Australian promises 
to provide Indonesia with some essential raw materials (and spare 
parts to help Indonesia get her industries moving again), 
Indonesian assurances that it would carry out its obligations to 
the United Nations and hold an 'act of ascertainment' in West Irian 
by 1969, and a proposal that Foreign Minister Malik visit 
1 	See p.24 and pp.45-50. 
2 	This was evidenced in a speech to the Indonesian Parliament 
by Foreign Affairs Minister Malik in early May 1966. See 
the Age, 7 May 1966. 
3 	Prime Minister Holt, CNIA, Vol.37, No.6, June 1966, p.375. 
4 	Ibid., No.8, August 1966, p.506. 
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Australia. 1 For Hasluck, one of the most important interests of 
Australian foreign policy at this time was that Indonesia should be 
'united, prosperous and peaceful'. 2 Moreover, in the context of 
political and economic developments of direct concern to Australia, 
his trip would serve as a proper and useful way to acquaint himself 
with the new personalities at the head of affairs in Indonesia, as 
well as with the incumbent politico-economic situation. 
Confrontation would remain, however, the focal point of 
discussions, for as far as Canberra was concerned, its solution 
would open the door to a resumption of normal relations between 
Australia, and Indonesia. 
On leaving Jakarta, Hasluck edged away from the government's 
hitherto cautious position when reflecting on the evolving 
political context of Australia's relationship with Indonesia. He 
spoke of the 'good neighbourliness' that had been sustained during 
even the most difficult phases of the confrontation issue and 
suggested: 
The disappearance of the sole source of disagreement 
between the two countries would enable both to look 
forward to develop the potential which existed for deep 
and constructive cooperation for mutual benefit. ... 3 
Some days later, in Australia, Hasluck turned to the economic 
context. He considered Indonesia had two immediate problems to 
overcome after it ended confrontation -- Indonesia had to settle 
its enormous debt difficulties and seek re-entry to the IMF before 
addressing more basic problems of foreign exchange and inflation. 
The Minister saw that international aid would be required to assist 
Indonesia's overall economic development in which Australia could 
play a moderate and useful role. 4 
By September 1966, Indonesia had paved the way for such a 
development -- it began negotiations for a peaceful settlement on 
the confrontation issue, resumed its seat in the United Nations and 
commenced discussions with creditor nations on the problems of debt 
rescheduling and economic reconstruction. By late 1966, the 
The Age, 11 August 1966. 
2 	Harris, personal interview with K.C.O. Shann, Canberra, 
November 1980. 
3 	CNIA, Vol.37, No.8, August 1966, p.507. 
4 	The Age, 12 August 1966. 
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Indonesian Ampera Cabinet had initiated its economic stabilization 
policy and the internal power struggle had resolved itself 
sufficiently for Suharto to offer an assurance that Indonesia had 
dropped her 'arrogant attitude° in international affairs and that 
in future, Indonesian foreign policy would give highest priority to 
the creation of regional stability and to cooperation among its 
Southeast Asian neighbours. 2 
In summary, throughout the period until Hasluck's visit, the 
main tenet of Australia's policy was to avoid any official comment 
on developments in Indonesia until a relatively clear picture of 
the directions of Jakarta's domestic and foreign policies emerged. 
Once it became apparent that the 'New Order' had taken over and the 
new direction of Indonesian policies could be ascertained, 
Australia moved to welcome the change of government and provide 
diplomatic assistance. However, while the conclusion of 
confrontation was the official reason given for relations entering 
a more cooperative phase, an important contributory factor was the 
ideological rapprochement between the two governments. 
What is clear is that while the Australian leadership was 
constrained by ideological considerations, there was an underlying 
ambivalence toward Indonesia at this time. This reflected 
attitudes that not only saw a left-leaning Indonesia as a threat 
but also saw that support from Indonesia could be of considerable 
value in the impending struggle against Chinese communism. 
Further, there is little doubt that both the Indonesian (Suharto 
and Malik) and Australian (Holt and Hasluck) leaderships acted 
rationally, each fully understanding the situation that existed 
between the two countries. In this way, the potential for 
accommodation was greatly broadened. The fact, decried by some, 
but applauded by others, that Hasluck took things steadily, taking 
the opportunity and the time to become acquainted with all the 
subtleties of the Indonesian situation, was an important, perhaps 
indispensable basis for subsequent detente. In this new situation, 
where the sources of strain and disagreement appeared to have been 
eliminated, there would be greater opportunities for increased 
Government Report to the People, Department of Information, 
Jakarta, Special Issue, 013/1967, pp.18-19. 
2 	FEER, 1967 Yearbook, pp.218-219. 
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contact at the unofficial, as well as the official and commercial 
levels. However, Hasluck's identification of Australia's goals and 
the methods through which they could be achieved was one thing; 
achieving them was another. 
Early Initiatives  
In January 1967, Hasluck again visited Indonesia, with three 
main objectives in mind -- first, to open the new Australian 
Embassy (the official reason given for the trip), second, to offer 
economic assistance and, third, to hold discussions on trade 
opportunities between the two countries. 1 While it was widely 
believed that these discussions would be guarded, avoiding the 
impression that Australia was appearing to be intervening in 
internal Indonesian politics, 2 the composition of the official 
party3 indicated the Australian Government's wish to generate trade 
and cooperation between the two countries. 4 The direction 
Australia's assistance took, as well as its timing, however, 
depended on Hasluck's assessments at the time of the likely course 
of Indonesia's internal political situation. Two other factors, 
though, were to influence Australia and to soften its rigid policy 
that 'Indonesia had to be seen to be doing right in Australia's 
eyes before any worthwhile aid will be given 1 . 5 
The first related to the role of Japan. It had maintained a 
CNIA, Vol.38, No. 1, January 1967, pp.41-42. 
2 	The Australian, 25 January 1967. See also The Age, 25 
January 1967 and The Mercury, 19 January 1967. 
3 	The official party comprised the Commissioner of the Export 
Payments Insurance Corporation (G.A. Hawley), the Chairman 
of the Export Development Council (C.G. McGrath), the Deputy 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs and former 
Ambassador to Indonesia (Sir Lawrence McIntyre), the Head 
of the Export Division of the Trade Department 
(A.Paltridge), the Director-General of Works (G.B. Maunder) 
and the Head of the External •Aid Branch of the Department 
of External Affairs (L.W. Engledon). Discussions were held 
with Foreign Minister Malik, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (The 
Presidium Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs), Mr 
F. Seda (Minister for Finance), Major-General Ashari 
Danudirdjo (Minister of Trade) and other senior officials 
and advisers to the Government. 
4 	The Advertiser, 16 January 1967. 
5 	The Australian, 25 January 1967. 
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close liaison with Indonesia during the period when Sukarno's 
influence began to wane, and continued to contribute credit and aid 
above and beyond the large amount already owed to it by Indonesia. 1 
The second factor was related to trade, and the realization that 
the Australian-Indonesian Trade Agreement was due for renewal in 
May 1967. In this regard, however, Hasluck's mission was unable to 
consider substantial changes to the Agreement until Indonesia's 
Western creditors had met in Amsterdam in February 1967, and the 
reforms of Indonesia's economic regulations and organizations had 
been completed. 2 
For her part, Indonesia's early actions continued to display 
a high degree of ambivalence. On the economic level, some weeks 
before Hasluck's visit, Indonesia opened the way to increased 
activity by removing the hostile policies for foreign investments 
which had marked the latter stages of the Sukarno era. Further, a 
few days before the party's arrival, the Indonesian Government made 
the 'appropriate symbolic gesture' 3 of restoring, to Australian 
control, the pharmaceutical company, NASPRO, which had been taken 
over by the Indonesian government in April 1965. On the cultural 
level, an Australian delegation, comprising sixty-eight members, 
spent two weeks attending an Indonesian language seminar in 
Bandung. 	Yet, these concessions were rendered somewhat 
superficial when, on another level, the Indonesian armed forces 
newspaper, Angkatan Bersendjata, published an editorial 
questioning Australia's participation in military pacts and 
revealed nagging, if unfounded, doubts about Australia's ambitions 
towards West New Guinea. Underlying historical sentiments were 
particularly evident when it concluded: 
We hope from now on that Australia is able to think in 
terms of Asia and the Pacific, so that it does not fall 
into the trap of becoming the South Africa or the Ian 
Smith Rhodesia[sic] of Asia.... 4 
In what proved to be an early indication of the relationship 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.165. 
2 	Creighton Burns offers an incisive analysis of these 
pressures on Australia's position regarding Indonesia in The 
Canberra Times, 27 January 1967. 
3 	The Canberra Times, 27 January 1967. 
4 	Ibid. 
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between, and conflicting foreign policy orientations of, the 
Foreign Ministry and the military, Foreign Minister Malik was quick 
to balance these statements. Speaking at the opening of the new 
Australian Embassy, Malik put the view that his country intended to 
'safeguard' its good relations and cooperation with Australia, and 
maintained that this would 'guarantee security and peace in the 
Pacific region'. 1 
While the basic aim of Hasluck's trip had been, given a 
favourable outlook, centred on exploring the prospects for trade, 
as well as the extension of more civil aid to Indonesia, the chief 
public product of his visit was a brief comment, made in Jakarta 
prior to his return, 2 which reflected his belief that the trip may 
not have been as productive as had been hoped. But given the 
constraints of the domestic situation in Indonesia, a closer 
examination of Hasluck's Jakarta statement reveals a number of 
tacks, all directed toward contributing to Indonesia's clearly 
indicated desire for economic rejuvenation. First, Hasluck made 
the promise that Australia would promote Indonesia's interests at 
the Amsterdam meeting of Indonesia's creditor nations in February 
1967. This meant urging the rescheduling of Indonesia's debts, due 
to fall in 1968 and 1969 -- a development regarded as essential by 
the Indonesians as the December 1966 meeting in Paris rescheduled 
only the debts and interest due in 1967 (to be paid in the period 
1971-1978). Integral here was the need for Australia to try to 
induce as many nations as possible to extend new credits to 
Indonesia. However, this would necessarily demand a sizeable 
Australian contribution over and above the $500 000 grant Hasluck 
made during his August trip. Second, in considering future 
economic assistance, Hasluck indicated that Australia would have to 
concentrate on projects to improve communications (specifically, 
closer shipping and air links to induce trade) and increase food 
production. These areas were of particular concern to the 
Indonesians, as they related to their stabilization programme, and 
were key areas where they felt Australia could contribute. 
Clearly, ventures such as those indicated by Hasluck, raised a 
number of complex questions and Hasluck's statement in Jakarta did 
The Canberra Times, 27 January, 1967. 
2 	CNIA, Vol.38, No.1, January 1967, pp.41-42. 
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little to answer them or inform Australia as to their substance. 
However, behind Hasluck's visit and his incomplete account of it, 
loomed one overpowering consideration. As the Advertiser  
editorialized: 
Australia ... should strain every effort to help 
Indonesia back on her feet. It is clearly in this 
country's interests to have a contented people in our 
Near North... How best to ensure internal stability is 
one of the most acute problems facing the Suharto 
regime.... 1 
That Australia stood to gain relatively more from a strong, 
prosperous Indonesia than did other nations, was re-enforced by the 
Canberra Times when it was argued: 
A strong Indonesia with its economic problems under 
control means stability in the region. We lived 
alongside another kind of Indonesia for long enough to 
learn at first hand the dangers of instability there.... 2 
Clearly, this publicly expressed those arguments, embraced 
privately by Hasluck, 3 which placed rehabilitation on a level of 
self-interest. However, altruistic considerations did emerge as 
interlocking with this self-interest. The welfare of the 
Indonesian people, it was argued, was paramount. As the Canberra  
Times indicated, 'It is about time they began to taste some of the 
undeveloped riches of their own country' . 4 
Hasluck did not further release any information relating to 
his trip until he had been back in Australia for a number of days. 
In a three-page statement (in preference to a press conference) he 
emphasized two points. First, that the economic rehabilitation and 
development of Indonesia was most important to the whole of the 
Southeast Asian region. Second, that in considering economic 
assistance to Indonesia, the Australian Government would need to 
place a high priority on the importance of improving 
communications, particularly in the context of increasing 
1 	The Advertiser, 16 January 1967. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 1 February 1967. 
3 	Harris, personal interview with K.C.O. Shann, Canberra, 
November 1980. 
4 The Canberra Times, 1 February 1967. 
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Indonesia's exports and food production. 1 
If there had been any doubts as to Hasluck's motives, they 
were dispelled when he made a statement to the House of 
Representatives on 28 February, 1967 in which he spent considerable 
time analysing the Indonesian situation for the Members. In regard 
to the domestic political environment, Hasluck identified what he 
believed was a transitional process -- a move 'from the former 
experiment with guided democracy to a form of representative 
government more in line with the popular will and... provisions of 
the 1945 Constitution'. Recognizing that problems lay ahead for 
Indonesia in the political sphere, Hasluck reinforced the 
Indonesian view that Indonesia's internal political arrangements 
were its own concern, and expressed sympathy with the Indonesian 
Government's objective to strengthen the role of national 
representative institutions in the formulation of government 
policy. On the economic front, Hasluck recognized that Indonesia 
was appoaching its enormous economic problems in a realistic way2 
and signalled Australia's intention to play a supportive role both 
through direct assistance and in international forums such as 
IGGI. 3 
Although he stressed to the House of Representatives that the 
Australian Government had 'a human sympathy for the people of their 
closest neighbour', it could be argued that Hasluck's intention to 
support Indonesia, both generally, and specifically at the IGGI 
meeting, stemmed from his perception of the role that economic 
development would play in creating the foundations of political 
stability in Southeast Asia. It also cannot be overlooked that 
Hasluck's position of support could also have stemmed from 
Australian concern over persistent reports that the British 
intended to withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia. While he 
considered (six months later) that such a withdrawal would take 
time, the problem facing Australia was not one of 'developing its 
1 	Other issues discussed by Hasluck and Malik centred on the 
first phase of the demarcation of the border between West 
New Guinea (Irian Barat), and the Territory of Papua New 
Guinea, and future cultural exchanges between the two 
countries. The Age, 1 February 1967. 
2 	Hasluck, P., "Statement of Australian Foreign Policy," CNIA, 
Vol.38, No.2, February 1967, p.58. 
3 	CNIA, Vol.38, 1967, p.42. 
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own distinctive role'. 1 Rather, Hasluckian 'realism' would demand 
an alternative form of collective security. 
Within a year the situation was to reach a critical point, 
with Britain announcing on 16 January 1968 that it did intend 
withdrawing from the region by the early 1970s. Hasluck was 
subsequently compelled to inform the House of Representatives of 
the government's thinking, in particular that while: 
I do not think that at this time we can talk 
realistically of one big defence pact covering all the 
countries of the region [,] we can readily envisage.., a 
variety of arrangements... all of which will contribute 
to regional security... They can range from the exchange 
of security information to actual military 
co-operation... developing economic and diplomatic 
co-operation and such things as joint technical projects 
which bring added strength to the participating 
countries. We in Australia are working to make the best 
use of all such opportunities.... 2 
Meanwhile, and in an earlier expression of this policy, Australia 
became involved in structuring solutions to Indonesia's economic 
problems. Although Australia was not one of the creditor nations 
which met to negotiate with Indonesia over the problems associated 
with the rescheduling of her debts, it did send official observers 
to the first Tokyo meeting. It was then that Australia became an 
active member of the subsequently formed IGGI, established by 
Western creditor nations and Japan to find and coordinate large-
scale aid to Indonesia. Over the next three years at IGGI meetings 
of member countries, Australian diplomats played an important role, 
and 'lent the most sympathetic support to the Indonesian 
delegations in their quest for sufficient aid to support first 
stabilization, and since 1968, rehabilitation and development of 
the Indonesian economy'. 3 Such aid grew from an initial emergency 
credit of US$170 million in 1966 to US$350 million and US$600 
million in 1968 and 1970, respectively. A substantial proportion of 
this aid, known as 'BE' (Export Bonus) credits was used to support 
Indonesia's balance of payments position, enabling it to maintain 
an adequate level of export earnings in relation to its import 
1 	CPD H.R., Vol.56, p.208, 17 August 1967. 
2 	Ibid., Vol.58, p.453, 26 March 1968. 
3 	Arndt, H.W., "Australian Economic Aid to Indonesia", 
Australian Outlook, Vol.24, No.2, August 1970, pp.129-130. 
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needs. 1 
The role of the Australian Export Development Council (EDC) in 
this development cannot be overestimated. In early April 1967, the 
EDC -- chaired by C.G. McGrath, one of Hasluck's party during his 
January trip -- released a report on the Indonesian economy, 
focusing on the role of the private sector as a viable second 
source of Australian aid to underdeveloped countries. Generally, 
the report alluded to the constructive and profitable role 
Australian exporters and investors could play in the economic 
development of Southeast Asia. 
The report at length, optimistically predicted the Indonesian 
economy's recovery capacity, stressing its new and extremely 
liberal attitude towards foreign capital. It also made the 
important point that, as an earnest show of good faith, the 
Indonesian Government had decided to return all investments seized 
by the previous administration. Now, foreign companies were being 
presented with the opportunity to enjoy 'taxation holidays, duty 
exemption for agreed periods, guaranteed transfer of profits after 
tax and repatriation of capital after expiration of the tax-free 
period. ,2  In this manner, investment in Indonesia, through exports 
or the establishment of factories, was not only being promoted as 
'good business', but was also considered to be politically 
advantageous. 
While such political and economic arguments were being 
orchestrated with precision, there were still, nevertheless, a 
number of unknown factors for Australia to consider: 
(1) the future role of the army in Indonesian society; 
(2) the prospects for a democratically held election (at 
that time predicted to be held in 1968); 
(3) Sukarno's role; 
(4) the durability of the communists in Indonesia; and 
(5) the scope of the economic problems facing Indonesia. 
However, Hasluck, while recognizing that the tasks and tensions 
confronting Indonesia were not matters to be overcome in only a few 
years, held firmly to the view that economic development would lead 
to stability in Indonesia -- an important Australian national 
Ibid., p.130. 
2 	The Australian, 3 April 1967. 
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interest. For the remainder of 1967, apart from a problem arising 
from an incident on the Papua New Guinea/Irian Jaya border, 1 the 
issue that figured prominently in the relationship centred on 
Australian investment in Indonesia. 
Call for Australian Investment 
As we noted earlier, 2 in October 1966, the Indonesian 
leadership embarked on a stabilization plan to steady the 
Indonesian economy. While it contained some hard-hitting 
measures, 3 criticism was mounting over business delays caused by 
the government's tight money policies, particularly in the import 
sector. Yet, it seemed that the Indonesian economy had, 
momentarily, staved off collapse. Efforts to obtain the 
rescheduling of debts had achieved encouraging results with new 
credits being ordered. Further, while production of food crops in 
1966 was below the target set by the government, it was an 
improvement on 1965, with an additional production rise in 1967 as 
a consequence of a renewed emphasis on planning. 4 
Armed with such positive developments, the noted Indonesian 
economist, Professor Emil Salim, 5 visited Australia to have 
discussions with businessmen and Australian officials, and attended 
the Australia-Indonesia Association (NSW) three-day summer school 
in April 1967 as a guest of the Australian Government. As 
principal speaker, he outlined Indonesia's rehabilitation 
programme, isolated the problems his government needed to tackle, 
and urged greater Australian investment, both governmental and 
1 	See Chapter Three. 
2 	See pp.27-32. 
3 	The Bulletin, 29 April 1967. These measures included the 
following principles: balanced budgets -- through 
intensified tax collection and by containing government 
spending; foreign exchange reform to assist an improvement 
in the trade balance and government revenues; placing 
limits on bank credit; ending of subsidies and restrictive 
controls on State enterprises, in order to improve their 
performance; creation of a favourable climate for foreign 
investment through the Foreign Investment Law. 
4 	See Chapter One. 
5 	A lecturer on economics at the University of Indonesia, a 
member of Parliament and a member of Suharto's economic 
advisory committee. 
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private, as well as investment from other international sources. 
The thrust of his arguments centred on his belief that there was no 
longer any tangible reason why trade between Indonesia and 
Australia should not vastly increase. 
In urging increased trade, investment and the proffering of 
loans to help Indonesia's economic reconstruction he argued that 
with confrontation finished, Australian finances for defence could 
be more productively directed to other areas; in particular, 
Indonesia. Salim was anxious to impress upon his audience of 
predominantly Australian businessmen the sincerity of the new 
leadership in Jakarta, and concluded with his assessment that: 
This is the first cabinet we have ever had that puts 
economic planning first - before politics, ... under the 
old regime, the intellectuals and planners just didn't 
count ... we are committed to this new government because 
it must succeed. If it does not there will be no other 
chance for us again.... 1 
However, Australian businessmen were prepared to adopt a 
wait-and-see attitude about investing in Indonesia and this was 
quickly recognized and duly acknowledged by the Indonesian economic 
adviser the following month. It was Salim's understanding that, 
although Australians had indicated to him that they were willing to 
invest 'big sums in quick-yielding projects' in Indonesia, they 
wanted further assurances that their interests would be safe from 
government interference. 
Professor Salim's prime mission was to help consolidate 
support within the Australian Government for a contribution toward 
Indonesia's US$200 million balance of payments gap. During his two 
week visit to Australia he achieved a great deal, impressing 
officials with 'the realism and determination of the 'New Order' to 
lift the Indonesian economy out of the corrupt inflationary mire 
which was Sukarno's heritage to his people'. 2 Salim amplified the 
Indonesian Government's emphasis on decontrol and 
debureaucratisation in major economic policy-making areas, while 
stressing that the Indonesian government had begun to move to 
exorcise inefficiency and corruption by dismantling the huge 
structure of regulations under the Old Order. 
The Indonesian Herald, 24 April 1967. 
2 	The Bulletin, 20 May 1967. 
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Although it was clear that there was a long way to go before 
economic stability could be claimed, 1 the country's stabilization 
programme was showing some signs of success in the first half of 
1967. 2 However, Indonesia's path to recovery was not without 
dilemmas. In the words of Salim, 'We have had to undergo painful 
and quick surgery with very rusty tools'; factories were seizing 
up; trade was being affected by an intense credit squeeze; a 
suspension of work on building projects initiated by the Old Order 
had thrown the building industry into a deep slump and freer trade 
had flooded the local market with imports which heavily undercut 
domestic products. 3 Textiles was a case in point, with certain 
Jakarta factories virtually closing down due to their inability to 
compete with prices of Hong Kong and Taiwanese cloth. It was also 
suggested that rice imports were discouraging local production 
(although the harvest in the first half of 1967 was an exceedingly 
good one) . 4 
The problems still facing Indonesia included: 
(a). Indonesia's raising of its foreign exchange export rate from 100 rupiahs to 110 rupiahs to the US Dollar during 
the first week of May (reported by Indonesian 
exporters). The move coincided with a steep rise in 
the blackmarket rate for the US dollar, standing out 
at 140 rupiahs as against 125 rupiahs in late April. 
(b). The increase was understood to be due to a dwindling 
of the country's foreign exchange reserve, and of the 
increasing number of Chinese nationals buying up hard 
currency as they prepared to leave for their homeland 
following a wave of anti-Chinese feeling in Indonesia. 
(c). Export markets were reported idle following the 
increase in the bonus export rate (which determined the 
proportion of foreign exchange earnings which exporters 
we required to hand to the government). 
(d). Indonesian producers were complaining that imported 
goods were flowing into the country freely, and 
undercutting local producers in such products as 
textiles and canned foods. 
2 	The rupiah had firmed up in relation to the US dollar; 
inflation had been cut back from between 40 and 50 percent 
to four percent during the first quarter (measured on a 
monthly rather than yearly basis). As Peter Samuel wrote 
'with government enterprises well on the way to covering 
costs and a general austerity programme being carried out, 
the huge inflation-producing government deficit is 
diminishing' (the  Bulletin, 20 May 1967). 
3 	The Bulletin, 20 May 1967. 
4 	See Denis Warner in The Courier-Mail, 12 June 1967. 
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Pointing out such problems, the Indonesian economist, Dr 
Panglaykim, argued that the Indonesian government 'was taking its 
free-market philosophy too seriously': His philosophy was simple: 
cheap imports were a valuable factor in any kind of 
anti-inflationary effort, but a country in Indonesia's position 
should not spend scarce foreign exchange on products which could be 
coming from existing Indonesian factories which were otherwise 
lying idle. In practical terms, he saw value in bans being put on 
the import of certain lines of textiles in order to get factories 
going again. 
Underlying these views was a perception that private business 
would be the key to Indonesia's recovery, and the Pacific 
Industrial Council's (in Sydney) decision to send a survey team to 
Indonesia (to examine the prospects for private enterprise in 
Indonesia, and draw up a list of viable projects) was described by 
Dr Panglaykim as being a major 'breakthrough'. He also felt that 
if companies formed consortiums (hence, spreading the risks and 
getting things moving quickly) then the conservative approach taken 
by Australian businessmen could be overcome. 2 
What of Australia's role? The aid offered by Australia was to 
be given under the BE system, enabling private businessmen and 
state instrumentalities to bid by auction for import certificates 
for goods on an essential imports list. However, compared to aid 
granted by other countries -- US $65 million (conditional on other 
countries combining to make the total up to US$200 million); Japan 
- US$60 million; and West Germany - US$13 million -- Australia's 
AUD$5 million contribution was the bare minimum we could 
respectably offer, although it was a no-strings grant compared to 
the other contributions which took the form of long-term loans at 
low interest rates. 
In early August 1967, there was a meeting of the 
Pacific-Indonesian Business Association in Jakarta at which private 
business leaders from nine nations surveyed the Indonesian economy 
and began planning possible investment, trade and technical 
training schemes. In a preamble to this conference, a function was 
The Bulletin, 20 May 1967, Dr Panglaykim also expressed 
these sentiments in an interview. Harris, personal 
interview with Dr Panglaykim, Jakarta, November 1981. 
2 	Ibid. 
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held in Australia during the previous week for the Australian 
delegation (made up of commercial and industrial executives). The 
major speaker at this function was the Indonesian Ambassador 
Kosasih, who stressed the significance of the talks for economic 
development in Indonesia. Moreover, he considered not only would 
Australia's participation in the talks be a turning point in 
economic relations between the two countries, but also that the two 
countries had the potential to develop a permanent economic bond. 1 
There is little doubt that the size and diversity of the 
Australian delegation -- the sixty private businessmen from 40 
firms was the largest national group at the conference, and the 
biggest private business delegation ever to represent Australia 
overseas 2 -- was a testimony to Australia's interest in Indonesia's 
economic development. However, the question remained as to how far 
that interest would be carried into positive action. The 
conservatism of Australian businessmen had always been in evidence 
in Southeast Asia, and prior to the conference, there had not been 
any significant increase in Australia's trade with Indonesia. 3 
The conference4 was opened on Thursday 3 August 1967 and was 
attended by 150 foreign businessmen from 14 countries. One of its 
stated aims (important in the light of Indonesia's hostile attitude 
to foreign enterprise under Sukarno) was to bring foreign and 
Indonesian businessmen together in an attempt to promote 
understanding and more direct contact. In this context, Australia 
was singled out by the Conference Chairman, Julius Tahija, a 
leading Indonesian businessman, as being the country from which 
1 	The Australian, 28 February 1967. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 1967. 
3 	See Appendices A and B. 
4 	The seeds for such a conference were sown in Sydney in April 
1967 at the first Pacific Industrial Conference by an 
Australian financier, the chairman and managing director of 
the Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (Sydney) H.D. 
Marks. He proposed an 'international task force' to help 
restore the Indonesian economy, claiming that the proposal 
expressed the feelings held by those at the April 
conference. Events were to bear him out, with the America's 
Stanford Research Institute agreeing to sponsor the meeting 
in Jakarta in August (the Sydney Morning Herald  , 2 August 
1967). 
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Indonesia could learn -- in particular, the manner in which 
Australia had 'balanced foreign and domestic interests'. 1 While 
Australian delegates were issued with comprehensive dossiers on 
Indonesia's new economic regulations, and assistance was given to 
ensure that they gained the necessary information and access to 
important contacts -- including Indonesian Government officials and 
businessmen -- caution prevailed throughout the Conference. The 
legacy of hostility which marked Indonesian attitudes to foreign 
investments under the Old Order (and still lingered in some 
quarters), together with the knowledge that Indonesia was still 
saddled with inefficient administrative mechanisms, only served to 
constrain any degree of enthusiasm over any future business links 
with Indonesia. 2 
For its part, the Australian Government remained at a 
distance. It continued to offer verbal encouragement and was a 
strong advocate of generous economic aid for Indonesia, yet it 
seemed to do less than it was able, to feed capital and technical 
assistance into the barren Indonesian economy. This remained the 
scenario well into 1968, despite the fact that Hasluck remained 'a 
powerful protagonist of the sensible thesis that continuing 
economic stagnation in Indonesia is more likely than anything else 
to undermine the new regime there, or drive it towards 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 August 1967. 
2 	Within days of this conference, the Indonesian diplomat, 
politician and journalist, Mr Soedjatmoko (Indonesia's chief 
representative at the United Nations in 1966) was in 
Melbourne to deliver the Dyason Memorial Lectures (7 and 9 
August 1967). He emphasized that (i) Indonesia was not 
interested in entering into a defence pact with anyone, 
including Australia. (ii) Australia and Indonesia could 
enter into closer economic ties, and called for Australian 
participation in middle-size manufacturing industries in 
Indonesia. (iii) Australia's high level of economic 
development made the development of a sense of affinity and 
equality difficult, although not impossible. (The Sydney  
Morning Herald, 10 September 1967). Following his series 
of lectures, Soedjatmoko put forward a two point plan, in 
Canberra, for improving relations between Australia and 
Indonesia. That (i) contact between Australia and Indonesia 
be more on a person-to-person basis, particularly in the 
cultural and tourism arenas. (ii) the two countries on a 
government-to-government basis move to consolidate 
relations, which were 'very stable - very friendly' (The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1967). 
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authoritarianism' . 1 
To sum up, it seems clear that Indonesia had commenced the 
long road back to national solvency and eventual development, 
despite its still insecure political basis. With the Indonesian 
Government shaping its 1967/89 Budget to confront inflation and 
bureaucratic anomalies, legislating to encourage public and private 
foreign investment and taking steps to suppress corruption and 
smuggling, it was actively trying to create an atmosphere of 
confidence and reinstate itself as a member of the international 
community. 
It was becoming evident at the end of 1967 that Indonesia was 
more concerned with internal rather than external security, as 
evidenced by the Indonesian Government's emphasis on resurrecting 
the economy. Its foreign policy was deliberately low-key, and its 
agreement to join Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore 
in ASEAN on 8 August 1967 reflected a more accommodating attitude 
towards its neighbours. 
Yet, such changes in Jakarta -- from a provocative stand in 
external policies to a policy platform designed to invite the 
widest possible range of friendly relations, which in effect 
amounted to a friends-and-neighbour's policy (something Australia 
had been urging on Indonesia for years) -- posed problems for 
Canberra's policy makers. When Indonesia's foreign policy 
reflected strong ideological overtones -- with Australia among the 
'old established forces' (in need of overturning) -- Canberra's 
military and political links with the two Western powers in 
Southeast Asia (America and Great Britain) involved Australia in 
the major issues as Jakarta saw them. In addition, Australia and 
Indonesia had a special relationship based on Australia's early 
support of Indonesian independence, pre-occupation with Papua New 
Guinea and the fact that, as neighbours, our general differences on 
regional security were also daily and concrete. 
However, during the first two years of the 'New Order', 
Indonesia's preoccupation with economic development (particularly 
in the extent to which developed countries would be prepared to 
assist financially) and a more accommodating foreign policy, placed 
an unfamiliar strain on Australia's relations with her closest 
Creighton Burns, the Age, 17 August 1967. 
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neighbour, with Australia's special relationship tending to waste 
away as it fell outside Jakarta's current interests. First, 
Australia was not invited to join ASEAN - Jakarta felt perhaps that 
two SEATO nations (Thailand and the Philippines) and two with 
British links (Malaysia and Singapore) were enough strange 
bedfellows for one organization. Second, as a more developed 
country, Australia also stood apart. At the same time our 
contribution in dollar terms was barely respectable. The fact was 
that creditor nations, including some with a considerably more 
remote interest than Australia in Indonesian stability (for 
example, Great Britain), had already met the target of AUD$200 
million balance of payments assistance for the year 1967. 
Clearly, Canberra withheld financial support for too long. 
While it was not Indonesia's view that Australia did this because 
it disapproved of the new regime in Jakarta or because it doubted 
the intentions of the Suharto government, the failure to act 
decisively suggested to them that, 'the Australian Government was 
not in a frame of mind to appreciate the importance of Indonesia's 
financial difficulties': The impression in Indonesia, about 
Australia's caution and parsimony, was one of puzzlement. The mood 
was also cynical. After Australia had preached to the Indonesians 
for so long about the need to concentrate on the economy, we now 
displayed a reservation in showing our appreciation. Hitherto, it 
had emerged that on the commercial level, the PIBA conference 
tentatively drew out fresh Australian business interest in 
Indonesia. This was appreciated to be necessary in the long-term, 
and, properly enough, was based on practical commercial 
considerations. 
The Changing Environment  
From 1968, however, the profound changes taking place in the 
wider international arena were to have implications for the 
Southeast Asian region as a whole, and for Australia-Indonesia 
relations in particular. Reliance on the external power of Great 
Britain and the United States of America had been a distinguishing 
feature of the foreign policies of a number of countries in the 
Southeast Asian region, including Thailand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Australia. The announcements in the first 
Bruce Grant, the Age, 14 August 1967. 
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half of 1968 that the British would withdraw their forces east of 
Suez by 1971, and that the USA would wind down its war-effort in 
Vietnam after 1968, served to shake confidence of these countries 
in their powerful allies, and to stimulate a fundamental 
reassessment of regional security among them. These changes were 
to affect not only Australia's attitude and policies towards the 
region, but also relations between Australia and Indonesia. 
Indeed, while the bilateral relationship was still confounded by 
basic differences in foreign policy between the two countries from 
1968 onwards, the reorientation of Australian foreign policy in the 
wake of these changes (from 1969) played a significant part in 
removing some principal differences between Australian and 
Indonesian approaches to regional security. In view of Australian 
attitudes and policies towards the region, historically, these 
issues could have provided the basis for the development of a more 
complex bilateral relationship than otherwise did eventuate: 
For years, the basis of Australian foreign policy had rested 
solidly on the ANZUS Treaty. 2 But the relationship with the 
Americans went deeper than this: 
Accord was reflected not only in the close cooperation 
between the two countries but in the degree to which... 
they had arrived by independent routes at the same 
estimation of the Asian situation. This concurrence was 
apparent at the regular ANZUS and SEATO meetings. There 
was virtually no divergence between Australian and 
American interpretations of Asian developments, of the 
need to stem the communist tide, resist aggression, 
promote security and stability in the area, and provide 
the opportunity for Asian countries, many of them newly 
independent, to decide their own destinies.... 3 
For Australia, security and stability was reinforced by a division 
of responsibility within Asia between the two allies. While Great 
Britain was involved in maintaining stability in the Malaysian 
The two major issues examined here related to Australia's 
continued presence in Malaysia/Singapore and, in Chapter 
Three, the 'Act of Free Choice' in West New Guinea. 
2 	The Treaty was between Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States of America, and was signed 1 September 1951. It was 
ratified in April 1952. 
3 	Greenwood, G., "The Political Debate in Australia", in 
Greenwood, G. and Harper, N., (eds.), Australia in World 
Affairs 1966-70 Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974, pp.48-49. 
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region, the USA provided security in East Asia, in particular, 
Vietnam. Australia, with interests encompassing the whole arena, 
was involved in both and maintained forces in defence of the 
former, while, at the same time, committing troops to the latter. 
However, the British and American decisions seemed to negate 
the whole philosophy underlying this participation. In particular, 
with the change in the USA's defence strategy under the Nixon 
Doctrine (1969) -- which espoused a programme of greater 
self-reliance in defence preparedness for countries under America's 
protection -- Australia came to the realization that it could no 
longer afford to predicate its security entirely on great power 
guarantees and there could be observed a hesitant but perceptible 
move on Australia's part towards an emphasis on security based more 
on regional cooperation. 
In essence, by the late 1960s, Australia was facing, and 
compelled to make adjustments to: 
basic changes in the pattern of great power 
relationships. The breakdown of the old 'bipolar' system 
was already far advanced by the mid-1960s... The Nixon 
administration positively encouraged the idea of a new 
multi-power balance and expectations along these lines 
had crystallized much further. Perhaps most decisive, 
the issues had changed. International politics no longer 
revolved around the cold war conflict, but was 
increasingly perceived in terms of multiple cleavages and 
great-power rivalries limited by an awareness of common 
interests... 	An 'era of confrontation' was indeed 
giving place to an 'era of negotiation' or, more 
prosaically, an era of hard bargaining and diplomatic 
manoeuvre. In this context, Vietnam appeared less and 
less the decisive battleground for the future of Asia, 
more and more an anomalous prolongation of the cold war. 1 
The British and American Military Withdrawals  
The British decision to phase out its military presence in 
Singapore and surrender its leases on bases there cast a shadow 
over the rationale and future of Australia's military presence in 
the area. As the Prime Minister, J.G. Gorton, said, it would bring 
about 'drastic alterations of previously understood arrangements as 
to the continuing availability of British forces in the region'. 2 
Richardson, J.L., "Australian Strategic and Defence 
Policies", in Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World 
Affairs 1966-1970, pp. 259-60. 
2 	CNIA, Vol. 39, No. 1, January 1968, P. 30. 
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Yet, this did not unduly trouble Gorton because, in the debate that 
followed, both in the public and parliamentary forums, and driven 
by strong personal feelings, 1 he favoured a withdrawal of all 
Australian forces from the region -- Malaysia and Singapore, as 
well as Vietnam. Moreover, Gorton's belief was that national and 
regional security would be better served by directing resources 
towards industrializing Australia rather than solely towards 
defence. 2 However, Gorton did not always hold this view, nor did 
some of his colleagues. Hasluck and Defence Minister Fairhall, for 
instance, argued that Australia should maintain its active role in 
the region, in military and economic terms. The assumption here 
was that Australia's security interests would be consolidated both 
through the establishment of strong economic links with Southeast 
Asia and through a continuing military presence in Malaysia and 
Singapore . 3 
Notwithstanding Gorton's view, it became evident in early 1968 
that broader political pressures 4 would prevail and that the 
Australian Government intended to maintain the commitment of 
1 	Harris, Interview with Mr J.G. Gorton, Canberra, April 1985. 
2 	Trengrove, A., John Grey Gorton: an informal biography, 
Cassell, Melbourne, 1969, p. 203. 
3 	It needs to be stressed however that Gorton took some time 
to move away from his January (1968) statement. By June 
1969, at the Five-Power Defence meeting held in Canberra, 
Gorton placed emphasis on 'a continuing visible presence' 
of Australian forces. (Gorton, 'Opening Address' in CNIA, 
Vol.40, No.6, June 1969, p.302). In August 1969, in 
response to a Question in the House, Gorton confirmed that 
it had been expressed as early as February 1969 that these 
forces would not be used to deal with internal problems, and 
could 'be used against external aggression only with the 
prior consent and approval of the Australian Government'. 
(CPD, HR., Vol.64, p.254, 14 August 1969). 
4 	Externally, the Singapore and Malaysian Governments were 
urging Australia to retain its presence as a focal point for 
new five power arrangements, while the United States wanted 
Australia to participate in the kind of regional arrangement 
which it was seeking to promote in Asia. Internally, the 
government came under pressure from those who favoured 
'forward defence, including the electorally powerful 
Democratic Labor Party. Moreover, opinion polls at the time 
indicated that a continued Australian commitment to 
Malaysia/Singapore had substantial majority support (see 
Richardson, "Australian Strategic and Defence Policies", 
pp.246-247). These themes are developed later in this 
chapter. 
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Australian forces to Malaysia and Singapore after the British 
withdrawal had been effected in 1971. In fact, Gorton not only 
considered that Malaysia and Singapore displayed a strong 
preference for a continued Australian commitment, but that there 
was a need for Australia to 'seek as far as possible according to 
our own resources, to fall in with them') However, the Australian 
Government were mindful to reassure the regional powers that it was 
not its intention to assume Britain's role, or her commitments in 
Malaysia and Singapore. Moreover, while Defence Minister Fairhall 
noted that were Australia to maintain a military presence in the 
area, he stressed that it would 'be in the context of a total 
cooperative effort, involving all five powers [Britain, New 
Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia]', and that Australia's 
participation would not be directed 'against anybody... we would be 
looking to the day when truly regional cooperative arrangements 
would extend beyond Malaysia and Singapore'. 2 Nevertheless, while 
both Fairhall and Hasluck attended the Five Power talks in Kuala 
Lumpur in June 1968, no decision was reached on the question of a 
framework for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore after the 
British withdrawal . 3 
By the end of 1968, the government was coming under 
increasingly heavy criticism, particularly from the Opposition, for 
delaying a decision on Australia's role after 1971. 4 While public 
opinion was increasingly in favour of a continued commitment, 5 it 
was announced in 19 November 1968 that Australia would only retain 
military forces in Malaysia and Singapore until the end of 1971, 
after which time it would seek joint security associations with 
other nations in the area. 
However, the impression had now emerged that Australia's 
hesitation was related to the direction of American policies in the 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 February 1968. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.58, p.1075, 2 May 1968. 
3 	Richardson, "Australian Strategic and Defence Policies", 
p.245. 
4 	The Age, 20 November 1968. 
5 	See, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 
1968; 3 May 1968; 8 June 1969; 22 November 1969. Cited in 
Richardson, "Australian Strategic and Defence Policies", 
p.245. 
84 
region following Johnson's decision on 31 March to de-escalate the 
USA's role in Vietnam. As Fairhall admitted to the House of 
Representatives: 
a clarification by the United States of its attitudes 
towards the end of the war in Vietnam, the likely peace 
which will follow and the conditions which will prevail 
throughout South East Asia as the Western Pacific ... are 
matters which are vital to any consideration of what we 
might be able to do and what we should do in the South 
Pacific area. 1 
Indeed, Australia's support of America's role and policy in Vietnam 
was based on the notion that Australia, essentially for its own 
security needs, had to be seen to be 'a willing ally'. 2 However, 
this notion was undermined not only by Johnson's announcement but 
also by his indication that he would not seek the presidency in the 
forthcoming elections. As Whitlam enthusiastically noted in the 
House of Representatives in late 1968, the announcement was 
tantamount to an admission of a failure of American objectives in 
Vietnam: 
I sought this indulgence because this is a momentous 
occasion ... The whole structure of Liberal policies and 
Liberal propaganda, not just about this but Australia's 
role in this region and beyond, has crashed ... The 
so-called 'realists' were in fact living in a world of 
fantasy which ignored basic truths about the nature of 
the war itself, the limitations of military power and the 
real nature of the communist challenge. 3 
The Australian Government was now faced with two options -- follow 
the direction taken by the USA, or pursue an independent policy. 
With Gorton proclaiming that it was 'groundless' to argue that the 
Americans were withdrawing from Southeast Asia into another period 
of isolationism, 4 and External Affairs Minister Hasluck arguing 
that an unconditional bombing halt would be 'an act of folly, 5 
there was a clear failure on the part of these Australian leaders 
to anticipate the pace of change in American policy. This was to 
1 	CDP, H.R., Vol.61, p.2953, 19 November 1968. 
2 	Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War, p.216. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.61, p.2425, 5 November 1968. 	Whitlam 
expanded on these comments in the ensuing debate. See 
Ibid., pp.2425-2430. 
4 	CNIA, Vol.39, No.6, June 1968, p.442. 
5 	Ibid., No.10, October 1968, p.442. 
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remain a feature of the Australian official attitude throughout the 
remainder of the Liberal-Country Party's tenure of office, although 
the sense of strong conviction which had marked the Holt 
government's endorsements of American policy was lacking in the 
Gorton and McMahon governments. 1 
It was becoming evident that Australia could ill afford to 
identify with an American foreign policy that was increasingly 
coming under fire at all levels. Further, with the election of 
Richard Nixon in November 1968, it was clear that there would be a 
gradual dilution of American interest and participation in the 
Southeast Asian region. 2 However, it was not until early 1969 that 
the government revealed any kind of public understanding and 
acceptance of the changes that were taking place in Australia's 
immediate environment. In a speech on defence to the House of 
Representatives in February 3 , Gorton, without setting any specific 
terminal date presented the government's decision to maintain 
forces of all arms in Malaysia and Singapore after the British 
withdrawal. While he acknowledged that, with the withdrawal of the 
British 'East of Suez', 'an era had ended', Gorton considered that, 
as problems still existed in the region, hopes for political 
stability would flounder if military security was not consolidated. 
The Prime Minister argued against the 'theoretical course' of a 
total withdrawal of all Australian military forces on the grounds 
that it would cast doubt on Australia's sincerity of purpose as far 
The most concrete example of this was Gorton's refusal, 
during the Tet offensive, to further increase Australia's 
contingent in Vietnam (CNIA, Vol.39, No.3, March 1968, 
p.111). Other examples included expressed "hopes" that the 
peace proposals of Johnson's two speeches (March and October 
1968) would come to fruition. Yet, in urging North Vietnam 
to participate in the Paris peace talks, Gorton felt, 'we 
should not have too sanguine expectations of too early a 
settlement....' (CPD, H.R., Vol.61, p.2424, 5 November 
1968). 
2 	Nixon foreshadowed changes in American foreign policy in 
speeches he made in August and September 1968, before his 
election. In expressing the need for greater military 
self-reliance on the part of countries in the region, Nixon 
favoured converting associations such as ASPAC to. defensive 
alliances - a proposition Gorton had dismissed in July as 
impracticable (CNIA, Vol.39, No.7, July 1968, p.285). 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.62, pp.33-37, 25 February 1969. See also 
CNIA, Vol.40, No.2, February 1969, pp.41-46. 
86 
as Malaysia-Singapore and other countries of the region were 
concerned. Moreover, he argued that, logistically, it would be 
easier to deploy air and ground forces to the region if they were 
'already set up and operating and needing only expansion instead of 
construction de novo': 
Although this Australian commitment was to continue under 
existing arrangements (under terms governed by Australia's 
association with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement), Gorton 
provided constraints to their use by indicating 'the conditions 
under which they will be there, and the role which we envisage they 
will fulfil'. In essence, an Australian military presence would 
not remain there: 
unless their presence continues to be actively desired by 
the governments of the countries in which they are 
stationed. While there, they are not intended for use, 
and will not be used, for the maintenance of internal 
civil law and order. 
Gorton also made it clear that 'their presence, and their military 
cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore, are not directed against 
any other country in the region'. Instead, they would be used to 
train local Malaysian and Singaporean forces as they built up their 
defence capacity, and, with the Australian Government's consent, 
for use against 'externally promoted and inspired communist 
infiltration and subversion... ,•2 
There were three reasons why Gorton was not prepared to commit 
Australia to an open-ended role in Southeast Asia. The first 
related to the needs of Malaysia and Singapore, the second to the 
requests of the Americans and the third to encouragement from the 
British Conservative Opposition. All amounted to the political 
pressures which had dominated Gorton's thinking on the issue, 
rather than an attitude that finally saw the need for a fundamental 
CPD, H.R., Vol.62, p.35, 25 February 1969. 	The forces 
planned to be retained were to consist of two squadrons of 
Mirages, totalling 42 aircraft in all. Except for one 
section of eight aircraft to be stationed at Tengah in 
Singapore, all aircraft would be based at Butterworth in 
Malaysia. In addition, Australia and New Zealand would 
combine in maintaining two battalions of ground troops, 
while each would maintain a naval ship 'for purposes of 
protection and not merely for purposes of training'. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.62, p.36. 
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reorientation of Australia's regional security posture. 1 With 
reference to the first reason, Gorton obviously found the 
Singaporean and Malaysian arguments for the retention of existing 
forces, as the focal point for the new Five Power arrangements, 
compelling. In fact, Singapore's arguments embraced the 
longer-term considerations of an Australian withdrawal, and 
suggested such an act on Australia's part may reduce criticism of 
Australia for eroding regional agreements and security. It was 
also articulated that in the wake of the collapse of the Five Power 
proposals, the subsequent vacuum might compel regional states to 
seek external protection from sources inimical to Australia's 
interests . 2 
The second reason centred on the United States of America and 
its desire that Australia participate in a regional arrangement, 
which it was trying to promote in Asia. Defence Minister Fairhall 
was to justify an Australian regional involvement in terms of 
America's strategy although, as was impressed upon Gorton during 
his May trip to the USA, the latter was not prepared to underwrite 
these arrangements. 3 Third, and perhaps more significantly, Gorton 
was encouraged by the Conservative Opposition in Britain which came 
to power in 1970 and which maintained a reduced presence in the 
area. 
In an interview with John Gorton, he preferred to see this 
development as the 'first conscious step' towards a 
reorientation in Australian foreign policy. Harris, 
personal interview with Gorton, Canberra, April 1985. 
2 	Richardson, J.L., "Australian Strategic and Defence 
Policies", p.246. See also The Age, 13 June 1969; The 
Australian Financial Review, 4 February 1969; and The 
Australian, 18 June 1969. 
3 	Richardson, J.L., "Australian Strategic Defence Policies", 
p.246. According to Richardson this view was impressed on 
Gorton during his visit to the USA in early May. Watt 
argues that the decision to retain forces in the region was 
made without any guarantee of military assistance from the 
USA, or any other power. It was made 'some two months before 
discussions with President Nixon in Washington on 6 and 7 
May 1969, and some six months before President Nixon 
disclosed at Guam his modified policy toward Asia'. (Watt, 
A., "The ANZUS Treaty: Past, Present and Future", 
Australian Outlook, Vol.24, 1970, pp.33-34). Moreover, it 
fitted in with the Nixon doctrine, enunciated in July 1969, 
which 'emphasized that America's allies and partners must 
accept primary responsibility for their own defence' 
(Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War, p.217). 
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There was, however, another issue and it related to the nature 
of the threat to be met. While it was clear that the Five Power 
arrangements would not be used in the event of intercommunal strife 
within Malaysia, it could be presumed that, while not clear, the 
threat to be met appeared to be either conflict between Singapore 
and Malaysia or, as was increasingly suspected in Jakarta, a 
resurgence of Indonesian enmity. 1 In any event, by the end of 
1971, Australia had joined Britain, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Malaysia in a Five Power arrangement which suceeded the Anglo-
Malaysian Defence Agreement. 2 
The Labor Opposition was extremely critical of the 
government's decision to retain a military presence in the region. 3 
Whitlam, in particular, considered it was the occasion for 
Australia to make a fresh assessment and was critical of the 
military and legal basis of such a commitment. Whitlam believed 
that: 
In its search after chimeras, its clinging to the myths 
and slogans and shibboleths of the past, the government 
is missing the whole point of what a fruitful, 
constructive policy should be. 4 
But the decision to retain forces in the region was 'of an order 
without precedence in Australian history', 5 and was an attempt to 
address a complex problem and to meet pressing immediate demands. 
It was, nevertheless, a compromise policy which fell far short of 
the government's regionalist rhetoric. Whether it was essentially 
1 	Ingleson, J., "South-East Asia" in Hudson, W.J., (ed.), 
Australia in World Affairs. 1971-1975, George Allen and 
Unwin, Sydney, 1980, p.297. 
2 	The arrangement came into effect in November 1971, and it 
obliged the five countries to consult if there was an armed 
attack or threat against Singapore or Malaysia. 
3 	The ensuing debate brought down criticism from Messrs 
Barnard, Cross, Daly and Drs Gibbs and Cairns. CPD, H.R., 
Vol.62, pp.267-307, 27 February 1969. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.62, p.267 and p.270. The Opposition favoured 
the development of highly mobile forces which would be able 
to render assistance from Australia, rather than the 
stationing of insignificant elements in the region itself. 
The government was urged instead to concentrate on building 
up indigenous forces through training, the supply of arms 
and technical assistance. Ibid., p.273. 
5 	Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War, p.193. 
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a policy of the line of least resistance or a conscious attempt to 
promote indigenous self-reliance through the minimum gesture 
towards a system of regional security, the Labor Opposition was 
extremely critical of a decision that was characterized as an 
exercise in 'imperial nostalgia'. 1 But an explanation of this sort 
failed to account adequately for the broader political pressures 
that were brought to bear and that were so strongly in favour of an 
Australian military commitment. 
While these were in evidence at the international level they 
also emanated from the domestic arena. On one level, the 
Democratic Labor Party (DLP) had brought strong pressure to bear on 
the government, while public opinion polls reflected strong 
majority support for the commitment. 2 With the federal elections 
due to be held in October 1969, political wisdom seemed to direct 
that no further strain be placed on the DLP's already deep 
discontent with the Gorton government's foreign policy. This 
discontent was clearly in evidence in DLP criticisms of a speech 
made by the new Minister for External Affairs, G. Freeth. 
Addressing himself to the questions raised by increased Soviet 
activity in the region, 3 Freeth put the considered4 view that: 
Australia has to be watchful [it, however)... need not 
panic whenever a Russian appears... In principle it is 
natural that a world power such as the Soviet Union 
should seek to promote a presence and national influence 
in important regions of the world such as the Indian 
Ocean area. 5 
While the speech was favourably received by the press and the 
parliamentary Opposition, it 'was widely reported, almost as widely 
Ibid., p.194. 
2 	Richardson, J.L., "Australian Strategic and Defence 
Policies", p.247, quoting polls published in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 16 October 1969. 
3 	This activity included a Soviet naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean toward the middle of 1968, and a Soviet diplomatic and 
trade offensive in Malaysia and Singapore. There were also 
incidents involving a Soviet fishing trawler and Australian 
fishing vessels. 
4 	Farran, A., "The Freeth Experiment", Australian Outlook, 
Vol.26, No.1, April 1972, pp.46-58. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.64, p.312, 14 August 1969. 
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misrepresented and heavily criticized from many angles': In 
particular, the DLP leader, Senator Gair, saw it as a radical shift 
on the part of the government to the left. 
These pressures saw the Gorton government move away from 
Freeth's statement, essentially because the October 1969 elections 
loomed and DLP preferences hung in the balance. With the election 
over (in which Freeth lost his seat), Australian public opinion 
swinging toward favouring a removal of forces from Vietnam, 2 and 
Nixon announcing in December that the American Government intended 
to withdraw 50 000 troops by April 1970, Gorton announced 
Australia's intention to withdraw from Vietnam, in concert with the 
Americans . 3 
throughout this two-year period, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that Australia's security policy needed revision. In 
particular, the strong anti-communism that marked the policies of 
Gorton's predecessors was becoming untenable in the light of 
evolving American policy. However, the constraints on any movement 
toward accommodating these changes lay less in the intellectual 
arena and more in the domestic one. In what was described by 
Farran, Freeth's Private Secretary at the time, as an 
'experiment', 4 External Affairs Minister Freeth attempted to 
construct a bridge between these two arenas. If it had not been 
for the federal elections, and an L-CP preoccupation with DLP 
preferences, Freeth's statement could have marked a new watershed 
in Australian foreign policy. However, instead of introducing 
tentative steps toward a reassessment of Australia's position, it 
only reflected, if not proved the extent to which the L-CP 
government was shackled by, past attitudes and policies. 5 
Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War, p.352. 
2 	Greenwood, G., "The Political Debate in Australia", p.88. 
According to Greenwood this shift took place only after the 
changes in US policy in Vietnam had become clear. 
3 	CNIA, Vol.41, 1970, pp.228-231 quoted in Richardson, J.L., 
"Australian Strategic and Defence Policies", p.239. 
4 	Farran, A., "The Freeth Experiment", p.46. 
5 	There were five major assumptions upon which successive L- 
CP governments had founded their approach to foreign and 
defence policy. The first, proving to be the most durable 
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While it was evident that Australian foreign policy was still 
founded on balance of power considerations, the important 
innovation lay in Freeth's judgement that the Soviet Union, as well 
as the USA, could play a positive role in the maintenance of the 
regional balance. His successor, W. McMahon, changed the rhetoric 
but kept the broad parameters of policy, which quickly came to be 
accepted into the new decade. 1 Moreover, McMahon embraced the 
notion that a role could also be fruitfully played by Japan, 
although he considered this role was political and economic, and 
not a military one. 2 By the end of 1971, McMahon, now Prime 
Minister, included China, along with the USA, Russia and Japan, 
among the powers through which regional stability and peace could 
be maintained. 3 
Indeed, by the early 1970s the marked international changes 
and shifts in relationships were too obvious to ignore. As 
Richardson concluded: 
the image of Asia polarized between Chinese-style 
communism and the American-supported 'countries on the 
fringes of China from Korea to India' (1) was replaced by 
an image of multi-power rivalry. The United States 
maintains its treaty commitments but 'calls on the 
countries of the region to do more themselves to provide 
for their own security'. The Soviet Union 'has given 
notice of its expanding maritime power and its interest 
in exerting influence upon many countries surrounding the 
Indian Ocean'. China's threat is curiously diminished: 
it 'aspires to challenge the influence of the United 
States and the Soviet Union alike, and continues to 
of the themes of international politics, rested on the 
notion of monolithic communism as opposed by the Western 
alliance system. Second, that communism's encroachment into 
the Asian-Pacific region was inimical to Australia's 
security interests. Third, it was argued that, to meet this 
situation, Australia had to rely on one or both of its more 
powerful allies, as it had during the Second World War. 
Fourth, Australian diplomacy would need to be directed 
toward encouraging one of her allies -- the USA -- to 
maintain a military presence in the region. Finally, there 
was the concept of 'Forward Defence', in part a 
demonstration of our loyalty to this major ally, and an 
attempt, through the forward deployment of Australian 
forces, to keep communism as far away from our northern 
shores as practicable. 
1 	Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War, p.352. 
2 	CNIA, Vol.41, No.3, March 1970, p.97. 
3 	Ibid., Vol.42, No.11, November 1971, p.609. 
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stimulate pro-Peking revolutionary ferment wherever it 
can, around and beyond its borders'. (2) Japan... 'will 
have great opportunities to play a progressive and 
constructive part in Asia.(3) Indonesia, India and 
Britain are further 'major countries [which] react 
cumulatively or competitively with each other'.(4). 1 
Clearly, the bipolar international system was breaking down. The 
winding down of an American presence in the region, begun in the 
Johnson period and formalized in the Nixon Doctrine, raised 
questions as to the validity of some of Australia's assumptions 
concerning the role which America played in support of Australia's 
security interests in the region. These same doubts were raised 
about Great Britain as well, when the decision was made to withdraw 
from 'East of Suez' as well as seek entry to the European Economic 
Community (EEC). However, it was the American's role in Asia that 
underwent the most rigorous reappraisal, with questions being 
raised as to the validity of an historical search for a 
'protector'. 	Alongside this, doubts also were raised about the 
concept of 'Forward Defence' and its relationship to 
interventionism on the part of successive American Governments. 
This debate was not only in evidence in the Parliament -- with, 
principally, Gorton, Fairhall and Fraser on one side and Whitlam, 
Barnard, and Cairns on the other -- but also in the media, 
especially journals and newspapers, as well as among a wide range 
of publicists and academics. 2 
It was during the Prime Ministerships of Gorton and McMahon 
that the Australian government was impelled to recognize the 
inadequacy of these assumptions and to move away from them. On one 
level, it could be argued that a reorientation, guided by strategic 
reviews and reassessments initiated by both the Gorton and McMahon 
governments between 1968 and 1972, took place in Australian foreign 
Richardson, J.L., "Australian Strategic and Defence 
Policies", p.261. Richardson was quoting, respectively, (1) 
Hasluck, CNIA, Vol.38, October 1967, p.421, (2) Department 
of Defence, Defence Report, 1970, p.4, (3) Fraser, the new 
Defence Minister, CNIA, Vol.41, 1970, p.138, (4) Defence 
Report, 1970, p.4. 
2 	Among those prominent in the debate were Bruce Grant, B.A. 
Santamaria, Denis Warner, Hedley Bull, Harry Gelber, Max 
Teichmann and W. McMahon Ball. 
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and defence policies. 1 At a more fundamental level, however, the 
L-CP government was too shackled by its past policies to be able to 
make a radical break with them. Thus, it was unable to strike out 
in any new directions. 
While the reasons for this lay in the nature of the nexus 
between the domestic arena and the conduct of Australia's foreign 
policy, a closer analysis of Australia's decision-making structures 
during this period exposes two main features -- discontinuity and a 
lack of cohesiveness. With reference to the former, a coincidence 
of views between Australia and her 'great and powerful friends' 
gave rise to rather sensible policies on the part of the former. 
When a gap opened up between Australia and her two major allies, 
Australian policies were emptied of much of their substance, and 
modifications had to occur in Australian thinking. Further 
complicating this issue was the fact that during the period in 
question there were a number of major changes to the Australian 
foreign policy decision-making process, from the Ministerial level 
through to the bureaucracy. All such changes had implications for 
the substance and conduct of Australia's policies. 
This included Gorton's policy of limiting severely 
Australia's regional military involvement, and movement 
towards a doctrine of greater Australian self-reliance (See 
the Australian Financial Review, 10 May 68; the Australian, 
13 May 68; and the Sydney Morning Herald, 30 May 68. See 
also CNIA, Vol.39, No.6, June 1968, p.250). During Gorton's 
tenure of office, Freeth's speech of August 1969 signalled 
the Australian Government's reassessment of relations with 
the communist powers (It needs to be added however, that 
while the speech was cleared by Gorton, it was not cleared 
by the Cabinet. See Bull, Hedley, "Australia and the Great 
Powers in Asia", in Greenwood, G. and Harper, N., (eds.), 
Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970, p.345). While this 
was abandoned, due ostensibly to domestic considerations, 
the L-CP Government, in the wake of the 1969 elections, 
initiated a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and Thailand, 
and played a decisive role in the Five Power arrangements 
and contributed to the ANZUK (Australian, New Zealand and 
British) force in Malaysia and Singapore (CNIA, Vol.42, 
No.3, March 1970, pp.95-103). Finally, under the Prime 
Ministership of McMahon, Australia, albeit cautiously, moved 
away from a policy of recognising Taipei as the sole 
government, and thus being entitled to a seat in the United 
Nations. McMahon's 'Two Chinas' policy was eroded by 
Peking's acceptance into the United Nations (Millar, T.B., 
Australia in War and Peace, p.292). Australia also attended 
the Cambodia Conference in May 1970 and moved closer to 
Japan in the political and economic spheres. 
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Indonesia's Role in Australia's Foreign Policy Options  
Australia had spent the best part of two years searching for 
new foreign policy options as a result of the British and American 
decisions to withdraw from Southeast Asia. Integral to this was a 
desire on the part of the Australian Government to seek security 
through military cooperation with its neighbours, particularly 
Indonesia. For Indonesia's part, she preferred to emphasize 
greater economic cooperation in trade and technical matters, and 
declared an aversion to any kind of involvement in military pacts. 1 
In this context, discussions between the two countries throughout 
1968, highlighted the differences between Australian and Indonesian 
approaches to regional security. 
While it was initially evident that there were grounds for 
disagreement between Australia and Indonesia on the best means of 
promoting regional security, 2 there were indications that Australia 
was gradually moving towards a closer identification with the 
Indonesian position. By the early 1970s, it appears that 
Australia, in attempting to reformulate its regional role as a 
result of British and American withdrawals, had moved closer to the 
Indonesian concept of 'national resilience'. 
Moreover, this rapprochement was encouraged by the USA, as 
Indonesia was being increasingly considered to be the linchpin of 
an American scheme for stability and order in the Southeast Asian 
region. As the American Defence Secretary, William Rogers, stated 
at an ANZUS council meeting in Australia in August 1969, America 
now considered that 'Indonesia [was] the key to all efforts for 
stabilizing the situation in Southeast Asia'. In this context, the 
former American Ambassador to Indonesia and then Assistant 
Secretary for Far Eastern and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, 
encouraged Indonesia to 'determine her own course' and argued that 
Australia should strengthen cooperation with Indonesia, encouraging 
her to increase her potential to play a role as a leading 
Crouch, H., The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p.339, and 
van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, p.194. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Indonesia and Australia", Gelber, H.G., 
(ed.), Problems of Australian Defence, Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 1970, p.43-46. 
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stabilizing factor in the region. 1 
In early February 1968, Hasluck visited Southeast Asia to 
hold discussions with Malaysia and Singapore over the implications 
of the British announcement to withdraw 'East of Suez'. These 
talks, which also included discussions in Jakarta with Foreign 
Minister Malik and President Suharto were informal and exploratory 
and were not intended to seek commitments or to advance any 
particular proposals. 2 Before Hasluck made this visit, it was 
suggested that during talks in January 1967 with Suharto and Malik, 
the External Affairs Minister favoured formal military links 
between the countries of the region, including Indonesia. 3 While 
Hasluck indicated that he always believed that Southeast Asian 
security had to be sought through regional cooperation, he denied 
to the House of Representatives late in March 1968 that he had made 
such an approach. He argued that it was not the time to enter into 
realistic discussions about establishing 'one big defence pact 
covering all the countries of the region'. However, he conceded 
that he envisaged: 
a variety of arrangements, some multilateral, some 
bilateral, some specific, some less clearly defined, 
which will contribute to regional security. They can 
range from the exchange of security information to actual 
military cooperation. Regional security even now can be 
promoted in a variety of ways, including developing 
economic and diplomatic cooperation. 4 
Hasluck's interpretations were subsequently considered as amounting 
to an official acknowledgement that to increase defence cooperation 
Jakarta Times, 21 August 1969. 	For strong arguments 
alleging the formative influence of American policy on the 
development of the Indonesian-Australian relationship during 
this period, see Young, K.E., The Guam Doctrine: Implements 
of Implementation. Key State Relations: Australia and 
Indonesia, Maclean, New York, 1970. 
2 	CNIA, Vol.39, No.2, February 1968, p.66. 
3 	See for example, remarks by Opposition Leader Whitlam in CPD 
H.R., Vol.50, p.220, 17 August, 1967. J.A.C. Mackie argued 
that Indonesia had been approached, implicitly by Australia, 
to join ASPAC. Mackie, J.A.C., Indonesia and Australia, 
p.44. van der Kroef, J.M., suggests pressures to join ASPAC 
came from Japan and from within Indonesia. See van der 
Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, pp.197-198. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.58, p.453, 26 March 1968. 
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between Australia and Indonesia, however loosely defined in the 
beginning, would play a major part in promoting regional security. 1 
What is more, Hasluck had noted with satisfaction that while 
Indonesia had adopted the view that becoming involved in military 
pacts would be prejudicial to a 'free and active foreign policy', 
it was already developing bilateral military cooperation with 
neighbouring countries •2 
In this context, in August 1967, Australia had expressed its 
satisfaction at the formation of ASEAN and its approval of the 
declared aims of the organization. 3 However, this approval must be 
viewed in the context of Hasluck's statement to a closed session of 
the SEATO council meeting in Wellington in April 1968. Referring 
to the increase in communist subversion and insurgency throughout 
Southeast Asia, he pointed out the considerable scope for security 
cooperation -- cooperation which would be greatly facilitated by 
membership of Southeast Asian countries in such organizations as 
SEATO, ASPAC and ASEAN. While Hasluck argued that the development 
of an effective cooperative community of Southeast Asian nations 
'would pose a really formidable barrier to communist expansionist 
ambitions', he also stressed the need to join policies for regional 
security with 'equally vigorous action to promote investment, 
commodity support schemes ... and expanding trade opportunities'. 4 
It is evident that such an attitude was very much in line with 
that of the Indonesian government 5 which envisaged regional 
cooperation within ASEAN as a means with which to enhance the 
economic and political viability of national governments in the 
Southeast Asian region, thus strengthening their resistance to 
communist subversion. It emerged later in 1968 that the focus of 
Indonesia's effort in ASEAN was the establishment of political and 
economic stability which constituted the essential prerequisites 
1 	The Australian, 29 March 1968. 
2 	CNIA, Vol.39, No.3, 1968, p.87. 
3 	Ibid., Vol.38, No.8, 1967, pp.328-329. ASEAN's aims were 
to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development, and to promote peace and stability in the 
region. 
4 	CNIA, Vol.29, No.4, 1968, pp.140-141. 
5 	See a speech by Foreign Minister Malik before the DPR, 
Department of Information, Jakarta, 1967, pp.3-9. 
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for an effective defence system. 1 Yet, at the same time, Indonesia 
advocated the necessity for Southeast Asian States to sever their 
institutional links with extra-regional powers. 2 
Because of Australia's extensive security links with the USA 
and its proposal to preserve its military presence in the Malaysia 
and Singapore area after the British withdrawal, such an issue 
might have caused problems in the Australian-Indonesian 
relationship. However, in view of the obstacles which acted 
against the establishment of effective regional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, and as most ASEAN members maintained the necessity 
of retaining their defence links with outside powers, it seemed 
that Indonesia was prepared to accommodate the Australian regional 
presence. Adam Malik, during his visit to Australia in March 1968 
(before the Johnson speech), asserted that he did not object to 
such a presence in Malaysia and Singapore after the withdrawal of 
British forces, although he added that Indonesia hoped that in the 
long term, the need for Australian forces in the region would be 
obviated by the build-up of the national defence capabilities of 
Southeast Asian nations. 3 
While the official reason given for Indonesia's acceptance of 
the Australian forces was that it was part of a Commonwealth 
defence arrangement, it is probable that Indonesia might have seen 
a positive value in the contribution which Australian forces could 
make to the security of Malaysia. While Malik had stressed that it 
was not Indonesian Government policy to bring defence matters 
within the scope of ASEAN, it seemed that this did not rule out the 
possibility of Indonesia's participation in a loose arrangement 
with Malaysia for bilateral military cooperation, directed at 
Communist insurrection in the Kalimantan border area. 4 Thus, the 
support which the Australian Forces could provide for the 
Singaporean and Malaysian forces could only have proved beneficial 
to Indonesia, especially in view of Australian assurances that its 
military presence was not directed against any country in the 
Antara, 2 November 1968. 
2 	Refer to The Build-up of National Endurance in Developing 
Countries, Departemen Pertahanan, Jakarta, 1971, pp.2-6. 
3 	The Age, 22 March 1968. 
Armed Forces Courier, 13 March 1968. 
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region. 
Thus, upon his return from Indonesia in June 1968, Prime 
Minister Gorton was able to report to the National Press Club that 
he had secured Indonesia's acceptance of Australia's peaceful 
intentions and of any decision regarding an Australian contribution 
to the defence of Singapore and Malaysia after 1971. 1 However, 
Indonesia had been notably cautious in its views on the possibility 
of increased defence cooperation with Australia and, when Gorton 
suggested that Australia and Indonesia enter a non-aggression pact, 
the Indonesian reaction was, if anything, hostile. It reiterated 
its principle of independent and active foreign policy which 
prohibited Indonesia from entering any military pact. At the same 
time, it was argued in the Indonesian press that Australia's 
proposal of a non-aggression pact was directed against the revival 
of Indonesia as a military power in Southeast Asia. 2 The only 
outcome of Gorton's miscalculation of the position held by the 
Indonesian government on regional security was a rather ineffectual 
Cultural Agreement between Indonesia and Australia, 3 although, in 
the final joint communique, the Australian Prime Minister and 
President Suharto agreed that such a step in regional cooperation 
represented the best means of strengthening the national 
independence and integrity of Southeast Asian countries. 4 
It would appear, therefore, that the difference between 
Australian and Indonesian official approaches to regional security, 
was quite marked. Where Australia sought military cooperation with 
its neighbours in order to overcome its strategic concerns (for 
example, China), Indonesia saw the foundations of regional security 
1 	The Australian, 21 June 1968. 
2 	Merdeka, 15 June 1968. It has been argued by Allan Reid in 
The Gorton Experiment, Shakespeare Head Press, Sydney, 1971, 
pp.54-5, that John Gorton did fear, during his time as Prime 
Minister, that an economic revival by Indonesia might see 
it re-emerge as a military power in Southeast Asia, and 
therefore, as a threat to Australian security. 
3 	For a detailed examination of this agreement see J.A.C. 
Mackie's article, "The Cultural Agreement: Prospects and 
Possibilities", 	Quadrant, 	Vol. 	XIII, 	No.5, 
September-October, 1969, pp.117-127. 	This article is 
examined in detail in Chapter Six. 
4 	CNIA, Vol.39, No.6, 1968, p.233. 
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in greater economic cooperation with its neighbours. 1 The 
Indonesian Government emphasized that it hoped for greater economic 
cooperation between Australia and Indonesia in trade and technical 
matters, particularly sea and air communications, and indicated 
that Australia's industrial power could be used to develop West 
Irian. 2 
Even though the Indonesian Government dismissed the 
possibility of its involvement in defence pacts, it was evident 
that certain military elements in the government were of the 
opinion that the development of regional security cooperation could 
take the form of informal bilateral arrangements such as those 
which existed with Malaysia. 3 It was apparent that even Adam Malik 
did not rule out the possibility that bilateral cooperation within 
ASEAN might lead to closer defence and security cooperation, short 
of military alliances. 4 But this emphasis on developing informal 
approaches to the problem of regional security cooperation fell 
within the bounds of Indonesia's declared aversion to any kind of 
involvement in military pacts. It was designed to avoid any 
interpretation that Indonesia's rigid domestic anti-Communism stand 
and its hospitality to Western investment might invalidate its 
1 	Editorial, Kompas, 16 June 1968, cited in Bulletin 
(Indonesian Current Affairs Translation Service), Antara, 
Jakarta, 1968. 
2 	Jakarta Times, 16 June 1968. 
3 	See the statement made by General Panggabean in Kompas, 19 
January 1967. 
4 	Malik, Interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 
September 1968, pp.568-570. In this context, it might be 
noted that the Australian and Indonesian armed forces were 
already developing informal channels of communication. In 
February 1968, there was a resumption of the training of 
Indonesian army officers in Australia, a scheme which had 
been shelved during confrontation. In March, an Australian 
army spokesman presaged the development of a variety of 
contacts and forms of cooperation with Indonesia, including 
training visits by ships and aircraft and personnel. By 
May, a month before the Five Power talks on Southeast Asian 
defence questions were due to be held, a senior Indonesian 
official, Air Chief Marshall Roesmin Nurjadin, visited 
Australia. The Australian, 29 March 1968. 
100 
policy of neutrality. 1 
Thus, while in 1968 it was evident that some grounds for 
disagreement between Indonesia and Australia on the best means of 
promoting regional security still existed, there were indications 
that the latter was gradually moving towards a closer 
identification with the Indonesian position. When Gorton announced 
on 25 February 1969, that Australian forces would remain in 
Singapore and Malaysia, 2 he again stressed, as noted earlier, that 
their presence was not directed against any other country in the 
region and that they would remain in the area only as long as 
needed by the host governments. 3 Moreover, it was argued that by 
assisting the defence of one part of the region, it would 
Nevertheless, in July 1968, Malik was driven to deny reports 
that there was momentum towards turning ASEAN into a 
military alliance, and that three American military bases - 
- linked up with American military installations in 
Thailand, Australia and the Philippines -- were being built 
in Indonesia (Antara, 24 July 1968). Despite Malik's 
denials, rumours persisted that the USA had a strong 
military interest in ASEAN (eg) On 19 October 1968, during 
his election campaign for the presidency, Richard Nixon 
suggested that the Asian nations should look to developing 
regional defence pacts as 'buffers' between the major 
powers. While such rumours died out, they carried the 
interpretation (not lost on Jakarta) that Indonesia could 
only have viewed a more direct military involvement with 
Australia, a major ally of the USA, as detrimental to its 
objective of maintaining a non-aligned foreign policy 
stance. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.62, pp.33-37, 25 February 1969. 
3 	Ibid., p.36. The Sydney Morning Herald (28 February 1969) 
editorialized that the most significant reaction to Gorton's 
statement came from Jakarta, where a Foreign Ministry 
spokesman indicated that Indonesia would have no objection 
to the stationing of Australian Forces in Singapore and 
Malaysia. It alleged that this amounted to a statement by 
the Indonesian Government that it regarded Australia as a 
Southeast Asian power with legitimate regional defence 
interests, which were compatible with its own. Indonesia's 
lack of objections to the Australian military presence, 
however, hardly amounted to an uncritical endorsement of it. 
Yet, the Indonesian Government could hardly have mistaken 
the intent behind the Australian move. No matter what the 
military rationale of the Australian commitment, it was 
evident that it constituted the first step towards shaping 
a regional policy without reliance on the support of a major 
power. 
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indirectly contribute to regional stability as a whole. 1 This was 
re-inforced in April, when the Defence Minister, Fairhall, 
intimated that because the USA had indicated that it expected a 
greater defence contribution from the region, the Australian 
commitment to Malaysia and Singapore, was seen as 'laying the 
groundwork for a desirable, wider alliance of Southeast Asian 
nations... . 2 
Malik pursued the same theme following talks with Freeth in 
Jakarta during the same month, and it set the tone for subsequent 
discussions between the two governments for the next two years. 
While he reaffirmed that Indonesia saw no urgency to arrange a 
military pact in Southeast Asia, he hinted at the possibility that 
Indonesia and Australia might agree to cooperate in 'some sort of 
security arrangement to neutralize the area'. 3 Nevertheless, it 
appeared that Australia's increasing emphasis on economic 
development as the main foundation of political stability, clearly 
complemented the stated objectives of Indonesian foreign policy. 
Conclusion 
By the early 1970s, Australia's relationship with Indonesia 
held out great promise. However, there remained a tension at the 
heart of Australia's policy which was based on a strong desire to 
see Indonesia emerge as a stronger Southeast Asian power, but not 
one that would dominate the region. Indonesia continued to worry 
many Australians as being representative: 
of the threatening and unstable forces in South East 
Asia. It thus fitted the traditional Australian view of 
Asia as a hostile and unpredictable field for foreign 
policy, in which Australia, although eloquent about 
neighbourliness, could best serve its interests by 
alliances with outside powers. 4 
Australia continued to enjoy the friendship of those powers -- 
Britain and the USA -- but the assumptions of the Cold War period 
of the 1950s and 1960s had begun to crumble, and the global roles 
of these two major actors on the international stage began to fade. 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.62, p.36, 25 February 1967. 
2 	CNIA, Vol.40, No.4, 1969, p.130. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April 1969. 
4 	Bruce Grant in the Age, 17 August 1970. 
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Now, more than at any time in its history, Australia had to make 
its own way, develop its own policies, initiate and conduct its own 
diplomacy, and forge its own defence in an environment more 
benevolent but in which it was more a separate entity. 
Essentially, Australia was compelled to accommodate a more extreme 
form of independence. 
More than this, Australia's external relations had been based 
on what were considered, particularly with the USA and Britain, to 
be 'natural' alignments. They gave Australia the freedom to be 
comfortably embraced not only by their long-term interests but by 
their ethnic and ideological mores. However, Australia now faced 
the lonely and more difficult problems involved in forging and 
*maintaining alignments with states with whom it lacked ethnic, 
cultural or historical bonds, and from whom it could not expect any 
special consideration or tolerance. This would involve: 
clarify[ing] in our own minds just what these countries 
matter to us, if it is not primarily for reasons of 
security, what part they play in our broader foreign 
policy strategies and objectives, and how we fit into 
their policies likewise. Because of our excessive pre-
occupation with security and the British or American 
connection in the past, we have given far too little 
serious attention to these questions until recently. 1 
Such was the case with our relationship with Indonesia. It was, 
however, only when doubt was cast upon the security of these 
alignments in the late 1960s that the Australian Government was 
prepared to deepen its relationship with Indonesia. As we have 
seen, this gave rise to an improvement in relations during two 
distinct stages: the first coincided with the change of government 
in Indonesia for the purpose of peaceful coexistence; and the 
second was stimulated by the changing strategic situation in the 
region, which demanded practical regional cooperation. It was then 
that Australia, together with other western and Asian powers, 
participated in measures for the stabilization of Indonesia. 
The significance of the international pressures at work on 
Australia's foreign policy and of the changing direction of 
Australia-Indonesia relations at this time was to emerge during the 
conduct of Australia's policy on West New Guinea. Indeed, the 
Mackie, J.A.C., "Australia's Relations with Indonesia: 
Principles and Policies, I", Australian Outlook, Vol.28, 
No.1, 1974, p.10. 
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question of West New Guinea, as this once more came to the fore in 
1969, came at a time when the stability of Indonesia, now at a 
critical stage of its development, was seen to require a successful 
outcome of the 'Act of Free Choice'. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BILATERAL ACCOMMODATION: WEST IRIAN'S 'ACT OF FREE CHOICE'  
AND AUSTRALIA'S 'KOALA' PHILOSOPHY  
Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on Australia's West New Guinea policy between 
1965 and 1969, the year that the 'Act of Free Choice' was 
conducted. It is divided into three main sections. The first, as 
a way of background, briefly reviews the origins of the West New 
Guinea dispute, and its emergence as an international issue during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. Second, Australia's diplomacy 
throughout this period is examined. At first, for security 
reasons, the Australian Government gave strong public and 
diplomatic support to Dutch retention of the territory. However, 
it did not have the unequivocal support of the international 
community (including the USA) and, contrary to the declared 
objectives of its diplomacy, Australia slowly reconciled itself to 
the possibility of a settlement of the issue. By the early 1960s, 
Australia's diplomacy was outdistanced by events, and it had no 
effective choice other than to accept the unpalatable settlement 
structured under the auspices of the USA and the UN, including the 
final Dutch-Indonesian agreement's call for the Papuan people to 
experience an 'Act of Free Choice' by the end of 1969. 
Finally, we turn to an examination of Australia's West New 
Guinea policy between 1965 and 1969. While Jakarta's attitude on 
the 'Act of Free Choice' was at best equivocal, an important 
objective of Australian policy during this four-year period was the 
overriding need to cultivate good relations with the new Indonesia. 
In circumstances where Indonesia's resolve to acquire the former 
colony overshadowed the indigenous Papuan population's right to 
self-determination, the purpose of Australia's policy was to bring 
about a settlement basically favourable to Indonesia, in the hope 
that this would positively influence the course of Indonesia's 
evolving international development. 
The West New Guinea Question Under Sukarno: A Background  
Indonesian control over West Irian has never been uncontested. 
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Ever since Indonesia gained independence it has faced, at different 
levels, an Irian 'problem' of one kind or another. 1 Initially, the 
problem was the recovery of the province from the Dutch. Before 
the Second World War, the territory of Netherlands New Guinea was 
administered from Batavia (Jakarta) as an integral part of the 
colony of Netherlands India. Under Dutch law and practice, the 
western half of the island of New Guinea was Dutch colonial 
territory, although less explored than most other parts of the 
colony, and with a smaller proportion of the people under direct 
control of the colonial authorities. Apart from a small oil field 
centred at the port of Sorong, on the Bird's Head Peninsula, the 
Dutch derived little economic benefit from the territory. 
Following the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic, there 
were doubts within the counsels of the nationalist movement about 
the territorial extent of the Indonesian Republic, specifically on 
the questions of whether or not to include Irian Jaya, East Timor, 
the British territories in North Borneo and the Malay Peninsula. 
It was ultimately decided by the counsels that the Republic should 
have exactly the same boundaries as the Netherlands Indies. As 
Hastings explained: 
Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea ... rested on 
legitimacy. All that had formed part of the former 
Netherlands East Indies, including West New Guinea, 
belonged to the successor state - Indonesia. 2 
This view was not only held by the clearly anti-Dutch Republican 
forces, but also by leaders of the federalist states outside Java, 
which were set up under Dutch auspices and were much more 
sympathetic to Dutch interests. 
Initially, there was no indication that the Dutch regarded 
New Guinea as being different from other parts of their colony. 
However, by the end of 1946 there was growing pressure on them, 
especially from the Eurasian community, to set New Guinea aside 
from the rest of the colony, as a homeland for them. It was not 
until 1949, though, that the issue emerged as a major barrier 
separating the Dutch and Indonesian protagonists. As Mackie was to 
note thirty years later: 
The Dutch insistence on retaining possession of what they 
1 	For a sketch of the preceding 50 years see Hastings, P., New 
Guinea, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969, pp.200-201. 
2 	Hastings, P.,"West Irian - 1969", p.15. 
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called 'Dutch New Guinea' at the time of the 1949 Round 
Table Conference negotiations leading to Indonesian 
independence, for reasons of Dutch domestic politics and 
wounded amour propre, created a deadlock which was broken 
only by the unsatisfactory compromise decision to 
postpone further negotiations on the issue until 1950. 1 
None of the Dutch or Indonesian camps could agree on the status of 
the territory. The Dutch wanted it excluded from the soon to be 
established United States of Indonesia, while both the Republican 
and Federalists groups, for different reasons, wanted it included. 
Although discussions on the matter were postponed until after the 
United States of Indonesia had come into existence in 1949, 
agreement was not reached even then. 
During the next twelve years, de facto control of the 
territory remained with the Dutch. However, the Indonesians argued 
that de jure sovereignty rested with them, and that Dutch 
occupation of the region was illegal. As a result, successive 
Indonesian governments sought to have the territory returned to 
Indonesian de facto control. Initially, the claim was pursued by 
diplomatic means, but after these had consistently failed, and 
following the rise to power of Sukarno in the late 1950s, resort 
was then to military means. 2 However, the crucial turning point in 
the struggle was not any particular strategy adopted by Jakarta, 
but a change of attitude by the United States of America. Although 
a firm supporter of the Dutch position in the 1950s, the USA 
switched direction following the election of John F. Kennedy to the 
Presidency, and came out in favour of a transfer of the territory 
to Indonesia. An agreement to this effect was signed by the Dutch 
and Indonesian representatives in New York in August 1962, with the 
provision that the territory be administered by a United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) from October 1962 until 1 May 
1963. At the end of this seven month transitory period, the 
territory would be turned over to Indonesia, with the condition 
Mackie, J.A.C., "Does Indonesia Have Expansionist Designs 
on Papua New Guinea?", in May, R.J., (ed.) The Indonesian-
Papua New Guinea Border: Irianese Nationalism and Small  
State Diplomacy. Department of Political and Social Change 
Working Paper No.2, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 
August 1979, p.45. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Does Indonesia Have Expansionist Designs 
on Papua New Guinea?" p.45. 
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that a UN supervised 'Act of Free Choice' be held before the end of 
1969, in which the Irianese could determine whether or not they 
wished to remain part of Indonesia. 
Since 1963, Indonesia's main problem regarding its province 
was the management and administration and, in particular, the need 
to balance local needs and expectations against national ones. It 
appears that with some exceptions, the latter's interests and/or 
needs have generally been predominant. This is illustrated by the 
way in which the 'Act of Free Choice' was carried out in 1969. 
Judging by Suharto's declaration on 3 February 1969, before the 
manner of the 'Act of Free Choice' was announced, that secession 
would be considered as 'treason' to the Indonesian Republic, it 
seems that the 'New Order' Government, like Sukarno, never had the 
intention of allowing or tolerating opposition to West Irian's 
integration into Indonesia. The net result was a stage-managed, 
and often particularly heavy handed, set of 'consultations', the 
consequences of which were never in doubt. 1 
The Australian Position 
The Australian Government, from the time of Indonesian 
independence to the transfer of West Irian sovereignty in 1962-63, 
had supported the Dutch arguments for the retention of West New 
Guinea -- a position which had also been backed, although not 
unanimously, by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) •2  The 
government's first statement on the West Irian question was given 
to the Australian Parliament in 1950, when, on 9 March the then 
Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, giving his first 
statement on international affairs, made a brief reference to the 
island of New Guinea and, specifically, to the West New Guinea 
For an excellent account of these proceedings see Hastings, 
P., New Guinea, pp.220-231. This account is strongly based 
on his reporting, during 1968-69, on the 'Act' for the 
Australian. 
2 	For an account of this period, and of the conduct of 
Australian foreign policy see Mackie, J.A.C., "Australia and 
Indonesia, 1945-1960", in Greenwood, Gordon and Harper, 
Norman, (eds.), Australia in World Affairs, 1956-1960. 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963, pp.272-326; Beddie, D.B., 
"Australian Policy Towards Indonesia," pp.123-139; 
Albinski, H. S. , "Australia and the Dutch New Guinea Dispute," 
International Journal, 16, Autumn, 1969, pp.358-382. 
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issue as it had unfolded throughout the preceding months: In an 
argument that was coldly realistic and based on serious security 
concerns, Spender asserted that New Guinea was important to 
Australia's security and strategic situation. He subsequently 
endorsed this view three months later when, on 8 June 1950, he 
rejected Indonesia's territorial claims on the grounds that West 
New Guinea was distinct from Indonesia ethnically and 
developmentally, and revealed that any arrangements made by 
Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning the status of West New 
Guinea would involve Australia's 'direct and vital interests'. If 
such was the case, these 'interests [were] entitled to be 
considered' . 2 
Although Spender's successor, R. G. Casey, 3 urged that the 
West New Guinea question be kept in 'cold storage' 4 : 
He contested Indonesian legal claims to the territory, 
stressed the differences between the Papuans of West New 
Guinea, and the Indo-Malayans of the 'Indonesian 
islands'... and re-affirmed the strategic importance for 
Australia of the whole island of New Guinea.' 
Unfortunately, the West New Guinea issue could not be kept in 'cold 
storage' because, as Hastings rightly stated: 
PKI propaganda, outraged nationalism, relentless 
hostility to the Dutch and President Sukarno's own 
particular notions of grandeur combined to produce in 
Indonesia inexorable pressures which could not be satisfied 
with anything less than the return of the lost province. 6 
Tensions mounted in relations between Australia and Indonesia as 
Australia maintained her rigid pro-Dutch policy on the West New 
Guinea question. Yet, despite their differences, efforts were made 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.206, p.633, 9 March 1950. 
2 Ibid., Vol.208, pp.3922-3923, 
not secure any support to 
principal. 
8 June 1950. Australia did 
this claim to be a party 
3 	Casey succeeded Spender in 1951, with the latter's 
appointment to Washington as Australian Ambassador. 
4 	Grant, B., Indonesia, p.156. 
5 	Watt, A., The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938- 
1965. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, pp.252- 
253. 
6 	Hastings, P., "West Irian - 1969", p.15. 
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to stabilize the relationship between the two countries. It was in 
this context that Foreign Minister Subandrio visited Australia in 
1959 -- a visit that produced a joint statement which aroused much 
controversy in Australia. 
The main thrust of this statement was that, while differences 
were acknowledged between the two countries as to the West Irian 
situation 'if any agreement were reached between the Netherlands 
and Indonesia as parties principal, arrived at by peaceful 
processes and in accordance with internationally accepted 
procedures, Australia would not oppose such an agreement'. 1 The 
admission that Australia would not oppose such an agreement 
represented a considerable change in Australia's policy and brought 
the wrath of the press and the Parliament down upon the 
government. 2 Although a shift in policy was denied by the 
government in the intervening period, Menzies made a visit to 
Indonesia, reaffirming the thrust of the original communique. By 
this time, it seemed that Australia was prepared to accept a 
decision by negotiation, whatever that decision might be, in return 
for firm promises that the matter would not be settled 'by force or 
threats of force'. 3 
In the following eighteen months until the August 1962 
Agreement, developments in the West New Guinea issue were crucial 
to Australia's relations with Indonesia. At one level the 
Indonesians were insisting that the United States keep out of the 
affair, while seeking massive injections of Soviet military aid. 
On another, the Dutch, under a newly elected conservative 
government, moved in association with the UN toward accelerating 
the process of self-government for their colony. Australia 
continued its line, recognizing Netherlands' sovereignty, while 
supporting self-determination. It also opposed Indonesian 
Quoted in Watt, A., The Evolution of Australian Foreign 
Policy, p.254. 
2 	See the Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 1959; 18 February 
1959; the Age, 19 February 1959; the Courier Mail, 16 
February 1959, 21 February 1959. The statement was debated 
in the Australian Parliament on 24 February. CPD, H.R., 
Vol.22, 24 February 1959, pp.194-219. 
3 	Greenwood, G., "Australian Foreign Policy in Action", in 
Greenwood, Gordon and Harper, Norman, (eds.), Australia in 
World Affairs 1961-1965 Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, p.88. 
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objectives unless they could be achieved by peaceful means together 
with a deliberate choice on the part of the indigenous peoples. 1 
By mid-August 1962 the Dutch were: 
faced by Indonesian armed forces strengthened by Soviet 
weapons; unsupported by any military alliance with 
Australia; and seemingly aware that their two NATO 
allies, the United States and Great Britain, were 
determined not to burn their fingers in the fire of such 
an internationally unpopular and, to them, relatively 
unimportant issue. 2 
Under such conditions the Dutch yielded to Indonesian demands. 
They signed an agreement with the Indonesians which amounted to an 
Indonesian takeover of power as from 1 May 1963, following an 
interim period of seven months under UN supervision. It was under 
this agreement that Indonesia undertook to hold the 'Act of Free 
Choice' by the end of 1969. That the Australian Government saw no 
alternative other than to acquiesce in the wishes of the 
Indonesians, was succinctly placed in its proper perspective by 
Grimshaw when he wrote: 
The West New Guinea situation confronted the government 
with a dilemma which went to the heart of the 
difficulties of Australian foreign policy - the choice of 
abandoning its own policy or of attempting to sustain it 
without the support of its great allies ... the 
exigencies of great power politics required Australia to 
accept a distasteful solution to the West New Guinea 
dispute. 3 
Australia's then Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield 
Barwick, defended the government's West New Guinea policy. In 
doing so, however, he indicated, quite correctly, that Australia 
had few options in the matter. As he argued in the House of 
Representatives on 21 August 1962: 
If [either party] should have contemplated a military 
adventure, it is worth remembering that none of the 
countries of the West, and particularly of those with 
whom Australia has the closest association, were at any 
relevant time willing to maintain a Netherlands 
administration by military means. 4 
1 	Greenwood, G., "Australian Foreign Policy in Action", p.89. 
2 	Watt, A., The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, p.256. 
3 	Grimshaw, C., "Problems of Australian Foreign Policy, 
January-June 1962", The Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Vol.8, No.2, November 1962, p.139 and p.142. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.36, p.517, 21 August 1962. 
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Marr, in his biography of Barwick, later reflected that: 
West Irian marked the end of the Australian assumption, 
which had operated since the war, that the United States' 
support for Australia was somehow automatic. Despite 
years of friendship, despite the ANZUS treaty, and 
despite the ties of language and blood, the United States 
had refused to help and had sided with Indonesia. 1 
Clearly the USA did not view favourably a continued Dutch presence 
in West New Guinea. Under these circumstances, and with Indonesia 
adopting an increasingly aggressive 'confrontation' tactic, 
Australia could not resist American pressures. However, although 
the policy volte face was due to those pressures, Barwick attempted 
in the Australian Parliament and at the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) to play down the negative implications that such a 
decision could have in terms of West New Guinea's right to self-
determination, and stressed the plebiscitary provision of the 
August 1962 Dutch-Indonesian Agreement. 2 
However, by November 1962, it became clear that Indonesia had 
a different view, with Indonesian indications that the takeover 
from the interim UN administration should take place before the 
agreed date. This led to the Indonesian view, by mid-1965, that 
there should not be a Papuan act of self-determination at all. 
Indonesia then: 
imposed a 'political quarantine' on West Irian, banning 
all except approved political activity, in order to 
'eliminate the remnants of colonialism in the province', 
as the Co-ordinator for West Irian Affairs subsequently 
put it. Rights of free speech, of movement, or assembly, 
were, if anything, even more severely curtailed in West 
Irian than in the rest of Indonesia under Sukarno's 
guided democracy'. By May 1965, Sukarno also announced 
that the agreed-to Papuan 'act of free choice' was no 
longer necessary. 3 
Meanwhile, the fact that the Australian Government still placed 
great store in the plebiscite was clearly reflected in late 
November 1962 when Menzies responded to questioning in the House of 
1 	Marr, D., Barwick, George Allan Unwin, Sydney, 1980, p.174. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.36, p.517, 21 August 1962. See also extract 
of his statement to the UNGA in the XVIIth Session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (New York), 21 
September 1962, UN Documents, A/PV.1127, pp.98-99. 
3 	van der Kroef, J.M., "Australia and West Irian: 	The 
Obsequious Silence", Quadrant, Vol.13, 1969, p.73. 
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Representatives on 'the projected plebiscite of 1969'. In 
expecting that the Dutch-Indonesian agreement would be adhered to 
he considered that 'the idea that the plebiscite should be 
abandoned is one that strikes directly across the whole principle 
for which this Parliament has stood, and which was acknowledged in 
the agreement made between the parties and approved by the United 
Nations'. 1 
However, with 'confrontation' being mounted by Sukarno, 
Canberra was careful not to provoke Indonesia unduly, especially 
not over the New Guinea issue. In late 1964 and early 1965, 
Australia-Indonesia relations came under stress as a result of 
Sukarno's policy regarding Malaysia. In early 1965, there was 
speculation in the Australian press that Indonesia's formal 
withdrawal from the UN would precipitate Indonesian announcements 
to the effect that it no longer felt bound by the plebiscitary 
requirement. Such a prospect led to the Opposition Leader, 
Whitlam, asking External Affairs Minister Hasluck what 
contingencies the Australian Government had made to ensure that 
Indonesia would fulfil its undertakings to the United Nations. 
Although Hasluck stressed that the government still expected the 
Indonesians to fulfil their obligations, he went on 'to take up one 
small point': 
The obligation for an act of self-determination in West 
Irian might perhaps be paraphrased as an obligation to 
carry out an act of ascertainment. I think 'self-
determination' does not mean the holding of some sort of 
plebiscite or direct consultation with the people in that 
manner. I am doubtful whether the documents would 
justify that view. There certainly has to be an act of 
ascertainment -- some sort of attempt to consult the 
people -- but the documents are not, perhaps, as strong 
on the means of self-determination as originally we would 
have liked them to be. 2 
Throughout this period, the West New Guinea problem brought two 
important Australian foreign policy principles into conflict. The 
first centred on the Government's concern with Australia's security 
and, because of the dominant Australian perception of the 
importance of the area to Australia's security, that of the island 
of New Guinea. The second related to promoting good relations with 
CPD, H.R., Vol.37, p.2707, 29 November 1962. 
2 	CPD, Vol.45, p.325 1 25 March 1965. 
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the countries of Southeast Asia -- not least, with Indonesia. 
Until the Subandrio visit in 1959, Australia tried with difficulty 
to achieve these dual objectives. The quandary -- where the weight 
of concern with security competed with the object of strengthening 
the relationship with Indonesia -- gave rise to confusion, and 
throughout the 1950s there was little certainty about the policy or 
about what it was likely to be. Moreover, Australia's West New 
Guinea policy reflected a mistaken assumption about Indonesia's 
underlying and sustained attitude to its claims on the territory. 
For Indonesia, West New Guinea: 
exemplified ... the imperialist influences which Sukarno 
was determined to expunge from Indonesia's environment 
[this]... was almost certainly reinforced by the recent 
experience of regional rebellion. Moreover, it could be 
argued that as long as the Dutch retained control of the 
territory, a threat would be posed to the integrity of 
the socially diverse and distended archipelagic state. 1 
The West New Guinea Question and the 'New Order'  
The question of self-determination was raised again following 
Indonesia's return to the UN in 1966. 2 During his trip to 
Indonesia later that year, Hasluck sought, and was given, an 
assurance by Foreign Minister Malik that Indonesia recognized the 
obligation it had incurred under the UN Agreement and intended to 
comply with it. 3 Malik, however, was driven to reaffirm his 
assurances in December when the Indonesian Home Affairs Minister, 
Lt. General Basuki Rachmat, not only put the view that the 
plebescite would not be held, but also that this was in accordance 
Leifer, M., Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p.61. 
2 	For an account of the rising tensions within WNG, and of 
foreign press accounts, see van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia 
Since Sukarno, pp.129-132. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol. 53, p.2380, 28 October 1966. In February 
1966, before the emergence of the 'New Order', the Secretary 
Coordinator for West Irian Affairs, Dr Legowo, announced 
that the proclamation of Indonesia's independence on August 
1945 signified the inclusion of West Irian in the Republic 
of Indonesia and that, consequently, the question of the 
'act of ascertainment of the wishes of the people of West 
Irian did not arise'. The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February 
1966. 
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with the wishes of the people themselves. 1 Within days of Malik 
counter-announcing that the 1962 Agreement would be adhered to, the 
Provincial Council of West New Guinea adopted a resolution 
rejecting a plebiscite. 2 
This gave rise to international concern that effective control 
over the territory's representative institutions or spokesmen would 
continue to prevent an untrammeled expression of Papuan opinion. 
However, in the following months Indonesian officials reiterated 
that the Papuans would be given a chance to express their political 
wishes, although a strong degree of ambiguity began to emerge in 
Indonesian pronouncements. The chief Indonesian delegate to the 
UN, Ruslan Abdulgani, said in early 1967 that although the 
inhabitants of West Irian would be permitted to decide whether or 
not they wished to remain in Indonesia, the agreement did not 
provide for a 'referendum' in the territory, only that 'the wishes 
of the people be heard'. 3 This stand was fortified by Indonesia's 
Ambassador to Australia, Major-General Kosasih, when, at a Press 
Conference in Port Moresby in mid-April, he argued that while 
Indonesia would 'fulfil every agreement made with other countries 
under the United Nations' regarding the West New Guinea question, 
the word 'plebiscite' did not appear in the original agreement. 4 
Nonetheless, Malik pressured Suharto to agree to carry out the 
act at a time when the fledgling government was vulnerable to the 
pro-nationalist stance adopted by Sukarno so successfully in the 
1950s and early 1960s. 5 In domestic terms, the West New Guinea 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 December 1966. 
2 	Ibid. The Provincial Council of West New Guinea was a 
proto-legislative body; its membership had been 
reconstituted under Indonesian supervision during the 1963- 
64 period. 
3 	The Straits Times, 7 January 1967. 
4 	The Sydney Morninq Herald, 17 April 1967. 
5 	van der Kroef argued that the domestic context provided some 
of the answers. van der Kroef's thesis centred on Suharto's 
political position and 'the long time volatility of the West 
New Guinea issue in domestic Indonesian politics', and his 
tactic to follow a Sukarnoist philosophy that had worked so 
successfully -- vis-a-vis China and his own domestic 
position. It is certainly plausible that certain elements 
of the new Suharto government especially from the military 
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question, if not handled properly, could be used by Suharto's 
critics to topple him. Hence, for Malik, vacillation would only 
contribute to this prospect. However, Malik's other, and perhaps 
more powerful argument centred on the international dimension of 
the West New Guinea question and Indonesia's thirst for 
international respectability. This search was based on the 
restoration of economic stability which itself was based on an 
agreement for assistance. Malik and Suharto were compelled, 
therefore, to elevate arguments for international respectability 
above the domestic constraints, and go along with the 'Act of Free 
Choice'. 
In addition, there was the continued but subtle pressures 
being applied by Australian Government leaders. A case in point 
was Hasluck, who assured the House of Representatives towards the 
middle of 1967 that Indonesia would honour its obligations under 
the treaty. Moreover: 
We have to accept, and we do accept, those statements at 
their face value and place our confidence in the good 
faith of the Indonesian Government by accepting that it 
will carry out its obligations under the treaty. So far 
as I am aware, the exact procedures that will be followed 
in making this act of ascertainment have not been 
declared plainly by the Indonesian Government. 1 
Debate on the West New Guinea question continued in a state of flux 
for the remainder of 1967 and most of 1968. In fact, it was not 
until November 1968 that the matter of West New Guinea's 
self-determination was again under the scrutiny of the Australian 
Government. It was also clear at this time that Suharto had been 
convinced that the 'Act of Free Choice' should go ahead. 
In response to a question that called for an explanation for 
the role of the UN in the plebiscite, Hasluck propounded the view 
that the 'responsibility' of the plebiscite rested upon 'the 
Secretary General of the United Nations', and that he sustained 
'reasonable confidence' that the 'Act of Free Choice' would be 
carried out. 2 In the event, on 26 February 1969, the Indonesian 
wing of the government, favoured ignoring the 'Act of Free 
Choice'. van der Kroef, J.M., Indonesia Since Sukarno, 
p.135. 
CPD, H.R., Vol.55, p.2138, 16 May 1967. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.61, p.3022, 20 November 1968. 
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Deputy Foreign Minister for West Irian Affairs, Sudjarwo 
Tjondronegoro announced a process to implement the 'Act of Free 
Choice' . 1 
There were two elements to the procedures which he envisaged. 
Essentially, the method of ascertainment would be through 
consultation (musyawarah) between the Indonesian Government and 
appointed 'tribal' leaders. Broadly speaking, special consultative 
assemblies would be formed in each of the eight regencies 
(Kabupaten) of West Irian. One delegate for every 750 persons in 
the regency -- with populations that vary from 35 000 to 165 000 
people -- would constitute these assemblies. However, they were 
not elected. Instead, they were made up of Indonesian appointed 
members of legislative councils in each regency, supplemented by 
tribal chiefs, persons chosen by those groups themselves and 
representatives from lower districts. 2 Although the second element 
1 In the preceding months Indonesian officials went to great 
lengths to secure the UN's blessing for the proposal. 
Particularly active was the Special Assistant to the Foreign 
Minister (Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro), who, in June 1968, had 
obtained in New York, an 'understanding' that the impending 
'Act of Free Choice' was Indonesia's 'sole responsibility'. 
By January 1969 (in both New York and The Hague), the 
Special Assistant had obtained approval for Indonesia's 
system for the 'Act of Free Choice'. See GAOR, Twenty-
fourth Session (1969), Annexes, A/7723, Report of the 
Secretary-General regarding the act of self-determination 
in West Irian, Annex II, "Report of the Indonesian 
Government to the Secretary-General concerning the conduct 
and results of the act of free choice in West Irian, 
pursuant to article XXI of the New York Agreement of 1962" 
(hereafter Annex II, A/7723), p.23 and p.26. 
2 	van der Kroef, J.M., "Australia and the West Irian Problem", 
Asian Survey, VX, No.6, June 1970, p.484. Initial 
consultations with the representative councils of the eight 
regencies took place between 22 March and 12 April 1969. 
While teams of UN observers were present at these sessions 
(including Ortiz), they had no role in any preparations for 
the election of the membership of the consultative 
assemblies. This task lay essentially with the committees 
of the existing representative councils. Moreover, the UN 
observer team was present at the election of only 195 
members (out of 1 026) of the consultative assemblies. See 
GAOR, Twenty-fourth Session (1969), Annexes, A/7723, Report 
of the Secretary-General regarding the act of self-
determination in West Irian, Annex I, "Report by the 
Representative of the Secretary-General in West Irian, 
submitted under Article XXI. paragraph 1, of the Agreement 
between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)" 
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of the procedure involved a separate deliberation of these 
assemblies, followed by mutual discussion to reach the goal of 
consensus (mufakat) as to whether or not to remain under Indonesian 
contro1, 1 on the evidence van der Kroef considered 'there was no 
voting, and the Indonesians exercised a controlling supervisory 
influence.' 2 So, between 14 July and 2 August 1969 the collective 
membership of the eight assemblies -- 1 026 persons -- would decide 
the fate of 750 000 Papuans in West Irian (this is examined in 
detail later). 
If Hasluck's statement to the House of Representatives in 
November 1968 reflected a policy not to be involved in any 
opposition to the method by which Indonesia chose to comply with 
the 1962 Agreement, then his successor, Gordon Freeth, further 
defended that procedure in February 1969. In a speech to a Young 
Liberals' Convention, Freeth put the view that while a plebiscite 
seemed 'the perfectly normal way to determine the wishes of the 
people' this was not particularly the case for the Indonesian 
people. For Freeth: 
the state of advancement of many indigenous people of 
West Irian is fairly primitive, [and]... they would 
barely understand what an act of self-determination was. 
So there are real difficulties if you try to adapt this 
one man, one vote idea of getting an intelligent decision 
from people. The Indonesians have a system of 
consultation and consensus in their own country which 
they have lived by for centuries. I think the rest of 
the world has to understand the great store the 
Indonesians set by this kind of process. 3 
The Australian Government's position had certainly come some 
distance from Spender's 'vital interest' arguments and Casey's 
attempt to put the question of West New Guinea into 'cold storage'. 
However, Barwick's subsequent defence of the 1962 Agreement -- and 
(hereafter Annex I, A/7723), pp.13-14. 
For a background to this question see Hastings, P., "West 
Irian -1969", p.12 ff. 
2 	van der Kroef, J.M., "Australia and the West Irian Problem", 
p.484. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 1969. For strong 
criticism of this line, see Mortimer, M., "The New Guinea 
Race", Contemporary Review, June 1969, pp.324-325. 
118 
the proposition 'that the indigenous people should have their 
choice of their future° -- had fallen away to Hasluck's belief 
that 'some sort of attempt to consult' the West Irianese only 
should be made, and this marked a course towards a new Australian 
realism. Nonetheless, underlying this pragmatism was evidence that 
Australian doubts about the validity of an act of 
self-determination were surfacing at a time when the staging of any 
act of self-determination in West Irian was being put increasingly 
in doubt by Indonesian policies. Freeth's refusal to reflect on 
Jakarta's form of consultation was the inevitable culmination of 
this process of reappraisal. But while the force majeure argument 
inherent in policy statements of the late 1960s, which were related 
directly to Australia's own national interests, may have been 
compelling, these policies were not without criticism, which came 
from many other quarters. 2 
At the international level, dissatisfaction was expressed by 
the UN's representative, Dr Frans Ortiz Sanz. 3 In a report to the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in November 1969, Dr Ortiz 
recorded Indonesia's rejection of the one man, one vote system in 
the 'Act of Free Choice'; and of his suggestion that he had a role 
to play in informing the people on the method of collective 
consultations in circumstances where the one man, one vote notion 
was not applicable. 4 Added criticism came from the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, Dr Luns, who was compelled to say that the procedure 
seemed to be 'a very one sided voting exercise', 5 and in 
consultations with Malik in Rome, in May 1969, he addressed 'the 
course of events' taking place in West New Guinea. ° 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.36, p.516, 21 August 1962. 
2 	van der Kroef, J.M., "Australia and the West Irian Problem", 
p.485. 
3 	Ortiz, a Bolivian, was appointed on 1 April 1968 as 
Secretary-General Thant's representative to participate in 
arrangements for the 'Act of Free Choice'. For biographical 
details see the Sydney Morning Herald, 28 May 1969. 
4 	Annex I, A/7723, p.9. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 1969. 
6 	Annex II, A/7723, p.30. 
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At the regional and domestic levels, West Irianese, granted 
permissive residence in West New Guinea, were critical of the 
'musyawarah' concept, and demanded that coastal areas in West Irian 
be permitted to exercise their act of free choice on a one man, one 
vote basis. 1 Meanwhile, on 21 May 1969, thirteen members of the 
Papua New Guinea House of Assembly were critical that Indonesia 
should conduct the 'Act of Free Choice'. This action brought down 
a rebuke from Barnes, the Australian External Territories Minister, 
who pointed out that the 'Act of Free Choice' was not a matter to 
concern the House of Assembly and that the territory's 
international relations were in any case, the province of the 
Australian Parliament. 2 
The Australian press was especially critical, some attacking 
Indonesian policies in particular, 3 while others were critical of 
Freeth. The Age, for instance, found the selection of a handful of 
tribal and district leaders to speak on behalf of the West Irianese 
population quite cynical, and considered the Australian 
Government's stand, unnecessarily justified by the responsible 
Minister, as: 
a new example of what used to be called the 'Koala Line' 
[which] suggests that Australian foreign policy is so 
dominated by terror of our neighbours. We are so anxious 
to be cuddled that we overlook the bombing and machine 
gunning of Papuan rebels in Irian and leap to the defence 
of Indonesia for not carrying out a common-roll 
election... the most fitting comment we could make would 
be complete silence. There are times when silence can be 
maladroit... There are other times when it can be 
preferable to hypocrisy. 4 
Others saw Freeth as elevating the gains from good post-1965 
relations with Indonesia above the risks associated with having an 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 1969. 	Mortimer 
considered such a vote would prove embarrassing to the 
Indonesians as the coastal majority was strongly anti-
Indonesian following 'years of neglect, corruption, broken 
promises, and suppression in the form of bombing, beating 
and shooting'. Mortimer, R., "The New Guinea Race", pp.324- 
325. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 and 23 July 1969. 
3 	The Australian, 14 January 1969. 
4 	The Age, 21 February 1969. 
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independent but economically weak West New Guinea to our north, 
even though a one man, one vote system would be universally 
preferable to the method chosen by Indonesia. 1 
At a press conference in April 1969, Freeth responded to such 
criticism with the observation that Indonesians had been 
conditioned from 1948 onwards to believe that West Irian belonged 
to them and that the issue was still a highly emotive one in 
Indonesia. He further argued: 
The present government has inherited this legacy. They 
have got to exercise a fair amount of political skill in 
Indonesia itself and statements made in Indonesia for 
home consumption are probably comparable to statements 
made by some newspaper editors in Australia ... and you'd 
[sic] place as much reliance on them in Indonesia from 
inside as I hope the Indonesians place on some of our 
editorials. We, I think, have got to show that we 
understand the present difficulties of the Indonesian 
Government and the fact that they are genuinely complying 
in their own way with the New York Agreement. 2 
The strong element of realpolitik in this statement stood in sharp 
contrast to the moral considerations which the press argued should 
have been paramount. However, the latter was able to adopt its 
highly moral position precisely for the reason that it was 
unwilling to concede that, realpolitik considerations aside, there 
was very little for Australia to protest about. 
Freeth laid the foundations for this interpretation in the 
House of Representatives in February when he said that while 
Indonesia was obligated to go through with the 'Act of Free 
Choice', no method was laid down for it in the New York Agreement. 3 
With the debate widening to the Senate, the Government stressed 
that, notwithstanding this lack of guidance in the Agreement, 
Indonesia had responded promptly and positively to Dr. Sanz's 
recommendations for a one man, one vote system; in any event, the 
whole process 'was properly in the hands of the Indonesian 
Government, and the Secretary-General and his representative in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1962 agreement between 
1 	See, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 
1969. 
2 	CNIA, Vol.40, No.4, April 1969, pp.160-161. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.67, p.156, 25 February 1969. 
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Indonesia and the Netherlands'. 1 Clearly, Freeth was fortifying in 
the Parliament his intention, established in February, not to be 
drawn into a controversy over West Irian. As far as he was 
concerned, by late March: 
[UN] supervision is being provided. The agreement does 
not specify the way in which the act of self- 
determination is to be carried out. It contains no 
reference to a vote as such. So far as we are aware the 
Government of Indonesia is meeting its obligations under 
the agreement ... So far as we know they are being 
carried out. 2 
Towards the end of April, Freeth visited Jakarta. Ostensibly, the 
trip was to enable Australia and Indonesia to hold discussions on 
big power involvement in the Indian Ocean, and the implications for 
the two countries of the planned British withdrawal. On West Irian 
and Indonesia's plans he was to declare that 'we can understand the 
difficulties of applying ... one man, one vote. We understand that 
this would be impossible'. 3 Moreover, he endorsed the Indonesian's 
handling of the situation as 'sound', 4 and stressed that as long as 
Indonesia carried out the Act 'honourably' in compliance with the 
New York Agreement, then Australia could not criticise it. 5 
However, within two weeks of his return, Freeth adopted a more 
qualified position, denying at a National Press Club luncheon in 
Canberra that he had approved the 'Act of Free Choice' planned by 
the Indonesians. Freeth was careful to record that while the 
Australian Government recognized Indonesia's system of musjawarah, 
it did not imply any commitment or approval of how such a process 
was to be applied when the act of self-determination took place in 
the middle of the year. Moreover, and in what was clearly an 
attitude that contrasted with his views in Jakarta, Freeth 
expressed the view that the practice and functions of diplomacy had 
guided Australia's attitude towards Indonesia in the past and that 
1 	Ibid., Senate, Vol.40, 18 March 1969, p.386. 
2 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.62, p.818, 25 March 1969. 
3 	The Age, 28 April 1969. 
4 	The Australian, 28 April 1969. 
5 	The Age, 28 April 1969. 
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'this continues to be our approach today.' 1 
This drew a great deal of criticism from the floor of the 
Press Club, with questions focusing on Freeth's 'expressed 
approval' of the 'Act of Free Choice', variously described as 
representing 'hard-headed pragmatism' and 'political expediency'. 
However, Freeth maintained that to understand what was taking place 
in West New Guinea was not to mean approval: 
The Australian Government recognizes the system of 
musjawarah which is an age-old process of consultation 
... That doesn't imply any commitment or approval of how 
that process is going to be applied ... I merely 
expressed the view that we understand the process they 
are about to apply. 2 
While it was clear Freeth was trying to fortify the government's 
position in the face of emerging public criticisms of their 
policies, the rationale behind Freeth's new circumspection grew 
from three areas: incursions into Australian New Guinea by the 
Indonesian military on April 26; the growing problem of Papuan 
border crossers from West Irian; and dissension within the 
Australian Cabinet over policies toward Indonesia. For Freeth, the 
border incursions, whilst not comparable to the issues Australia 
faced during confrontation, carried the seeds of potential 
disharmony between the two countries. Moreover, and perhaps in 
direct reference to the conflict within Cabinet, 3 if Australia were 
to be 'too heavy-handed, these seeds could quite easily grow to 
critical size. 14 
This criticism was also evident in the Australian Parliament. 
In the Senate, Senator Georges, promptly upon Freeth's return from 
Jakarta in April, provocatively questioned whether the government's 
actions were intended to 'placate Indonesia' and whether Australia 
1 	CNIA, Vol.40, No.5, May 1969, p.240. 
2 	Ibid., P.242. 
3 	The main protagonists here were the Minister for External 
Territories, Barnes, who advocated a tougher line with 
Jakarta, and Freeth, whose critics were beginning to find 
his attitude all too accommodating towards Indonesia. This 
conflict reflected Australia's post-1962 problems of 
maintaining a pragmatic ambivalence in its policies toward 
the West New Guinea question. 
4 	The Australian, 17 May 1969. 
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was 'as subservient to Indonesia as it is to America in matters of 
foreign policy.' 1 Events in the Parliament throughout May reached 
a point where, in an adjournment debate on 29 May, Freeth felt he 
was compelled to 'bring [Members] back to a sense of reality in 
this matter. 12 Moreover, 'in the interests of maintaining good 
relations with a large neighbour we should at least give the 
Indonesians the benefit of the doubt and await events as they turn 
out 1 . 3 Freeth continued this line, in the face of rising 
criticism, into the months preceding the West New Guinea plebiscite 
(14 July - 2 August 1969), sustaining the view that Australia had 
to make allowances for Indonesia's conduct of the plebiscite, just 
as Indonesia, in view of the place of West New Guinea in its 
history, had made allowances in conducting the Act at al1. 4 
Whatever the wisdom of his pragmatism, two interrelated 
factors were instrumental in shaping Freeth's inflexible policy 
position, and the groundswell of criticisms. The first centred on 
the West New Guinea Papuan refugees and border crossers and the 
second related to the effect this had on opinion, both public and 
official, in Australian New Guinea, more particularly in terms of 
Pan-Papuanism. Such factors5 were to deepen the Australian 
Government's dilemma for, as Hastings observed in early 1969, the 
border crossers were not only destabilizing 'relations with 
Indonesia ... their comings and goings were also bedeviling 
relations, surely but slowly within New Guinea itself.' 6 
Refugees or Border Crossers? 
From 1965 there was an increase in the movement of 
border-crossers from West New Guinea into Papua New Guinea. The 
Australian Government responded to this quandary, and to problems 
1 	CPD, Senate, Vol.41, 29 April 1969, p.1020. 
2 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.63, p.2554, 29 - 30 May 1969. 
3 	Ibid., p.2555. 
4 	Text of television interview of 15 July in Perth, Western 
Australia, in CNIA, Vol.40, No.7, July 1969, pp.398-399. 
5 	It is intended only to examine the refugee and border 
crosser issues. 
6 	The Australian, 28 March 1969. 
124 
in West New Guinea generally, by playing it down, and adopting a 
hard policy line on crossers 	even the once tolerated traditional 
crossers. Throughout the next four years the issues to emerge 
related to the political and economic grievances of the crossers 
and whether any anti-Indonesian activities were based in Australian 
New Guinea. These issues gave rise to a number of border incidents 
of potentially serious proportions, as well as the creation of 
liaison arrangements between Australia and Indonesia to resolve 
them. 
Under the Dutch administration, border crossings were few and, 
therefore, not a political problem. 1 However, between 1963 when 
the Indonesians formally took over West New Guinea2 and the end of 
1966, when the anti-Indonesian Papuan resistance began to take 
form, nearly 600 West Irianese had crossed into Australian 
territory. 3 In 1967 there were 866, in 1968, another 801, and a 
further 350 by May 1969, when Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam 
Malik, charged that there were 'indications' that Papuan refugees 
in Australian territory, near the border, were being trained for 
subversion in West Irian. 4 
Initial Australian and Indonesian responses tended to 
emphasize the accidental nature of the crossings. At first, the 
Australian Government tended to portray them as traditional 
movements, inducing the West Papuans to return to West New Guinea, 
whilst granting permissive residence to a small number who sought 
asylum on humanitarian grounds. In the words of Hasluck in mid-
1967: 
The reason for most of these movements [in 1963] was that 
it had been customary for people to move backwards and 
van der Kroef, J.M., "Australia and the West Irian Problem," 
p.492. 
2 	May, R.J., "Living With A Lion. 	Public Attitudes and 
Private Feelings", in May, R.J., (ed.), The Indonesian-Papua 
New Guinea Border, p.81. May considered that the inflow of 
West Papuan nationalists into Papua New Guinea following the 
transfer was 'immediate'. 
3 	See Nyamekye, Kwasi and Premdas, R.P., "Papua New Guinea 
Perceptions on the Border; Internal Pressures and Policies" 
Iii May, Ron, (ed.), The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border, p.66. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.63, p.2315, 28 May 1969. 
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forwards in this country, and it was not until the 
meaning of an international border was explained to them, 
with some patience and care, by both the Indonesian 
authorities and the Australian administrative 
authorities, that they became aware there was a border. 1 
However, such movement across the border into Australian New Guinea 
intensified with the upsurge of indigenous resistance in West New 
Guinea to Indonesian rule. This coincided with the pursuit of 
Irianese across the border by Indonesian military patrols, the 
cause of many incidents. Yet as Verrier pointed out: 
Along with the 
the Australian 
1967, to avoid 
line on border 
which had been 
troubles in West New Guinea as a whole, 
Government played this down [and], from 
embarrassing Indonesia, took a tougher 
crossings even of the traditional kind 
tolerated in the past. 2 
In the face of mounting opinion in Australia, arising from the 
announcement of the 'Act of Free Choice', Hasluck was compelled to 
again insist that the border-crossings amounted only to traditional 
family and tribal movements, and put the view that such crossings 
'had no connection with political developments in West Irian'. 3 
Meanwhile the Indonesians were arguing that many of these Irianese 
did not know exactly the location of the borders separating their 
own territory from those under Australian administration. They 
stressed particularly that those Irianese who did leave West Irian 
for the Australian controlled areas must have done so for no reason 
other than economic. 4 Whether the crossings were due to custom, 
economic or, as Hasluck pointed out, employment reasons, he gave 
assurance that if the Irianese were to lay a claim for political 
asylum, then it would be carefully considered. 5 
On 26 April 1969, the new Foreign Minister, Gordon Freeth 
continued the stand of his predecessors with the view that, 
Ibid., Vol.55, p.1579, 2 May 1967. 
2 	Verrier, JR., Australia, Papua New Guinea and the West New 
Guinea Question 1949-69, Ph.D. thesis, Department of 
Politics, Monash University, 1976, pp. 366-367, quoted in 
May, R.J., "Living with a Lion. Public Attitudes and 
Private Feelings" in May, Ron, (ed. ), The Indonesia-Papua  
New Guinea Border, p.81. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.60, p.443, 22 August 1968. 
4 	Antara, 2 July 1968. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vo1.60, p.443, 22 August 1968. 
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although he recognized that the activities of border-crossers had 
intensified, they were 'not likely to be political troublemakers' 
and arrangements with the Indonesian Grwc./.11mont about them had 
'been worked out very satisfactorily': Yet, this seemed at odds 
with the views that were emerging in official circles in Papua New 
Guinea. In late 1968, close scrutiny in the House of Assembly of 
the Administration's border policy gave rise to the admission by 
the secretary for law that not only was there an escalation in the 
number of camps on the Papua New Guinea side of the border, but 
also that they were cells with the potential for political 
activity. This prompted the administration to instruct the 
refugees that they should return to Indonesian territory. 2 
On the day Freeth made this statement, 79 West Irianese 
refugees crossed from West Irian into Australian New Guinea (West 
Sepik district) with armed uniformed Indonesians bearing down on 
them. External Territories Minister Barnes confirmed, in the House 
of Representatives on 30 April, that the small group of Indonesians 
had entered Australian Papua New Guinea at Wutung, a small village 
on the New Guinea coast, and within a few hundred yards of the 
border. During the incursion, shots were fired at the 
Officer-in-Charge of Wutung patrol post, Mr A. Try, two native 
constables and the station interpreter. In accounting for these 
events Barnes was quick to point out that not only had police 
reinforcements been sent to the area but strong representations had 
been made to the Indonesian Government and that they had given 
assurances that this would not occur again. 3 Yet, five hours 
before, Freeth had told a press conference in Canberra upon his 
return from Indonesia that no formal complaint to the Indonesian 
Government over the shooting had been lodged. He confirmed that he 
had discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Malik who had 
reportedly 'expressed regret and stated that no similar occurrences 
would occur again'. Freeth also revealed that the Indonesian 
authorities would not only allow West Irian refugees to cross the 
border into Australian New Guinea but also indicated a desire to 
improve communications between the two countries on the movement of 
1 	Jakarta Times, 29 April 1969. 
2 	May, R.J., "Living With a Lion", pp.83-84. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.63, 30 April 1969, pp.1490-1491. 
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West Irianese. 1 
Clearly, these events revealed three things. First, Freeth had 
known of the incident while in Jakarta, a nd, in lino with his 
accommodating policy at this time of the 'Act of Free Choice', 
declined the option to lodge an official Australian protest. 
Second, the two Ministers were at odds. Barnes' confirmation that 
diplomatic representations were made to Indonesia was not borne out 
by Freeth's description of his talks in Jakarta. Although Malik 
had cooperated fully in attempts to move towards smoothing down the 
incident and its implications, it was not clear why the Department 
of External Territories had not released details of the incident in 
the first place (this would have cleared the air and saved the 
atmosphere of mystery and confusion that followed). 
Third, in revealing Indonesia's intention to allow 'refugees' 2 
to cross the border into Papua New Guinea, and to improve 
communications to accommodate this, Freeth was indicating a 
reversal of Indonesian policy. Moreover, if such a policy was 
agreed upon by Freeth on behalf of the Australian Government (which 
seemed likely), it indicated an entirely new approach towards 
Indonesia by Australia, which had formerly allowed as few West 
Irian refugees into Papua New Guinea as possible. While this 
reflected a policy of deference to Indonesian wishes (and, in fact, 
to strained Australian facilities), it seemed more than evident 
that Barnes knew little of these policy developments. Barnes was 
concerned with the effect of the incident on Papuan opinion in 
Eastern New Guinea and reportedly wished to pursue a much harder 
line with the Indonesians. However, at the time when Freeth gave 
his Press conference, he had not seen Barnes and therefore it was 
more than likely Barnes was presented with a highly important new 
policy on which the External Territories Minister had not been 
previously consulted. 
In critically examining Australia's West New Guinea policy, 
the incident's most serious after-effects were not to be considered 
only in terms of Australian-Indonesian relations, 3 but in 
1 	The Australian, 1 May 1969. 
2 	Freeth, quoted in the Australian, 1 May 1969. 
3 	In view of the arguments that had been posited over the 
years about the refugees/border-crossers, and their 
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little-disguised differences between Freeth and Barnes. That there 
was a clash of interests, if not a considerable overlap in their 
respective responsib4144-4 ., was evidenced by their respective 
conduct. While Freeth expressed concern that Indonesian and 
Australian interests clearly lay in a low-key response to the 
Wutung affair, Barnes argued for a tougher line on Australia's 
part. Thus, he must have been dismayed to have heard Freeth's 
views and policy on West Irian refugees. Although the Indonesians 
did not propose to stop would-be refugees, and Freeth raised no 
objections to such a policy (implying that there would be no 
impediment on our side of the border either), the New Guinea 
administration, until this point, had followed a tacit policy of 
discouraging refugees -- specifically at the request of the 
Department of External Affairs. 1 
Within three weeks of the first incident, and two days of 
Freeth's more qualified position on the 'Act of Free Choice' (at 
the National Press Club on 16 May), a second encounter took place 
and became known as the Kwari incident. On 18 May 1969, in the 
Western district 15 armed and uniformed Indonesians raided a camp 
occupied by 250 West Irianese who had been living there for more 
than two months. The camp was near the Western District village of 
Kwari and twelve miles inside Australian territory. Two refugees 
from the camp reached an Unevangelised Field Mission at Suki, 45 
miles east of Kwari to tell of their plight and that of the 
refugees, whereupon the Director of District Administration, Tom 
potential to destabilize the area, it seemed certain that 
a sudden influx of refugees, as a result of the softer 
policy positions taken by Australia and Indonesia, would 
present considerable technical problems, particularly if 
such refugees attempted 'to spread rabid anti-Indonesian, 
pro-West Irian propaganda' (the Australian, 1 May 1969). 
The government leader in the Senate, Senator Anderson, 
denied that there was conflict between the two Ministers' 
departments. In response to a question from Senator Georges 
(ALP, Qld), Anderson blamed the press for playing up the 
fact that there were differences in approaches over the 
border incidents. CPD, Senate, Vol.41, p.1141, 1 May 1969. 
See also ibid.: p.1412, 21 May 1969. Further, in response 
to a query from Senator Cavanagh (ALP, SA) Anderson 
confirmed that Malik and Freeth had agreed to steps which 
would prevent a repetition of the incidents. Anderson 
evaded Cavanagh's persistent interjections as to whether or 
not Australia had made 'any strong protests to Indonesia' 
(CPD, H.R., Vol.62, pp.1142-1143, 1 May 1969). 
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Ellis, dispatched three helicopters to the site, with 14 police and 
District Officer, Arthur Marks, to search for evidence of the 
refugees' claims. 1 
In a public statement of support for the raid on 26 May, 
Foreign Minister Malik alleged that West Irianese were being 
trained in these camps for subversion, and queried whether the camp 
in question was 'a camp to infiltrate the area, or a camp for 
sabotage of West Irian?' Although he thought that it was 'a good 
gesture' if the camps were used for the rehabilitation of West 
Irian refugees, with a view to returning them to Indonesia, Malik 
added the following day: 
Indonesia would be grateful if ... Australia would 
prevent the existence in the area of the camps if they 
were used for training West Irianese refugees. This 
would be necessary for the task of a good neighbour 
policy. 2 
In Canberra, on the evening of the same day, External Territories 
Minister Barnes indicated that he had not seen any evidence to 
suggest that the West Irianese had established training camps on 
the Australian side of the border. Freeth was prompted by 
questions from the press to announce, within a month of his 
assurances in Jakarta that all was well on the border, that a 
liaison officer from Papua New Guinea (a senior officer of the 
Territory Administration in Port Moresby) would be sent to Jayapura 
in an effort to prevent further border incidents. 3 Freeth also 
revealed that a First Secretary of the Australian Embassy in 
Jakarta, J.M.C. Watson, had gone to West Irian in connection with 
the first border incident. 	It was expected that the two 
Australian officials would be in West Irian at the same time, with 
Watson 'have[ing] a look around and record[ing] his own 
impressions' . 4 
Yet, Freeth, generally, did not go beyond that, except to say, 
'the government did not take strong views until reports were 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 May 1969. 
2 	Ibid., the Age, 28 1969. 
3 	Ibid. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1969. 
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verified'. 1 Maintaining a close and tactful silence following 
earlier contradictions between himself and Barnes over the first 
incident, it was not until the following day that Freeth revealed 
the Australian Government's response to Malik's allegations 
regarding the camps. The West Irianese who had left Indonesian 
territory were, he stated, stationed at Yoke, awaiting 
consideration of their application for permissive residence. He 
denied they were engaged in any training involving the use of 
military weapons or sabotage. 2 However, he added that the 
government would develop a clear understanding of events on the 
border only when investigations had been completed. 3 
Meanwhile, Freeth had instructed Australia's Ambassador in 
Indonesia, Gordon Jockel, to meet with Malik and assure him that 
there were no such refugee training camps on the Australian side of 
the border. 4 In a discussion held on 30 May at the Foreign Affairs 
Department in Jakarta, Jockel reaffirmed that the purpose of the 
camps in Papua New Guinea was simply to house the refugees who, 
when rested, would be sent back across the border. 5 Pleased with 
these assurances, Malik was quoted as saying, 'I would regard the 
border incidents as over'. 6 
Yet, it was to emerge the following week that on 29 May, the 
day before Jockel's meeting with Malik, and despite assurances from 
Freeth and Malik, another Indonesian patrol was involved in an 
incident with a group of West Irianese, six miles inside Australian 
territory. 7 Although it was reported on 4 June by the Sydney  
1 	The Age, 28 May 1969. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.63, P.2315, 28 May 1969. See also the Age, 
29 May 1969. 
3 	This view was endorsed by Anderson, the government leader 
in the Senate, in response to a question by Senator J.M. 
Wheeldon (ALP, WA). Anderson indicated that an effort was 
being made by the government 'to get some greater precision' 
in the reports on the incident (the Sydney Morning Herald, 
29 May 1969). 
4 The Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1969. 
5 Indonesian Herald, 31 May 1969. 
6 The Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1969. 
7 The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 1969. 
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Morning Herald that administration patrols had discovered 280 West 
Irianese in West Irian as well as three bodies in a creek, 1 it was 
assumed that their presence was due to the incident of 18 May. It 
was not until Thursday 5 June that it was established as fact that 
there had been a third incident. 2 Moreover, in confirming the 
details in a subsequent report, the Coroner in Port Moresby, Max 
Allwood, stressed that the Indonesian patrol had continued to 
search Australian territory for other border-crossers for two days 
after the shooting. 3 As this incident brought down heavy criticism 
in Port Moresby and Australia, 4 both Canberra and Jakarta moved 
swiftly to downplay these incidents. 
While Ambassador Jockel was instructed to inform Malik that 
the Australian Government held the strong view that the Indonesian 
military must not intrude into Australian territory 5 , his 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 June 1969. 
2 	District Officer Marks, who was despatched on 26 May, was 
shot at by a group of Indonesians. Marks, leading a patrol, 
had been walking along a bush track while six West Irianese 
paddled the canoe with Marks' baggage. During the day, the 
canoe had been secured and the party was resting on the 
bank. It was then that the Indonesians surprised the group. 
Three of the men later made their way to Kwari Camp, two 
bodies were subsequently found by a helicopter crew, and the 
third was reported to a patrol several days later. This was 
confirmed in an interview with R.W. Blaikie, at the time a 
District Inspector in the Department of District 
Administration (Brisbane, March 1986). 
van der Kroef was to observe that over 250 refugees were 
located living in six scattered camps near Kwari, with some 
of the refugees claiming to have fought against Indonesian 
troops before crossing the border (van der Kroef, J.M., 
"Australia and West Irian", p.493). The Sydney Morning 
Herald, in a report on the incident, established that the 
administration had confirmed they had been found in a 16 
square-mile area south of Kwari, and that 'there were 92 
men, 48 women and the rest were children' (the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 8 June 1969). 
3 	The Canberra Times, 7 June 1969. 
4 	During a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting in 
Sydney, Eba Oleavale, a member of the Territory House of 
Assembly, accused the Indonesians of 'a deliberate 
infringement' on the border, arguing as the border area was 
clearly marked, it was improbable that they crossed into 
Australian territory unwittingly (the Sydney Morning Herald, 
6 June 1969). 
5 	The Times (Jakarta), 7 June 1969. 
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instructions did not extend to a formal protest. In response, Malik 
put the view that while Indonesia would take every step to prevent 
further border incidents, such incidents should not be exaggerated 
as a 'wrong presentation of the facts may make things difficult to 
solve'. 1 Freeth attempted to put events into some kind of 
perspective when he suggested the following week that the incidents 
were 'pretty minor', and that, 'It is no use endangering our 
relations with the Indonesian government when all the indications 
are that they think the same way as we do on the border'. 2 
The judgement underpinning Australia's West New Guinea policy 
throughout this period was that good relations with Indonesia were 
paramount. Moreover, as Indonesia had clearly stated, under both 
Sukarno and Suharto, that it did not envisage any course for the 
territory other than integration, the Australian Government was not 
prepared to alienate the 'New Order' leadership for what was 
clearly a lost cause. But Australia's policy was constantly 
plagued by faulty representations by government spokespersons as 
they sought to turn the government's critics' arguments back 
against them. In the final analysis, the Australian Government's 
main problem at this point was no longer relations with Indonesia 
but with the Australian public (this is extended later). 
Two further points should be made. First, the root of 
Australia's West New Guinea policy went back to the late 1950s -- 
and a time when the dispute over West New Guinea had exposed an 
unrealized degree of Australia's political and geographic isolation 
-- and it was implied in government statements ever since that the 
territory's integration with Indonesia was merely the end of an 
historical process. Second, unlike the earlier Sukarno period, the 
conservative government in Australia fully understood Indonesia's 
The Canberra Times, 7 June 1969. 
2 	Indonesian Times, 18 June 1969. Meanwhile, talks between 
senior Indonesian and Australian officials on these border 
problems had commenced on 10 June in Jayapura, and were 
intended 'to try to improve liaison between the two sides 
of the border as the refugee problem threatens good 
relations between Indonesia and Australia' (the Times, 7 
June 1969. See also the Age, 9 June 1969). For a detailed 
analysis and criticism of Australia's self-interest in 
establishing this border liaison see Verrier, J.R., 
Australia, Papua New Guinea and the West New Guinea Ouestion 
1949-69, p.346. 
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attitude to the former colony and its determination to obtain it. 
In this context, the principle of self-determination was deemed by 
2 Inuones.La, as we noted in Ch --' -- 	1 4-- 	 .4.m-b.,' 4-o% themy%-ci. ‘.%r Aic 
priority of ensuring the integrity of the Republic. 
The 'Act of Free Choice'  
In the period of 14 July to 2 August 1969, the Indonesian 
Government conducted the 'Act of Free Choice'. The Pepera (an 
acronym for Penentuan Pendapat Rakjat), as it came to be called, 
was conducted, in compliance with the New York Agreement in the 
main centres of West Irian's eight administrative districts -- 
Merauke, Wamena, Nabire, Fak Fak, Sorong, Manokwari, the island of 
Biak, and the West Irian capital of Jayapura. While some isolated 
demonstrations had erupted in some of the centres during the 
preceding months, 2 it seemed inevitable that the vote by the 
Consultative Assemblies would be to remain with Indonesia. Thus 
the real question for the Indonesians centred on the degree to 
which the vote would be affirmative, and this involved two sets of 
uncertainties. The first related to the actual conduct of the 
plebiscite, and the second centred on the UN Representatives' 
report to the Secretary-General, U Thant, following the Act. 
There seemed little doubt that, apart from the most 
sophisticated of West Irianese in the coastal towns and the more 
primitive highlands, where the West Irianese would probably not 
understand the nature of the question being asked, the majority 
would vote to stay with Indonesia. Nevertheless, the Indonesians 
were concerned with the uncertainty of the Act being held publicly 
and with the methods of election to the Consultative Assemblies. 
As a large part of the initial selection was done by the largely 
Papuan field staff, in consultation with various representative 
groups, there was an air of uncertainty over the true nature of 
feelings among those selected. The problem, therefore, was not so 
much that the West Irianese would vote for severance, but that 
1 	See pp.22-23 and p.53, Chapter One. 
In his final report, Ortiz noted that there were outbreaks 
of violence in the Manokwari Regency (in particular), in the 
towns of Waghete and Enarotali, and due to border crossings 
into East New Guinea, along the eastern border with the 
Australian-administered territories of Papua and New Guinea. 
Annex I, A/7723, pp.14-16. 
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Indonesian sovereignty would not be given full acclamation) 
The second uncertainty grew out of U Thant's refusal of an 
Indonesian 	 Ty M, Ortiz 0.m.srslc reportbeOlf MI" request that Dr L. 	Yuaaer 
subsumed as a supplementary report to the Secretary-General's 
annual report or disseminated with Indonesia's own report as joint 
documentation. Such suggestions by Dr Sudjarwo, the Indonesian 
diplomat in charge of ensuring a smooth functioning of the Act, 
were not acceptable. This meant that both Sanz's report and an 
Indonesian Government report would be forwarded separately to the 
UN General Assembly under a covering memorandum. 
Nevertheless, the Pepera commenced on schedule with the first 
Act being held in Merauke on 15 July 1969. In what was described 
later as 'a clever exercise in the fascinating Indonesian style of 
mass politics', 2 the Act followed its pre-ordained course: on 15 
July, Merauke's 175 tribal delegates decided unanimously that the 
regency remain part of Indonesia. The previous night of colour and 
fanfare set the tone for well orchestrated proceedings. Merauke was 
full of Indonesians, including the Minister for Home Affairs, Amir 
Machmud, and the Minister for Information, Air Vice-Marshal 
Budiardo who met with the 175 delegates in a public greeting 
ceremony. The day of the first 'Act' was attended by other 
dignitaries, including the UN representative, Dr Sanz, and the 
Australian, Dutch and Thai Ambassadors to Jakarta, who accompanied 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik. On Wednesday 16 July 1969, 
similar proceedings were enacted at Wamena, with largely the same 
results. This process was repeated, with regional variations in 
the six remaining centres for the following two weeks: 
The various Pepera were conducted with all the familiar 
instruments of Indonesian political persuasion and 
intimidation. There were free cigarettes, cheap plastic 
brief cases and food and goods specially flown into all 
centres for the occasion combined with heavy handed 
police and security activities. 3 
Each session lasted for half a day and followed a similar format, 
and without exception, all members spoke in favour of West New 
1 	Harris, personal interview with R.W. Furlonger, Canberra, 
November 1980. 
2 	Hastings, P., New Guinea, pp.222-223. 
3 	Ibid. 
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Guinea retaining its links with Indonesia. 
Following the results of the third 'Act', conducted at Nabire 
on 18 July, Indonesia's --nfiAemi-e was running at a high level - 
This induced the Minister for the Interior (Machmud) to announce 
that Indonesia had, already, emerged triumphant from the 'Act of 
Free Choice' for the reason that the first three councils, with its 
525 members representing a population of 467 000 -- over half the 
West Irian population --represented an overall membership 
majority. 1 Following the session in Jayapura on 2 August, Malik 
contacted the UN Secretary-General and informed him that the 
'people of West Irian, through their elected representatives have 
... clearly and unequivocally expressed their unanimous decision to 
remain within the Republic of Indonesia 1 . 2 For all practical 
purposes the process of confirming West Irian's incorporation into 
the Republic was over, although, the extent of the aftermath 
depended largely on the manner in which Indonesia chose to proclaim 
the result on Independence Day later that month, and on the report 
of the UN representative, Ortiz Sanz. 
Meanwhile, if there were any doubts about Indonesia's 
intentions to orchestrate these events in West Irian, the 
Indonesian Ambassador to Australia put them to rest at a meeting of 
the National Press Club in Canberra on Wednesday 16 July, by making 
it clear that, 'In our heart and mind -- I would like to be blunt 
about this -- it is precalculated'. 	The Ambassador worded his 
comments carefully and in terms that reflected Indonesia's 
historical right to, and a concern for security in, West Irian. 
More than this, he argued that if Indonesia were not allowed to 
develop West Irian, it would become a 'hot spot', endangering not 
only Indonesia and Australia but the whole world. 3 
Within days, Freeth reaffirmed the Australian Government's 
policy of non-interference in the election process. 	In an 
interview on the Australian Broadcasting Commission's 'Four 
Corners', the Minister argued that Australia had had its hands tied 
over the elections because it was 'a matter which is being 
The Age, 21 July 1969. 
2 	Malik's telegram to the Secretary-General is quoted in Annex 
I, A/7723, p.19. 
3 	The Australian, 17 July 1969. 
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internationally administered by an international agreement between 
two countries'. 1 While he said Australia had 'no legal standing' 
in the matter, he did r.nnt-.Amria that  Inc) was concerned that the people 
of West Irian were not properly represented in the 'Act of Free 
Choice'. However, leaving little doubt in anyone's mind that self-
interest and not self-determination was the driving force of 
Australian policy, he stressed that 'I am not here to defend the 
Indonesian Government', adding that Australia's long and short-term 
interests were the only considerations he would give to the matter. 
As expected, the assemblies reached unanimous decisions to remain 
with Indonesia. On 5 August 1969, Malik announced the outcome, 
adding that the 'Act of Free Choice' was 'final' and could not be 
held to doubts by the UN 'or by other countries'. On 16 August, 
Suharto announced that West Irian was 'now an indisputable part of 
Indonesia' . 2 
It was apparent from Dr. Ortiz's final report that the results 
of these successive consultations did not rest well with the UN 
representative. While Ortiz explained that he had no alternative 
but to accept Indonesia's choice of method in conducting the 'Act 
of Free Choice', 3 he noted 'that without doubt certain elements of 
the population of West Irian held firm convictions in favour of 
independence'. 4 Moreover, while it could be alternatively argued 
that there was some measure of support among the people for 
retaining ties with Indonesia, it could be stated that, as the 
Indonesian Government had 'exercised at all times a tight political 
control over the population', 5 the Papuans were not really given a 
free choice. 
Conclusion 
Many Australian consciences were clearly offended by the 
official Australian desire and readiness to accept the inevitable 
1 	The  Australian, 21 July 1969. 
2 	Quoted in van der Kroef, J.M., "Australia and the West Irian 
Problem", p.484. 
3 	Annex I, A/7723, p.10. 
4 	Ibid., P.20. 
5 	Ibid. 
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in West Irian, even in the face of repeated instances of 
anti-Indonesian rebellion among the West Irianese. Freeth's 
position was totally unacceptable to a large cross-section of 
Australia's articulate opinion, including the press, Parliament, 
and the churches, and it gave rise to uncompromising criticism over 
his 'Act of Free Choice' and 'Refugee/Border-Crossers' policies. 
In an editorial following the first week of the Pepera, the 
Australian, compelled by Freeth's comments and reflecting the core 
of this criticism, stressed some of the factors that Freeth, 'for 
reasons of diplomatic nicety', had not been able to bring out in 
the West Irian argument. The first related to 'the raising of 
totally false expectations inside and outside West Irian'. The 
second was that the 'Act of Free Choice' was never intended to be 
anything more than a face-saving device for the Dutch who always 
intended to relinquish control to Indonesia. The newspaper 
considered Indonesia, for its part, saw the 'Acts' as 'acts of 
grace to smooth the path back to normal relations with the Hague, 
and to reinforce the legitimacy of the transfer'. 1 
Clearly, whether Freeth's policy on West New Guinea was 
criticized on grounds of questionable morality or of simply 
neglecting the consequences for Australia's interests, it was 
noticeable right across the spectrum that the emphasis of criticism 
centred more on the style of Freeth's West New Guinea policy rather 
than its substance. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the thrust and 
intensity of these criticisms of the moral and legal aspects of the 
dispute, the debate died down, with the overwhelmingly greater part 
of Australian press and other public opinion reluctantly accepting 
the Indonesian fait accompli in West Irian. 2 The West New Guinea 
question, and its inherent problems, were to become submerged under 
the weight of other issues. In Australia, on the domestic level, 
these centred on the forthcoming election; in regional terms, on 
problems that were emerging in East New Guinea, where a copper 
company's plans to take over traditional lands were giving rise to 
popular unrest; and on the international plane, the all 
encompassing manifestations of the American and British decisions 
to wind down their security roles in the region. 	The latter 
1 	The Australian, 21 July 1969. 
2 	See Chapter Six. 
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issue, particularly, demanded Australia's endorsement of 
Indonesia's policy in West Irian. That Indonesia had an emerging 
position and role in the region was - 1 .T.r when Pr 	nt Nixon in 
Jakarta on Sunday 27 July 1969, pledged America's full cooperation 
in Indonesia's movement towards economic and social development. 1 
The Australian, 29 July 1969. 
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PART TWO 
A VULNERABLE RELATIONSHIP? : AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES  
AND OPINIONS BEFORE THE COUP IN PORTUGAL (APRIL, 1974)  
Introduction 
To this point, emphasis has been on relations conducted at the 
government-to-government level, stressing the international context 
and Indonesia's strengthening role in Australia's continuing search 
for regional security. However, this has tended to cast into the • 
shadows an important, though evolving, dimension of the broader 
story of Australian-Indonesian relations -- domestic political 
opinion. In the ten years following the coup in Jakarta, a small 
groundswell of opinion on Indonesian issues gained momentum in 
Australia on the tide of events that were taking place in 
Indonesia. Such developments, particularly the consolidation of 
the army leadership at the expense of the New Order civilian 
elements, compelled debate not only on the nature of those trends 
but also on Australia's Indonesia policy, and the risks associated 
with successive Australian governments having become too closely 
identified with the Suharto regime. 
Part Two describes and analyses these attitudes and opinions 
and relates them to the policies pursued by the Australian 
Government. It is divided into three chapters, and contains the 
views of politicians, academics, interest groups and individuals, 
as well as the press which emerged as a most important source of 
analyses of, and commentaries on, international affairs during this 
period. These views can be taken together as a representative 
cross-section of informed opinion on Indonesian affairs between 
1965 and 1974, and it is the purpose here to survey such opinion as 
well as to evaluate its impact on Australia's Indonesia policy. 
'Public Opinion': A Framework 
While the term 'public opinion' is often used in political 
discussion, it is difficult to define precisely what it means as 
there is no 'single or united public opinion'; there are only 
public opinions -- individuals and groups holding different 
attitudes and views on a wide range of issues. Moreover, while 
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community attitudes change and the political public itself changes, 
not all expressions of public concern are equally powerful or 
important. S. opinions carry gre ater weight honaligP those who 
offer them are in positions of influence, for example trade union 
leaders and businessmen. Other types of opinion matter because 
they are effectively organized. 
Yet, the phrase 'public opinion' -- that is, what the majority 
of people feel on any issue -- is useful in political discussion, 
because the importance of public opinion is that it provides an 
important link between the people and the government. The feelings 
and attitudes of individuals, whether communicated through groups, 
public opinion polls, demonstrations or election results, become 
one source of opinion a government will wish to consider in framing 
its policies. While it has been argued that the general public 
plays a minor role in the conduct of international politics -- 
mobilized only when aroused or organized by parties or interest 
groups or when panicked by a major crisis l -- decision makers do 
not formulate policy independently of 'certain policy criteria in 
the form of widely held values and expectations'. 2 In this 
context 'Government ... identif[ies] itself almost unconsciously 
with a vaguely sensed general will, and no clear formulation of the 
pressure of public opinion upon Government policy ever occurs'. 3 
This 'general will' is now examined in detail. 
Clearly, foreign policy making is a matter for the executive branch 
of government. However, in the past twenty to thirty years the 
international and domestic conditions which have supported the 
insulation of foreign policy from domestic politics have been 
considerably eroded. During this period, the transformation of the 
foreign policy environment by socio-economic, political and 
technological developments has altered the policy maker's situation 
markedly. The degree to which foreign policy has remained a 
Duchacek, I.D., Nations and Men: An Introduction to 
International Politics. The Dryden Press, Illinois, 1975, 
p.214. 
2 	Almond, G., The American People and Foreign Policy. 
Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1950, p.6. 
3 	Younger, K., "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy", British 
Journal of Sociology, No.6, June 1955, p. 169. 
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separate area or has become part of the domestic political process, 
however, is a matter of some uncertainty. 
While little influence is afforded public opinion in terms of 
determining foreign policy, 1 it does provide a direct link between 
the people and specific political actions, exemplifying a basic 
kind of democratic procedure. 2 In elaborating on its utility, some 
distinctions need to be made within and between what Cohen 
describes as effective public opinion 3 and those opinions held by 
the community. 
Of the first, there are two forms of effective public opinion 
or ways that people can seek to influence government policies. One 
is the climate of opinion within which decisions on foreign policy 
are made, 4 while the second is made up of the articulate 
expressions on policy of specific individuals and groups, including 
the Parliament and the media - the press, television and radio. 5 
Unlike opinions held by the community at large, which find 
expression in opinion polls and, in turn, provide a wider context, 
if not parameters, 6 to decisions on foreign policy, articulate 
opinion has an activist dimension. Community (public) opinion 
The public's role in foreign policy formulation varies from 
issue to issue but most academic studies on the opinion-
policy relationship accord only a passive if not peripheral 
role to public opinion. It is acknowledged, however, that 
the crux of any theorising about this nexus is inexorably 
bound to the concept of 'influence'. See Waltz, K., 
"Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises", in 
Rosenau, J.N., (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. 
Free Press, New York, 1967; Frankel, J., The Making of 
Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press, London, 1967. 
2 	Moodie, G.C., and Studdert-Kennedy, G., Opinions, Publics 
and Pressure Groups. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1970. 
3 	Cohen, B.C. , The Political Process and Foreign Policy : The 
Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1957, p.29. 
4 	Millar, T.B •, Australia in Peace and War, p.43. 
5 	Cohen, B.C., The Political Process and Foreign Policy. Chs. 
3-6 and 10. Due to the enormity of undertaking an 
examination of radio and television comment, this study 
concentrates solely on press (newspapers) opinion. 
6 	Reynolds, P.A., An Introduction to International Relations 
(2nd ed.) Longman, New York, 1980, p.83. 
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tends to be spontaneous, often a reaction to a specific event or 
policy change. Sometimes ill-informed and not intensively felt, 
mass public opinion may also be fickle. 1 uii UnC ULLIG1 
articulate opinion seeks, through argument and with regard to 
specific interests, to influence policy makers, either directly or 
indirectly, by shaping public attitudes. For this reason, policy 
makers tend to give greater political weighting to articulate 
opinion (see Chapter Six). 
Groups form one of the major channels through which such 
opinions are expressed. Whether wishing to promote particular 
policies (for example trade or investment), to press for solutions 
to specific issues, or simply to encourage understanding or 
friendship, these interest groups2 provide an important link 
between the people and government. 3 Another important and 
politically influential component of articulate opinion is formed 
by individuals. Whether academics, former party leaders and ex-
bureaucrats, or public commentators, each seeks to influence policy 
through a public expression of their views. This, as is also the 
case with interest groups, is supplemented when possible by direct 
personal contact with those in the policy making process. 
The media, especially the press, play an important role in the 
activities of almost all these groups, as well as in the expression 
of articulate expression (see Chapter Four). Their power is found 
not only in its factual reporting and its evaluative editorial 
opinions, but also in its role in conveying opinions, expressed by 
other groups, to an audience that includes both policy makers and 
the public at large. Finally, an appraisal of the role of the 
Parliament, which is undertaken in Chapter Five, completes the 
picture of those aspects of the foreign policy making process under 
Holsti, K.J., International Politics, p.342. 
2 	For the purpose of analysis, an interest group is often 
identified in terms of the 'shared values' of its members, 
vocationally based, having ties with government and 
continuing channels of political access. For example, the 
Australian-Indonesian Business Cooperation Committee. 
Opinion groups are voluntary associations actively pursuing 
policy objectives by means other than those resulting from 
continuing relationships with the government. For example, 
the Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET). 
3 	Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War, pp.44-48. 
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review in this section. While the majority party or parties 
ultimately control the formal decisions of the Parliament, the 
parliamentary debate in both the House of Repr esentatives and the 
Senate often clarifies the issues, adding a significant dimension 
to this process. 1 More importantly, however, the forum of 
Parliament can be used by MPs seeking to influence foreign policy 
decisions. 
The Australian Context  
In early February 1972, a day before Suharto was due to visit 
Australia for the first time, journalist Bruce Grant suggested that 
the Indonesian President would 'be wise not to dismiss lightly, 
growing concern in Australia about some social developments in 
Indonesia'. Elaborating, Grant warned: 
The consensus in Australia in support of close relations 
with Indonesia can be damaged seriously.. .if Australians 
believe that they are helping to keep in power a regime, 
especially a military dictatorship, which rules on behalf 
of a privileged class or caste... In [such] circumstances 
it is doubtful whether any reasons of State, however 
strong, would persuade Australians against their 
consciences, that the consensus should be maintained. 2 
When Suharto departed, the Australian's Robert Duffield suggested 
that the President had done so 'leaving Australians little wiser 
1 	While it is widely regarded by commentators that the 
Parliament does not have a substantial role in the 
formulation of foreign policy, it can be effective in 
setting the constraints within which foreign policy may be 
conducted. This can be done through a variety of 
mechanisms, including the party backbench committee (on 
foreign affairs) system, the parliamentary library research 
service (information flow), and the joint party committees 
(House of Representatives and Senate). For a more detailed 
examination see Millar, T.B., Australian Peace and War, 
pp.29-31; Knight, J., "The Royal Prerogative and Foreign 
Policy: Notes on an Assumption", Australian Outlook, 
Vol.29, No.4, April, pp.35-43. Miller, J.D.B., Australia 
and Foreign Policy, the Boyer Lectures (1963), Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, Sydney, 1963. See also Knight, J. 
and Hudson, W.J., Parliament and Foreign Policy, Canberra 
studies in World Affairs No.14, Department of International 
Relations, ANU and AIIA, Canberra, 1983; Indyk, M., 
Influences Without Power: The Role of the Backbench in 
Australian Foreign Policy 1976-1977, APSA/Parliamentary 
Fellow Monograph, No.1, 1979. 
2 	The Age, 5 February 1972. 
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about him or his country': More precisely, the question remained 
as to whether or not Suharto was any the wiser about Australian 
attitudes and opinions that fell outside the COiiiUS which Grant 
alluded to. Such a question must also be extended to the 
Australian Government and its awareness and understanding of those 
attitudes, because Grant had identified something a great deal 
deeper than mere opinion. In the context of Australia's burgeoning 
relationship with Indonesia, he was alluding to a growing 'conflict 
between statecraft and human conscience' which was emerging as a 
tangible element in the relationship -- deeply embedded and 'one 
which Australia and Indonesia cannot expect to dispel overnight 1 . 2 
Thus, although the Australian Government had consolidated good 
relations with the Indonesian Government by the time of Suharto's 
visit, it did not have the broad consensus of support it would have 
liked from within the Australian community. 3 
As already stated, its diplomacy had been directed to 
enhancing Indonesia's status as a regional force. Against this 
background, the Suharto visit produced agreement which promised a 
bright future, with the two countries committing themselves to 
upgrading economic, military and political cooperation. Australian 
determination to retain and develop strong relations was sustained 
by the new Whitlam government. By the beginning of 1974, the 
Australian Government was working persistently for the development 
of cooperation in those areas where there was something to gain, 
and notwithstanding Whitlam's early unsuccessful forays into 
regional diplomacy, it was determined to keep the relationship 
buoyant. 
However, a perceived deterioration in Indonesia's domestic 
situation had created by now an uneasiness within Australia, 
especially among journalists, lawyers and scholars -- some of whom 
were internationally known for their work on Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, it became progressively clearer that Indonesia did 
not share the Australian Government's growing concern that 
1 	The Australian, 12 February 1972. 
2 	The Age, 5 February 1972. 
3 	As noted earlier, this section limits its analysis to the 
press, the Federal Parliament, and to selected groups and 
individuals. 
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Indonesia should have an interest in strengthening, rather than 
weakening (through its domestic policies), the existing, although 
eroding, ALItLialiall 	L1ILUS in fay--r of  ' 	ties 
On the eve of the East Timor issue, Hastings put this 
situation in a different perspective when he wrote: 
One of the more interesting tendencies these days among 
politicians and academics of certain disposition - by no 
means confined to the left - is Asia-'knocking'. It 
manifests itself in loosely characterising ... Malaysia 
as 'racist', Thailand as 'corrupt' ... and Indonesia as 
'right-wing militarist'. The impact of these views is 
that Australia should have nothing to do with these 
countries or that it should seek, by withholding aid, 
refusing defence cooperation and generally indicating 
disapproval, to get them to re-order their societies in a 
fashion more congenial to Australian democratic 
sensitivities. Apart from the fact that attitudes like 
these scarcely win friends and influence people if 
translated into foreign affairs, they are also 
half-truths at best. 1 
The task now is to analyse the framework of issues that concerned 
Grant's 'consensus' and which gave rise to the trend identified by 
Hastings. This, as indicated, will be served best by broadening 
Hasting's focus to include not only politicians and academics, but 
also the press, interest groups, and community opinion generally. 
The seeds of uneasiness were sown in 1968 with the debate on 
Indonesian issues centring on the economic development strategy 
pursued by the government in Indonesia, and political prisoners. 
It picked up momentum on the wave of dissent over the West New 
Guinea issue in 1969 and continued into the 1970s. The purpose 
here is to trace this early concern, its intensity and bearing, up 
until the Suharto visit in 1972. The respective chapters will then 
focus on its manifestation during the 1972-1974 period. In doing 
so, it identifies only the main groups and individuals that were 
flushed out at varying times over the six-year period, to focus on 
the issues that concerned them 2 and, in general, to put this local 
opinion into some kind of perspective. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 November 1973. 
2 	The major issue examined here concerns the broader economic 
and political developments in Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCILIATION AND OPTIMISM: AUSTRALIAN PRESS OPINION (1965-1974)  
Introduction 
As already stated, the press constitutes one of the major channels 
linking the public with the decision makers, and influences the 
decision-making process in two distinct ways. First, it reflects 
the depth and intensity of public interest in particular issues by 
reporting actions and statements concerning policy and by assessing 
individual questions in editorials and commentaries. Moreover, it 
provides those involved in the formulation of policy with a vehicle 
to disseminate information and publicize their own views. 
Second, as the major source of information for the public, the 
press is able to influence the nature of public response to 
particular issues through the kind of coverage accorded them. By 
establishing the focus of attention, the press indirectly 
determines how the public will react. This chapter assesses the 
extent to which the press fulfil these functions -- that is, as a 
forum and a conveyer of information l -- in relation to Indonesian 
issues . 2 
Until the end of confrontation in August 1966, Australian 
press opinion had pursued two major themes: the first evoked a 
sense of anticipation and was related to developments in the 
domestic power struggle unfolding in Indonesia. The second centred 
on the notion of the importance that a stable and prosperous 
Indonesia had for Australia's long-term security interests. The 
ending of confrontation roughly coincided with the commencement of 
Suharto's stabilization programme in the latter part of 1966. 
Thus, the reaction of the Australian press with regard to these 
events was reserved and marked by caution. During the next three 
Grant, B., "Foreign Affairs and the Australian Press", 
Twentieth Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, Sydney, 1969, p.18. 
Grant saw the press contributing to the foreign policy 
process in two ways: by providing a platform for debate and 
by acting as a spokesperson for society. 
2 	The main issues which are examined relate to political and 
economic developments. 
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years, this reticence, however, gave way to optimistic assessments 
of Indonesia's consolidation and future, only to be overshadowed in 
 period the 	 by rising concern regarding the laLLG1 	 4..44c
direction taken by the new regime and the costs involved. For many 
observers in the press, events arising from the West New Guinea 
issue in 1969 confirmed some of their consternations, as did 
developments in Indonesia up until the mid-1970s. 
The Demise of Sukarno  
Generally, the press documented the 30 September Coup and its 
aftermath with varying interpretations and intensity. The majority 
of press correspondents l conducted careful and useful assessments 
of events as they unfolded, with the downfall of some of the major 
actors during the Sukarno years -- Dr Subandrio, Aidit, Njono, and 
the PKI -- generating most interest in the first six months after 
the coup. 2 
At another level, editorial opinion during the period ranged 
from the Sydney Morning Herald's perceptive, but rather critical, 
attacks on the architects and props of confrontation -- the PKI, 
1 	In particular Peter Hastings, Stanley Karnow, R.E. Stannard, 
Alan Ramsey, Ian Ward of the Australian; Frank Palmos of 
the Sunday Mail; Denis Warner of the Sydney Morning Herald; 
Creighton Burns of the Canberra Times; Bruce Grant of the 
Age; the Bulletin also covered these events extensively 
with reports from Dennis Bloodworth, Bruce Grant and Gavin 
Young. The majority of these correspondents were based in 
the region and were a valuable source of information apart 
from news agency reports. 
2 	See for example the Australian's coverage: 	"Vengeance 
Slaughter: 100 000 believed killed in Indonesia" (24 
December 1965); "Nasution backed for power post: Sukarno's 
heir apparent" (27 December 1965); "Generals won't let 
Sukarno go" (1 February 1966); "I am the Army and the 
people - Bung Karno" (1 February 1966); "Indonesian Front 
to seek full PKI ban" (5 February 1966); "China protests 
on 'barbarous' attack" (5 February 1966); "Officers begin 
drive to topple Subandrio: Sukarno would be isolated" (22 
February 1966); "Death sentence for PKI leader" (23 
February 1966); "Generals desert Nasution and back Sukarno" 
(25 February 1966); "Sukarno back with China?" (26 February 
1966); "Sukarno knew all - Witness" (28 February 1966); 
"Shann: We are friends" (2 March 1966); "Blockade on 
Sukarno men" (12 March 1966); "The final revolt or Sukarno 
manoeuvre?" (14 March 1966); "President Vanishes as Army 
triumphs" (14 March 1966); "Nasution influence seen behind 
new five" (21 March 1966); "All Reds sacked from Cabinet" 
(29 March 1966). 
148 
Subandrio and Sukarno l -- the undisguised ridicule of Sukarno, and 
his overall foreign policies on the part of the Age; 2 the Canberra3 
Times' sympathetic call that respect be shown for Indonesia's 
'domestic privacy'; to the Australian, 4 which found it 'possible 
to suffer genuine revulsion at the apparent glee with which some 
extremists in this country have watched the further deterioration 
of [Indonesia's] economy'. All, however, had a number of concerns 
in common: that the ending of confrontation was imperative -- in 
human and security terms -- and that Indonesian leaders redirect 
their energies and resources toward extricating Indonesia from the 
economic quagmire into which she had plunged during the Sukarno 
regime. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, in particular, sustained staunch 
derision of Sukarno and his government, and the implications of 
their rule in domestic socio-economic and political terms. 5 
Fundamental to its position, expressed at the outset, was its 
belief that 'an essential precondition of economic security must be 
an end to the expensive, futile and resource-consuming exercise of 
'confrontation' . 6 
While criticism of Sukarno and Subandrio marked many of the 
Age's editorials, it was rather more restrained in its view of 
whether the duo would survive the upheavals of the post-coup 
period. It found that in the absence of unbiased and uncensored 
reporting from the centre of the conflict it would be too early to 
establish in whose hands power really lay in Indonesia. Moreover, 
it considered 'Indonesia's future domestic and foreign policy has 
still to be determined by an angry and confused people'. 7 The 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1965 and 22 December 
1965. 
2 	The Age, 14 December 1965, 23 February 1966 and 13 March 
1966. 
3 	The Canberra Times, 25 January 1966 
4 	The Australian, 30 December 1965. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1965, 22 December 
1965, 14 March 1965, 21 March 1966 and 9 May 1966. 
6 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1965. 
7 	The Age, 23 February 1966. 
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Canberra Times pursued a similar theme and expressed concern not 
for the Indonesia State but for its people. In a series of 
sensible editorialsi it ArNr.”Ta.mni-,ma the tragedy that WaS unfolding, 
and counselled restraint in Australia's observations of the 
unfortunate manifestations of Sukarno's rule. 
Interestingly, most Australian newspapers were not completely 
convinced that Sukarno was losing effective power, while they were 
convinced that Australia had a role to play. The Australian led 
the rally in this regard, although it cautioned that: 
In the present highly charged atmosphere of Indonesia, it 
would be easy for any outside influence to be 
misunderstood - even influence from a country, such as 
Australia, which is conceded a special position. 2 
The Australian's advocation of 'patient diplomatic spadework, 
rather than public intergovernmental discussion° was shared by the 
Canberra Times which, although praising in its observations of the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta over so many eventful years, 
harboured a 'nagging doubt... That this diplomatic and proper 
silence might not be enough'. 4 In rationalizing the confusion that 
marked Australian interpretation of events in Indonesia, the 
Australian, in what was to emerge as a common theme in the next ten 
years, suggested that, 'the main reason we do not understand them 
is our insistence on observing and even judging Asians ... by 
Western criteria' . 5 
When the 11 March order was signed, delegating powers to 
General Suharto, the Australian press reacted cautiously. The 
Mercury (14 March 1966) thought that 'it was more a matter for 
speculation than surprise', while the Sydney Morning Herald6 
counselled caution in any assessment of its implications. These 
sentiments were characteristic of Australian press interpretations 
of events in Indonesia for the remainder of the year and gave rise 
1 	The Canberra Times, 25 January 1966 and 5 March 1966. 
2 	The Australian, 30 December 1965. 
3 	The Australian, 1 January 1966. 
4 	The Canberra Times, 25 January 1966 
5 	The Australian, 24 February 1966. 
6 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 March 1966. 
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to much speculation about the capacity of Suharto to sustain his 
position. The Age, in particular, felt that because economic 
deterioration and anti-communist sentiment s had inspired thA MOVA  
against Sukarno, the Suharto regime, if it were to survive, would 
have to first consolidate its power, and then turn towards making a 
determined effort to address Indonesia's internal disorders. 1 The 
Advertiser2 was more specific and saw the critical questions as 
being whether or not the military could deal with immediate 
problems of inflation, inefficiency and corruption,areas where 
their record was not solid (and was to prove problematic in the 
years to come). 
This economic aspect preoccupied most of the press, with 
the Canberra Times3 and the Mercury4 particularly holding fears that 
as the Army had always been enthusiastic about confrontation, the 
resources needed to maintain the campaign would continue to be 
wasted in that direction. Foreign policy matters, confrontation in 
particular, were of immediate concern however, as many in the press 
believed its abandonment would pave the way for economic 
rehabilitation. Most newspaper editorials5 called for a 
redirection in this area, although there was no outright 
expectation that any immediate or dramatic changes would take place 
in Indonesia's external behaviour particularly, as the Advertiser 
rather perceptively warned, it 'may be too valuable an outlet for 
Indonesian nationalism to be dropped 1 . 6 
The Sydney Morning Herald7 continued its vilification of 
Sukarno and his persistent attempts to retain the threads of power 
(protecting and resuscitating the PKI, preserving left-wing of 
influence in the government -- notably Subandrio's -- and to 
The Age, 14 March 1966. 
2 	The Advertiser, 14 March 1966. 
3 	The Canberra Times, 14 March 1966. 
4 	The Mercury, 16 March 1966. 
5 	See, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1966; 
the Advertiser, 22 March 1966. 
6 	The Advertiser, 22 March 1966. 
7 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 March 1966. 
151 
re-establish closer ties with Peking). What particularly peeved 
the Sydney daily was Suharto's slow movement toward consolidating 
power. This impatience threaded itself through many of its 
editorials, manifesting itself in early 1967 when, in response to 
Sukarno's persistent threshing about in the political net, it 
hinted rather provocatively to its readers that Suharto could use 
military action against Sukarno's 'calculated obstructionism' 
instead of waiting for the 'doubtful processes' of the People's 
Congress. This apparent languor on the part of Suharto (and the 
military), and his clear involvement in the power struggle, 
concerned not only the Sydney Morning Herald l but the Canberra  
Times2 and the West Australian. 3 The thrust of their arguments 
centred on the pre-occupation of a government trying to curb 
Sukarno and to assert its full authority at a time when it should 
have been concentrating on redressing Indonesia's economic 
problems. The Advertiser went as far as to warn that if the chaos 
continued, an explosion of nationalism would occur 'far more 
dangerous than anything the world has seen so far in Indonesia 1 . 4 
For Denis Warner, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald in early 
1967, these events in Indonesia held wider implications, because: 
the behind-the-scene political manoeuvring could help to 
undermine confidence in the ... assurance that the 
Government will create the conditions that will make it 
possible for foreign capital to have the confidence that 
it can work undisturbed in Indonesia. 5 
Not all papers expressed this impatience and concern, while most 
displayed a shallow understanding of Indonesia. Some recognized 
the merit in taking a softer line with Sukarno, acknowledging that 
a large element within the Indonesian population continued to see 
Sukarno as Indonesia's 'natural' leader. Even the Sydney Morning 
Herald, carrying a lead article by Warner, expressed this very 
point, giving historical and contemporary political reasons why 
1 	See also the Sydney Morning Herald, 14 September 1966. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 14 March 1966. 
3 	The West Australian, 30 September 1966. 
4 	The Advertiser, 8 August 1966. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 1967. 
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Suharto needed to retain Sukarno as a 'figure-head'. 1 Editorials 
in the Advertiser2 and the Age3 shared Warner's views, as did the 
Mercury  . 4 
The appointment of Malik, of impeccable anti-communist 
credentials, as Acting Foreign Minister and second Deputy Prime 
Minister, received widespread approval in the Australian press, as 
did the announcement of a new Cabinet, although the Sydney Morning 
Herald5 indicated to its readers that Malik was not pro-Western and 
could be best described as an 'Indonesian nationalist with a 
Trotskyist background'. Subsequent statements by Malik and Suharto 
on confrontation held most attention for the press, in particular 
their gradual movement toward discussing its abandonment. It paved 
the way for wider and, for the most part, positive interpretations 
of developments in Indonesia, its future direction and the 
implications of both for Australia in national interest terms. 6 
In this regard the press had been, up until this time, far from 
reticent about stressing the importance of Australia's national 
interests, arguing, as the Sydney Morning Herald did in May 1966, 
and reinforced continually up until Hasluck's visit in August, how 
important 'a stable and prosperous Indonesia would be [to] ... 
Australia for reasons of security as well as trade'. The Canberra  
Times put it in terms easily understood by its readers, at what was 
an important stage in Australia's history, when it argued soberly 
that: 
For Australia, the Indonesian problem could prove 
strategically and politically more important than the 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 1966. 
2 	The Advertiser, 14 March 1966. 
3 	The Age, 31 March 1966. 
4 	The Mercury, 16 March 1966. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1966. 
6 	See the Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1966, 18 May 1966, 19 
May 1966, 3 June 1966; the Canberra Times 9 May 1966, 20 
May 1966, 6 June 1966, 13 June 1966, 12 August 1966; the 
Advertiser, 7 July 1966; the  Mercury, 16 March 1966, 2 May 
1966, 23 June 1966, 27 June 1966; the West Australian, 14 
March 1966, 3 June 1966; the Age, 19 April 1966, 14 April 
1966, 17 May 1966, 28 May 1966, 3 June 1966, 2 July 1966, 
5 July 1966 and 16 July 1966. 
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situation in Vietnam. We may sigh with relief at the 
ending of Confrontation, but we should also realise that 
the battle for survival of the new forces inside 
Indonesia is only just beginning . 1 
In sum, many in the press considered that the ending of 
confrontation would hold financial and security implications for 
Australia. First, the Australian defence budget would be shedding 
the financial burden associated with Australia's response to the 
campaign; and second, the prospect of a substantial withdrawal of 
British forces from the area was imminent. 
The second of these implications drew protracted analyses from 
the Advertiser2 and, again, the Sydney Morning Herald. The latter 
put it to its readers that an end to confrontation could pose as 
many problems for Australia as it solved. 3 It was at this point 
that the Sydney Morning Herald argued, rather perceptively, for a 
redefinition of the role and responsibilities of the Commonwealth 
Far East Strategic Reserve, and Australia's role in it, in any kind 
of post-confrontation regional setting. Fundamental to this 
re-evaluation was the belief that, with Indonesia casting off its 
Communist coat and displaying the potential to become a powerful 
force of stability in the region, Australia could not afford to 
offend her by giving her the impression that it would be 
'irrevocably and indefinitely' committed to the support of 
Malaysia. The seeds of such a notion (of not offending Indonesia) 
were sure to be fertilised by the uncertainty that surrounded the 
future of Britain's presence in the region. In this situation, 
argued the Sydney newspaper, it would be unacceptable for Australia 
to be the sole or even principal Commonwealth force in Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
Denis Warner took up this theme in the Advertiser, 4 drawing 
sustenance from a recently published article in the journal 
Survival. 5 However, Warner came the full circle and allocated an 
1 	The Canberra Times, 13 June 1966. 
2 	The Advertiser, 16 August 1966. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 1966. 
4 	The Advertiser, 16 August 1966. 
5 	Buchan, A., "Britain in the Indian Ocean", Survival, 
Vol.VIII, No.7, July 1966, pp.222-228. 
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important role for Australia in the wake of a British withdrawal. 
He believed that there was 'a healthy trend towards regional 
cooperation now replacing the truculence of confrontation in 4-he 
southern tier of Southeast Asia', and warned that until the 
countries of the region could assure their own security, although 
it fell on Australia's shoulders to bear the responsibilities left 
behind by Britain. This potential dilemma, however, was too far 
down the track for the Canberra Times which continued to be less 
optimistic about the prospects of a post-confrontation Indonesia. 
It warned that although moderates wielded the major influence in 
Jakarta, there were still hawks in positions of power. Besides: 
the history of the past three years of Confrontation, the 
old Indonesian tactics of blow hot, blow cold, the 
uncertainties of power within Indonesia today, all 
dictate that we should view these developments with 
care. 1 
At this point, it was clear that there was a division in the press 
about Indonesia's reluctance to commit itself to an official ending 
to confrontation. Although it was a diplomatically safe attitude 
to be adopted by the Indonesians, it was at variance with the help 
that was coming in from other countries. While this was a matter 
related to timing, some in the press argued this reluctance could 
prove of little consequence. However, others argued if it 
indicated a lack of appreciation on the part of the Indonesian 
administration of the urgency of their predicament, then it could 
be more serious. On another plane, the Canberra Times 2 and the 
Mercury3 began to shift the focus of their analysis away from the 
likely prospect of an end to confrontation to the equally likely 
power struggle it would give way to. 
An end to confrontation, therefore, had its consequences, in 
regional and domestic terms. On balance, it would be of immense 
significance to Australia. And this theme dominated press 
appraisals of its official ending in August. The Canberra Times  
saw it, as did most of the press, in the following terms: 
It lessens political tensions in our immediate strategic 
area and foreshadows a growth of trade which could help 
1 	The Canberra Times, 20 May 1966. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 13 July 1966. 
3 	The Mercury, 2 May 1966. 
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cushion the effect of a British move into the Common 
Market. 1 
Meanwhile Hasluck announced an increase in Colombo Plan programming 
for Indonesia for the following year. The press considered it 
should be seen for the 'spirit of cooperation' rather than 'the 
scale of its contribution for solving Indonesia's economic 
difficulties' -- something the West Australian2 had hinted at 
earlier in June. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 in contradiction to its advice in 
March, counselled Hasluck to move with caution, and considered his 
course of waiting for developments to consolidate themselves in 
Indonesia as a 'prudent' and wise one. Forgotten was the view that 
the urgency of the post-coup situation in Indonesia should have 
convinced Hasluck to abandon his 'pussy-footing' approach. The 
Sydney Morning Herald at that time considered that 'It is not the 
occasion for too nice an attention to the delicacies of 
non-interference' . 4 
The Age 5 had always tried to pursue an even line, urging 
Australia to engage in 'watchful and flexible diplomacy'; it now 
looked for some practical response from Canberra and suggested that 
'a handout in time may be a sound political and economic 
investment'. 6 This view was shared by the Advertiser 7 which argued 
that the most pressing problems facing Indonesia were related to 
creditors, rescheduling of debts and raising new loans. However, 
although a role for Australia in this process would be 'a small 
price to pay for the economic rehabilitation and political 
stability of Indonesia', it was quick to warn, that 'nothing is 
likely to follow automatically from an economic rescue operation', 
not least the securing of Indonesia's friendship. This emphasis on 
1 	The Canberra Times, 12 August 1966. 
2 	The West Australian, 3 June 1966. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August 1966. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herlad, 14 March 1966. 
5 	The Age, 9 April 1966. 
6 	The Age, 22 September 1966. 
7 	The Advertiser, 8 August 1966. 
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friendship with Indonesia, together with the need for economic 
reform (for strategic reasons) dominated the Australian press 
coverage of events in Indonesia, as they unfolded up until March 
1967, when Suharto became acting-President. 
While Hasluck's trip to Indonesia in January 1967 provided the 
backdrop to the development of these two themes, 1 the Canberra  
Times warned upon Hasluck's return that 'one overpowering 
consideration' underlined his early diplomacy: 
that Australia stands to gain relatively more from a 
strong prosperous Indonesia than most other nations do. 
A strong Indonesia with its economic problems under 
control means stability in the region. 2 
Much of the press, however, became too anxious, expressing 
disappointment at the slow pace towards economic reform by the 
Indonesian regime, while recognizing the three major obstacles of 
this reform -- the appalling state of the economy the regime had 
inherited, a shortage of trained and qualified people in the 
administrative processes and, 'less obvious but no less potent' was 
'Sukarno's exploitation of all his remaining and by no means 
inconsiderable power in a campaign of deliberately calculated 
obstructionism'. 3 This power struggle concerned many press 
observers, 4 so much so that the Sydney Morning Herald pointed out 
to its readers that it seemed probable that Suharto may remove 
Sukarno using 'military action' instead of waiting for a solution 
to the struggle through the democratic processes inherent in the 
People's Congress. 5 
The Canberra Times6 called for vigilance and warned against 
becoming complacent -- a view shared by the Northern Daily Leader, 
1 	See Frank Palmos, Sunday Mail, 14 August 1966; and the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1967. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 1 February 1967. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1967. 
4 	See, for example, Creighton Burns, the Canberra Times, 27 
January 1967. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1967. 
6 	The Canberra Times, 1 February 1967. 
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and which it had already expressed in November. 1 As the Canberra 
Times argued: 
L11 new regime has to show results; •if •it fl^c. 
people may begin to compare their new state with their 
old -- to the disadvantage of the present rule. There is 
no promise of stability in that 2 . 
Consolidation of Suharto's Power: and the Ending of Confrontation  
The removal of Sukarno from the Indonesian Presidency or, as 
Grant put it in the Age, perhaps describing more accurately the 
sophisticated political exercise which had just ended in Jakarta, 
'the removal of the Presidency from Sukarno', 3 prompted a flurry of 
articles and editorial opinion in the Australian press. The Sydney 
Morning Herald assessed Sukarno's role in Indonesia's history and 
concluded his demise was the best outcome believing: 
the greatest single obstacle to the political and 
economic spring cleaning of which Indonesia stands so 
desperately in need, has been removed. The Indonesian 
people... are entitled to hope that a new era has 
dawned. 4 
Such a hope was also held by the Australian press which was 
preoccupied with three themes throughout 1967 and the early months 
of 1968 -- Indonesia's economic reconstruction, security and 
defence issues and a return to democracy in Indonesia. 
All major papers, either in their editorials or lead stories, 
expressed a strong desire to see Indonesia become an economically 
viable state. And as the year went on it became clear that the 
Australian press was generally more hopeful about Indonesia's 
future prospects, although many papers acknowledged the 
uncertainties that cast a shadow over any optimism. This was 
perceptively conveyed by the Examiner, when it told its readers 
that although the Suharto regime was making moves to overcome 
endemic corruption and inefficiency, 'the Government's task now is 
to establish the economy before a rising tide of popular impatience 
and destructive inflation foster an uprising more successful than 
The Northern Daily Leader, 14 January 1967 and 30 November 
1966. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 1 February 1967. 
3 	The Age, 2 March 1967. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March 1967. 
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the communist coup'. 1 
This had been taken up earlier and quite forcefully by the 
Canberra Times in particular, and it argued that the onus was on 
the West, in particular Australia, 'to help generously in the 
restoration of the Indonesian economy and the advance of the 
Indonesian people'. As far as the Australian role was concerned, 
it concluded that this restoration 'should be paramount among 
Australia's policy aims. It is more important than Vietnam or the 
maintenance of American arms in Southeast Asia'. 2 
To some observers in the press, Indonesia's welfare was not a 
high Australian foreign policy aim. Grant, reporting from Jakarta, 
indicated a growing feeling among Indonesian officials and 
diplomats that Australia was failing to act decisively in the area 
of economic assistance. They pointed to the fact that other 
creditor nations, including some with a more remote interest than 
Australia in Indonesia's stability, had already met the target of 
$US200 million balance of payments assistance to Indonesia for that 
year. While these officials did not believe Canberra's reticence 
was due to any kind of disapproval of the regime, or its 
intentions, they were: 
puzzled at Australia's parsimony and cynically amused 
that after preaching to the Indonesians for so long about 
the need to concentrate on the economy we should now be 
so slow to show our appreciation. 3 
While Australian businesses had expressed fresh interest in 
prospects for future Australia-Indonesia trade links, these were 
long-term and quite properly, rooted in practical commercial 
considerations. Government-to-government relations, for Grant, 
were another matter, and the Australian Government in Indonesia was 
leaving an impression in the minds of many in Indonesia that it 
'has been either too hardheaded or negligent in its Indonesian 
policies this year' 4 -- a view shared by the Age's Creighton Burns5 . 
1 	The Examiner, 28 March 1967. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 14 March 1967. 
3 	The Age, 14 August 1967. 
4 	Ibid. 
5 	The Age, 17 August 1967. Burns criticized the conservatism 
on the part of Australian business and directed a broadside 
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It would appear that the Australian press, in general, reacted 
optimistically towards the overthrow of the left in Indonesia by 
the military, greeting the latter's plans for economic 
reconstruction with a great deal of enthusiasm. The Canberra Times 
argued that 'the situation [in Indonesia] is better than it was 
eight months ago' and lauded that 'moderates now wield the major 
influence in Djakarta'. 1 Similarly, the Sydney Morning Herald2 
suggested that the new administration, described by the Sunday 
Mail3 as 'sincere' and the Canberra Times as 'politically honest', 
was aware of the need for urgent economic reforms in Indonesia and 
the establishment of fruitful economic relations with the West. 4 
Such enthusiasm was perhaps understandable in view of the important 
position Indonesia occupied in Australian regional perceptions. As 
the Sydney Morning Herald noted: 
One of the most important interests of Australia's 
foreign policy is that her great Asian neighbour, 
Indonesia, should be stable, prosperous and under the 
control of a friendly government.' 
If, then, Indonesian reconstruction and political stability was in 
Australia's national interests, it was perhaps only logical that, 
according to the Australian press, the latter had almost an 
obligation to contribute positively in this regard and to attempt 
to foster good relations between the two countries. While it 
seemed politically and economically sound 'to embark on a massive 
and integrated drive to help rehabilitate Indonesia', 6 time was of 
at the Australian Government, which he considered had done 
'less than it might have to feed capital and technical 
assistance . into the barren Indonesian economy' -- a 
situation he found ironical in view of Hasluck's thesis that 
a deteriorating situation in Indonesia was more likely than 
anything else to undermine the Suharto regime, 'or drive it 
towards authoritarianism. 
1 	The Canberra Times, 9 May 1966. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1968. 
3 	The Sunday Mail, 14 August 1966. 
4 	The Canberra Times, 14 March 1967. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1968. 
6 	The Age, 8 August 1966. 
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the essence. The Canberra Times criticized the Australian 
Government over its seeming hesitancy to commit itself to the task 
at hand, referring to this reluctance as being indicative of '- 
lack of appreciation of the urgency in the situation. 1 
However, despite such obvious enthusiasm, caution was still 
evident, with Indonesia's past record concerning some in the press. 
The Canberra Times2 was still preoccupied with the uncertainties of 
power within Indonesia, while the Age considered that 'it is too 
much to assume that the new Indonesian regime will be logical; our 
best hope is that it will be practical'. 3 The West Australian, 
referring to the continuing political instability and the sheer 
magnitude of problems facing the new administration, warned that 
unless the Indonesian leadership could provide evidence of quick 
economic progress, they ran the risk that the country would again 
'accept Sukarno's slogans as a substitute for rice 1 . 4 Pursuing a 
similar theme, the Mercury5 suggested that the 'military leaders 
have a sense of honesty and discipline, but with few exceptions 
they are not good civil administrators or politicians'. On this 
theme, perhaps more harshly, the Advertiser considered that: 
so far they (Indonesian leadership] have shown no 
stomach, let alone ability, for taking hold of this 
country's galloping economic problems. And, as for 
corruption, the Army itself has a not unspotted 
reputation. 6 
Generally speaking, however, at this point the media seemed to be 
in agreement that time would be the greatest judge of the new 
administration in Indonesia, and attempts by the new Indonesian 
Foreign Minister, Adam Malik -- described by the Sydney Morning 
Herald as a 'hard-headed realist', and the person most responsible 
for returning Indonesia back into the international community 7 
1 	The Canberra Times, 13 February 1966. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 30 May 1966. 
3 	The Age, 14 April 1966. 
4 	The West Australian, 14 May 1966. 
5 	The Mercury, 16 March 1966. 
6 	The Advertiser, 14 March 1966. 
7 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 April 1968. 
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to bring an end to the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia 
received particular praise from the Australian press. 
Economic and Political Security: Problems and Prospects  
With the removal of this seemingly great obstacle to 
cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, attention in the press 
shifted towards the prospect of the development of some kind of 
bilateral or other security arrangement between the two countries 
in light of Britain's imminent withdrawal from the region. The 
Sydney Morning Heraldl reacted favourably to reported comments2 from 
Malik and Indonesia's Ambassador to Australia, Lt. General R. 
Hidajat, to the effect that 'Indonesia would want to be a party to 
any security force for the area since Britain has withdrawn', by 
suggesting that, 'Australia would like to see Indonesia joining in 
defence arrangements'. 
However, a gradual recognition of the reality of the 
situation, both from the perspective of Indonesia's domestic 
environment and ideological orientation, rapidly led to 
disillusionment on the part of the Australian press. In contrast 
to its earlier enthusiasm, the Sydney Morning Herald3 turned to 
express concern over the fact that joint security arrangements 
might extend to matters of internal security, particularly with 
reference to West Irian. For Australia to become involved in 
stabilizing West Irian would be a contradiction in terms in that 
'it would be difficult for Australia to put down a Papua 
Nationalist movement in West Irian while, at the same time 
encouraging the same thing in Papua New Guinea'. 
From an ideological perspective, Grant was concerned about the 
divergence of Australian and Indonesian perceptions of regional 
security, particularly with regard to the role of the USA in 
Vietnam. 4 Grant also expressed anxiety over Malik's developing 
view that once Britain and the USA were to withdraw from Southeast 
Asia, Indonesian hegemony within the region would be assured. 
1 	Ibid. 
2 	The Australian, 8 April 1968. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 1968. 
4 	The Age, 23 April 1968. 
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Subsequent suggestions by Suharto and Malik that ASEAN may develop 
a military capacity, and that Australia was not an Asian country, 
left certain sections of the media feeling as if Au straliawas in 
the process of being isolated militarily. 
On a more practical level, Hastings seriously questioned the 
capacity of Indonesia to play at least a positive role, much less 
an important one, in the region in future, given the fundamental 
problems of internal stability and the structure of the Suharto 
Government) He argued that the government would, over time, 
become more and more inclined towards military dictatorship, with 
the result that economic activity would be increasingly 
subordinated to political control. That Hastings' prediction 
gradually began to show fruit was, in general, a source of mounting 
frustration and disillusionment on the part of the Australian 
press, who expressed concern over the Suharto Government's domestic 
political, rather than economic, preoccupations. 
At least initially, the press remained favourably disposed 
towards the Suharto Government, placing the blame for the 
continuing political instability on purposely disruptive elements 
such as the left, student movements, and Sukarno. However, the 
removal of Sukarno, whose popularity in Indonesia was still a force 
to be reckoned with, was, to a strong degree, seen to be the key to 
stability. Once he was removed from the political scene, economic 
reconstruction could begin unhindered, thereby allowing progress to 
occur at a rate which would be favourable to the greater part of 
Indonesian society. Yet forceful removal could, as one paper 
argued, 'produce a vast internal commotion amounting to civil 
war' . 2 
It is worth noting that the relatively sedate nature of 
Sukarno's later removal, in comparison with his flamboyant and 
dynamic political career, was the source of contradictory views 
held by the Australian press. While Sukarno's removal paved the 
way for Indonesia's much needed 'political and economic spring 
cleaning', it was also evident that his downfall was viewed with a 
great deal of sadness by the press, as if perceiving it to be a 
blow against idealism. In particular, recognition of Sukarno's 
The Australian, 1 May 1968. 
2 	The Northern Daily Leader, 14 January 1967. 
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efforts on behalf of the Indonesian revolution was characteristic 
of the somewhat eulogistic response of the press to Sukarno's 
downfall. 
While it could be expected that Sukarno's removal, coupled 
with the essentially pragmatic nature of the new regime, would tend 
to create a situation which would be embraced approvingly by the 
Australian press, irregular incidents served to bring into 
question, albeit briefly, the integrity and cohesiveness of the 
Suharto government. Commenting on the instability of the new 
regime, the Advertiser suggested that 'the generals are kept 
together by [Sukarno's] economic ineptness and the bankruptcy into 
which he has led the republic'. The Sunday Mail followed a 
similar line in response to continuing Indonesian aggression around 
and within Malaysia. Adopting a particularly cynical stance, it 
speculated that perhaps 'Jakarta approves of the clandestine raids 
but will disclaim all knowledge of them while a public relations 
campaign is exerted on the world to win forgiveness for past deeds 
and support for the future'. 2 
Generally speaking, however, this was a time for optimism and 
positive perceptions of the new government. Such views were 
reflected by the Age when, in criticizing negative views of 
Indonesia, it commented that 'it is more important to recognize 
Indonesia's change of heart in domestic and foreign policies than 
to seek devious motives behind particular manifestations of it'. 3 
The fact that such views placed priority on the conservatism and 
pragmatism of the 'New Order' allowed the Australian press to take 
a conciliatory line toward apparent infringements of civil 
liberties in Indonesia. Thus, the Advertiser 4 was able to comment 
on the postponement of elections by Suharto as being 'not likely to 
worry anyone except for frustrated politicians and student 
leaders'. Of greater concern was the possible instability 
resulting from slow economic growth and a dearth of employment. 
2 
3 
4 
The Advertiser, 7 July 1966. 
9 October 1966. 
1966. 
13 October 1967. 
The Sunday Mail, 
The Age, 2 July 
The Advertiser, 
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However, mounting frustration at the relatively slow progress 
of the Indonesian economy and the persistence of political 
instability began to take the form of increasing criticism. This 
was directed initially at such factors as cronyism and corruption, 1 
which the Australian press saw was severing the lifeline of 
Indonesia, both economically, in the case of discouraging foreign 
investment, and politically, in the sense of antagonizing militant 
student groups. 2 
Increasingly, the government itself became the focus of 
criticism as the realities of military control became ever more 
apparent. Leading the vanguard was the Sydney Morning Herald, 
ironically one of the most ardent supporters of the new Suharto 
Government initially. As early as February 1968, the Sydney 
newspaper was slightly critical of Suharto's push to become 
President, without elections for the next five years. 3 More 
militant, although essentially still conciliatory in nature, the 
Sydney Morning Herald again attacked the Indonesian regime a month 
later, questioning Suharto's indefinite prolongation of his 
emergency powers, and putting to its readers that it was difficult 
to understand why he found it necessary to 'stack' the People's 
Congress with his supporters. 4 
This was followed in October 1968 by a warning that the use of 
execution as a means of controlling subversive factions carried 
with it the danger that the good name of Suharto could be damaged, 
precisely at a time when he was trying to develop it 
internationally. 5 It predicted that, for example, Indonesia's 
treatment of political prisoners was likely to have an extremely 
1 	See Denis Warner's comments in the Sydney Morning Herald, 
22 February 1967. 
2 	See the West Australian, 4 August 1967; the Canberra 
Times, 31 October 1967; the Examiner, 28 March 1967, 28 
March 1967 and the Sydney Morning Herald, 8 January 1968. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 February 1968. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March 1968. In late 1968, the 
editor of the Sydney Morning Herald criticized Suharto over 
his decision not to recognize the freely elected leadership 
of the country's biggest political party, Parmusi 
(22 November 1968). 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October 1968. 
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detrimental effect on negotiations with the Soviet Union, its 
largest creditor. 1 The Sydney Morning Herald's subtle criticisms 
seemed to question, increasingly, the morality of the Tna^nc.n 
Government, echoing sentiments expressed in mid-1966 by the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Australia (L. Aarons), when he 
condemned the massive execution of political prisoners by the 
Suharto regime. 2 
In spite of some minor criticisms, the tone of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, as was the case of the Australian press in general, 
had essentially been conciliatory. It would appear that during the 
three years from 1966 to 1968, press attention had focused almost 
exclusively on the problems and prospects for Indonesia following 
the advent of the new regime, and the implications for the region. 3 
The tone had been generally enthusiastic and, to a certain extent, 
optimistic about the potential for the development of better 
relations between Australia and Indonesia. Yet, there had also 
been an understandable wariness, undoubtedly fostered by 
Indonesia's past record and continuing political instability. The 
press in Australia had, to a greater extent, stressed caution yet, 
at the same time, criticized any hesitancy on the part of the 
Australian Government to expand relations. Thus, the impression 
was given that it was a confusing period both for politicians and 
the media. 
As the furor over the 'Act of Free Choice' and associated 
developments died down, 4 press attention again returned to focus on 
the comparatively leaden issues of economic progress and the 
potential for further expansion of Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia. A common theme in relation to the former was the 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 1968. 
2 	Letter to the Editor, the Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 
1966. 
3 	A particularly good analysis was published by Peter Hastings 
throughout June and July 1968, in the Australian (28 June 
1968, 16 July 1968, 17 July 1968). See also editorial on 
4 April 1968 which reflects on Hastings' June article and 
his argument that Indonesia was in a great deal of trouble 
economically. The editor concluded that if Indonesia was 
to lapse into its former state of instability, the region 
as a whole would be affected. 
4 	See Chapter Three. 
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effectiveness of the Suharto regime in stabilizing the economy and 
bringing a halt to rampant inflation. 1 Yet, this enthusiasm 
appeared to be somewhat t-mp° ,-°,1 by an acknowledgement of 
negligible progress and the factors which were actively working 
against the efforts of the government. In this regard, Hastings, 
writing in the Australian in early 1970, suggested that: 
Indonesia's basic ills of a rundown economy are so bound 
up with intractable social and cultural attitudes and 
personal and corporate corruption that it is hard to 
establish the priorities of a national therapy. 2 
Bribery and corruption, as well as the vast extremes between wealth 
and poverty, were strong themes in a scathing article published in 
the Age by Federal MHR, Neil Brown. 3 
In what was the first public statement of criticism by a 
member of the government backbench, Brown focused, particularly, on 
the extent of corruption in Indonesia. While he considered that it 
was 'not the government's fault' Brown argued that it would 
obstruct efficient administration, deter foreign investment and 
prod 'continuous overseas criticism at a time when the government 
is engaged in a delicate exercise of image building'. Such 
criticism was not only restricted to structural problems in the 
Indonesian economy but also extended to the government itself. On 
the eve of President Suharto's visit to Australia in February 
1972, 4 Hastings argued that while the achievements had been 
1 	See among others, the Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1970, 
8 May 1970; the Australian, 4 July 1971; the Age, 11 
February 1970. 
2 	The Australian, 28 January 1970. The Financial Review, 17 
February 1971 followed a similar line in a discussion on the 
potential rewards and problems related to investment in 
Indonesia. In particular, it outlined a number of dangers 
such as corruption, and arbitrary and outdated business laws 
which were serving to make potential investors 
understandably wary. 
3 	The newly-elected Liberal member for Diamond Valley, 
Victoria. The Age, 14 February 1970. 
4 	The purpose of his four-day visit from 6-9 February, was to 
'find out what skills, know-how, capital, and material 
assistance may be furnished by the government in Canberra 
for the mammoth task of lifting his people towards even the 
most modest standards of this century' (the Review, 
22 January 1972). See also the Courier Mail, 5 February 
1972. 
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substantial, the Indonesian Government could be criticized on 
account of its 'occasional intellectual limitations, and the narrow 
framework in which Aev.leo,me.rvi- 	even cbonnnmie■ 
development, which is too often considered good in itself without 
too much enquiry as to where it is heading'. 1 
The Imperatives of Closer Bilateral Relations  
The realism which was increasingly evident in statements on 
economic development also found its way into perceptions of the 
nature of relations between Australia and Indonesia. As if in a 
warning of what was to follow in subsequent years, the Canberra  
Times2 argued that, 'friendly relations cannot entail uncritical 
approval of all political structures and events'. Moreover, there 
was a growing recognition in the press of the marked discrepancies 
between Indonesian and Australian perceptions of security. 3 Grant4 
and Hastings went a step further, with the latter stating that 
'basic common interests are hard to discover', and: 
the cause of relations between us is not being served by 
the pretence that we are both essentially Asian nations, 
one of whom happens to be rather more developed 
technologically than the other. 5 
However, conciliation and enthusiasm remained the dominant themes 
of the Australian press with regard to relations generally. This 
was reflected in the reaction to the seabed pact signed between the 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1972. On the eve of 
Suharto's visit to Australia, Hastings, now with the Sydney 
Morning Herald, went to Indonesia to report on its most 
recent developments. He subsequently published two 
searching pieces in the Sydney Morning Herald (27 and 28 
January 1972) and an interview with Suharto (31 January 
1972). 
2 	The Canberra Times, 5 February 1972. 
3 	See among others, the Sydney Morning Herald, 3 October 1970 
and a series of articles in the Australian by Hastings (28 
January 1970 and 11 March 1970). 
4 	The Age, 17 August 1970. 
5 	See Hastings' excellent analysis of the Australian- 
Indonesian Conference (held at the ANU in May 1970) in the 
Australian (27 May 1970). See also Grant's article on the 
conference in the Age, 23 May 1970. 
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two countries, 1 and the offer, by the McMahon government, of 
sixteen Sabre jets to Indonesia. 2 On this note, also, the 
Australian press in general, were compelled to comment on the fact 
that whereas Australia was now donating surplus aircraft to 
Indonesia, a decade earlier it was frantically buying aircraft from 
the Americans in the belief that war with Indonesia was imminent. 
As the Sun Herald editorialized, 'A decade ago Indonesia was the 
benchmark against which we ordered our arms and armies, our most 
likely foe in the event of a war'. 3 Such a dramatic turn around 
was widely viewed as evidence of both the pragmatic nature of the 
Suharto Government and the development of friendly relations 
between the two countries. 
A further case in point was the forementioned visit of 
President Suharto. While certain sections of the press expressed 
concern at the increasingly dictatorial nature of the Indonesian 
Government, 4 it was almost unanimous in condemning planned protests 
against Suharto over such issues as political prisoners and 
widespread brutality. In this vein, the Sydney Morning Herald  
stated in strong terms that 'left-wing plans here to try to 
embarrass President Suharto are nothing but deceitful and 
unscrupulous mischief-making in the communist interests' . 5 
While internal political developments in Indonesia commanded a 
relatively high degree of newspaper attention, they represented 
something of an enigma to the Australian press. Without doubt, the 
most attention focused on the proposed general elections of 1971, 
1 	See the Sydney Morning Herald, 19 April 1971 and the 
Financial Review, 17 May 1971. In relation to the seabed 
pact, the Sydney Morning Herald commented 'the ease and the 
lack of fuss with which Indonesia and Australia have signed 
a mutual boundaries agreement aimed at avoiding future 
disputes over mineral searches indicate how close 
Jakarta-Canberra relations have become' (20 May 1971). 
2 See, among others, the Age, 
Mail, 4 December 1971. 
Herald's editorial saw the 
of 'the increasingly close 
(2 December 1971). 
3 December 1971 and the Courier 
Similarly, the Sydney Morning 
gift of Sabre jets as evidence 
relations which have developed' 
3 	The Sun Herald, 6 February 1972. 
4 	See, for example, the Canberra Times, 3 November 1970. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February 1972. 
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and the attempt by the government to ensure victory. 1 Adopting a 
realist stance, the Sydney Morning Herald accepted that the 
—4- o 	4-* 	4- 	=1.%e1 1.No1roma11ee1 jeiw.i mi-c ion MCM1AL pavc4.4suocsou. Jay (.44.4g4i 
dialogue with the intellectuals and elites', rather than a 'return 
to the chaos of earlier years with its possibility of communist 
(PKI) exploitation'. 2 This was a theme that was widely repeated as 
was the view that, 'it is not the way the elections are being 
conducted that counts; it is the fact that they are being held at 
all' . 3 
In general, however, the press could not help but be concerned 
at the 'win at any cost' and 'bulldozing' 4 tactics employed by the 
government and the army. The Canberra Times, for example, argued 
that, 'the pressures now being used by government and army 
officials, including intimidation and assorted tough tactics, to 
promote Sekber Golkar have rightly drawn criticism'. 5 
Overwhelmingly though, the attitude of the press was that despite 
the distastefulness of such tactics, the end result would tend to 
justify the means. In this regard, the Northern Daily Leader ° 
suggested that, following the Golkar victory, 'the continuance of 
the Suharto regime will be a satisfactory outcome from our point of 
view'. To this, Rohan Rivett, writing for the Sunday Review, added 
that since a vote for Golkar was a vote against returning to the 
chaos of the past, 'most advanced thinking in Indonesia supported 
Suharto and the Golkar experiment'. 7 Besides, according to the 
Canberra Times, this would be 'the first step in a return to free 
1 	The Australian, 23 April 1971, 30 June 1971, 9 July 1971; 
the Age, 4 January 1971, 22 June 1971; the  Sydney Morning 
Herald, 16 February 1971; the Financial Review, 18 February 
1971; the Sunday Review 21 March 1971. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May 1971. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 July 1971. 
4 	Peter McCawley, at the time a Research Scholar at ANU, used 
such a term in an article published by the National Times, 
2-7 August 1971. 
5 	The Canberra Times, 15 June 1971. 
6 	The Northern Daily Leader, 6 July 1971. 
7 	The Sunday Review, 23 July 1971. 
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and fully representative elections': 
However, it became increasingly clear that, as the Indonesian 
Government assumed steadily tighter control, the conciliatory 
nature of the Australian press had its limits. In February 1972, 
the Canberra Times criticized the Suharto regime's inability to 
deal satisfactorily with growing internal dissent by suggesting 
that Suharto's 'uncharacteristic overreaction to what was 
originally a miniscule problem may generate the very forces he had 
hoped to suppress'. 2 Some concern, also, was expressed in certain 
sections of the press over the post-election reorganization of the 
Indonesian Parliament which essentially turned it into little more 
than a 'rubber stamp' for Suharto's policies. 
It would appear that the Australian press in general 
perpetuated a conciliatory and optimistic attitude toward 
Indonesia, with some qualifications. This was understandable when 
viewed in the sense that friction over West Irian did nothing to 
change Australian perceptions of Indonesia's regional value. 
Indeed, it may have served to enhance it. As Grant argued at the 
ANU Conference on Australia and Indonesia in mid-1970, and reported 
in the Canberra Times, 'an Australian security role of any kind in 
Southeast Asia was impossible without the assent of Indonesia 1 . 3 
Similarly, the Sydney Morning Herald referred to Indonesia as 'the 
single most important element in maintaining regional stability' 
and suggested that, 'in the long run our Asian policies as a whole 
are most likely to be judged most keenly by our relations with 
Indonesia' . 4 
The election of the Whitlam Labor Government in December 1972 
did little, according to the Australian press, to change the nature 
or conduct of these relations. 5 Essentially, this was because this 
issue was one area in which Liberal and Labor policy was 
1 	The Canberra Times, 15 June 1971. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 14 February 1972. 
3 	The Canberra Times, 20 May 1970. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February 1972. 
5 	See, among others, the Age, 11 January 1973, 12 March 1973, 
14 May 1973; the Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 1973, 
6 April 1973; the Financial Review, 23 March 1973. 
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bipartisan. Thus, press perceptions and attitudes seemed, at least 
with regard to such issues as economic development and investment 
and corruption, to display a continuity which essentially 
transcended the change in government. 1 Yet, there appeared to be a 
degree of concern over the manner in which Whitlam, as both Prime 
Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, perceived and conducted the 
relationship with Indonesia. 2 
Early in 1973, Warner suggested in the Sydney Morning Herald3 
that the traditional 'threat from the north' analysis which had, in 
one way or another, always figured in governmental policy towards 
Indonesia 'simply did not figure in Mr Whitlam's policy thinking, 
or at least not in his policy statements'. Similarly, concern was 
expressed over the possible implications of the government's 
recognition of the People's Republic of China for the relationship 
with Indonesia. 4 In this regard, the Sydney Morning Herald  
reported that Whitlam's visit to Asia, and Indonesia, in 
particular, was less 'an exercise in international courtesy', as a 
move to 'dispel any notions of a future Canberra-Peking axis'. 5 
Whitlam's visit was perceived favourably by the Australian 
press and widely applauded 5 as symbolic of the importance of 
Indonesia to Australia, and the close relations that existed 
between the two countries. However, his initiatives relating to 
the establishment of a regional grouping incorporating the newly 
recognized China, were viewed much less enthusiastically. The 
Mercury, for example, and representative of much press comment, 
suggested that Whitlam was naive, and 'obviously needs to do a lot 
1 	See, for example, the Age, 14 May 1973, 23-24-25 July 1973; 
the Sydney Morning Herald, 5 November 1973. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 1973; 	The 
Australian, 24 February 1973, 27 February 1973 (Alan 
Ramsey); The Age, 26 February 1973 (Burns), 24 February 
1973 (Barnes). 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1973. 
4 	Age 10 February 1973 (Denis Warner); Financial Review, 16 
October 1973. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 1973. 
6 	The Sydney Morning Herald 15 January 1973; the Financial 
Review, 1 February 1973; the Age, 19 February 1973. 
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more thinking about the affairs and feelings of Australia's 
neighbours before launching his more fanciful ideas on foreign 
affairs'. 1 The subsequent rejection of Whitlam's proposals by 
Indonesian officials thus came as no surprise to the Australian 
press. 
However, there was some degree of contention over with whom 
the blame rested for the rejection. While certain sections of the 
press criticized the Australian Prime Minister for his naivety and 
lack of understanding, Indonesia was also singled out. Adopting a 
conciliatory, though pragmatic line, the Age argued that 'the 
present regime in Jakarta is unlikely to engage in daring 
initiatives until it has settled certain basic problems'. 2 More 
cynically, Solomon, writing in the Canberra Times, 3 suggested that 
fear of losing its dominant position in the region was the primary 
motivation behind the rejection of the Whitlam initiatives. In 
essence, 'they conflict[ed] with Indonesia's desires to be the . 
biggest fish in the Southeast Asian pool, and [Indonesia] does not 
want Australia coming in and upsetting this 1 . 4 
Emerging Antagonism 
If Whitlam's visit was designed to enhance relations between 
Australia and Indonesia, then it became increasingly apparent 
towards the end of 1973 that the reverse was occurring. A series 
of trenchant and damning articles 5 on Indonesian politics by Neil 
1 	The Mercury, 22 February 1973. For an account of this 
episode see David Solomon, the  Canberra Times, 22 February 
1973; Brian Johns, the Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 
1973; the Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 1973, 24 
February 1973; Alan Barnes, the Age, 24 February 1973. 
2 	The Age, 24 February 1973. 
3 	The Canberra Times, 26 February 1973. 
4 	See interesting comments made in the Economist (3 March 
1973) which considered, among other things, 'The Indonesians 
like being the big fish in the ASEAN puddle... they do not 
want to be dwarfed by Japan and China in an inclusive Asian 
pool'. 
5 	The Age, Don Chipp, "Indonesia: 	Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow": Part One: "Affection, respect fly out the 
window" (23 July 1972); Part Two: "Cruelty on our 
doorstep" (24 July 1973); Part Three: "People starve, as 
regime gets fatter" (25 July 1973). 
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Brown's parliamentary colleague, Liberal MP, Don Chipp, served as a 
partial catalyst towards a heightening of antagonism between the 
A4A 	writeanythinguniqueon cult-41 icciumc  countries. Chipp two
as corruption and political suppression but expanded upon themes 
that were, by this time, relatively familiar in the press, academic 
writings l and the Australian Parliament. 2 
Chipp tended to adopt an openly antagonistic line towards the 
Suharto regime, in contrast to the essentially conciliatory one 
which had been largely espoused previously. Referring to government 
in Indonesia as a 'ruling junta', supported by the 'useless 
institution which they call Parliament', 3 Chipp argued that 
'corruption and graft are as bad, if not worse than under Sukarno's 
regime. They are now openly practised on the surface'. 4 He then 
recommended that the 'New Order' be required to 'do something new 
first' before foreign aid be forthcoming. 5 Further, he criticized 
the Australian press and public by suggesting that, with regard to 
political prisoners, they 'allow these hideous assaults on human 
rights in our nearest neighbouring country to be perpetuated 
without raising a voice in protest or anger'. 6 
While there was a mixed press and public response to the Chipp 
articles, 7 there seemed to be little difference of opinion over 
whether or not they would affect relations. Michael Richardson 
wrote in the Financial Review8 that the articles were perceived in 
Indonesia as a 'damaging interference in the internal affairs of 
1 	See Chapter Six. 
2 	See Chapter Five. 
3 	The Age, 25 July 1973. 
4 	The Age, 23 July 1973. 
5 	The Age, 25 July 1973. 
6 	The Age, 24 July 1973. 
7 	See for example, Creighton Burns' reaction in the Age, 27 
July 1973, and a letter to the Editor of the Age (7 August 
1973) from Ken Ward. Ward, of Monash University, was a 
co-author of the book Showcase State, published that year. 
See also, Peter Hastings' article "Indonesia at Crisis 
Point...III", the Sydney Morning Herald,  17 March 1974. 
8 	The Financial Review, 16 October 1973. 
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friendly states'. More importantly, Indonesia saw it 'as a 
lingering tendency to deal with Asia in hectoring, standover terms 
from a self-assumed pedestal of Western superiority'. Similarly, 
other factors -- such as the very nature of the Whitlam 
government -- were becoming gradually conducive towards the 
emergence of an 'underlying and potentially serious tension' in the 
relationship, described by Whitlam as being of 'paramount 
importance' to both countries. 
Generally speaking, however, press attitudes towards 
Indonesia, as evidenced by a series of almost patronising articles 
by Peter Hastings in the Sydney Morning Herald in November 1973, 
remained essentially conciliatory. 1 Apart from the controversial 
Chipp articles, and a growing but still relatively minor degree of 
criticism over the existence and treatment of political prisoners, 
attention continued to be focused on relatively mundane issues such 
as economic and political development and the implications for 
Australia of Whitlam's efforts in the diplomatic arena. 
The following six months were to prove eventful. The visit to 
Indonesia in January 1974 of Japan's Prime Minister, Tanaka, and 
the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship under President 
Caetano three months later, sent shockwaves, respectively, through 
Jakarta and the Portuguese colony of East Timor. The former 
occupied the Australian press for months, with firsthand accounts 
of the ensuing riots in Jakarta. 2 However, this was quickly 
overshadowed by thoughtful, and in some cases concerned analyses of 
their long-term domestic and regional implications. The latter 
theme was prominent in press interest, as it turned increasingly to 
interpretations of events in Portugal and, by implication, East 
Timor. The latter quickly displaced the Tanaka incident and was to 
stay firmly entrenched in press perceptions for the next five 
years. 
The Age considered that the riots in Jakarta reflected a: 
simmering resentment at the increasingly big role of 
foreign investment generally in a society with continuing 
extremes of wealth and poverty which the capital from 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 and 6 November 1973. 
2 	See, among others, the Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 
1974, 18 January 1974; the Age, 17 January 1973, 18 January 
1974; the Australian, 17 January 1974; the National Times, 
21 January 1974. 
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abroad is doing little to reduce. 1 
While this interpretation of events was widely embraced 
2 sections of the press began to qiicir,n the 'New 
Order's' economic policies and their domestic implication for 
Australia's long-term security interests. 
At the forefront of criticism of the regime's economic 
direction was Hastings who, writing in a series of articles in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, felt compelled to suggest that not only had 
'the sheer success of the New Order Government's economic policies 
... created a host of social ills with which nobody seems able to 
cope', but, more importantly, 'something has been going wrong with 
the New Order Government's sense of direction and priorities for 
some time past'. 3 Nevertheless, the January riots did little to 
persuade the Indonesian Government into constructive and sustained 
action to cope with the clearly mounting social and economic 
frustration. Rather, there was 'considerable recourse to 
repressive measures', with the government detaining intellectuals, 
academics, and student leaders on charges of 'conspiracy'. 4 While 
Hastings subsequently conceded that 'the government and its 
official apologists are clearly embarrassed by their inability to 
The Age, 17 January 1974. 
2 	The Financial Review, 17 January 1974; the Examiner, 17 
January 1974; the Australian, 17 January 1974; the West 
Australian, 18 January 1974. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1974. See Rohan Rivett's 
similar analysis in the National Review, 1-7 February 1974. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 1974. Forty Australian 
academics signed a petition, some months later, urging the 
Whitlam Government to protect the democratic rights of all 
Indonesians in Australia. • The academics accused the 
Indonesian Government of gross interference with their 
freedom of speech in Australia by reprisals it took against 
Professor Ernst Utrecht, a professor of international law 
at the University of Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur. Utrecht had 
made a three-week visit to Australia in March, during which 
he was strongly critical of the Suharto regime. The 
academics alleged Utrecht was subsequently sacked from his 
post due to Indonesian pressure on the Malaysian Government. 
The Australian's editorial (20 June 1973) called on the 
Australian Government to 'explain to the Jakarta Government 
that, where democratic rights are concerned, we cannot 
tolerate the victimization of Indonesians who come here as 
our guests'. 
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prove conspiracy links between detainees and the January riots', he 
called for an understanding of the Suharto regime's preoccupation 
with security issues, 	 andethnic 	 and theycs.. 
direction of political developments over the previous decade. 1 
Some in the press ventured to examine in detail the underlying 
forces behind the riots. On one level, attention centred on the 
racist nature of the demonstrations, as it became clear that 
protestors directed attention not only at the Japanese but also the 
local Chinese -- considered by the editor of the Courier Mail to 
have been 'traditional victims of Indonesian hostility'. 2 On 
another level, sections of the press discerned the presence of a 
factional struggle within the highest circles of government. Of 
particular interest was the attention given to on-going rumours of 
rivalry3 between Major General Ali Murtopo (a senior adviser to 
President Suharto) 4 and General Sumitro (Head of Kopkantib 5 and 
Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces). The Australian 6 indicated 
that there were signs that students involved in the disturbances 
had received encouragement from Sumitro, and it appeared that they 
thus represented not an attempt to overthrow the regime but merely 
the manoeuvreing for position of different groups within it. 7 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 1974. 
2 	The Courier Mail, 18 January 1974. 
3 	The situation had arisen where officers engaged in strictly 
military tasks tended to regard Murtopo's more 'political' 
role, and his special access to Suharto, with suspicion. 
Cutting across these rivalries between 'political' and 
'professional' generals were ethnic and regional feelings 
arising from the comparative dominance of officers of 
Central Java's Diponegoro Division, which was once commanded 
by Suharto. 
4 	Murtopo was head of Opsus (Special Operations) and on 
Suharto's personal staff (Aspri). 
5 	Command for Restoration of Security and Order (Komando 
Pemulihan Keamanan dan Keteriban). 
6 	The Australian, 17 January 1974. See also the Age, 19 
January 1974, the National Times, 21 January 1974 and the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 5 and 6 March 1974. 
7 	The outcome was a general reshuffle of top positions 
including the removal of Sumitro as Commander of Kopkamtib. 
In March 1975, he resigned as Deputy Commander of the Armed 
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Concern over the implications of these events for Australian 
security were also expressed in other newspapers. The Financial  
Review, 1 for example, called for 'a serious look at the Ticti - i^n of 
whether a more neutral attitude to whoever is in power in Indonesia 
would conflict with Australia's long-term interests'. Hastings 
indicated in the Sydney Morning Herald that there was not only 'a 
need for Australians and Indonesians to consider their relationship 
and where it is taking them', but also 'how far either side can go 
with the other'. In essence: 
Australia needs to think about its neighbour a little 
more objectively than it has in the past as the single 
most important of its foreign policy problems ... because 
of its undoubted ability to involve all neighbouring 
powers in its messy activities. Indonesia is an 
uncomfortable neighbour on any assessment and under any 
government. 2 
Conclusion  
Press reporting of developments in Indonesia during this nine-
year period was thorough and comprehensive -- often 
undiscriminately so, particularly in the three years following the 
coup. While it could be argued that the press provided a forum for 
debate and attempted to inform domestic opinion, reporting of 
developments in the 1965-68 period generally did not provide the 
basis for clear and relevant policy discussion. In the immediate 
post-coup period for instance, the press gave varying but 
sensational attention to the power struggle taking place in 
Jakarta, and newspaper editorials left the resulting muddled 
picture undisturbed. It was not until the political dust settled 
that editorials attempted to describe and evaluate the issues 
arising from Indonesia's internal disorders and her move towards 
economic rehabilitation. 
It could not be argued, however, that the press underrated the 
problems facing Indonesia while perhaps exaggerating the importance 
of an Australian role in providing assistance. In terms of the 
Forces. Murtopo retained his Opsus, which led McDonald to 
consider that his role in Sumitro's downfall was 'apparent 
although indefinable'. McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, 
p.140. 
The Financial Review, 17 January 1974. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 March 1974. 
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former, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age saw Sukarno as the 
major obstacle to any practicable solutions in Indonesia. Others 
considered that Sukarno was Indonesia 1-1,1 	caution and 
patience. While the Sydney Morning Herald was unsuccessful in 
swaying the Australian Government away from its cautious policies, 
it was -- at a time when the British were withdrawing from the 
region and discussing the prospects of entering the European 
Economic Community -- effective in stimulating a general awareness 
in the press of Indonesia's potential role in Australia's national 
interests, in both the strategic and trade arenas. However, while 
such issues dominated the views of the Sydney Morning Herald and 
the Age, the Canberra Times (and sometimes the Age) were at the 
forefront of a number of newspapers which were more concerned with 
the humanitarian aspects of developments in Indonesia, and in this 
context, supported the Australian Government's inclination to tread 
carefully. 
The continuing power struggle, however, increasingly disturbed 
all these newspapers, as well as the Mercury, the Advertiser and 
the West Australian. This gave rise to a period in which there was 
considerable interplay between the press and government on the 
major issue of economic development, and sustained criticism by the 
press of the government's reticence to assist Indonesia 
economically, spilled over into the Australian business arena. 
Many in the press found it incredible that the Australian 
Government, as preoccupied with regional security as the L-CP 
coalition then was, was not prepared to contribute to such security 
through assistance to Indonesia. Inevitably, press appreciation of 
the government's policies became increasingly negative and there is 
no reason to believe that this did not reinforce similar 
perceptions within the wider Australian community. 
The Sydney Morning Herald was undoubtedly the most vocal and 
forceful exponent of this argument. It repeatedly called, 
patronisingly at times, for a more intense Australian effort to 
assist Indonesia, and gave full support to all measures which were 
designed to rehabilitate the country. Not content with merely 
advocating economic assistance, the Sydney Morning Herald proposed 
a security arrangement between Australia and Indonesia. While such 
a view was widely criticized, it may have been of major influence 
in the Australian Government's subsequent examination and proposal 
of such an alliance within the year. For the Sydney Morning  
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Herald, security and ideological reasons prevailed and were to 
underwrite its appraisals of Indonesian issues through to 1972, and 
t4 	*4- 4- 1117L. V1S1l. L.o Australia. 
However, most of the press avoided such an extreme position as 
that adopted by the Sydney Morning Herald, and it was here that 
seasoned correspondents such as Palmos, Grant and, ironically, 
Hastings played a role. Their interpretative appraisals confronted 
the substantive issues being generated by Indonesia's drive towards 
political and economic stability. Paradoxically, it was Hastings 
who expressed the earliest concern about this process and the 
Suharto government's preoccupation with domestic political control. 
However, optimism prevailed and the imperatives and 
implications of the ideological changes that had taken place in 
Indonesia gave rise to press views that stressed pragmatism, while 
taking a conciliatory line toward Indonesia's increasingly 
hardening domestic policies. In such a situation, the press 
created a climate in which the government would have been 
encouraged to maintain the course of its Indonesia policies. 
By the early 1970s, a number of dissenting government MPs had 
formed links with the press, in particular, the Age, and the 
Melbourne daily was instrumental in raising questions not only 
about the performance of the Indonesian Government but also about 
the nature of its relationship with Australia. Catalytic here were 
the views of Don Chipp, which sowed the seed of Indonesian 
discontent with the press' role in Australia-Indonesia relations. 
Such views as they developed in the narrower institutional 
environment of the Australian Parliament are now examined. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BIPARTISAN INTEREST: THE AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY 
DEBATE (1965-74)  
Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyses the attitudes within the 
Federal Parliament on Indonesian issues between 1965 and 1974. The 
principal issue examined is Indonesia's economic and political 
transformation and the bearing it would have on regional security. 1 
In the immediate post-coup period, economic development was debated 
more than anything else in terms of Indonesia's stability and its 
vulnerability to communism. Also of fundamental importance was the 
enhancement of Indonesia's status as a regional power and the 
implications of such a strategy for Australia's future defence and 
security interests. However, by the early 1970s, the debate was 
placing emphasis less on ideological and short-term political 
considerations than on economic and humanitarian factors. 
The concern here is with the extent of the Parliament's 
interest in particular issues and the debate's main features, 
including the differences between Government and Opposition 
parties. This approach enables an assessment to be made of the 
influence exercised by Parliament and the major political parties 
in the formulation of Australia's Indonesian policy. It also 
provides a perspective to view the development of this issue 
outside the parliamentary arena, and to make judgements about the 
nexus between Parliament and the wider community. 
Beginning of the 'New Order'  
In the period from the coup up until the MPR election of 
Suharto to the Presidency in March 1968, Australia's understanding 
of events in Indonesia, and government policy towards that country, 
were not particularly informed by the level or intensity of debate 
in the Federal Parliament. Although a lack of knowledge and 
understanding of events, as they unfolded, was a feature of this 
The other issues that concerned the Parliament, but to 
a lesser degree, included political prisoners and the 
West New Guinea 'Act of Free Choice'. 
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thirty month period, three main concerns were nevertheless 
expressed: the make-up of the new government in Indonesia, the 
direction it wouJAA 	 and 4-- disposition" 	Australia.  take, 	4 %-wwwu.L..4 
Other more immediate and humanitarian concerns related to the state 
of the Indonesian nation and the plight of its people. 
While the tone for official responses to the coup prior to the 
conclusion of confrontation in August 1967 was set by Hasluck's 
statement to the House of Representatives on 19 October 1965, as 
noted earlier, 1 the Minister was circumspect in his observations of 
events in Indonesia. Indeed, even in response to opposition 
probing2 only a week before, while not prepared to speculate on the 
future shape of the Indonesian Government following such an 
upheaval, Hasluck noted the fluidity and uncertainties of the 
political situation, and maintained that Australia was 'deeply 
interested in the stability, prosperity and social welfare of the 
people of Indonesia'. 3 
Hasluck repeated these points in his 19 October statement. 4 
But attention was diverted on this occasion away from a much needed 
interpretation of events in Indonesia, and their implications, with 
Hasluck preferring to make strong references -- which were to 
underwrite the debate conducted by the political parties for the 
next seven years -- to Communist activities in Indonesia and the 
destructive role of the PKI in the coup, the growing concern in 
Indonesia over the country's stagnating economic situation, and the 
need for economic reconstruction and development. 5 Hasluck also 
confirmed that the government would stand firm on its policy on 
confrontation, yet intimated that should this 'one occasion of 
conflict be removed there are many ways in which we could work 
together for mutual benefit'. As he was to repeat to the House of 
Representatives on 10 March 1966, cloaking the political 
1 	See Chapter Two, pp.55-56. 
2 	Question from G.M. Gray (ALP Member for Capricornia, 
Qld). 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.48, p.1651, 12 October 1965. 
4 	The same speech was read in the Senate by Senator John 
Gorton. 	CPD, 	Senate, 	Vol.5, 	20 October 	1965, 
pp.1048-1051. 
5 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.48, p.1914, 19 October 1965. 
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necessities of the situation with a humanitarian concern, 'There is 
... a formidable task to be done in concentrating resources, both 
human and material , on domestic constv1ion And dovcblopmgant_ The 
longer this is postponed, the harder the task will be'. 1 
Meanwhile, government spokespersons had to fend off questions 
from both sides of the House of Representatives, and of the Senate, 
although question time served to provide an opportunity for both 
Labor members and government backbenchers alike to highlight and 
condemn the situation in Indonesia. Generally, the Labor Opposition 
shared the government's outlook on early developments in post-coup 
Indonesia, with the Leader of the Opposition, A.A. Calwell, at the 
forefront. He held that Australia's interests lay in 'a stable 
Indonesia, developing for the welfare of all her people ... without 
interference from her neighbours and without interference on her 
part with [sic] her neighbours'. 2 Communism concerned Calwell who 
was strongly anti-Communist, and he considered that the only way to 
defeat it was through economic, rather than military, means. This 
view was supported by others who were keen to undermine the appeal 
of Communism, and called for the Indonesians to put economics 
before politics by pursuing 'proper land reform, education and 
administration aimed at improving the lot of the lower classes, and 
not by perpetuating a hierarchy which is of use only to itself". 3 
K.E. Beazley, who also shared such philosophies, provided a clearer 
and more rational framework for such views, when, in drawing 
parallels with America's post-war Marshall Plan in Europe, he said: 
economic aid achieves much in the world, depending on the 
motive from which it is given, and provided the 
motivation gets across to the recipient. 
In this context, Beazley had a different perspective from that of 
his leader and considered it was wrong that the Marshall Plan had 
become regarded as a form of anti-Communist propaganda -- 'a hope 
that if a monetary grant is made to a country, its policy can be 
bought' -- and directed criticism at Hasluck's condition, somewhat 
in the same vein, that an extension of an Australian hand depended 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.50, p.180, 10 March 1966. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.48, p.1916, 19 October 1965. 
3 	E.W. Harding (Labor Member for Herbert, Qld). CPD, H.R., 
Vol.50, p.852, 31 March 1966. 
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on the winding down of confrontation. 1 
It was not until the change of regime in Indonesia following 
the signing of the 11 March Order (1966) that the debate in the 
Parliament became pungent. In an attempt to transform the rather 
confined debate, and frustrated by the events of the previous six 
months within Indonesia, Liberal backbenchers and Ministers became 
considerably less inhibited in their attacks on the actions of the 
Communists in Indonesia, and so reintroduced an inveterate theme in 
the Indonesian debate between the parties. 2 Even the Minister for 
Trade and Industry, John McEwen, 3 was driven to say: 
We can gauge Australia's feelings about the whole problem 
of Communist encroachment in Southeast Asia and our own 
instinctive concern with our own security by considering 
for a moment the reaction of Australians to the 
displacement of the pro-Communists in Indonesia. No-one 
would deny that there has been a wave of relief 
throughout Australia at the turn of events. 4 
Such a statement drew strong criticism from the Opposition, in 
particular, Dr J.F. Cairns, who levelled criticism at a Minister 
who, while extolling 'the extraordinary danger which his country 
faces from China[,]... presided over the sale of $500 million worth 
of wool and wheat to that country' and 'the sale of $100 million 
worth of metal ...'. While Cairns argued that a Communist victory 
in Indonesia may have been unfortunate for political developments 
in Australia, he distanced himself from McEwen's generalizations, 
warning that he did not welcome the victory of a regime which would 
be able to institute a military dictatorship in the future. 5 
Clearly, while views from both sides of the House of 
CPD, H.R., Vol.48, pp.2128-2129, 21 October 1965. 
2 	Sir Keith Wilson (the Liberal Member for Sturt) was the 
first to trigger this post-coup phase of the debate when 
he told the House of Representatives of the actions of 
the 'murderous group of Communists who were backed by the 
Chinese Communists in attempting to take over the country 
[Indonesia]'. CPD, H.R., Vol.50, p.303, 16 March 1966. 
3 	Later Sir John McEwen. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.50, p.450, 22 March 1966. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.50, pp.451-452. Similar sentiments were 
expressed by Victoria's ALP representative in the Senate, 
Senator Cohen. Ibid., Senate, S.31, 30 March 1966, p.351. 
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Representatives l embraced a strong ideological element, Labor 
members displayed, as did the Minister for External Affairs, a 
concern for the welfare of the Indonesian people, and hence seemed 
to possess a more balanced approach to reconciling the ideological 
and moral assumptions of their arguments. However, for Liberal 
members, the moral dimension became increasingly absent. Events in 
Indonesia provided them with the opportunity to praise the new 
regime, with wider reference, in both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, to the government's anti-Communist strategy in Asia 
and the respective roles of the USA and Britain in the overall 
policy of 'containment' in Southeast Asia. Thus, as Defence 
Minister Fairhall said to the House of Representatives in early May 
1966, and which was a theme to emerge persistently from the 
government's side in both Chambers into the 1970s: 
There is no denying that resistance to Communist 
aggression in Southeast Asia has stiffened in the free 
countries of the Asian continent. Who can deny that the 
efforts of the United States, ourselves and our allies in 
Vietnam have contributed very largely to the situation 
which resulted in the Communists being thrown out of 
Indonesia. 2 
However, the Labor Opposition were to deny the validity of such a 
view. Whitlam, in particular, was quick to point out the irony of 
a situation in which, prior to the 1966 Federal elections, the 
bogey for the conservative government in Australia was not 
Communist aggression in Vietnam, but Indonesia. He described the 
government's attitude and policies then as 'utterly negative and 
obstructive', 3 and inevitably conducive towards decisions like the 
purchase of the F-111 military aircraft and the institution of 
conscription; decisions he was to later describe as having 'been 
two disasters of a solely military nature'. 4 Therefore, in noting 
the difficulty which government members had in reconciling their 
position on Indonesia, both prior to and following the coup, 
1 	See also the debate in the Senate involving Senators 
Mulvihill, Henty and Turnbull. Ibid., 31 March 1966, 
p.403 and p.407. This debate went into April involving 
Senators Davidson, Webster and Dittmer. Ibid., 20 April 
1966, pp.454, 459 and 544. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.51, p.1642, 10 May 1966. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.51, p.1643, 10 May 1966. 
4 	Ibid., Vol.69, p.1148, 15 September 1970. 
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Whitlam had identified an ambivalence that was to be constantly 
attacked by the Opposition during the next six years. 
Post-Confrontation  
Hasluck's first statement, 1 after the end of confrontation and 
following his first trip to Indonesia in August, provided the 
foundation for the government's attitude and, with modifications, 
its policies for the next six years. Endorsing an earlier view 
that confrontation had to cease before cooperative efforts on 
reconstruction could occur (drawing comparisons with Vietnam), he 
etched a framework in which the long-term task of economic 
rehabilitation and reconstruction was central to his desire to 
promote stable and progressive conditions in the region. Integral 
to this was the need for the Indonesian Government to recognize the 
importance of mapping out an economic rehabilitation programme. It 
was agreed during his visit that there was, in the short term, a 
number of concerns to be addressed. On one level, there was a need 
to revitalize industries and basic services while, on another, 
there was a requirement for Indonesia to stabilize obligations 
relating to the West Irian - Papua New Guinea border, including (by 
1969) the 'Act of Free Choice' in West Irian. 2 
Hasluck's second visit to Indonesia in January 1967, provided 
him with the opportunity to build on this accord, and enabled him 
to publicly achieve a clearer and more authoritative understanding 
of events as they had transpired since the coup. On 28 February, 
as noted earlier, 3 the External Affairs Minister informed the House 
of Representatives of the political situation in Indonesia, of its 
transitory nature, and the difficulties implicit in such a 
situation. However, on the developing political level, he was not 
able to provide too many details. Despite expressing Australia's 
sympathies with the Indonesian Government's broad objective to 
strengthen the role of the country's representative institutions in 
the formulation of government policy, 4 Hasluck was reticent in 
making any comments on Indonesia's future political arrangements. 
1 	Ibid., Vol.52, p.223, 18 August 1966. 
2 	See Chapter Three. 
3 	See Chapter Two, p.69. 
CPD, H.R., Vol.54, p.198, 28 February 1967. 
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On economic matters, he was less restrained, informing the 
Parliament in detail of the enormous task that lay ahead for the 
Indonesian Government, and of the implications for Australia's 
'material self-interest' if such a task were to be successfully 
achieved. Although not in the context of government-to-government 
dealings, Hasluck also raised the value of personal contacts, a 
notion the government itself was to embrace in the years to come 
and one that was to become the focus of broad criticism in the 
early 1970s. 
This outlook immediately set the pattern for subsequent 
government policy and the parliamentary debate on Indonesian 
matters. For the conservative parties, Hasluck's concept of 
'material self-interest' overshadowed a concern for the welfare of 
the Indonesian people. Underwriting this concern was the ever 
present ideological preoccupation. 1 In its mildest form, W.T. 
Arthur, in extolling the virtues of a role for Australia in the 
region, told the House of Representatives, in early March 1967, 
that: 
Australia is in a unique position ... On the one hand, 
the Asians have a Red China, extolling the philosophy of 
world revolution and preaching the doctrine that power 
comes out of the mouth of a gun. On the other hand is 
Australia, together with America and the other treaty 
signatories, who seek to guarantee Asia its freedom and 
who ask nothing in return. This places us in a unique 
position, and one which I know Australia will treat as a 
sacred trust. 2 
W.C. Harworth3 had also said six months earlier: 
the need for long term and ambitious plans for economic 
assistance to Indonesia is essential ... There are no 
grounds for complacency in this part of Southeast Asia. 
The great test is in the days to come. There are very 
great dangers there ... In a run down economy, such as 
exists in Indonesia, people are apt to become impatient 
and to create troubles. We shall have to assist in every 
way we can to prevent such happenings. We must do it 
CPD, H.R., Vol.63, p.2181, 22 May 1969. See also similar 
comments expressed by Senator J.L. Cavanagh, Ibid., 
Senate, S.32, 25 August 1966, p.129. 
2 	Ibid., Vol.54, pp.345-346, 2 March 1967. 
3 	The Liberal Member for Isaacs, Victoria. 
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quickly .... 1 
For the Opposition, however, the Government was not acting quickly 
enough. This conviction, and the underlying ideological 
preoccupations of the conservative parties, precipitated in the 
immediate post-confrontation period dour criticisms that were to 
mark the Opposition debate on Indonesian issues into the 1970s. For 
Whitlam, the government's inertia in offering economic assistance 
to Indonesia was magnified by the amount that the government was 
spending on Australia's military commitment in Vietnam. As he 
lamented on 25 August 1966, in an early indication of his 
perceptions regarding Indonesia and its standing in Australia's 
national interests: 
What are we going to do in Indonesia? Indonesia is the 
country in which we can have more influence than in any 
other country in our region ... which will be the most 
significant in our region. Once again, we are virtually 
ignoring Indonesia. We are missing the second chance. 2 
For Whitlam six months later: 
There could be no better, or rather clearer, illustration 
of the government's shortsighted preoccupations, 
amounting to an obsession, with military means and 
military methods as our sole concern and interest in 
Asia than its attitude to recent developments in 
Indonesia ... the government heaves a collective sigh of 
relief and proceeds to lose interest in Indonesia ... 
Yet Indonesia is a country of 100 million people, our 
nearest neighbour and a country that has barely escaped, 
after terrible turmoil a convulsion, from the threat of 
Communist domination. 3 
Cynicism soon emerged as a characteristic feature of many of 
Whitlam's early comments on Australia's contribution to Indonesia's 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.52, p.685, 1 September 1966. See also 
speeches by H.J. Bate (Liberal Member for Macarthur, 
NSW); Ibid., pp.740-741, 1 September 1966; J.E. Lucock 
(CP Member for Lyne, NSW). To a lesser degree see J. 
Corbett (CP Member for Maranoa, Qld); Ibid., Vol.56, 
p.796, 5 September 1967. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.52, p.483, 25 August 1966. This was also 
a strong theme in a speech Whitlam gave to a public 
meeting in Young, N.S.W., on 30 May 1966 (See The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 31 May 1966). 
3 	Ibid., Vol.54, pp.207-208, 28 February 1967. 
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rehabilitation. 1 Not even Treasurer McMahon's Budget Speech later 
in the year (1967), in which the government allocated $5.2 
-4114-- __ 4-- mv4-414,7,..4 	 (14R1 RVCi'PM A M1111t./11 	Aac ...... cu Ary.a,ay 	%--, 
mechanism devised by the Indonesian Government to allocate the 
proceeds of foreign exchange receipts to Indonesian importers 2 -- 
dampened his criticisms. In a Parliamentary debate on 
international affairs at the same time he argued, 'We were not 
there helping when the help was needed ... we held back in helping 
Indonesia throughout the last financial year when many other 
countries ... contributed more than Australia did. Was their 
interest greater than Australia's?' 3 This line of argument, used 
intermittently by Whitlam, 4 continued into 1969. 
Other Labor Members too were dissatisfied. Senator Keefe, in 
broader terms, was critical of the explicit self-interest inherent 
in government decisions in the aid arena; in particular, that 
recipients of Australia's aid were chosen on the basis of the 
government's own security needs, resulting in the most urgent needs 
not being addressed. 5 Beazley had expanded on this theme earlier 
1 	Whitlam's understanding of our contribution in 1966 was 
that it amounted to sending 'some lamp black for tyres' 
(CPD, H.R., Vol.52, p.483, 25 August 1966). In 1967 he 
was on record as saying an offer of $200,000 on top of 
Australia's $1.5 million total aid package for the 1966- 
67 allocation was 'slightly more than the sum subscribed 
in a telethon ... in less than twenty-four hours ...', 
drawing him to conclude 'the contrast between the private 
generosity of Australians and the public parsimony of 
their elected Government is humiliating' (Ibid., Vol.54, 
p.208, 28 February 1967). 
2 	This scheme was the subject of criticism and debate in 
September because of the 'tied' nature of aid. See CPD, 
H.R., Vol.57, pp.1802-1805, 5 October 1967. In the 
Senate, see the speech by Senator Heatley (Liberal, Qld), 
Ibid., Senate, S.33, 1 March 1967, pp.220-221. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.56 p.221, 17 August 1967. 
4 	Whitlam pursued this line of argument through Questions 
in the House of Representatives, principally to External 
Affairs Ministers Hasluck and Freeth. (Ibid., Vol.60, 
p.1343, 19 September 1968. Ibid., Vol.62, p.379, 4 March 
1969). References also were made to it in broader 
debates (See for example Ibid., p.902, 26 March 1969). 
The government's position on aid to Indonesia was 
defended stoutly by Gorton (Ibid., pp.904-905, 26 March 
1969), and Freeth (Ibid., pp.914-915.)). 
5 	Ibid., Senate, S.33, 5 April 1967, p.572. 
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and called for an Australian understanding of, and adjustment to, 
Asian nationalism and economic advancement. However, more 
importantly, he saw Australia's inability to accept that the 
revolution of expectations' within countries in the region was 
eroding any efforts to secure and sustain relationships with any 
one of them. 1 In the Senate, Senator Willesee amplified this, 
sustaining the view that it was imperative that Australia 
particularly nurture relations with Indonesia. 2 
G.M. Bryant3 pursued these themes as well, but advocated that 
the government 'cast off the shackles of its doctrinaire approach 
to government and enterprise', 4 and develop the potential economic 
opportunities between the two countries. While Bryant predicated 
his observations on the basis of geo-strategic considerations, Rex 
Connor argued for the advantages that trade between the two 
countries would provide, particularly in primary products, 
including petroleum -- breaking Australia's dependence on the 
American dominated Persian Gulf -- food (wheat, meat and dairy 
products), rubber and timber. Further, reflecting a strong measure 
of self-interest, he asked of the government: 
Is it not to our advantage to secure a stable economy 
there and to secure a stable government without worrying 
too much about questions of ideology... If we are to 
achieve anything today as a trading nation we must 
consider what we can do with Indonesia. This government 
is prepared to ignore it and to bypass it because bigger 
dogs have their paws on the bone. We have been warned 
off so far as Indonesia is concerned. It is their 
legitimate prey, not ours. 5 
Bryant's views were particularly important in the context of this 
evolving debate in the House of Representatives because only a few 
1 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.53, p.1572, 11 October 1966. 
2 	Ibid., Senate, S.32., 14 September 1966, p.364. Senator 
Willesse devoted a great deal of time to Indonesia in 
this major speech on international affairs. Willesee 
maintained his views in a second major speech to the 
Senate a year later. Ibid., 20 September 1967, 
pp.767-768. 
3 	The Labor Member for Wills, Victoria (CPD, H.R., Vol.56., 
pp.186-189, 17 August 1967). 
4 	Ibid., p.188. 
5 	The Labor Member for Cunningham, N.S.W. 	(fl, H.R., 
Vol.56, pp.946-947, 7 September 1967). 
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weeks earlier, he had been a member of a parliamentary delegation 
to Southeast Asia, led by the Minister for the Navy (and Minister 
in Charge of Tourist Activities), D. L. Chipp. 1 Although one of 
its primary aims was to ascertain Australia's image in the 
countries visited, its success could be measured by its ability to 
acquire a first-hand view of developments in Indonesia, 
particularly in the administrative/economic and foreign relations 
spheres. With reference to the former sphere, the delegation was 
'impressed by the identity of purpose at most levels which the 
Suharto administration has obviously tapped in its determination to 
restore Indonesia's administrative and economic capability'. 2 In 
regard to foreign policy the delegation had discussions with 
Foreign Minister Malik in which he argued for 'positive 
neutrality': a desire to see the affairs of Southeast Asia handled 
by Southeast Asians. It was argued by the delegation that such a 
notion would underwrite any future Indonesian undertakings to 
secure 'a mutually beneficial and non-aligned relationship with 
other Asian states'. While Indonesia regarded an Australian 
involvement in such an association as premature at this time, 
'Australia was expected to play a greater role in the region 
through the development of its bilateral relations'. 3 
It seems that the broader message that Indonesia wanted to get 
across managed to filter back to Australia, 4 not only to the 
Opposition, but also to the External Affairs Minister, who 
suggested in mid-August 1967 5 that it would be 'premature and quite 
unrealistic' to think of Indonesia in terms of an alliance. The 
difficulty, however, lay in convincing the Indonesians that any new 
The delegation comprised Chipp, Messrs. F.E. Stewart 
(ALP), E.M. Fox (Liberal), J. Corbett (CP), G.M. Bryant 
(ALP) and Senators M.F. Scott (Liberal), F. Dittmer 
(ALP). They visited Singapore, the Philippines and 
Indonesia. 
2 	Official Report of Australian Parliamentary Delegation 
to Southeast Asia, 2-20 July 1967. The Parliament of 
the Commonwealth of Australia (No. 162), Commonwealth 
Government Printer, Canberra, 1968, p.15. 
3 	Ibid., p.23. 
4 	The Report was not tabled until 2 November 1967 (CPD, 
H.R., Vol.57, p.263, 2 November 1967). 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.56, p.209, 17 August 1967. 
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security arrangements to which Australia could become a party, 
should be understood by them as serving objectives which were also 
in the interests of Indonesia, even though Indonesia was not to be 
a party to them. 
At this time, regionalism -- the role of Australia in Asia -- 
re-emerged as an important foundation in Australia's policies 
towards Southeast Asia. Hasluck, as did Barwick before him in the 
early 1960s, pursued the notion that geographically, Australia was 
part of Asia and it was of great consequence that any policy should 
accommodate the means to establish and nurture an understanding 
between ourselves and the developing Asian nations. Indeed, in 
1964, External Affairs Minister Barwick had told the 30th Summer 
School of the Australian Institute of Political Science that: 
Australia must heavily depend on its diplomacy for the 
implementation of its foreign policies ... Because of our 
situation as a European people residing in close contact 
with South and South East Asia ... our diplomacy is 
called upon to ensure our own comprehension of our 
neighbours, [and] to explain ourselves to them ... 
[However] it remains a continuing task in which we need 
sensitive and skilful diplomacy.' 
While the Hasluckian stress on regionalism continued to reinforce a 
preoccupation with Asia as a central focus of attention for policy 
makers, the emphasis on strategic concerns -- once a way of 
pressing the two major Western powers to maintain their regional 
presence for the purposes of 'containment' and stability -- was 
giving way to an acknowledgement of the dual notions of economics 
and security, with a shift in attention toward a potential role for 
Indonesia. 
Whitlam supported Hasluck's general position but sought to 
carry the argument further. First, he pursued the notion that 
Australia could, and should, no longer rely on the great powers 
which lay outside the region; rather, security rested on Australia 
seeking regional accommodation. For this reason, he elevated 
relationships with Indonesia, Japan and India above temporary 
alignment with the United States in Vietnam or with Britain in 
Malaysia and Singapore. Moreover, Australia's defence and trade 
roles in Asia had to be broadened and complemented by a political 
Barwick, G., "Australia's Foreign Relations", in Wilkes, 
J., (ed.), Australia's Defence and Foreign Policy, AIPS, 
Melbourne, 1964, p.8. 
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one, in our own right. 
Second, until such time as arrangements of this nature were 
secured, Australia could not forego existing alliances, remaining 
mindful that adjustments and accommodations of the interests and 
needs of other regional countries which hold 'deep suspicion of 
policies which are engineered from outside the region' would have 
to be made. Underpinning Whitlam's concept of regionalism was the 
need for 'Asian solutions for Asian problems'. 1 However, before 
Australia could think in these terms it would be necessary to lower 
its 'ideological temperature' because 'the passion of countries in 
this region is not ideology but nationalism and economic advance'. 2 
As far as Whitlam was concerned and revealing perceptions that 
were to underpin his foreign policy as Labor's first Foreign 
Minister since Evatt: 
Rather than complain about Britain's desire to plan and 
make known her plans (about withdrawal], the government 
should welcome the opportunity and accept the 
responsibility to cast its own plans to accord with the 
circumstances in which we are now placed and to accord 
with the needs of this country and the region in which we 
are placed for all time. 3 
Clearly, while there was agreement between the two parties on the 
notion of regionalism, there were different emphases. The 
government, however, was tentative, particularly in relation to 
Indonesia. The next period, following the election of Suharto, saw 
these emphases converge. 
A Changing Regionalism 
The opening session of Parliament in 1968 roughly coincided 
with the election of Suharto to the Presidency in March (Australia 
also had a new Prime Minister in John Gray Gorton). During this 
autumn sitting of Parliament the Indonesian debate was sporadic, 
yet continued within the framework of regionalism and, in 
particular, economic development. The Governor-General's Speech of 
12 March gave early momentum to this theme when it was confirmed 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.56, p.219, 17 August 1967. 
2 	Ibid., p.220. 
3 	CPD, p.218-219, 17 August 1967. Senator Willesse pursued 
these themes in his two major statements on international 
affairs (Ibid., Senate, S.32, 14 September 1966, 
pp.360-366, and Ibid., 20 September 1967, pp.764-769). 
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that Australia's aid to Indonesia in the next financial year 
(1968/69) would be doubled. 1 
Frank Crean- praised the government for this initiative and, 
fresh from a recent trip to Indonesia, indicated to the House of 
Representatives his impressions of increasing political stability 
in that country. However, he warned it was a stability that could 
only be sustained if economic development took place. Crean 
advocated a more substantial role for Australia in this process by 
suggesting that, due to the reduction in our defence activities in 
relation to Indonesia, the resources (money) saved could be devoted 
to economic assistance for that country. For Crean, in Australia's 
'past there has been an attempt to concentrate on defence as the 
sole means of protecting ourselves or building stable relations in 
this part of the world'; the focus now should shift to the 
economic dimension, with aid being 'given with something like the 
same dedication and precision as apply when military operations are 
undertaken'. Such a process however could only be successful if 
Australia developed better mechanisms for the distribution and 
administration of aid. 3 
This emphasis in the Governor-General's speech on aid to 
Indonesia drew a favourable response from other Labor members in 
addition to government members. 4 Yet, what was surprising was the 
tenor of the latter's remarks. While Dr W.T. Gibbs 5 viewed it as 
tangible evidence of Australia's willingness to assist Indonesia in 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.58, p.8, 12 March 1968. 
2 	The Labor Member for Melbourne Ports, Victoria. Ibid., 
p.45, 13 March 1968. 
3 	Ibid. Crean also wrote a letter to the Editor of the 
Age (12.7.68) expressing the same sentiments. Referred 
to in the House by H.J. McIvor, ALP Member for Gelibrand 
(Victoria). CPD, H.R., Vol.58, p.114, 14 March 1968. 
4 	See, for example, McIvor's response, CPD, HR., Vol.58, 
p.114, 14 March 1968. The small level of aid, however, 
did draw criticism from Senators Dittmer (ALP, Qld) and 
Poke (ALP, Tasmania), Ibid., Senate, S.37, 28 March 1968, 
p.415 and 430. 
5 	The Liberal Member for Bowman, Qld. CPD, H.R., Vol.58, 
p.69, 13 March 1968. 
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her struggle towards recovery, M.W. Lee l was more concerned that 
the aid distributed to Indonesia be put to useful purposes. In 
what amounted essentially to the earliest expressed concerns in the 
Parliament over who actually benefited from Australia's economic 
assistance to Indonesia, Lee affirmed that efforts since the coup 
to correct the economic situation had met with only limited success 
and cited recent demonstrations in Jakarta and Bandung over basic 
commodity prices, as support for his argument. For him, one of the 
major problems that had to be overcome was corruption. As if 
setting the stage for later criticisms of the nature of economic 
development in Indonesia he continued: 
Unfortunately the enormous aid programme has not 
benefited Indonesia as a whole, but it has undoubtedly 
made a certain group of people rich beyond measure. Some 
of the people responsible for economic crimes had been 
arrested, but many of their counterparts are still at 
large today... Many people are not unaware that under 
General Suharto corruption is still prevalent and that 
people involved in corruption far outnumber the clean 
ones. 2 
On 26 March, Hasluck steered the debate away from such criticism 
back to his earlier theme of regional security, and the potential 
for Australia and Indonesia to consolidate new roles. Regional 
security for him, and indeed for Labor's Senator Willesee 3 , 
continued to be attainable, if not through defence pacts, then 
through 'a variety of arrangements, some multilateral, some 
bilateral, some specific and some less clearly defined, all of 
which will contribute to regional security 1 . 4 Of particular 
interest to Hasluck was the fact that Indonesia had already begun 
to contribute to that process 'in practical ways' and had also 
indicated that military cooperation with neighbouring countries 
could develop. Finally, he was adamant that economic and social 
The Liberal Member for Lalor, Victoria. Ibid., p.393, 
21 March 1968. 
2 	Ibid. Lee's assertions drew no comment or reaction in 
the Parliament or press. 
3 	CPD, Senate, S.37, 30 April 1968, p.648. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.58, p.453, 26 March 1968. 	In fact, he 
was to reinforce this view throughout 1968, together with 
a slow movement toward an acceptance of Indonesia's 
determination to maintain a 'free and active foreign 
policy', free from military pacts. 
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advancement depended on political stability, as it did on security 
from the disruptive effects of subversion, insurrection and 
infiltration.' 
On the other side of the House of Representatives, Crean 2 -- 
one of the few politicians in the Parliament to attempt to 
articulate the developmental issues that could face Indonesia -- 
pursued a deeper prescriptive analysis of what lay ahead for the 
country in terms of economic and social development. Within the 
framework of Black's3 work on international relations between 
developed and developing countries, he fleshed out the problems 
that confronted Indonesia. First, as a result of the Sukarno era, 
Indonesia's capacity to absorb economic assistance was limited. 
Second, particular areas needed to be targeted and developed, 
especially its vast natural resources base and infrastructure, 
including transport, education and agriculture. Third, and most 
importantly for Crean, there was a need for Indonesians who 
possessed the necessary skills, to identify their own country's 
needs and how they could be successfully met by aid-giving 
countries like Australia. Crean, however, revealed a wider 
perspective when he concluded that: 
If we are successful in the next few years in keeping 
Indonesia politically viable -- and we will be able to do 
this only if we assist it to develop economically -- 
Indonesia may become as great a nation in that part of 
the world as Japan is in its area. 
It appears that while Hasluck's views on Indonesia in the context 
of future regional stability generated some debate within the 
Parliament, emphasis tended to be more on Vietnam, China and the 
role of America in the region. 4 However, this broader debate, and 
its preoccupation with ideology and security, served to provide an 
imposing backdrop to the conservative parties' continuing 
1 	Ibid. 
2 	Ibid., p.589, 28 March 1968. 
3 	Black, C.E., The Dynamics of Modernization. Harper & 
Row, New York, 1966. 
4 	See, for example in the House of Representatives: E.G. 
Whitlam, CPD, H.R., Vol.58, p.464, 26 March 1968; Messrs 
T.E.F. Hughes (Liberal Member for Parkes, N.S.W.), R.M. 
Hatten (Liberal Member for Oxley), Ibid., pp.585-599, 28 
March 1968. In the Senate there was a paucity of debate 
on international affairs. 
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stereotype views on Indonesian issues. During the remainder of 
1968, the debate in the Parliament on economic assistance to, and 
economic and political development within, Indonesia was paled by 
events related to the PKI purges in various parts of Indonesia, 
political prisoners and early rumblings over the West New Guinea 
'Act of Free Choice'. Further, it was to remain of minor import 
until regenerated by Fraser's Defence Speech of March 1970 1 and 
McMahon's statements of April and September on Australia's aid. 2 
Indonesian and Australian Security: A New Framework 
Aid 
McMahon's statements on aid were to straddle a period that not 
only saw an Australian Parliamentary Delegation 3 include Indonesia 
in its itinerary but also ushered in a debate that saw economic 
development discussed with less reference to Indonesia's stability 
and vulnerability to Communist infiltration, than directly to 
defence. While McMahon's September policy statement reflected the 
decision to publicly disassociate Australia's aid from political or 
economic considerations -- thus increasing the diplomatic value of 
aid programmes generally4 -- integral to this new direction in the 
debate on Indonesian issues was the government's continuing and 
underlying concern with Australia's self-interest and the lesser 
reference to the welfare of the Indonesian people. Fundamental to 
the former, was the evolving desire to enhance Indonesia's status 
1 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.66, pp.232 ff, 10 March 1970. 	This 
speech was simultaneously read in the Senate by Senator 
Anderson (Ibid., Senate, S.43, 10 March 1970, p.159 ff) 
2 	Respectively, Ibid., H.R., Vol.62, pp.743-744, 7 April 
1969 and Ibid., Vol.69, pp.980-984, 3 September 1970. 
See also Ibid., Senate, S.43, 7 April 1970, pp.560-561. 
3 	The delegation comprised D.L. Chipp (Lib.), Senators 
Byrne (DLP), Dittman (ALP), Rae (Lib.); Messrs A.F. 
Bennett (ALP), S.E. Calder (CP), L.K. Johnson (ALP) and 
R.H. Whitlam (Lib.). 
4 	The idea to emphasize the political impact of Australia's 
development assistance in this way came from K.C.O. 
Shann. Harris, personal interview with Shann, Canberra, 
November 1980. 
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as a regional power, through aid and trade. 1 
Fraser's Defence Speech pointed to the government's desire to 
plot a defence posture underlined by a greater degree of 
self-reliance. Central here was an acknowledgement of the 
diminishing British and American roles in the region and, because 
of this, an attempt to redefine Australia's own. Communism 
remained the focal point, but took on a socio-political character. 
Accordingly, military involvement was shaded by a new emphasis on 
economic and diplomatic tools. Such an approach would assist the 
national and regional development which was considered conducive to 
the social, economic and political stability basic to Australia's 
national security interests. This thesis was fortified by the 
findings of the Parliamentary Delegation which went to Indonesia in 
mid-1970. Although their findings were not tabled until April 1971, 
the important point to note was that members of that delegation 
returned to stimulate the debate on Indonesian issues. 
It is in this new framework that McMahon's speeches should be 
viewed. It showed that as of 1970, a quarter of Australia's 
external aid, excluding that directed to Papua New Guinea, was 
being directed to Indonesia. McMahon's aid package to Indonesia 
included the first public commitment to a triennial programme of 
funding (1970-73), thereby allowing Indonesia's still precarious 
economy to anticipate assistance considerably more in advance than 
had previously been the case. As before, the aid was 
non-repayable, and incorporated the 'bonus export' approach of 
conserving scarce Indonesian foreign exchange. 2 
This deliberate guiding of Australian diplomacy towards the 
betterment of Indonesia's status as a regional force, and its 
bearing on Australia's future defence and security interests, drew 
some predictable responses. On the government side of the House of 
Representatives, backbenchers praised Fraser's stand to maintain 
Australia's Forward Defence posture, pointing to the near success 
1 	A new aspect of Australia's development assistance policy 
was McMahon's indication that the government was looking 
'at proposals for coordinating official aid with 
investment by Australian private enterprise', although 
this was put entirely in terms of benefits for less-
developed countries. CPD, H.R., Vol.69, p.984. 
2 	Ibid., Vol.66, p.744, 7 April 1970. 
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of the Communists in Indonesia. 1 As Irwin argued, 'We never wait 
until a bushf ire reaches the homestead paddock before we try to put 
it out; we always go out and fight the fire in the back 
paddocks' . 2 
However, there were some who were reviewing their long held 
arguments and coming around to this notion of security through 
development -- a powerful theme in Fraser's Defence Statement. This 
transformation was particularly marked in the case of the outspoken 
conservative politician, Calder, in a speech to the House of 
Representatives in April 1970. While Communism still concerned 
him, Calder's views were couched less in military than in 
developmental terms: 
a constructive and positive approach to the problems of 
Asia ...should ensure that Australia will become a 
trusted leader in the future developments that take place 
in the region. Australia must be active to ensure 
stability and security in Southeast Asia. We could never 
enjoy any real security or even a sense of security if we 
turned a blind eye to the problems of Southeast Asia... 
help[ing] the Southeast Asian countries and to ensure a 
sound basis for their economic and political stability. 3 
Meanwhile, Whitlam continued his criticism of the government's aid 
policy into the new decade, finding the three-year pledge 
'commendable', yet considering it a subterfuge in the sense that 
the rate, in real terms, was decreasing. 4 The Opposition leader 
also chided the government's defence that such aid was in grant 
form, and pointed to Australia's position relative to less rich 
countries which, nevertheless, gave larger grants (for example, The 
Netherlands). He also directed criticism at the 'tied' nature of 
1 
2 
3 
4 
L.H. Irwin (Liberal Member for Mitchell, NSW), for 
instance, considered the PKI 'failed only by 4 to 5 hours 
[in Indonesia]... the timetable was [then set] for 
Mainland China to attack India on 23 March of the 
following year'. Ibid., p.322, 11 March 1970. 
Ibid. 
CPD, H.R., Vol.66, p.1255, 16 April 1970. 	See also 
Ibid., p.425, 12 March 1970, where similar ideas were 
expressed. 
Ibid., p.744, 7 April 1970. 
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Australia's aid, 1 and concluded by calling for a review of 
Australia's Indonesia aid policy adding, rather bluntly, 'whatever 
the amount may be -- it will not make a great difference to 
Indonesia's economy'. 2 
Whitlam was again, in September, provided with an opportunity 
to restate his views when the Foreign Minister, McMahon, delivered 
a major statement to the House of Representatives on Australia's 
external aid. 3 While acknowledging McMahon's continued interest in 
'this tremendously important aspect of Australia's relations with 
her neighbours', he directed the attention of the House of 
Representatives to his firming view that Australia's contribution 
continued to be modest; in fact it 'only managed to restore the 
yearly rate of increase of our total spending to the level at which 
it stood before the present Prime Minister (Gorton) came to 
office.' 4 Whitlam was particularly critical of Gorton who, he 
argued, had put pressure on McMahon to cut overseas aid spending. 
He emphasized this by drawing statistical comparisons with 
Australia's past performances in aid contribution, and in relation 
to other countries. For Whitlam this contribution: 
cannot be merely charity. It cannot be considered merely 
as a humanitarian enterprise. This should bulk in our 
consideration; but nonetheless, self-interest itself 
demands that we regard our aid to our neighbours as a top 
priority. 5 
Whitlam argued that in the short-term, economic development in the 
countries of Southeast Asia was vital to Australia's own security 
interests and that, in the long term, it would serve Australia's 
commercial self-interest. In relation to Indonesia, in the final 
analysis, Whitlam found that if Australia was now not prepared to 
assist that country economically, it may be put into the position 
of having to contribute substantially more towards future defence. 
The bonus export component of Australia's aid was 
directly tied to Australian purchases and therefore 
provided benefits to Australian industry and exporters. 
Similarly, food aid provided direct benefits to the 
Australian primary producer. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.66, p.745, 7 April 1970. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.69, pp.980-984, 3 September 1970. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.69, p.985, 3 September 1970. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.69, p.986, 3 September 1970. 
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As it was, 'our military expenditure in Southeast Asia is much 
higher than what we are prepared to contribute to the region's 
economic development'. In the Senate, C.B. Byrne, who had only 
recently returned from Southeast Asia, considered this expenditure 
was justified, because: 
when one discusses the Australian presence with people of 
significance in those areas, one inevitably hears that 
they find it necessary, desirable and welcome. They see 
the containment of Communism on the Indo-Chinese 
Peninsula as something that will save the rest of 
Southeast Asia. 1 
The budget session of Parliament that year, however, provided 
Whitlam with further opportunity to criticize the government over a 
seeming lack of interest in Indonesia. He stated that he was 
unable to find any historical precedent for such disinterest and 
took pleasure in reminding the House of Representatives that: 
the only important decisions ever made by this government 
in terms of our relations with Indonesia have been two 
disastrous ones of a solely military nature - the 
introduction of conscription and the purchase of the 
F111. 2 
W. Morrison3 pursued Whitlam's argument of Australia's limited and 
reactionary interest in Indonesia, broadening it by suggesting to 
Hasluck that Australian diplomatic representation in Indonesia 
could be strengthened with regional offices in Indonesia, 
Portuguese Timor and West Irian. However, on the question of 
Australia's foreign aid programme, he was less generous than 
Whitlam in his comments on the government, criticizing McMahon's 
recent aid statement as being underpinned by a 'half-baked and 
pathetically superficial aid philosophy'. Moreover, he suggested 
that McMahon had simply pontificated on the moral and humanitarian 
motives of aid-giving and argued, 'if it had not been for the cold 
war and the aid sanction between the East and the West our moral 
and humanitarian instincts might not have been so much in 
1 	Ibid., Senate, S.45, 17 September 1970, p.677. 	C.B. 
Byrne was a member of the Democratic Labor Party. 
2 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.69, pp.1145-1146, 15 September 1970. 
3 	The Labor Member for St. George (NSW), and later Minister 
for External Territories and Minister for Defence in the 
Whitlam government. 
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evidence' . 1 
Trade 
Meanwhile, the issue of trade had been raised earlier in May 
by A.J. Grassby2 , the first MP to raise it in any substantial way. 
Grassby centred his early speeches on one major theme -- the Export 
Payments Insurance Corporation and its activities in relation to 
Indonesia. He argued that although there was a continuing interest 
within Australia with regard to Indonesia and its battle to regain 
momentum, it was not reflected in tangible areas like trade, as 
revealed by the decreasing value of goods covered by the 
corporation. 3 In effect: 
the amount of trade as a whole -- not only the amount of 
trade covered by a number or percentage of exports 
insured by the Corporation, but the total amount 
originating in Australia -- is not very significant. 4 
Indeed, Australia's export performance in relation to Indonesia 
placed us seventh compared to other nations. Grassby considered -- 
notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in dealing with 
Indonesia, confrontation and the recent political turmoil -- there 
was a need to criticize the clear lack of Australian enterprise in 
the trading arena, compared to that of other nations. He was 
particularly disturbed by the winding down of the corporation's 
activities. Essentially, Australia's: 
record calls for an examination and a review because it 
is in our interests, not only our commercial and trading 
interests, as a good neighbour seeking the stability of 
Southeast Asia, to develop in every way our links with 
the Republic of Indonesia, our nearest neighbour. 5 
For Grassby it was vital that first, trading relations between 
Australia and Indonesia be subjected to examination by the Minister 
for Trade and Industry (McEwen); second, that this embrace an 
analysis of the lack of enterprise in Australia in this regard; 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.69, p.1150, 15 September 1970. 
2 	The Labor Member for Riverina (NSW) and later Minister 
for Immigration in the Whitlam Government. 
3 	Between 1960-61 and 1963-64, total Australian exports to 
Indonesia fell from 36.3 percent to 0.1 percent. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.67, p.1962, 12 May 1970. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.67, p.1963, 12 May 1970 
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and, third, that the corporation's activities be stimulated 'to 
promote greater, stronger and more enduring links with our nearest 
Grassby continued this criticism over the ensuing months, 
maintaining pressure in the Parliament2 on the government through 
interjection3 and questions4 , culminating in his call in May 1972 
for the government's commitments to an Asian Pacific Economic 
Community. 5 In an observation in August of that year, however, and 
his last on this matter as an Opposition Member, Grassby reflected 
on his 'campaign' and conceded that Australia was 'losing the race 
for trade in New Guinea, and certainly is losing it in Indonesia, 
our nearest and most important neighbour'. 6 
Such criticism of the government in the area of economic 
assistance and trade drew little response from the Cabinet, but did 
not go unheeded by government backbenchers. Grassby's initial 
broadside in May 1970 drew a stern rebuff from I.L. Robinson7 who 
outlined the difficulties which Australian exporters faced in trade 
with Indonesia. These related in particular to financial 
arrangements and to the availability,from Australia's manufacturing 
resources, of the type of goods demanded by the market in 
Indonesia. Such a situation, according to Robinson, was 
exacerbated by competitive trade arrangements between Indonesia and 
other countries, including Japan and West Germany. 8 
CPD, H.R., Vol.67, p.1964, 12 May 1970. 
2 	The issue was raised only on a few occasions in the 
Senate. See, for example, statements by Senators 
Mulvihill and O'Byrne, respectively; Ibid., Senate S.45 
26 August 1970, p.284 and Ibid., 21 April 1971, p.940. 
3 	See for example, Ibid., H.R., Vol.69, p.884, 2 September 
1970. 
4 	See, for example, questions to McMahon (Minister for 
External Affairs), on aid to Indonesia; Ibid., Vol.70, 
p.2304, 15 October 1970, and Ibid., Vol.71, p.676, 25 
February 1971. 
5 	Ibid., Vol.78, p.2269, 9 May 1972. 
6 	Ibid., Vol.79, p.797, 29 August 1972. 
7 	The Country Party Member for Cowper (NSW). 
8 	CPD, H.R., Vol.67, pp.1968-1969, 12 May 1970. 
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Nevertheless, In September, D.E. Fairbairn l was quick to 
defend the government's policies against the criticisms mounted by 
whitiam and Morrison. However, he attempted to shift the focus 
away from Australia's poor trade links with Indonesia when he 
reminded the House of Representatives, as had Sir Magnus Cormack in 
the Senate some months earlier, 2 of Australia's diplomatic efforts 
in relation to Indonesia in other areas: in representation, 
particularly during confrontation, and in economic assistance -- 
which was in grant forms and pledged three years in advance. 3 
However, while such themes were inherent in the Parliamentary 
Delegation's report, which was tabled in April 1971, 4 they were not 
defended again by any government backbencher until late 1971, when 
S.E. Calder5 pursued a similar line to Fairbairn, although he did 
urge the government to grant more aid (both military and economic) 
and stimulate trade (particularly in oil, which had decreased 
substantially as an import from Indonesia after Australia began its 
own oil production programme). 6 But a defence of Australia's 
economic assistance programme to Indonesia was not made again until 
October 1972 when L.S. Reid, 7 although rather critical of the 
The Liberal Member for Farrer (NSW), and Minister for 
National Development. 
2 	CPD, Senate, S.43, 22 April 1970, p.1023. Cormack was 
concerned, however, that Australia's contribution to 
Indonesia's economic rehabilitation was akin 'to pouring 
water onto an ash heap in that the more water one pours 
onto it the more water the ash seems to absorb'. 
3 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.69, p.1215, 16 September 1970. See also 
the defence mounted by N.A. Brown (Liberal Member for 
Diamond Valley), particularly of Australia's aid as a 
percentage of GNP (Ibid., pp.1147-1148). See also the 
defence put up by Tasmanian Liberal Senator, P.E. Rae, 
Ibid., Senate, S.45, 26 August 1970, p.284. 
4 	Report of the Australian Parliamentary Deleaation to 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, 25 June - 16 July 
1970, Parliamentary Paper No.39, AGPS, Canberra, 1971. 
5 	Country Party Member for Northern Territory. 
6 	CPD, Vol.75, p.3331, 11 November 1971. Calder went as 
far as to question Prime Minister McMahon as to whether 
the Australian Government was going to enter into a 
defence arrangement with Indonesia, Ibid., p. 3981, 2 
December 1971. 
7 	The Liberal Member for Holt, Victoria. 
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limited amount of aid given in our overall aid programme, commended 
the government's humanitarian rationale for the giving of aid, and 
called on it to embrace the voluntary agencies as vehicles for its 
distribution. 1 
Meanwhile, the wider Indonesia debate in the Parliament had 
straddled the Suharto visit of February 1972, with increasing 
emphasis being placed on Indonesia's stability and the importance 
that Indonesia held in terms of Australian security. 2 It should be 
noted that never far below the surface of opinions expressed by 
Members of both parties at this time was a concern for Indonesia's 
long-term stability, and the implications for Australian security 
if this stability was to falter. Reference to this element of our 
external environment was sometimes implicit, other times explicit. 
As D.J. Hamer3 argued in the Parliament on the eve of Suharto's 
visit to Australia: 
While Indonesia is in strong and free hands we are not 
vulnerable to invasion. Therefore, the maintenance of 
Indonesia's strength and independence must be a high 
priority of our economic aid, and our foreign and defence 
policies. 4 
The Communist Threat  
Fundamental to Hamer's views was the long-held fear of 
communist invasion; a theme that had underwritten much of the 
debate in the House of Representatives 5 on Indonesian issues since 
1966. Earliest references to it embraced two essential elements -- 
the threat of communism to regional stability and the resistance of 
anti-communist forces in Indonesia. 
CPD, H.R., Vol.81, p.2321, 10 October 1972. Although 
this approach was repeated by J.D.M. Dobie (Liberal 
Member for Coole) and S.E. Calder, it drew sharp 
criticism from Dr R.E. Klugman (ALP Member for Prospect, 
NSW). Ibid., pp.2321-2322. 
2 	See in particular Hamer's speech in the parliamentary 
debate on Australia's Defence, Vol.77, pp.1449-1450, 11 
April 1972; and M.J.R. Mackeller (Liberal Member for 
Warringah, NSW), Ibid., Vol.78, p.2887, 23 May 1972. 
3 	The Liberal Member for Isaacs, Victoria. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.75, p.3516, 23 November 1971. 
5 	In the Senate, few references were made to Communism, in 
the context of Indonesia, between 1966 and 1974. 
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In terms of the former, the earliest comment in March of that 
year was made by Sir Keith Wilson when he warned the Australian 
Parliament of the consequences to Australia had the attempted coup 
in Indonesia on 30 September succeeded. 1 This was followed almost 
immediately by McEwen's insensitively worded speech in which he 
noted the 'wave of relief' throughout Australia at developments in 
Indonesia. Although this statement invoked acrimonious exchanges 
between both sides of the House of Representatives 2 , and drew 
comments from the Australian press, it set a pattern for subsequent 
statements, in varying intensity, from the Government and the 
Opposition. W.C. Harworth3 spoke of 'Chinese' Communism while J. 
Bate4 referred to 'expansionary' Communism, but both saw 
Indonesia's resistance as providing the test at a time of 'very 
great danger° in Southeast Asia as a whole. 
This theme was to dominate the conservative parties' 
statements on Indonesia over subsequent years, most prominent being 
from Sir John Cramer° who put it to the House of Representatives in 
1969: 
Although Indonesia now has defeated Communism, the number 
of Communists who infiltrated into that country presented 
a very dickie [sic] problem for a long time. The 
Indonesian government now has control. What would be the 
position if other countries came under Communist 
domination? How much longer could Indonesia hold her 
place? I remind honourable members that she is right on 
our doorstep. 
Such arguments had been pursued by McEwen during less stable times 
in Indonesia in 1967 when he said that, had Communism succeeded: 
we would have been living for the last 20 years under the 
shadow of a nation of 100 million people - our nextdoor 
neighbours - subjected to the influence and direction of 
CPD, H.R., Vol.50, p.303, 16 March 1966. 
2 	See Dr J.F. Cairns (Labor Member for Yarra, Victoria), 
Ibid., pp.451-452. H.B. Turner (Liberal Member for 
Bradfield), Ibid., Vol.51, pp.1740-1741, 11 and 12 May 
1966. 
3 	Liberal Member for Isaacs, Victoria. 	Ibid., Vol.52, 
pp.685-686, 1 September 1966. 
4 	Liberal Member for Macarthur, NSW. Ibid., pp.740-741. 
5 	Ibid., p.685 and p.740. 
6 	The Liberal Member for Bennelong, NSW. Ibid., Vol.62, 
p.782, 20 March 1969. 
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China, the greatest aggressive Communist power today. 1 
Cramer was joined by L.H. Irwin 2 and Calder, the latter considering 
Australia as once being in the 'firing line' 3 of an Indonesia that, 
up until 1965, 'was almost the jewel in the communist crown'. 
However, it was now 'slowly coming around the corner to economic 
and social stability under a strong anti-communist government 1 . 4 
Calder also stated that, while he was a member of the Parliamentary 
Delegation that visited Indonesia in mid-1970, he had 'heard almost 
every day from Indonesia's leaders, warnings about the downward 
thrust of Communism'. 5 
Calder's preoccupation with Communism and desire for economic 
and social stability was a theme that was deeply submerged in many 
of the statements made by government Members. Labor's K.E. 
Beazley6 -- perhaps the most perceptive and capable of Labor's 
rising leaders, and one who had also a strong interest in economic 
and humanitarian questions -- attempted to loosen this link to 
Communism. In 1967, in tandem with Hasluck -- now tending towards 
an emphasis on the need for economic assistance rather than an 
embracement of this rather fervent anti-communist line -- he 
argued that 'Starvation is more destructive than armies ... the 
fundamental political issue in the world today will be proved to be 
not communism or anti-communism but starvation'. It was not until 
the early 1970's that we heard government Members move beyond this 
single-minded fervor and begin to talk about a positive economic, 
rather than a military, role in the search for stability. 
The second element of this debate on Communism - resistance to 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.57, p.2691, 2 November 1967. See also 
the similar view held by W.T. Arthur, Liberal Member for 
Barton, NSW, Ibid., Vol.54, p.346, 2 March 1967. 
2 	The Liberal Member for Mitchell, NSW, Ibid., Vol.66, 
p.322, 11 March 1970. 
3 	Ibid, p. 425, 12 March 1970. See also Ibid, p. 1255, 16 
April 1970. 
4 	Ibid., Vol.69, p.884, 2 September 1970. 
5 	Ibid., p.1344, 17 September 1970. 
6 	Labor Member for Fremantle, WA. Ibid., Vol.56, p.765, 
5 September 1967. 
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anti-communist forces -- was first raised by A.A. Armstrong l early 
in 1966. In his view: 
had South Vietnam fallen, as it would have done if the 
United States had not used its strength to prevent this 
happening, there would have been a leap-frog movement to 
Indonesia, because great impetus would have been given to 
the Communist forces in Indonesia and the anti-Communist 
forces would have experienced a reduction of practical 
and moral backing. 
Over the ensuing months this interpretation was to gain currency 
among government Members. In May, as we noted earlier, Defence 
Minister Fairhall embraced the notion, giving it a more liberal 
interpretation when he said resistance by America and its allies in 
Vietnam was fortifying the resistance of the non-communist 
countries of the Asian mainland. 2 
P.E. Lucock3 focused directly on anti-Indonesian elements when 
he put it another way: 
One of the contributing factors to the setback that China 
suffered in Indonesia was our action in Vietnam [which] 
gave the Indonesians courage, faith and the belief that 
there were people who believed in them. 
This line of argument strengthened over the years, in the face of 
Opposition criticism. Particularly scathing was T. Uren 4 who, in 
response to Armstrong's earlier blanket criticism of worldwide 
Communism, pointed to contradictions inherent in the government's 
arguments by drawing attention to the American-backed (economic 
assistance) Communist governments in Yugoslavia, Rumania and 
Poland. G.M. Bryant5 , recently returned from the Parliamentary 
Delegation visit to Indonesia, told the House of Representatives, 
in response to Lucock's views: 
I am surprised to hear anybody claim that Australia's 
commitment in Vietnam steeled the resolution of the 
Indonesians to deal with their own problems. When some 
1 	The CP Member for Riverina, NSW. Ibid., Vol.50, p.708, 
29 March 1966. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.51, p.1642, 10 May 1966. 
3 	The CP Member for Lyne, NSW. Ibid., Vol.56, pp.380-381, 
23 August 1967. 
4 	The Labor Member for Reid, NSW. Ibid., Vol.50, p.709, 
29 March 1966. 
5 	The Labor Member for Wills, Victoria. Ibid., Vol.56, 
p.382, 23 August 1967. 
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of us asked the Indonesians about this matter ... they 
regarded our questions as insulting ... The Indonesians 
have had four lots of internal trouble - two right-wing 
revolutions and two left-wing rev- 1 - 4-4 -ns - and they have 
managed to control all of them. Their attitude to 
Vietnam is: If we were able to control our own affairs 
in this way, why are not the South Vietnamese? 
Notwithstanding this criticism, government Members persisted with 
this view into the early 1970s. Armstrong, 1 and Bate2 were 
particularly vocal at the time of the resurgence of Communist 
activities in Central and East Java in early to mid-1968. It 
reached a stage where Beazley, in response to this heightening 
acrimony, told the Parliament, 'All this government wants to talk 
about is Communism... '. 3 
It was not until the latter part of 1970 that a convergence of 
the Armstrong thesis and the role of economic development -- as a 
tool for stability -- seemed to occur in statements made by 
government Members. In September 1970, R.V. Garland4 argued that, 
'the resistance of the Indonesian generals to the 1965 Communist 
coup was stiffened greatly by the presence of the United States and 
other forces in South Vietnam', and called for continued Australian 
economic assistance. One backbencher suggested closer military 
cooperation with Indonesia. 5 
Such emphasis on economic development and its relationship to 
Indonesian stability was also evident in Labor's interpretations of 
events in Indonesia during this same period. Apart from those 
leading to criticisms of the government, like those of Whitlam (as 
already quoted), there were some constructive views. The earliest 
1 	Ibid., Vol.58, p.612, 28 March 1968. Bryant, again was 
critical of Armstrong. Ibid., p.614. 
2 	Ibid., Vol.59, p.1157, 7 May 1968. 
3 	Ibid., p.2181, 22 May 1969. See also similar comments 
expressed by Senator J.L. Cavanagh, Ibid., Senate, S.32, 
25 August 1966, p.129. 
4 	The Liberal Member for Curtain, WA. 	Ibid., Vol.69, 
p.960, 3 September 1970. 
5 	J.E. McLeay, the Liberal Member for Boothby, SA. Ibid., 
p.1237, 16 September 1970. 
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such example was that expressed by E.W. Harding l who argued that: 
Communism in Asia can be defeated in the long run only by the Asians themselves, suppressing it by force of arms 
and doing nothing to remove its causes, as we have seen 
in so many other parts of the world, will only make its 
supremacy a certainty... I hope that the Indonesian 
government ... will begin to put economics before 
politics ... Australia as a nation can help Indonesia in 
this respect. 
While Whitlam only once spoke of an Indonesia 'that has barely 
escaped, after terrible turmoil and convulsion, from the threat of 
Communist domination', 2 he was to take a prominent part in debates 
on an Indonesian revival, although, without the stress on Communism 
that was evident in the views of his parliamentary contemporaries. 3 
He believed that while the government under Suharto was a more 
stable arrangement than was the government under Sukarno the 
stability offered by Suharto could only be maintained if economic 
development took place. Thus, he felt we had historical and 
practical reasons to render assistance to Indonesia. 
However, not all Labor members shared Whitlam's confidence in 
Indonesia's stability, particularly in the long term. In a lively 
debate on Australia's defence in March 1969, G.G.D. Scholes 4 
pursued a similar line to that taken by his leader regarding aid, 
but was more explicit in his reasons for doing so. Using colourful 
language to describe threats to Australia from our north, 5 Scholes 
was critical of the stationing of Australian forces in Malaysia, 
believing it to be one of the least likely sources of communist 
Ibid., Vol.50, p.852, 31 March 1966. 	In the Senate, 
Senator Willesee was pursuing a balanced view on 
Indonesia, and Australia's prospects in assisting her 
(Ibid., Senate, S.35, 20 September 1967, p.767). 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.54, p.208, 28 February 1967. 
3 	See for example, H.J. McIvor (Labor Member for 
Gellibrand, Victoria), who argued that he had 'no quarrel 
about giving practical help to the less developed 
countries of the world... Aid of this type provides the 
best instruments with which to combat the downward thrust 
of Communism' (Ibid., Vol.58, pp.114-115, 14 March 1968). 
4 	The Labor Member for Corio, Victoria. Ibid., Vol.62, 
p.362, 4 March 1969. 
5 	Scholes was of the view that 'If we [were to] hang a map 
of Asia on the wall, Asia looks very threatening. If the 
paint came unstuck it would fall over Australia'. 
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infiltration in Asia. Such a view however did not extend to 
Indonesia. Indeed: 
Whilst we may like to think - it is good for our 0Wh 
morale and for our policies to do so because it solves a 
difficulty - that Indonesia is now safe from any future 
Communist infiltration or subversion, I would suggest 
that Indonesia is a far more vulnerable part of Asia than 
is Malaysia. 
The strange hold these continuing perceptions of communist threat 
had on some sections of Parliament was further revealed, albeit 
curiously, in an exchange weeks later. In a resumption of the 
debate on defence later in March, Labor's A.W. James set out to 
condemn the Indonesian Government for their brutal activities in 
the purging of communists -- a move which was gaining momentum at 
that time in parts of Java. James saw it as nothing other than 
the: 
massacring [of] hundreds or thousands of progressive 
thinking people ... who want ... to lift the standard of 
living of those who have been exploited down through the 
ages ... [Indonesians] call them left-wingers and 
communists and think that gives them the right to 
murder. 1  
James levelled his criticism at both sides of the parliamentary 
floor for not attempting to publicly confirm, and condemn, the 
'barbarity of the kind perpetrated in Java by a section of the 
Indonesian army'. As he provocatively pointed out to the House of 
Representatives: 
We condemn the Communists if they behave in this way in 
Vietnam or Malaysia and Singapore ... What would be our 
government's action if the position were reversed? We 
would want to send troops to Indonesia to put down the 
so-called Communist menace.... 
This drew angry responses from members of the conservative parties, 
in particular, L.L. Bosman, G.O. Giles and Sir John Cramer. Bosman 
set his sights on 'the temerity' of James to call the government 
side of the House of Representatives to order, and focused on 
James' political sympathies which in his view, reflected 'a unique 
capacity for sympathy with the very organizations and countries 
which caused so much havoc in Indonesia and the situation which 
prevails here today'. Playing down the military's activities he 
added: 
Communist ... people infiltrated during the difficult 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.62, p.754, 20 March 1969. 
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years which faced Indonesia and with graft and corruption 
endeavoured to create anarchy. In turn, they caused a 
resurgence amongst the people and divided them to such a 
degree that they have now reacted against one another. 1 
While Cramer reinforced this theme, 2 his Liberal Party colleague, 
Giles, insisted that he was 'not one of those who looks for a 
communist under every bush', and pursued an argument very similar 
to Whitlam's, rather than that by the majority of his own party 
colleagues and many in the Labor ranks. 3 While there were some in 
the government ranks, like Armstrong, 4 who were coming around to 
this line of thinking, particularly following Garland's speech to 
the House of Representatives in 1970, 5 the prevailing view within 
the government was that a stable Indonesia was vital to regional 
stability, 6 although the emphasis on Communism was more implicit. 
The New Whitlam Government  
Although some debate took place on economic aid to Indonesia 
in the first few months of the new Whitlam government, it was 
sporadic and not the subject of full debate until the East Timor 
crisis had reached its zenith. In May 1973 Whitlam made reference 
to the role assistance -- both economic and military --played in 
Australia's relations with Indonesia, however, it was in a debate 
that revolved around Whitlam's notion of a new regional 
organization. While this idea had earlier drawn strong criticism 
from the Opposition, 7 Whitlam continued promoting such a concept, 
although he later acknowledged, in a major speech to the Parliament 
on international affairs in May, that it would 'be a slow and 
delicate growth. We are content at present to let the concept take 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.62, p. 756, 20 March 1969. 
2 	Ibid., p.782. 
3 	Ibid., p.764. 
4 	See Ibid., Vol.64, p.326, 14 August 1969. 
5 	See J.D. Jess (Liberal Member for La trobe, Victoria). 
See Hamer's statement to the House of Representatives. 
Ibid., Vol.75, p.3516, 23 November 1971. 
6 	Hamer, CPD, H.R., Vol.77, p.1450, 11 April 1972. 	See 
also M. McKellar (Liberal Member for Warringah, NSW), 
Ibid., Vol.78, p.2887, 23 May 1972. 
7 	Bury. Ibid., H.R., Vol.82, p.93, 28 February 1973. 
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seed' and stressed that the government was 'completely flexible on 
the timing, structure and membership of any future arrangements'. 1 
Whitlam was content meanwhile, to direct Australian Govt 
efforts towards consolidating and strengthening bilateral 
relations. 
More broadly, Whitlam considered that an important element of 
Australia's cooperation with our regional neighbours lay in the 
extension of aid and assistance -- both economic and, at variance 
with his firmly held views of the past seven years, military. 
Initially he focused attention on military cooperation with the 
view that the form it took was vital to the development of 
Australia's interests; only, however, if it was not directed 'to 
serve contrary ends by aggravating the very tendencies and 
developments which it is designed to head off'. With respect to 
Indonesia, he argued that Australia's defence cooperation was not 
only in accord with such a philosophy but would serve as a model 
for defence cooperation arrangements in the future. In this 
context, regional cooperation would be on an informal basis without 
the need for formal military pacts, while promoting 'self-reliance' 
in the recipient country, and its 'capability to resist external 
threat' . 2 
Notwithstanding this early acknowledgement of the value of 
military cooperation -- no doubt for domestic consumption -- 
Whitlam moved quickly to point out the 'more important element in 
our relations with Indonesia' -- civil aid. While Whitlam stressed 
Australia's programme with Indonesia -- over double that of our 
defence aid -- was to serve as a model for our overall civil aid 
programme, he was, at the time, more concerned with Indonesia's 
efforts towards generating: 
economic growth, creating wider employment activities, 
maintaining and accelerating expansion of the 
agricultural sector, achieving more balanced regional 
development and greater diversification of the economic 
structure, and providing improved social welfare, 
and Australia's widening role in assisting its regional neighbours 
reach such goals. 3 
CPD, H.R., Vol.84, p.2646, 24 May 1973. 	See also 
Introduction, Part Three. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.84, p.2646, 24 May 1973. 
3 	Ibid., p.2647. 
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References in Whitlam's speech to Indonesia did not generate 
any discussion in the Parliament and the issue of aid and trade in 
relation to Indonesia was not raised again for nearly a year. 
Instead, Opposition criticisms of the direction and flamboyance of 
Whitlam's regional policies dominated debate throughout the year. 1 
Whitlam on one occasion attempted 'to dispel any misunderstandings' 
about his government's foreign policy, while also emphasizing to 
leaders in Southeast Asia the continuing and undiminished 
importance of the region to Australia. 2 While he layed great 
stress on trade and economic links with the countries which he had 
visited earlier in January, his statement met wide-ranging 
skepticism in the Parliament for its lack of substance. 
Snedden, the new Liberal Party leader, stressed the 'special' 
scope for increasing trade between Australia and Indonesia, and 
resurrected an idea put to the House of Representatives some four 
years earlier by Morrison when he suggested that there was value in 
establishing consulates throughout Indonesia. He also revived the 
former Liberal-Country Party government's concept of 'special trade 
preferences', advocating their use as a catalyst to generate trade. 
Moreover, Snedden indicated that any increased assistance for the 
economic development of a country like Indonesia needed to include 
technical -- as opposed to tertiary -- education, together with 
management training, which was an area he argued Australia had 
something to offer. Also, there was scope for cooperative efforts 
in business and development ventures, as evidenced by Indonesia's 
encouraging provisions for such investment cooperation. 3 
During a debate the following month, the government came under 
pressure from its own backbench. In a speech on the Australian 
Development Assistance Agency Bill, J.C. Kerin4 expressed concern 
about two areas -- the excessive level of defence aid to Indonesia 
and the direction and nature of Australia's civil aid program. 
Whether Indonesia was a military dictatorship or Australia and 
1 	This criticism began in February, and was initiated by 
the former Liberal Foreign Affairs Minister, L.H.E. Bury. 
CPD, H.R., Vol.82, p.92-93, 28 February 1973. 
2 	Ibid., Vol.88, pp.202-207, 7 March 1977. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.88, pp.442-443, 14 March 1973. 
4 	The Labor Member for Macarthur, NSW. Ibid., pp.874-878, 
2 April 1974. 
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Indonesia shared common defence problems, Kerin considered both 
were irrelevant when considering the view that such a high level of 
defence aid could 'mean that her neighbouring countries may also 
feel induced to spend more on equipment'. 
Australia's civil aid program was of particular concern to 
Kerin, who referred to recent criticism by an Australian academic, 
Dr P.J. Eldridge, 1 and the 'self-interested nature' of Australia's 
programme aid to Indonesia. Kerin also made reference to Associate 
Professor Herb Feith2 who criticized 'the conventional World Bank 
style or International Monetary Fund style approach to economic 
development to which Indonesia has become committed'. The work of 
both Eldridge and Feith lent force to Kerin's belief that, 
notwithstanding advances in the Indonesian economy, little by way 
of distributions had flowed to the people, and he queried whether 
'the classic economic models of engines of economic growth still 
hold?'. Moreover, he argued: 
I am sure that definitions of development which take 
growth as their hub are misleading, that emphasis, 
particularly in Indonesia, should be on increasing 
capacity in development of indigenous resources and that 
political stability need not be the main measuring stick 
of the levels of assistance we offer. 3 
However, C.J. Hurford4 reinforced the principles of a policy that 
had been evident for some years when, in terms of Australia's 
overall aid to Asia, he argued the case for a 'special effort in 
support of Indonesia'. This was built on arguments related to its 
proximity to Australia, her complex development problems and the 
overarching notion, now a doctrine, that: 
Indonesia's political stability and programme in economic 
development are matters of vital concern to our country. 
A severe crisis in the Indonesian economy almost 
certainly would herald a period of political instability 
with obvious complications for Australia's security. 
Hence, if Indonesia was to overcome her development problems it 
would serve Australian foreign and security policies, as well as 
1 	Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, 
University of Tasmania. 
2 	Reader, Monash University. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.88, p.877, 2 April 1974. 
4 	The Labor Member for Adelaide, SA. Ibid., pp.925-927, 
3 April 1974. 
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Australia's long-term commercial interests. 1 
This was one of the last references to the issue of 
Indonesia's economic development and its implications for security 
in the region. However, many of its major precepts were to come 
under intense scrutiny with the emergence of the East Timor issue 
on the parliamentary agenda. 
Conclusions  
The amount of time devoted to discussion of Indonesian issues 
in the Parliament during the period reviewed was relatively small 
compared to other foreign and domestic policy matters. However, 
what debate there was reflected deep-seated ideological and 
historical prejudices. Throughout the nine-year period, this 
debate focused in main on economic assistance to, and economic and 
political developments in, Indonesia. 
Fundamental to the style and tone of the debate was the 
conservative parties' incessant preoccupation with Communism and 
its implications for Australia's security. A concern was shared by 
all parliamentary parties about future regional security issues in 
the wake of British and American decisions to wind down their 
presence in the region. Integral to these views was a recognition 
of Indonesia's place in any future regional security arrangements, 
although there were marked differences as to how its potential 
security role should be realized. 
Future regional security issues aside, early discussion on 
developments in Indonesia was neither informed nor intense (unlike 
that in the press at the time). For the first eighteen months, 
questions from Parliamentarians about the features and political 
direction of the new administration in Jakarta found few answers in 
government statements, with government leaders keeping a tight rein 
on any information or assessments concerning such matters. To a 
point, this reflected the nature of foreign policy-making in that 
this requires a greater degree of secrecy and discretion than 
domestic issues, but it also meant that the government was a victim 
of conditions over which it had very little control. In such a 
situation, it was faced with acutely difficult decisions at a time 
when the Labor opposition possessed no real alternative to the 
CPD, H.R., Vol.88, p.926, 3 April 1974. 
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tactics and position adopted by the Government. 
When the political dust had settled in Indonesia, and the 'New 
Order' had consolidated its position, a period began in which the 
parliamentary debate was dominated by the conservative parties' 
deep-seated anti-communist political beliefs. For these parties, 
while there were overwhelming international and domestic reasons 
for this, it set the tone and shape of the debate on Indonesian 
issues up until the early 1970s. 
The government's preoccupation with Australia's security 
interests was never far from the surface in expressions of concern 
for Indonesia's poor economic and political situation. Indonesia's 
vulnerabilities served to galvanize the conservative parties in 
their broader and ongoing, but flawed, campaign against communist 
encroachment in the region. At the forefront here were hardened 
Liberal and Country Party figures such as Arthur, Harworth, 
Armstrong, Bate, McEwen and Calder. This troubled many Members in 
the Opposition, as well as a number of government Members, 
including Hasluck, McMahon and Chipp. 
Those at the forefront of Opposition concern were Beazley, 
Bryant, Keefe and Willesee, and to a degree, Cairns. This group 
was particularly critical of the explicit self-interest inherent in 
government views. Beazley in particular, a man of compassion and 
intellect and who had a deep interest in economic and humanitarian 
questions, quite correctly took the government to task on many 
occasions over its motivations in extending politically loaded 
assistance to Indonesia. Moreover, few opposition Members 
disagreed with Whitlam's often caustic criticism of the 
government's hesitation to act in this area, a weakness he was to 
focus on until he was Prime Minister. The decision, however, to 
make Indonesia a special point of attack against the government was 
one of the less understandable elements in Labor's policy. 
While Whitlam was particularly critical of the government's 
preoccupation with military-strategic considerations in shaping its 
attitudes towards Asia, others in the Labor Party (like some 
elements of the press) focused on the opportunities lost to 
Australia through such an attitude, in the economic and trade 
areas. This widened the debate and shifted the focus away from 
ideology, something Hasluck had been attempting to achieve for much 
of the 1967-69 period. In doing so, it gave rise to a more 
constructive bipartisan debate. 
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The high level of parliamentary interest in aid issues 
generally at this time obviously contributed to the mounting level 
of pressure on the government to address the now central issue of 
economic assistance to Indonesia. Indeed, Indonesia became the 
major focal point for a change in Australia's aid policy, affecting 
the duration for which aid commitments would be made. Importantly, 
in the context of the changing international situation as perceived 
by the government, the achievement of Australia's foreign policy 
objectives depended increasingly, in the long term, on Australia's 
economic aid programme. 
Moreover, the public l and parliamentary interest in Indonesian 
aid and trade issues, as well as the Australia-Indonesia political 
relationship, may have been one of the factors leading to a number 
of parliamentary investigations into such matters. 2 These 
inquiries brought together a cross-section of politicians, while 
providing active non-government (and government) individuals and 
interest groups (seeking to be heard on contentious Indonesian 
issues, such as aid3 and political prisoners. 4) with the opportunity 
See Chapter Six 
2 	See Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Inquiry into Australia's Foreign Aid (1973), 
Parliamentary Paper No.338; Prospects for Trade between 
Australia and Indonesia. Report from the Senate Standing 
Committee on Industry and Trade, AGPS, Canberra 1975. 
See also Official Hansard Transcript of Evidence, Vol.1 
and Vol.2;  Australia's Relations with Indonesia, Interim 
Report, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Government 
Printers of Australia, Canberra 1974. (In May 1970, the 
Joint Committee appointed a sub-committee to consider 
Australia's relations with Indonesia. An Interim Report 
of the sub-committee was considered and adopted by the 
full committee on 17 October 1972. It was tabled in 
April 1973. The Report's preliminary findings on the 
subject of relations between Papua New Guinea and West 
Irian reflected the Committee's belief that they were of 
'immediate concern'. The sub-committee comprised 
Senators R. Bishop, Dame Nancy Buttfield and J.L. 
Carrick; and S.E. Calder, D.M. Cameron, Hon. Sir John 
Cramer, Hon. R.C. Katter, F.M. Kirwan, M.J.R. Mackellar, 
W.L. Morrison and R.J. Reynolds. The evidence upon which 
the committee based its preliminary findings was not 
available to the writer. 
3 	The Liberal Member for Holt (L.S. Reid), for example, 
maintained direct links with the voluntary aid agencies. 
As President of one such agency -- For Those Who Have 
Less -- he was in a position to represent the agencies' 
views -in the Parliament. The work of academics (for 
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to participate, as well as to establish links with influential 
Members of Parliament. The impact of those who contributed 
submissions and oral evidence can be gauged from the coincidence 
between the views reached by the inquiries, and some of the 
opinions expressed. The value of such inquiries lay also in the 
amount of information made available to the public and, with the 
exception of one inquiry,' the ensuing bipartisan report. 
There were a number of other features of the parliamentary 
debate on Indonesian issues, which concerned foreign policy in 
general and were important in relation to the existing and future 
role of parliament. First, many parliamentarians had gained first-
hand knowledge of Indonesia. G.M. Bryant (Labor), D.L. Chipp 
(Liberal) and Senators M.F. Scott (Liberal) and F. Dittmer (Labor) 
had been members of the Parliamentary Delegation to Southeast Asia 
(including Indonesia) in 1967. In 1970, Chipp and Dittmer were to 
return, joined by S.E. Calder (Liberal). Moreover, Crean, Whitlam 
and Beazley (Labor) maintained a close personal interest in 
Indonesian affairs throughout the period reviewed. Such personal 
involvement of even a small number of parliamentarians noticeably 
affected the quality of the debate on Indonesian issues. 
Second, political developments in Indonesia as a whole could 
not be separated from the plight of the Indonesian people. Within 
the parliament and outside, participants in the debate stressed the 
need for the Australian Government to act in two areas -- to assist 
in Indonesia's economic development and to take diplomatic action 
that would facilitate closer political relations. In the debates 
in the parliament throughout this period both aspects were 
explored; economic assistance and foreign policy were inextricably 
linked. 
For the most part, throughout this period, a bipartisan policy 
on economic assistance to, and development in, Indonesia was 
example Dr. Eldridge and Professor Feith) on Australia's 
development aid to Indonesia also generated debate in the 
Parliament. 
4 	Professor Feith actively campaigned on the political 
prisoners issue from the late 1960s into the 1970s, by 
which time -- in December 1973 -- 25 parliamentarians 
had signed a petition calling for either the release or 
trial of political prisoners in Indonesia. 
1 	Australia's Relations with Indonesia, Interim Report. 
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pursued in the Parliament. The government and opposition Parties 
were in essential agreement over the political, economic and 
humanitarian considerations underlying these aspects of Australia's 
Indonesian policy. In the late 1960s, however, when Australia was 
experiencing a degree of regional insecurity,and the direction of 
its foreign policy was not clear, differences in rhetorical terms 
were more acute. By the mid-1970s, when major changes in our 
international environment were nearly complete, some well-informed 
and concerned parliamentarians put pressure on the government to 
take up a number of contentious issues with Indonesia. 
Up until this time, however, no major Indonesian issue emerged 
to any significant degree in the Parliament or among the major 
political parties. 1 This was, in large part, due to the cross-
party consensus which the government's Indonesia policy received, 
particularly in the pre-Whitlam government period. However, it was 
also due to the limited understanding (or interest) most 
There was no available evidence that the Liberal Party's 
extra-parliamentary organization expressed views on 
Indonesian matters to Liberal MPs. The Federal Council 
of the Liberal Party met annually but its reports and 
resolutions were secret. The Country Party rarely 
focused on issues other than those concerned with their 
rural interests. While the defence and foreign policy 
sections of the ALP platform provided the context for 
policy during the period under review, the ALP -- 
including the trade unions which occasionally had a view 
on Indonesian matters -- was more interested in domestic 
policies. On many of these Indonesian matters, the 
conference was often endorsing policies put forward by 
the Parliamentary Labor Party (and thus appeared to have 
little influence on the latter). Refer to the following: 
Australian Labor Party, Official Report of the  
Proceedings of the 26th Commonwealth Conference 1965, 
published by ALP, 1965, p.74 ff (especially p.80); 
Australian Labor Party, Official Report of the  
Proceedings of the 27th and 28th Commonwealth  
Conferences, 1967 and 1969, Griffin Press, Adelaide, 
1967, p.19 ff and Appendix L, esp. p.211 (Item 24 on West 
Irian and a call for a 'democratic plebiscite'); 
Australian Labor Party, Platform, Constitution and Rules  
(29th Commonwealth Conference) 1971, Commercial Printing 
House, Adelaide, 1971. (Indonesian issues did not figure 
in any Resolutions adopted by the 1971 Federal 
Conference). The 1973 Conference adopted a Resolution 
(No.14) that 'expresses... grave concern at the prolonged 
detention and torture of political prisoners in South 
Vietnam...'. No mention, in this regard, was made of 
Indonesia. The Australian Labor Party, Platform,  
Constitution and Rules, David Combe, Canberra City, 1973, 
p.52. 
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parliamentary Members had of Indonesian issues, or of broader 
foreign policy issues. Thus, while the Parliament was 'part of the 
context of argument and of explanation,' it did not, like the 
political parties generally, have any direct influence over the 
government's formulation of its Indonesia policy in this period. 
These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine. 
Miller, T.B., "The Making of Australian Foreign Policy" 
in B.D. Beddie, (ed.), Advance Australia - Where?, p.158. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WIDER COMMUNITY OPINION: MAJOR LOBBY GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS 
(1965 - 1974)  
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on other sources of Australian domestic 
opinion in the period extending from the coup until the first 
raising of the East Timor issue in the Australian Parliament in 
1974. Approaches to Indonesian issues as expressed through public 
opinion polls, non-government lobby groups and individuals, 
including the academic and business communities, are considered 
together with an assessment of their impact on public opinion and 
policy-making by the Australian Government. 1 
The Australian Government's attitudes and policies toward 
Indonesia at first received little comment in the wider community. 
What comment there was, existed as part of the broader discussion 
taking place on Australia's foreign policy in the context of the 
changing nature of international and regional politics. This 
debate intensified with the British and American decisions to 
withdraw from the region while, on another level, attention began 
to focus on the role that Suharto's Indonesia would play in such 
circumstances. 
This discussion however saw the emergence of dissenting views 
that focused on the increasingly authoritative nature of the 
Suharto regime. The West New Guinea issue served to accelerate 
this discussion, sowing the seeds of a debate that increasingly 
focused on the level of costs that Australia was prepared to accept 
in the maintenance of what was, by the early 1970s, a fast 
developing and increasingly important strategic relationship. 
1 	This includes those people or groups, other than 'public 
opinion', who made up what Almond calls the 'attentive' 
public. This group of individuals and organizations are 
well informed on Indonesian matters, have been interested 
in them for some time and express opinions on these matters. 
This group represents only a small percentage of the 
population, the remainder are either not interested in 
foreign policy matters, or are apathetic. Almond, G., The 
American People and Foreign Policy, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
New York, 1950, p.6. 
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For the purposes of analysis, this chapter is divided into 
three sections: the first briefly examines public opinion; the 
	A 	A 	 4,-...141r;Alimlc T.744-1, 
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views on Indonesian issues. These are divided into two main 
categories: those groups and individuals whose major interest was 
centred on Australia's relationship with Indonesia and those groups 
which, while not specifically organized around an interest in the 
relationship, were concerned with Indonesian matters. The first 
category was made up of groups like the Australian-Indonesian 
Association (AIA) and the Australian Indonesian Business 
Cooperation Committee (AIBCC), as well as the academic community. 
The second category was also made up of groups such as the Returned 
Services League (RSL), Trade Unions, Churches and Aid Groups. 
While their broader activities were directed more towards other 
interests, it became evident that this activity increasingly 
embraced Indonesian matters. 
Community Opinion  
Before examining the broadly held attitudes of the general 
community, a number of points need to be made. First, public 
opinion polls serve only to indicate the climate of community 
opinion on a specific issue at a particular point in time and 
cannot be considered to be a contribution to public opinion. 
Second, community opinion, as reflected in these polls, provides 
only a framework or context within which policy-making decisions 
are made by government l -- a point which can be, and has been the 
subject of strong debate. 
On the one hand, it was once the view of R.G. Casey, one of 
Australia's more respected External Affairs Ministers, that public 
opinion was fundamental to any government sanctioning of a foreign 
policy decision. 2 Yet, the view has also been expressed that in 
any meaningful examination of the foreign policy process in 
Australia, little weight would be given to the role of community 
Millar, T.B., Australia in Peace and War, p.43. 
2 	Casey, R.G., The Conduct of Australia's Foreign Policy, 
Third Roy Milne Lecture, AIIA, Melbourne, 1952, p.5. 
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opinion: Nevertheless, the degree to which public opinion 
influences government policy depends on the kind of knowledge and 
4.... J.Ilvo.i.vement which the opinions reflect 5.11 * .1 	 ' um 
opinion polls, a crude evaluation can be made of the general nature 
of the political commitments on which public opinion rests. 
A number of organizations have sought to monitor public 
opinion regarding foreign and defence policy issues. 2 Sixteen 
surveys, 3 each polling a separate 'sample' of Australians but using 
similar approaches, 4 are summarized in this thesis. 5 In each 
survey, an attempt has been made to ascertain the attitudes of 
people on a number of specific issues including those related to 
threats to Australia, communism in Asia, reciprocal government 
attitudes between Australia and Asia, Australian aid and the East 
Timor issue. From the responses, a rough profile of prevailing 
attitudes on Indonesia can be reconstructed and some insight 
provided into the opinion milieu, and its relationship to the 
policy-making process. 
Boyce, P.J., "The Foreign Policy Process", in P.J. Boyce 
and J.R. Angel, (eds.), Independence and Alliance:  
Australia in World Affairs 1976-80, George Allen and Unwin 
and the AIIA, Sydney, 1983, p.22. 
2 	See Appendix D. 
3 	Ibid. 
4 	Polling organizations work on the theory that a sample of 
about 2 000 people selected with sufficient care will 
indicate with considerable accuracy the thinking of the 
community as a whole -- even if the community covers an 
entire nation. The sample is selected by random 
probability: sampling aims to choose the sample in such a 
way that theoretically every person in the area surveyed has 
an equal chance of being selected -- or quota sampling where 
respondents are chosen by selecting quotas (determined from 
known data such as census statistics) according to age, sex, 
location, occupation and economic status. Questioning 
methods vary. The Morgan and APOP get their answers by 
response, and it is considered that the numbers questioned 
are far less important than the accuracy of the sample. 
5 	This chapter confines its analysis of public opinion polls 
to an examination of the two major community opinion issues 
of the period -- 'threats to Australia' and 'economic 
assistance'. The remaining issues/polls are discussed only 
as they relate to the broader issue of Australia's 
relationship with Indonesia. 
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Threats  
Since 1967 a number of surveys have been conducted on the 
threatsquestion of 	4-- Australia's security . In terms of changing 
patterns of public opinion, the late 1960s reflected a fairly 
stable period with just over fifty percent of the Australian 
electorate agreeing that Australia was threatened by some country 
or countries -- only one third felt that no country posed a threat. 
In the following years there was a clear lessening in that 
consciousness, by the mid-1970s, the number of people who saw no 
threat outnumbered those who did see threats, the former 
constituting nearly half the electorate. Since then however, and 
as is assessed in more detail in Chapter Ten, there has been an 
increase in threat consciousness with the 'no threat' figures 
reverting back to the 1967 levels and a higher proportion of people 
being convinced that some countries threaten Australia: 
Table 1 
THREATS TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY 
(percentage) 
1967-69 1976 1978 1980 
Some Countries 
threaten Australia 51.6 43.4 45.6 63.1 
None threaten 
Australia 34.3 46.4 42.3 34.0 
Can't say 14.1 10.2 12.1 2.9 
100 100 100 100 
Table 2 
: COUNTRIES NAMED THREATS TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY 
(by percentage of total population) 
1967-69 1976 1978 1980 
China 30.9 17.1 13.9 13.5 
Russia 13.5 20.2 15.6 40 
Vietnam 10.6 1.8 7.6 7 
Indonesia 6.9 9.7 13.5 11.3 
Japan 5.5 6.9 9.3 6 
America 2.4 3.5 3.1 6.6 
Source: Huck, A., "A Note on the Volatility of threats", Australian Outlook, Vol.35, No.1, April 1981, p.89. 
Huck's analysis is based on opinion polls. All polls before 1980 were taken by Australian Public Opinion Polls 
(the Gallup Method). The 1980 poll was conducted by aat Poll, in cooperation with the Department of Political 
Science, University of Melbourne. 
Huck, A., "A Note on the Volatility of Threats", Australian 
Outlook, Vol.35, No.1, April 1981, pp.88-89. See also Goot, 
M., "Red, White and Brown : Australian Attitudes to the 
World Since the Thirties", Australian Outlook, Vol. 24, No.2, 
August 1970, p.192. 
225 
Those who agreed that Australia was threatened reflected a 
wide range of concerns and apprehensions. Moreover, the change in 
opinion about the countries named has been very mar'-ed • mu - 
preoccupation with China in the 1960s steadily declined while the 
Soviet Union increased dramatically into the mid-to-late 1970s, by 
which time the level of concern about Indonesia was not very 
different from that about China. However, this was not always the 
case. 
In the course of a survey conducted in late 1967, 1 of over 
half of those questioned who agreed that some country or countries 
threatened Australia, 7.1 percent considered Indonesia was a 
threat, behind China (30.8%), Russia (13.0%) and North Vietnam 
(9.4%). In 19692 , with about 50 percent of the electorate 
continuing to believe that Australia was under threat, Indonesia 
was still ranked fourth behind the other three countries. While 
nearly 8 percent considered Indonesia was a threat in 1969, this 
proportion increased to 10.2 percent in early 1970,3  third behind 
China (27.1%) and Russia (15.0%). This was not surprising in view 
of the public reaction to Indonesia's 'Act of Free Choice'. 
Nevertheless, it could not be said that the Australian Government 
would, in electoral terms, have been pressured to take a firmer 
line with Indonesia than they did. 
Overall, throughout the 1967-70 period the results reflected 
relatively stable patterns, with China the major perceived threat 
to Australian security (30%), ahead of Russia (14%), North Vietnam 
(10%), Indonesia (8%), and Japan (6%). 4 While this stable pattern 
is also reflected in an examination of the background of those who 
saw Australia under threat, 5 the variations in the political sphere 
1 	Gallup Poll, No. 194, The Roy Morgan Research Centre, 
Melbourne, November 1967, pp.34-41. 
2 	Gallup Poll, No. 203, April 1969, pp.56-64. 
3 	Ibid., No. 209, February 1970, pp.53-55. 
4 	Huck, A., "Images of China: 	1. The Idea of 'China' in 
Australian Politics", Australian Outlook, Vol.24, No.3, 
December 1970, pp.316-319. 
5 	Analysis by state and by age, for example, reveals little 
variation, with those in the 30-49 years-of-age grouping 
expressing the greatest concern about threat overall. This 
was also true in relation to Indonesia. The older 
respondents appeared more concerned about Japan (reflecting 
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proved to provide the most interesting statistics. While Indonesia 
was seen to be a threat by 8 percent of the electorate, one in 
every two such voters was L-CP, one in three voted for the ALP and 
one in ten was a DLP voter. 
From these surveys it is clear that on the issue of threat, 
Australian public opinion was dominated by perceptions of China. 
While this created latitude for policy leadership in this area for 
the conservative government, opinion on the threat posed by 
Indonesia did not alter Australia's Indonesian policy. 
Economic Assistance  
Few surveys on foreign aid generally have been conducted in 
Australia. Between 1966 and 1974 only three major polls were taken 
on this issue, two of which centred specifically on Indonesia. 1 In 
contrast to the 38 percent of respondents who indicated in 
September 1965 that economic assistance to Sukarno's Indonesia be 
stopped a year later, 2 nearly two out of three people thought 
Australia should at the least maintain its non-military aid to 
Indonesia, then under the firming control of the Western-leaning 
General Suharto. 3 While this provided the conservative government 
with a favourable political climate within which to increase its 
aid allocation to Indonesia, plans to double it in 1968 from six 
historical experiences) while the younger groups were more 
preoccupied with China and North Vietnam. Moreover, it was 
evident that those who lived in the cities were less prone 
to concerns about threat than their country cousins. In 
terms of a threat from Indonesia, however, the capital 
cities and the country areas shared the same level of 
concern. Men seemed more worried about Indonesia than women 
who were concerned with threats from Russia and Japan. In 
occupational terms, the professional and semi-professional 
group of people were markedly more threat conscious than the 
lower economic grouping, with those undecided in the latter 
group in 1967 (30.1%) more committed to an opinion as to a 
threat by the late 1960s (only 13.7% were undecided). 
Gallup Poll, No. 185, The Roy Morgan Research Centre, 
Melbourne, September 1966, pp.30-32 and Poll No. 200, pp.29- 
31. See also the Age Poll (ASRB Pty. Ltd.) on attitudes to 
overseas aid, 10 April 1972. 
2 	See "Australian Public Opinion Polls" (Gallup Polls), Nos. 
1836-1851, July-September 1965. 
3 	Gallup Poll, No. 185, September 1966. See also APOP (Gallup 
Polls), Nos. 1932-1946, October 1966 - January 1967, p.l. 
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million to thirteen million dollars met with resistance, indicating 
that such plans would need to be explained and sold to the public 
ince 1 	nn 	 4- .1.14  
of respondents who favoured the proposed increase in aid to 13 
million dollars were offset by the 23 percent who wanted to cut out 
the existing package of six million dollars. 2 The minority of 22 
percent who favoured the increase believed such an increase would 
not only assist the Indonesians but would promote better 
relationships. On the other hand, the majority of nearly 60 
percent3 who considered aid should be kept at six million dollars a 
year believed that not only did Australians have more need for the 
money but, ironically, that Indonesia should be financially 
independent. 
While Australians generally accepted the principle of giving 
foreign aid, they believed overwhelmingly by 1972 that charity 
began at home with Australia's poor and underprivileged. In a 
survey conducted in April 1972 the majority of those polled 
believed that aid would be better given on a needs basis, and 
regardless of the recipient country's politics. At the same time 
however, such altruism was mixed with a certain amount of 
skepticism about the way foreign aid programmes operate. For 
example, most believed that for one reason or another, much of the 
money collected in Australia did not reach the people who needed 
it, and considered that it was better to send food and other goods 
to overseas countries in need, rather than cash. Moreover, there 
was also a strong body of resistance to the idea of increasing the 
then level of aid, with more than one in every two people 
considering that Australia's interests would be better served by 
spending more on defence. 4 
Whether the general electorate favoured Australia's aid 
policies or not, it is difficult to argue that they could have 
influenced government policy. While many in the electorate were 
skeptical about giving of aid in general, the government would have 
taken heart from those polls that, up until the mid-1970s, revealed 
1 	Gallup Poll, No. 200, October 1968. 
2 	See Appendix D. 
3 	65 percent were L-CP voters, and 56 percent ALP voters. 
4 	See Appendix D. 
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a small majority of opinion which favoured the continuation and, 
after 1966, increasing of aid to Indonesia. 
In appraising the public opinion on Indonesian and related 
issues during this period, two points can be made. First, while 
opinions concerning threat were rooted in an intense (historical) 
concern for Australia's security, and opinions on aid based on 
altruistic considerations, Indonesia ironically figured prominently 
in both. Second, a characteristic of Australian opinion in regard 
to these issue areas was represented by the 'don't know' answers to 
the questions. However, this was not unusual when compared to the 
response to surveys taken on other foreign and defence policy 
issues. While this could substantiate claims that the general 
community does not have an interest in such issues, there was a 
large number of those persons surveyed who consistently responded 
to the questions. 
Groups and Individuals with a Major Interest in Indonesia 
1. Australia-Indonesia Business Cooperation Committee  
In the 1950s and early 1960s, Australian business groups were 
disinclined to engage in trade and investment with Indonesia. 1 Due 
to a lack of structural complementarity between the economics of 
the two countries, trade was minimal, while investment 
opportunities were hamstrung not only by the unstable business and 
political climates in Indonesia, but also by Australian Government 
monetary policies. While it has been argued that post-coup 
Australian business interest in Indonesia subsequently burgeoned, 
marking 'a volte face from the attitudes of the previous fifteen 
years', 2 it was slow to gain momentum. It was not until the early 
1970s that increases in activity can be noticed, coinciding with 
the founding in Melbourne of the Australian-Indonesian Business 
Cooperation Committee (AIBCC). 
Formed in November 1971, under the aegis of the Australian 
Chamber of Manufacturers, the committee was established to assist 
commercial relations between the two countries. Chaired by J.B. 
1 	See Arndt, H.W., "Trade Relations between Australia and 
Indonesia", Economic Record, Vol . 44 , June, 1968, pp.168-193. 
2 	Viviani, N. , "Australian Attitudes and Policies towards 
Indonesia", p.121. 
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Reid, 1 and the result of a great deal of lobbying by the then 
Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, S. Sukirno, 2 the concept of the 
ATUO0 wmc 11=cdnel 
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Cooperation Committee. Its main aims were to foster friendship and 
understanding between each country's business communities, as well 
as to promote trade, investment, technical and economic 
cooperation, and tourism. While other committees dealing with 
Japan, China and Korea tended to deal in large commodities and to 
function on a government-to-government level, the AIBCC's role was 
considered to be more that of an advisory one. Rather than 
becoming involved in commodity negotiations, it tended towards 
assisting people who wanted not only to trade with Indonesia but 
also to engage in investment. This assistance principally took the 
form of advice and information on trading and other regulations and 
practices. 3 
In its early stages, the AIBCC was dilatory. While the 
Indonesians were hopeful it would provide a springboard for joint 
ventures between the two countries, Australian businessmen were 
extremely reticent about entering into such undertakings. Such 
caution was due to remaining (though decreasing) controls in 
Indonesia over foreign investment and, as Indonesia's Finance 
Minister, Sultan Hamengku Buwono, was reported as saying at the 
1 	J.B. Reid was, during his Chairmanship from November 1971 
until September 1975, the Chairman of James Hardie Asbestos 
Ltd., of Hardie Trading Ltd., and of Mercantile Credits Ltd. 
He was also a director of Avis Rent-a-Car Pty. Ltd., and a 
director of BHP. James Hardie Asbestos, Hardie Trading and 
BHP all had involvements in Indonesia (Prospects for Trade 
between Australia and Indonesia. Senate Standing Committee 
on Trade and Commerce, (Official Hansard Transcript of 
Evidence) (Evidence) or (Report), Canberra, 1974. Vol.1, 
p.206 (hereafter Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade). 
2 	The Bulletin, 11 December 1971. Sukarno was later to be 
identified in the 1975 Senate Report to be a partner in a 
major Australian holding in Indonesia. See Eldridge, P.J., 
Indonesia and Australia: 	the politics of aid and 
development since 1966. 	Development Studies Centre 
Monograph No. 18, ANU, Canberra, 1979, p.108. 
3 	Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade (Evidence), 
pp.206-207. Two other organizations played a role in 
shaping economic relations between Australia and Asia -- 
the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the Private 
Investment Company for Asia (PICA). See Eldridge, P.J., 
Indonesia and Australia, pp.111-112 and Senate Committee, 
Prospects for Trade, (Report), pp.132-133. 
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founding ceremony of the AIBCC, to the lingering impression in 
Australia of the policies of the Sukarno government.' However, it 
did play an important role. Whereas in 1969 there were only three 
major Australian investments in Indonesia, this had increased to 
thirty by late 1971, including offshore oil exploration near 
Surabaya; Indo-Milk, a milk-processing factory; and Kiwi, a 
shoepolish conglomerate. 2 By 1974 this had ballooned, with two 
hundred registered members of the AIBCC, 3 ranging in size from 
Australia's largest companies to sole traders and consultants, and 
with interests in mining, building materials, manufacturing, 
banking, metal products, and engineering and architectural 
services. 4 Meanwhile, its counterpart in Indonesia had been 
established, 5 and the AIBCC sought a closer relationship with other 
bodies with similar interests to its own, including the 
Australian-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, whose members were drawn 
mainly from import-export firms. ° These developments were 
underpinned by the construction of a web of linkages between the 
Indonesian Embassy and the Department of Overseas Trade 7 and 
Foreign Affairs8 , both in Australia and Indonesia. 9 By 1974-75 
1 	The Bulletin, 11 December 1971. 
2 	Ibid. 
3 	Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade (Evidence) p.206. 
4 	Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade (Report), p.131. 
5 	The Indonesian-Australian Business Cooperation Committee 
(IABCC) was established in July 1972. The inaugural 
President was E. Kowara, Vice-President of the Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce. Eldridge points out that Kowara's son 
is married to President Suharto's daughter. (Indonesia and 
Australia, p.110). 
6 	Seminars attended by both Indonesian and Australian 
businessmen and officials were held by the IBCC in 1972 
(Canberra), 1973 (Sydney) and 1975 (Melbourne). The IABCC 
held a seminar in Jakarta in 1974, coinciding with an 
Australian Trade Display in Indonesia that year. 
7 	For a background on its role see the Department of Overseas 
Trade submission in Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade 
(Evidence), Vol.II, pp.1351-1442. 
8 	The department's role is less well documented in its 
evidence (submission not documented), Ibid., pp.1071-1088. 
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however, international and domestic developments within Indonesia 
did not auger well for these fledgling contacts. On one level, 
world recession and the oil crisis of that period was exacerbated, 
on another, by the unsettled domestic political situation of early 
1974. In essence, these 'features ... produced a changed set of 
business conditions for joint venture entrepreneurs and people in 
trade'. 1 
In late 1974, the Senate Standing Committee on Trade and 
Commerce held an enquiry into the prospects for Australian trade 
relations with Indonesia. In its submission2 to this enquiry, the 
AIBCC focused directly on these features. First, it considered 
that while the oil crisis had affected the availability of raw 
materials for the manufacturing sector, consumer goods and 
dependent services, hence causing a world-wide shortage of goods 
available on the open market, the increases in Indonesia's foreign 
exchange earnings augured well for Indonesia's economy in terms of 
growth and development. The AIBCC considered that while 
international developments such as these 'caused nations and their 
business communities to reassess priorities of national 
importance', Indonesia faced the prospect of a turnaround in her 
economic position. This meant eliminating, in two years, the 
international debts that had been rescheduled for repayment up to 
the last years of the 20th century and, while placing strain on the 
existing infrastructure and demanding more expertise, any movement 
towards an economic 'take-of f'. 3 
Second, the AIBCC also considered that the political situation 
in Indonesia, as evidenced by the Tanaka riots, not only indicated 
a greater sense of economic nationalism in the government and 
people of Indonesia, but also a hardening of government attitudes 
9 	Kelman, B.N., Address to AIBCC Luncheon, 19 October 1976. 
Kelman succeeded Reid on 30 September 1975. 
1 	Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade (Evidence), p.202. 
2 	The submission took the form of a speech given by Reid at 
a joint meeting of the IABCC and AIBCC, held in Jakarta on 
25-26 April 1974. See Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade 
(Evidence), pp.201-205. 
3 	Senate Committee, Prospects for Trade (Evidence), p.201. 
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and policies towards foreign business. 1 While the AIBCC counselled 
wise planning on the part of the Indonesians if they wished to 
maximize any long-term benefits that might accrue from their 
improving economic position -- focusing on major areas of concern 2 
and interest3 -- its major preoccupation was: 
that foreign investors are being actively disencouraged 
and are no longer welcome, in the light of an increase in 
the restrictions and performance requirements of foreign 
business activity. There is also concern that perhaps 
the rules laid down at the commencement of a 
joint-venture investment will be changed, adversely to 
the foreigner during the early years of the investment 
... businessmen who are committing large sums of money, 
skilled personnel and time must have reasonable prospects 
of fair business conditions which must remain stable.... 4 
In 1968, Professor H.W. Arndt stated that, in marked contrast to 
the optimism expressed in the mid-1930s about Australia-Dutch East 
Indies trade, 'Australia and Indonesia, two large neighbouring 
trading nations, hardly trade with each other'. 5 Over a decade 
later, Arndt was to reaffirm this with the view that, 
'Economically, neither country is very important to the others. ° 
Professor Arndt concluded however: 
It is very desirable that both countries adopt policies 
which will promote ... bilateral trade, not only for its 
Ibid. 
2 	The 'commercially frustrating' port-handling and shipping 
facilities, and the shortage of educated Indonesians with 
'the practical experience of applying their ability and 
training in industry...'. (Ibid., p.203). 
3 	The possible establishment of a stock exchange and money 
market as a platform for Indonesian finance and joint 
venture business opportunities, and the development of 
government sponsored savings schemes. This would include 
teaching rural people to save, and providing them with the 
opportunity 'to share directly in the growth and prosperity 
flowing from investment'. Fundamental to these 
considerations was Australia's foreign aid, but with greater 
emphasis on practical skill. (Ibid., p.204). 
4 	Ibid., p.203. 
5 	Arndt, H.W., "Trade Relations between Australia and 
Indonesia", p.168. 
6 	Arndt, H.W., "Economic Relations between Australia and 
Indonesia", in J.A.C. Mackie, (ed.), Indonesia: The Making 
of a Nation, RSPS, ANU, Canberra, 1980, p.752. 
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direct economic benefits but also because it can serve as 
one way of bringing the two nations closer together. 1 
It can be argued from this, and other writings, 	ALWAL was an 
advocate of an economically strong Indonesia, and that this would 
provide Australia with increasing marketing opportunities for 
Australian products. It can also be concluded that, along with 
Arndt, the AIBCC shared these aims and ideals. In the years 
following the committee's establishment, efforts were directed to 
sustaining them through a network of official and unofficial 
agencies. This gave rise to a modest, although important, 
framework of linkages within which the AIBCC played a pivoted role. 
It is in this context that the AIBCC's political role should be 
viewed. 
Still in their infancy, however, these links were to undergo 
stress due to two factors -- the difficulties that businesses 
encountered in dealing with a country such as Indonesia, and 
encroaching worldwide recession. This was exacerbated by the 
unsettled domestic situation of early 1974. The AIBCC's immediate 
reactions related to the effect of these events on Australian 
interests in Indonesia, and the desirability of stable conditions 
for the maintenance of an Australian business interest generally. 
An overriding consideration however, was that it was considered to 
be very much in these interests to tread softly with regard to 
Indonesia's hardening attitude on foreign investment and to ride 
out the problems of this period -- an attitude they sustained 
during the East Timor crisis, a year later. 
2. 	Australian-Indonesian Association  
Although the idea for an Australian-Indonesian Association 
(AIA) 3 first surfaced in the 1940s, it was not until the mid-1950s 
that the structure and functions were clarified and the 
organization established in Victoria. Founded by a group of people 
with backgrounds in the universities, the Volunteer Graduate 
1 	Ibid., p.753. 
2 	See Chapter Ten. 
3 	Most of this information on the aims and structure of the 
organization in the pre-coup period is drawn from Viviani, 
N., "Australian Attitudes and Policies towards Indonesia", 
pp.116-117. 
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Scheme, and as hosts to visiting Indonesian students (on 
Australia's Colombo Plan), it began with the specific and 
non-political aim to promote and foster friendships, understanding 
and good relations between the people of Australia and Indonesia'. 1 
The AIA subsequently developed strong links with two major 
universities -- Monash and Melbourne -- and with Australians who 
had visited Indonesia as tourists, as well as those who had worked 
and studied there. By the mid-1960s, the organization's membership 
had reached 200, while its interests were sustained through a 
variety of functions that dealt with Indonesia, including social 
functions, informal discussion groups and conferences. 
The AIA's philosophical underpinnings precluded it from any 
kind of political orientation, thus, as an organization, it 
refrained from entering into the debate that slowly engulfed the 
relationship in the 1950s and early 1960s -- West New Guinea and 
confrontation. However, while it preferred to provide a balance to 
the negative tone that was to emerge throughout this debate, it did 
not prevent individuals from providing critical commentaries on 
both the Australian and Indonesian Government's policies. 2 Yet, 
the association: 
kept awake a positive interest in Indonesia which was in 
danger of being swamped in the fear-dominated climate of 
the early 1960s. Its members are heirs to the spirit of 
confidence in Indonesia of the 1940s, and they seem to 
share some of the idealism apparent at that time. While 
the Association has sought an apolitical stance, it was 
inevitable that some members would oppose government 
policies ... and spread some views within and outside the 
Association . 3 
In September 1970, H. O'Neill, writing in the organization's Annual 
Report, reflected: 
As the Indonesian government proceeds with the tasks of 
national planning, the Australian government is very 
interested in helping. Australian businessmen, 
technicians, scientists and economists are responding to 
requests for assistance and Indonesians in positions of 
responsibility are being invited under the Colombo plan 
to gain experience here ... the Association, which was 
1 
• Australian Indonesian Association of Victoria (hereafter 
AIA (Vic.)), Annual Report, 1964-65, 17 September 1965, p.1. 
2 	Viviani, N., "Australian Attitudes and Policies towards 
Indonesia", p.117. 
3 	Ibid., pp.117-118. 
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significantly sustained by long-term personal friendships 
is not yet properly geared to the new level of business 
and institutional links which now appear to be 
prevailing.' 
In the intervening post-coup period the relationships had 
burgeoned, particularly at the political level. The association's 
membership, now totalling 336 and embracing wider and more diverse 
interests, compelled the organization to continue providing 
opportunities for interaction between the people of the two 
countries. This also required it to achieve a balance between 
purely social functions, which provided the members with a first 
hand visual and oral experience of Indonesian culture, and those 
which enabled it to provide information, by now in increasing 
demand, on Indonesian socio-economic and political developments. 
While social gatherings provided visitors with friendship and 
hospitality (including in 1968, Foreign Minister Malik), 2 efforts 
over the years were directed towards humanitarian tasks, including 
fundraising, drug appeals and disaster relief activities, 3 in 
conjunction with the Red Cross (1970) 4 and Community Aid Abroad 
(CAA) (1971). 5 The failure of the Cultural Agreement to promote 
increased activity in this area led the association to make 
unsuccessful approaches for assistance to Australia's External 
Affairs Minister, Freeth. Nevertheless, the establishment in 1969 
of an Advisory Committee to the Minister of Education and Science 
heartened the association as evidence of an increasing government 
interest in the teaching of Asian languages and culture in 
general . 6 
Throughout this period, lectures and discussions groups, 
centring on socio-economic developments in Indonesia, were becoming 
a major part of the association's activities. They developed in 
AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, 1969-70, September 18, 1970, p.4. 
2 	AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, 1968-69, September, 1968, p.l. 
3 	AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, 1969, September 26, 1969, p.2. 
4 	AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, 1970, September 18, 1970, p.2. 
5 	AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, 1971, September, 1971, p.3. 
6 	AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, 1969, September 26, 1969, pp. 
1-3. 
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sophistication over the years, particularly as the issues emerging 
grew in complexity, and began imposing on the Australian-Indonesian 
relationship. Early discussions took the form of lectures by guest 
speakers, with Indonesianists such as Professors Legge and Feith, 
and J.A.C. Mackie, predominant.' There was also the occasional 
conference and convention; however, these were to increase in 
frequency and importance in terms of the association's overall 
activities. 
Early lectures and discussions tended to focus on broad themes 
related to the relationship, 2 but by 1969 the focus was narrowing 
onto specific issue areas related to the Indonesian domestic scene, 
paralleling the increasing awareness within the community. 3 
Meanwhile, links were being established and consolidated with 
senior academics, public servants and journalists from Jakarta. 
The association also provided a platform for visitors from 
Indonesia to meet with representatives from Australian firms which 
had expressed an interest in 'joint ventures' in Indonesia. 4 
However, this aspect of the association's activities, and 
indeed of the Australian-Indonesian relationship was proving 
problematic. As the President of the AIA observed, late in 1973 on 
the growing issue of the nature and extent of the organization's 
relationship with Australian firms conducting business in 
Indonesia: 
Australian business is becoming increasingly active in 
Indonesia and the appropriate relationship between our 
Association and such local business is one of unresolved 
All of Monash University. 
2 	For example, a weekend conference was held early in 1965 
with the theme: "Australia-Indonesia 1945-1949 and Today". 
The conference was attended by AIA members from fledgling 
associations in Canberra and NSW, as well as by the 
Indonesian Ambassador, Major-General R.A. Kosasih and staff 
from the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra. AIA (Vic.) Annual  
Report, 1964-65, p.3. 
3 	In 1969, the AIA convention was held at Cowes. 	The 
Indonesian Ambassador, Lt. General Hidajat was present and 
lectures were given by ANU's Dr Pangestu who spoke on 
"Economic Development under the Order Baru" and Ulf 
Sundhaussen from Monash University who spoke on "The 
Military and Civilians in Politics", Annual Report, 1969, 
p.3. 
4 	AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, 1970, p.3. 
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issues of our Association [sic]... There are indeed 
uncertainties in our feelings and thoughts. We are 
conscious of the need for economic and social improvement 
in Indonesia and this can certainly be helped by foreign 
business activities. We would like to do all we can to 
assist Australian business activities which has as a 
substantial concomitant an increase in the welfare of the 
Indonesian people. We are at the same time conscious of 
the criticisms of current economic policies and of some 
of the actions of foreign companies in Indonesia and of 
the widespread ambivalence that does still exist in 
Indonesian circles towards foreign investments) 
This not only reflected an understanding of the changing nature of 
the relationship but also the changing character of the debate 
engendered by it, particularly as it related to Indonesian matters, 
and the way it put stress on the philosophical underpinnings of the 
association's charter. That there was more Australian interest in 
Indonesia at this time than at any other time in the relationship 
was evidenced by an: 
increased membership, the number of people attending our 
language classes and those conducted by other bodies, the 
artifact shops, the cultural displays [and]... the 
increasing number of visitors to Indonesia from all 
sections of the Australian community.... 2 
However, these positive developments were being compromised by 
dissenting views within Australia -- a situation that drew from the 
association's president in late 1972 the view that 'it is quite 
clear that there is an accelerating need for an organization of 
this kind to try to ameliorate abrasive cultural contacts' between 
the two countries. That year the president of the association had 
been called on by the Australian Government to represent community 
interests on official occasions during the Suharto visit in 
February. 3 
Over the next two years, the association's membership 
increased to well over 500 and its activities intensified, with 
thriving language classes, lecture series, weekend conferences and 
social functions giving it the characteristics of a cultural 
institute, as the community interest in Indonesia deepened and 
broadened. At the same time, the issues that touched the 
AIA 	(Vic.), 	"Annual Report, 	1972-73", AIA News, 
October-November, 1973, pp.5-6. 
2 	Ibid., p.6. 
3 	AIA (Vic.), Annual Report, September 1972, p.4. 
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association, too, broadened and deepened. 1 However, the Tanaka 
riots in early 1974, while reflecting 'the suspicions and the 
extent of the feelings which exist or can be aroused over this 
vexed question of foreign entrepreneurship and its attendant social 
problems', strengthened the resolve of the association to maintain 
its momentum and composure as a cultural body 'where Indonesians 
and Australians could meet and share their experiences without any 
suspicion of their being used in the pursuit of anybody's vexed 
economic interests' •2 
Dr Viviani has argued that while the AIA in the pre-coup 
period had some long-term influence on some Australian attitudes -- 
through building on existing pro-Indonesian attitudes and drawing 
Indonesia and its problems into the public arena to facilitate 
wider understanding and appreciation -- it was: 
not entirely apolitical, and specific activities of 
individuals may combine with these to have political 
effects ... but their [AIA's] political influence, either 
institutionally or through their members individually, 
has been of such diffuse long term nature that its impact 
on community attitudes is difficult to evaluate) 
This analysis could also extend to embrace the organization's 
activities in the post-coup period, well into the 1970s. In 
considering the association's broadened activities during this 
For example, the 1972 Convention focused on student 
involvement in Indonesian and Australian politics (Ibid., 
p.2). In 1973, seminars on Indonesia's economic and 
domestic political developments were conducted by Harold 
Crouch and Jamie Mackie. Nancy Viviani delivered a lecture 
on the historical development of Australia's relations with 
Indonesia and in early 1974, Dr K. Thomas of Latrobe spoke 
at a Presidential Weekend on Indonesia's second development 
plan. Three important seminars were conducted later in 1974 
in conjunction with the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies 
at Monash University: "The thaw of 1973, the Anti-Tanaka 
riots and the Aftermath"; "Current development strategy and 
its critics, with special reference to rural poverty"; and 
"Australian-Indonesian relations - past trends and future 
policies". Discussions were lead by Messrs J.A.C. Mackie, 
Nazaruddin, Sjamsuddin, Zainu'ddin, Harold Crouch, and Ron 
Hatley, as well as by Doctors Herbert Feith, Ken Thomas and 
Barbara Harvey. 
2 	AIA (Vic.), "Annual Report 1973-74", AIA News, November 
1974, p.7. 
3 	Viviani, N., "Australian Attitudes and Policies towards 
Indonesia", p.118. 
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time, it could be argued that its attempts to familiarize its 
members and others in the community, with socio-economic and 
political developments in New Order Indonesia, had an important 
influence on how these Australian's perceived Indonesia. Given 
that many in this group came from various sectors of society -- 
businesses, schools and churches -- it is also likely that this 
influence reached out into the wider community. 
This situation is even more interesting when the focus is 
turned to those persons who were actively involved in providing 
these interpretations of Indonesia over the years -- Mackie, Arndt, 
Legge, Feith, Crouch and Viviani. Each had his or her own 
interpretations of an Indonesia that was becoming increasing 
embroiled in highly complex and controversial issues, and some 
would emerge as principals in the debate generated by Indonesia's 
actions in East Timor. Thus, it was likely these interpretations 
transcended the association's philosophical ideals, while also 
penetrating the Australian community. Ironically, AIA attempts to 
sustain a positive interest in Indonesia in the issue-dominated 
climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s were being placed under 
increasing stress, not least from within its own ranks. 
3. 	Collective Influence of the AIBCC and AIA 
Although it is difficult to gauge the full impact of these 
groups, they did keep officials and Ministers aware that sections 
of the public were concerned with specific Indonesian issues. At 
the same time, they were able to keep the issues alive in the minds 
of the public and offered organizations through which political 
action could be taken. While the AIBCC promoted the interests of 
the private sector and had a strong influence in sustaining 
domestic political support for the Indonesian Government and its 
economic policies, the AIA's activities, through substantial but 
informal links to the universities, were more widely focused. 
However, by virtue of such links, the AIA found its agenda was 
focusing increasingly on many of the issues that concerned the 
AIBCC, particularly Indonesia's economic development, although its 
perspective differed and, it seems, its capacity and success in 
translating it into political pressure was more constrained. 
There is evidence to suggest that the AIBCC influenced the 
decision-making process through its close personal and political 
ties with the government and through its links with the 
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bureaucracy. Moreover, it is evident that influence was sought as 
an opinion-group (according to the type of role played in the 
political process) by means of conferences and public statements. 
The AIA, on the other hand, while able to establish similar links, 
as well as with aid, business and church groups, established no 
group/group alliances on any particular issue, leaving us to 
conclude it had no discernible decisive influence on government 
policy on issues of major interest to it. 
4. The Academic Community  
A survey of the academic community has presented the opinions 
of a small number of individuals whose writings have stood out 
during this period. These authors have shared a specific interest 
in either Australian-Indonesian relations or Indonesian issues (the 
latter are only examined where they impinge on the relationship) 
and are distinct because they have taken more than a transient 
interest in raising issues that have been of direct relevance to 
Australia's Indonesia policies. Five academics made major 
contributions to the debate on Australian-Indonesian issues -- 
J.A.C. Mackie, 1 H.W. Arndt, 2 P.J. Eldridge, 3 H. Feith4 and R. 
Mortimer5 . Bruce Grant6 and Peter Hastings 7 also provided fertile 
Formerly lecturer in History at the University of Melbourne, 
Director of the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash 
University, and presently Professor of Social and Political 
Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, at the 
Australian National University (ANU). 
2 	Formerly Professor of Economics, Research School of Pacific 
Studies, ANU. 
3 	Then Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University 
of Tasmania. 
4 	Reader in Politics, Monash University. 
5 	The late Rex Mortimer was Associate Professor, Department 
of Government, University of Sydney. Formerly Professor of 
Politics and Administrative Studies, University of Papua New 
Guinea. 
6 	Journalist, academic, former Ambassador to India during the 
Whitlam Government, and author. 
7 	Journalist, academic and former Editor, each of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, the Australian, the Bulletin and New Guinea. 
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grounds for the debate that began taking shape within months of the 
rise of the 'New Order'. While other journalists l made a strong 
contribution to the debate, these two correspondents, Melbourne and 
Sydney-based respectively, also published widely in the academic 
press. The purpose here is not to examine their contributions in 
the daily press (as already covered), but to briefly shadow their 
academic writings in order to identify their important views and 
positions on the relationship. 
J.A.C. Mackie and H.W. Arndt were to publish seven major 
articles 2 in the academic press in the decade before the East 
Timor issue emerged, as well as many other papers on Australian 
foreign policy, 3 Indonesian politics4 and the Indonesian economy. 5 
7 	Journalist, academic and former Editor, each of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, the Australian, the Bulletin and New Guinea. 
1 	Stanley Karnow (Australian), Frank Palmos (Sunday Mail), 
Creighton Burns (Age), Dennis Bloodworth (Bulletin). 
2 	Mackie wrote: "The Culture Agreement -- Prospects and 
Possibilities", Quadrant, Vol.13, No.5, September/October 
1968, pp.117-127; "Indonesia and Australia", in H.G. 
Gelber, (ed.), Problems of Australian Defence. Melbourne, 
Oxford University Press, pp.32-52; "Australia's Relations 
with Indonesia: Principles and Policies, I. Australian 
Outlook, Vol.28, No.1, 1974, pp.3-14; "Australia's 
Relations with Indonesia: Principles and Policies, II", 
Australian Outlook, Vol.28, No.2, August 1974, pp.168-178. 
Arndt wrote: 	"Trade Relations Between Australia and 
Indonesia", The Economic Record, Vol.44, No.106, June 1968, 
pp.168-194; "The Indonesian Economy: Problems and 
Opportunities for Australia", Chapter 17.in Arndt, H.W., 
'A Small Rich Industrial Country. Melbourne, Cheshire, 1968, 
pp.218-227; "Australian Economic Aid to Indonesia", 
Australian Outlook, Vol.24, No.2, August 1970, pp.124-139. 
3 	For example Mackie wrote "Reconsidering Australian Foreign 
Policy", Australia's Neighbours, No. 50/51, November-December 
1967, pp.4-5; (with M. Osborne), "The Domino Fallacy", 
Australia's Neighbours, No.54/55, March-April 1968, pp.1-4. 
4 	Mackie also contributed the following: "The Commission of 
Four Report on Corruption", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, Vol.6, No.3, November 1970, pp.87-102; 
"Civil-Military Relations and the 1971 Elections in 
Indonesia", Australian Outlook, Vol. 24 , No.3, December 1970, 
pp.250-262; "Indonesia in the 1980s", Australian Outlook, 
Vol.25, No.3, December 1971, pp.334-344; "The Golkar 
Victory and party-aliran alignments" in Oey Hong Lee, (ed.), 
Indonesia After the 1971 Elections, London, Kuala Lumpur, 
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In effect, their writings, along with those of Professor Feith, 1 
provided the intellectual and moral framework within which the 
national debate at this level emerged, drawing others like a 
magnet. 
One of the most sensible and important writings appeared in 
Ouadrant in 1969. 2 In a cautiously cynical celebration of the 
signing of the Cultural Agreement between the two countries -- a 
paradox in view of the paucity of contacts at that level -- Mackie 
considered the agreement was unlikely to be viable due to a number 
of underlying considerations: Australia's heritage, European in 
character and fortified by a European-oriented educational system; 
the paucity of commercial interaction between the two countries -- 
normally a 'mainspring' for political and cultural relations and, 
in the case of Australian-Indonesian relations, much stronger in 
the mid-1950s; and Australia's modified isolationism. 3 
Mackie believed that this was all the more reason for closer 
5 	Arndt, for example, wrote "Economic Prospects for the 
1980's" Australian Outlook, Vol.25, No.3, December 1971, 
pp.319-334; "Regional Wage Differentials". Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economics Studies (BIES), Vol.8, No.1, March 
1972, pp.89-92; "PT Krakatau Steel", BIES, Vol.4, No.2, 
July 1975, pp.127-136. Professor Arndt also published 
extensive surveys throughout this period on Indonesia's 
economic performance in the BIES's "Survey to Recent 
Developments, 1966-75, various issues. 
While not all Feith's writings listed here will be 
considered, he was a steady contributor to the debate on 
Indonesia's regime and their policies. See for example, 
"Indonesia -- Blot on the New Order", New Republic, Vol.158, 
April 13, 1968, pp.17-21; "Suharto's Search for a Political 
Format", Indonesia (Ithaca), No.6, October 1968, pp.88-105; 
"Southeast Asia and Neo-Colonialism", Paper presented at The 
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) 
Conference: Australia, Papua New Guinea and Southeast Asia, 
9-11 May 1975, subsequently published in E. Wolfers, (ed.), 
Australia's Northern Neighbours Melbourne, Nelson for AIIA, 
1976; "Political Control, Class Formation and Legitimacy 
in Suharto's Indonesia", (Paper presented to the Melbourne 
Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, 
16 May 1976. Subsequently published in Kabar 
Seberang/Sulating Maphilindo, No.2, June 1977. Feith also 
published in the Australian newspapers. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "The Cultural Agreement -- Prospects and 
Possibilities", Quadrant, Vol.13, No.5, September/October 
1988. 
3 	Mackie, J.A.C., "The Cultural Agreement", pp.118-120. 
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synthesis to take place between, on one level, the planning of 
Asian language programmes for Australian schools and universities 
and, on another, a nationwide effort towards cultural 
bridge-building. Moreover, as he argued forcefully and 
convincingly, and was to do so for the next decade: 
The benefits of any closer cultural relations we have 
with Indonesia are going to depend not just on the 
piecemeal exchange of ideas and techniques - theirs 
artistic, ours scientific or technological - but upon 
building up opportunities for personal contacts on a 
basis of equality and mutuality, so that there will be 
above all a sharing of experiences within some continuing 
framework: 
Integral here was the need for an Australian equivalent to the 
'Ford Foundation' or 'British Council' to pave the way, acting as a 
vehicle of cultural contacts while coordinating activities and the 
flow of information between the two countries. 
While Mackie was adamant that this process would need to 
involve movement in both directions, and would depend on a strong 
governmental foundation in each country, he shied away from 
extrapolating on the role that government aid/assistance had in 
this process. He preferred instead to identify 'other areas where 
there is scope for private initiatives, and at the same time, the 
sort of two-way collaboration for the sake of mutual benefit which 
is probably an essential condition of any meaningful relationship 
with each other'. 2 This centred on the scholastic and 
intellectual arenas, and the need for intellectuals in both 
countries to gain their bearings in relation to each other's 
society. To Mackie this was particularly important because the 
Western scholar -- hampered by difficulties in securing research 
materials, an 'understanding' and 'feel' for Indonesia, as well as 
by contrasting intellectual frames of reference -- needed to: 
'get inside' that frame of reference [otherwise]... his 
understanding of Indonesia will be skin deep.... And 
unless their controversies and ours about problems of 
mutual interest can be pulled closer together, we are 
both losers.' 
Fundamental to this process was a need for Australians to have an 
understanding not only of Indonesia's problems and the debates they 
1 	Ibid., p.123. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "The Cultural Agreement", p.124. 
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generated, but also of their significance to Australia. 1 
This notion of interpretation was a fundamental concern to 
Professor Mackie throughout the 1960s and 1970s and may go some way 
towards explaining his intellectual endeavours in relation to 
Indonesian society and its politics. These began in 1966 when 
Mackie was careful to provide a level-headed analysis of the 
immediate post-coup period; in particular, Indonesia's external 
behaviour and 'the durability of the new, tranquil phase of 
Indonesia's relations with her neighbours'. 2 While they were 
strong interpretative contributions, they were also part of any 
ongoing process of conveying to his readers the subtleties, and the 
role, of the Suharto regime within Indonesian society. 
Over the next decade he visited Indonesia on countless 
occasions and it was not surprising, therefore, that Mackie 
remained a consistent and articulate observer of developments 
within that country. However, his writings began to reflect a 
sense of struggle, as he himself not only had to come to terms with 
these developments but also with the fast emerging differences of 
political views on issues related to human rights, the nature of 
the military regime, and economic development. The economic 
development debate in particular gained momentum in the early 
1970s, as criticism began to focus on the unequal interdependence 
between the wealthy Western countries and the Third World States. 
The main element of this criticism centred on the theory of 
development within these states, and the Western stimulated notion 
that growth should be their major goal, a notion strongly embraced 
by H.W. Arndt. 
While Arndt was not a developmental theorist, he had been 
involved throughout the 1960s in the construction and application 
1 	Ibid., p.126. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Indonesia's New Look: 	An end to 
Confrontation?", New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and 
Southeast Asia, September/October 1966, p.55. See also his 
"Indonesia and Australia", pp.32-52. Mackie documents the 
ideological and political factors that had underlined 
Australia's relations with Indonesia since 1945, examining 
three sets of issues in post-1966 relations: (a) the 
problems of regional security arrangements in the wake of 
the British and American military withdrawals; (b) the 
retention of Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore; 
and (c) the West New Guinea and Papua New Guinea questions 
(pp.43-52). 
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of development programmes within the region, particularly in 
Indonesia. A strong advocate of economic growth in Third World 
States, Arndt believed that the solution to the economic dilemmas 
of those States lay in large-scale industrialization -- in the 
hands of indigenous technocrats however, based on Western 
assistance and participation. 1 
Moving through the late 1960s into the new decade, Arndt 
increasingly saw that Indonesia's problems lay not only in 
overpopulation and underemployment, but also in corruption, 
bureaucracy and the severe shortage of skilled personnel in the 
public and private sectors. 2 Meanwhile, Arndt prescribed 
balance-of-payment aid and long-term capital assistance, even 
though he had prognosticated in 1968 that, 'to expect Indonesia to 
enjoy reasonable economic stability and substantial economic 
development over the next five years requires a major act of 
faith' . 3 
Indonesia's stability was a fundamental theme throughout 
Arndt's writings on Australia-Indonesian relations, and Indonesia's 
politics and economy. He considered developments in Indonesia, for 
better or worse, would 'involve the whole region and become 
enmeshed in world politics', and that Australia's interests, were 
bound to the political stability of Southeast Asia generally. In 
this context, Australian economic aid was to figure prominently in 
future analyses by Arndt on the rehabilitation of the Indonesian 
economy. At first he was of the view that Australian energies in 
this regard would be best directed towards mobilizing Western 
donors (for example, the Tokyo Club) to ensure Indonesia's economic 
rehabilitation. 4 This would not only prove to be strategically 
important for Australia, it could also provide Australia with 
1 	See Arndt, H.W., A Small Rich Industrial Country, p.225. 
For a critical analysis of Arndt's philosophy see Mortimer, 
R., "From Ball to Arndt", in R. Mortimer, (ed.), Showcase 
State. Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973, p.l. 
2 
See Arndt, H.W., A Small Rich Industrial Country, p.223 ff; 
also Arndt's surveys in the BIES throughout this period. 
Ibid., p.226. 
4 Arndt, H.W., A Small Rich Industrial Country, p.227. 
3 
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brighter prospects for a long-term trading partnership. 1 
Hitherto, trade between the two countries had been shallow and the 
potential in the short term did not look promising. 
Arndt broached this area of Australia-Indonesia relations with 
a great deal of pessimism. He effectively illustrated in 1968 in 
the Economic Review2 the paucity of contacts on this level, due 
essentially to historical disassociation and a lack of structural 
complementarity. This situation was further exacerbated by 
Indonesia's political and economic troubles during the Sukarno 
period. 3 While the bulk of Arndt's analysis illustrated well the 
interaction of these obstacles to trade in the past -- primarily 
Australian exports to Indonesia and Indonesian non-oil exports to 
Australia -- he was no more confident that these could be overcome 
in the immediate future either. Moreover, he contended that oil -- 
the largest component of trade between the two countries since the 
mid-1930s4 -- would decrease in importance through the 1970s. 
There were, however, other areas for opportunities between the 
two countries. In particular, he considered Indonesia's increasing 
demands for industrial products and capital equipment would open up 
doors to Australia's manufacturing sector. Arndt was adamant that: 
Indonesia, like other large and over-populated developing 
countries, must industrialize... Indonesia's important 
requirements will be... to expand agricultural 
production, fertilizers, chemicals... agricultural 
machinery.., equipment for basic industries, such as road 
and rail transport, communications, shipping, ports, 
power and irrigation. 5 
By 1971, Arndt had to struggle in his writings with the same 
problems that confronted Mackie. Writing in 1971 for example, 
Arndt considered Australia's aid to Indonesia was inadequate, 
something that concerned him in view of 'the great importance 
Australia attached to Indonesia and to her recovery under the New 
Ibid., p.224. 
2 	Arndt, H.W., "Trade Relations Between Australia and 
Indonesia", pp.  168-193. 
3 	Ibid., pp.169-173. 
4 	See Table I, Ibid., p.169. 
5 	Ibid., p.192. 
247 
Order'. 1 Aid now amounted to A$30 million, and was being disbursed 
in the IGGI context, with part of the allocation directed toward 
Balance of Payments support (Bonus Export - BE). This component 
ran into difficulties in 1968-69 due, among other things, 2 to 
regularly changing regulations, and to the fact that 'most of the 
products of Australian industries, even when they were competitive 
in quality and price, were unknown to Indonesian importers'. 3 
The lack of interest shown by Australian investors by the turn 
of the new decade also disappointed Arndt. He considered that 
Australia's prospects far outweighed her motivation and initiative, 
because, of the 220 investment projects approved in 1970, only five 
were Australian. This was not only due to an indifferent attitude 
on the part of the Australian Government to overseas investment by 
Australian companies but also to a manufacturing industry that had 
only recently begun to look for export markets. 4 Nevertheless, 
Australia's weak performance 5 did not detract from Indonesia's 
economic prospects and performance. In fact, Indonesia's economic 
gains, although slow, provided sustenance for Arndt, and gave him 
not only an opportunity to promote the fundamental role that 
Western technology and know-how had played in this process, but 
1 	Arndt, H.W. , "Australia 's Economic Aid to Indonesia", p.133. 
2 	Arndt focused on the complexities of the Indonesian Foreign 
Exchange Market, and criticized the Australian Government. 
He considered that the latter could have shown more 
generosity by waiving the requirement that BE aid be spent 
3 
4 
on Australian products. 	Arndt, H.W., "Australian Economic 
Aid to Indonesia", p.134. 
Ibid., 	p.131. 
Arndt, 	H.W., 	11 	Australian 	Economic 	Aid 	to 	Indonesia", 
pp.136-137. 	The Australian Government provided facilities 
for 	investment 	insurance 	(Export 	Payment 	Insurance 
Corporation) against non-commercial risks; however, this 
was limited to investments which directly promoted the 
export of Australian goods. In a postscript to his article, 
"Australian Economic Aid to Indonesia", Arndt noted the 
improvement in Australian investment patterns, although he 
conceded its overall contribution to the economic 
development of Indonesia was likely to remain marginal. 
5 	The Gorton government came under continual criticism from 
the Opposition during this period in the Parliament, 
particularly from Whitlam and Grassby (See Chapter Five). 
The Australian press also took to the government on these 
issues (See Chapter Four). 
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also to point out that such a role could only benefit other 
Southeast Asian countries. 1 However, there was a warning that any 
optimism regarding Indonesia's performance and long-term prospects 
could be eroded by three factors: 
(a) a premature decline in foreign aid; 
(b) rising economic nationalism and public impatience with 
living standards, resulting in social revolt; and, 
(c) as occurred in the 1950s, a slackening of development 
efforts due to friction among the Indonesian leadership, 
to the entrenched bureaucracy, to depressed export prices 
and to a run of bad seasons. 2 
Arndt was to maintain his arguments and their underlying 
assumptions for the remainder of the period, 3 defending his 
approach vigorously at the Senate enquiry in 1974 into Australia's 
trading relations with Indonesia. However, by this time a new 
element had entered into the debate on economic development in 
Indonesia, and Australia's contribution to it. In an address 
delivered at a seminar at the Australian National University in 
Canberra in August 1974, Arndt said: 
For contemporary critics of development without equality 
Indonesia has, at least in this part of the world, become 
the "showcase state". Paucity of hard facts about the 
distribution of income and wealth has lent a free rein to 
strong opinions. And the fact that development policy in 
Indonesia has in the last few years been the 
responsibility of professional economists has led the 
critics, and especially the political scientists among 
them, to conclude with alacrity that the fault has been 
with the economic polices adopted. 4 
Arndt was referring to criticisms that were emerging in the early 
1970s and which cast doubt on the steady growth and strength of 
economic conditions in Indonesia. In particular, his reference to 
1 	See, for example, his 1971 publication entitled, "Economic 
Prospects for the 1980s", pp.319-333. 
2 	Ibid., p.329 ff. 
3 	See his surveys in the BIES, 1971-75. 
4 	Arndt, H.W., "Development and Equality: The Indonesian 
Case." A paper delivered at the ANU on 27 August 1974, 
cited in his submission to the Senate Standing Committee on 
Industry and Trade (Prospects for Trade Between Australia 
and Indonesia, p.21. 
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Indonesia as a 'showcase state' was inspired by the publication in 
1973 of Dr Rex Mortimer's book entitled Showcase State: the  
illusion of Indonesia's 'accelerated modernization'.  
Mortimer, a senior academic from the University of Sydney, had 
published extensively on Indonesian affairs under the 'New Order', 
predominantly within a left-wing ideological framework, 1 and was to 
engage this framework in setting the stage for a later 
understanding within Australia of the events that took place in 
Jakarta in early 1974. Against a background of discussion and 
criticism of the generally accepted concept of development and its 
application in the Indonesian case, the book examined the 
socio-economic and political policies of the Suharto government. 
While these policies had been accepted as having introduced an era 
of 'political moderation and economic rationality', and 'social 
calm and economic progress', 2 Mortimer and his co-authors sought to 
illustrate that these policies perpetuated Indonesia's economic 
dependency and, in serving the interests of the Indonesian elite 
(especially its military element), created injustice and inequality 
within Indonesian society. 3 
These writings were important contributions to the evolving 
debate on Indonesian issues, and are relevant here in three 
regards. First, they were produced at a time when the new Whitlam 
government was rewriting Australia's foreign policy -- a policy in 
which Indonesia was to retain its role as 'the linchpin of 
Southeast Asian security' 4 . Second, some of the general themes and 
arguments that emerged from the book were given dramatic validity 
See for example "Indonesia: emigre post-mortems on the 
PKI", Australian Outlook, Vol.22, No.3, December 1968, 
pp.347-359; "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian 
Commission", Indonesia, No.8, October 1969, pp.1-20; "The 
Downfall of Indonesian Communism", Socialist Register, 1969, 
pp. 189-217; "Culture and Politics in Indonesia", Australian 
Outlook, Vol.26, No.3, December 1972, pp.326-333; "Values 
in the Perception of Indonesian Politics", Review of 
Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Vol.7, No.2, July-December 
1973, pp.1-7. 
2 	Mortimer, R., Showcase State. Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1973, p.vii. 
3 	Ibid., p.xi. 
4 	Viviani, N.; "Australians and the Timor Issue: I", p.200. 
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by the 15 January riots in Jakarta the following year. In this 
regard, they were a powerful indication of one major statement --
the S-harto government's 	 stabilization and development 
policies had done little to relieve the suffering of the masses. 
They were also indicative of a potentially explosive political 
setting, fueled by the widening gap between the wealthy and the 
poor. Third, they formed one joist of a debate that was being 
slowly erected by dissenting opinion within Australia at the time. 
By this time Mortimer, Arndt and Mackie had been joined in the 
debate by Dr P.J. Eldridge l who had written two major papers on 
Australia-Indonesia relations. 2 Both papers were complex responses 
to the questions being raised by Mackie and Arndt. In his 
'Indonesia and Australia', Eldridge provided a poignant, although 
imbalanced, analysis of the nature and implications of Australia's 
historical tendency to 'search for special relationships'. In an 
era of increasing multilateral diplomacy -- and taking account of 
Australia's historical efforts to build multilateral institutional 
links with fellow commonwealth countries and the USA -- he was 
doubtful about Australia's ability to pursue distinctive bilateral 
links with Indonesia in the areas of trade, aid, education and 
culture. 3 Indonesia too had difficulties. However, these were 
enmeshed in an inability for Indonesia to place 'Australia 
naturally into domestic political perspective'. Further, Eldridge 
rather contentiously suggests that this was exacerbated by: 
the unsophistication of the Australian approach, in the 
context of Indonesia's deep-rooted traditional culture, 
her complex experience of colonialism, the struggle to 
achieve national independence and more lately economic 
development from a situation of extreme and deepening 
poverty. 
Matters that were central to his overall theme were then more 
1 	A former schoolmaster from the UK, Eldridge arrived in 1964 
to take up a lectureship at the University of Tasmania. He 
completed his PhD (London School of Economics) in 1967 and 
subsequently published it; The Politics of Foreign Aid in 
India, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1969. 
2 	Eldridge, P.J., "Australian Aid to Indonesia: Diplomacy or 
Development?", Australian Outlook, Vol.25, No.2, August 
1971; "Indonesia and Australia", Australian Neighbours, 
September-October 1971. 
3 	Eldridge, P.J., "Indonesia and Australia", p.5. 
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convincingly canvassed: Indonesia and Australia relations, while 
superficial, had 'achieved a more concrete level of understanding 
in the development of economic relations than in the political' 
arena; cultural relations would prove the most evasive, if for no 
other reason than for a country to consider this level of contact 
is 'to consider what level of shared meanings might be possible... 
To bridge the gap requires a high level of empathy - a quality for 
which Australians are perhaps not internationally famous...'. 1 
This argument may not have been new -- various academics and 
journalists had expressed similar views in the context of 
Australia-Asia relations before -- but Eldridge was edging in a new 
direction with his contention that 'There is evidence that when 
talking of cultural relations, Indonesians are a great deal more 
concerned with human and practical aspects than Australians'. 2 
Eldridge was disturbed by the 'lack of any credible historical 
dimension in the formulation of official attitudes to Indonesia'. 
Moreover, relations with Suharto's government seemed to be a 
reaction to the Sukarno era, and conditioned by the influence of a 
hangover from the cold war -- not good ingredients for a meaningful 
relationship with Suharto. Although Eldridge considered Suharto 
would welcome the uncritical support that marked our role in the 
partnership since the coup, he warned: 
this uncritical support, if coupled with a substantial 
incomprehension of Indonesian society and even a 
hostility, not merely towards certain forces supporting 
the former president [Sukarno] but also in actual 
practice towards certain basic characteristics of that 
society, will in the long-term turn out to be based on 
false expectations . 3 
Yet, Eldridge did consider it appropriate that we continue 
participating in Indonesia's social and economic development. In 
fact, Australia's links with Indonesia in this regard were to 
dominate much of what Eldridge had written in the 1970s on the 
relationship. 4 The philosophical underpinnings here are perhaps 
1 	Ibid., p.7 (writer's own emphasis). 
2 	Eldridge, P.J., "Indonesia and Australia", p.8. 
3 	Ibid., p.9. 
4 	See for example, Eldridge, P.J., "Australian Aid to 
Indonesia: 	Diplomacy or Development?", pp.141-158; 
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less important than with his concern with 'what combination of 
resources and techniques can be fitted into what specific locations 
within the society, economy and administrative apparatus of the 
recipient country'. 1 In attempting to come to grips with this 
problem, Eldridge not only weathers some of the major thrusts of 
Arndt's analyses, but also embraces many of the considerations 
canvassed by Mackie. 
Eldridge, on one level, considered there were a number of 
factors that were of general significance for Australia's 
relationship with Indonesia, which needed to be digested and which 
went beyond the parameters of the Australian aid programme. 2 Like 
Arndt, he noted that a great proportion of Australia's economic 
assistance was allocated to commodity and general import credits. 
Thus, trade promotion was a dominant, self-serving aspect of 
Australian aid policy. 3 However, on the other level, Eldridge 
considered that if Australian aid to Indonesia was to be effective, 
Australia would have to come to terms with the various 
international influences at work in Indonesia, to understand 
Indonesia's internal problems, and take a stronger role in solving 
them. 4 While he does not specifically reflect on how the 
Indonesians themselves might have reacted to such attempts, 
Eldridge suggested that: 
it should not prove impossible to set up a variety of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (in addition to 
straight forward assistance to health, social services 
and education) that enable Indonesia to diversify her 
production, and develop her own technology, skills and 
"Australia's Relations with Indonesia: An Alternative 
Approach", Australian Outlook, Vol.29, No.1, April 1975, 
pp.34-52; "Recent Trends and Issues in Australia-Indonesia 
Relations", Politics, XIII (1), May 1978, pp.42-52; "Aid 
in the end, is a political process", Current Affairs 
Bulletin, 1 February 1979, pp.18-30; Indonesia and 
Australia: the politics of aid and development since 1966, 
pp.1-203. 
1 	Eldridge, P.J., "Diplomacy or Development", p.141. 
2 	Eldridge, P.J., "Diplomacy or Development", p.141 ff. 
3 	Ibid., p.144 (see also Arndt, H.W., "Australian Economic 
Aid to Indonesia", pp.130-132). 
4 	Ibid., p.151 ff, p.157. 
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capacities to a greater extent. 1 
Eldridge quite correctly considered Australia's aid programme to 
have been too Australia-centric. Thus, while maintaining due 
regard for Indonesia's sovereignty, Australia would have to make 
certain social and economic choices in order to give the aid its 
proper scope. In the final analysis, this would enable Indonesia 
to diversify its production, and develop its own technology, skills 
and capabilities. 2 Moreover, and in an argument that reflected 
many of the frustrations inherent in Mackie's arguments, Eldridge 
considered that much of this penetration on Australia's part would 
depend on an aid program that was development-oriented in its 
priorities, and on the need to establish direct links with those 
organizations in Indonesia which were specifically concerned with 
Australian funded projects. 3 
Eldridge maintained these arguments throughout the 1970s. 4 
However, he deviated in 1975 and 1978, with two articles in the 
academic press which were, in effect, responses to the growing 
discontent within Australia about Australia's relations with 
Indonesia, 5 and the East Timor crisis of 1975-77. 6 Of particular 
concern to Eldridge in the first, was the nature of the Suharto 
regime and its domestic policies -- a situation which, he argued, 
should have been disapproved or resisted by Australia. In the 
second, he focused on the East Timor issue, highlighting the 
diplomatic tensions caused by, what was now, a clash in political 
cultures. 
Mackie had approached these problems in two major papers which 
he published in Australian Outlook in 1974. 7 Aware of the doubts 
1 	Ibid., p.157. 
2 	Ibid., p.148-149. 
3 	Eldridge, P.J., "Diplomacy or Development", p.158. 
4 	See, in particular, Eldridge, P.J., "Aid, in the end, is a 
political process", and Indonesia and Australia: 	The 
Politics of aid and development since 1966 (1979). 
5 	Eldridge, P.J., "An Alternative Approach", pp.34-52. 
6 	Eldridge, P.J., "Recent Trends and Issues", pp.42-52. 
7 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Principles and Policies: 	I" (April), 
pp.3-14, Principles and policies II (August), pp.168-178. 
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and misgivings that were emerging within Australia at the time, and 
of calls for the Australian Government to step back from its close 
association with the 'New Order' Government, Mackie set out to take 
account of four basic principles he believed should underwrite 
Australia's relationship with Indonesia. 1 First, 'Australia can no 
longer afford to pursue policies which entail any substantial risk 
of seriously antagonizing Indonesia'. Second, Australia should not 
become 'too closely associated with a particular government or... 
faction within any Indonesian government'. Third, the 'tendency to 
think about Australia's relations with Indonesia in purely 
bilateral terms' should be minimized. Fourth, in formulating long-
term policy goals, Australia needed 'to think much more in terms of 
the political dynamics of the regional international system' and be 
less preoccupied with security and "threats from the north' which 
have dominated so much of our thinking about Indonesia and other 
Asian countries since 1945'. 2 
Discounting a policy of reducing Australia's foreign aid to 
Indonesia, to signal 'our moral disapproval and possibly to exact 
some leverage on the Indonesian Government in the direction of 
reform', as unrealistic, 3 Mackie proceeded to illustrate other ways 
in which Australia could exert some influence on the Indonesian 
Government, one important aspect that had tended to be overlooked 
by other observers. In what was a fusion between critical 
understandings of both Australian and Indonesia political 
processes, within a wider framework of international relations, 
Mackie sought to find a position between the moral question raised 
in cutting aid, or at least military aid, and the realpolitik 
arguments related to Indonesia's historical and contemporary 
importance to Australia. Underlying this task were the moral and 
1 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Principles and Policies: I", p.3. These 
feelings found expression in: Mortimer, R., Showcase State; 
articles written in 1973 by former Liberal Minister Don 
Chipp, and published in the Age (see earlier); and 
publications, in.Australia, by Professor Herb Feith (see 
earlier) and overseas, by TAPOL, the periodic publication 
by the British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian 
Political Prisoners (London), on political prisoners and 
other forms of political repression. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Principles and Policies: II", pp.168-169. 
3 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Principles and Policies: I", p.4. 
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political dilemmas posed by a decade and a half of successive 
Australian Governments and diplomats in Jakarta in: 
building up personal and institutional links with men at 
the highest levels of the Indonesian government.., for as 
the political base of the regime narrowed, the close 
association with it of our official representatives has 
been regarded in some circles in Jakarta, whether rightly 
or wrongly, as excessively partisan and tantamount to our 
bestowing full endorsement and support upon the generals, 
regardless of the policies they are pursuing. 1 
Yet, for Mackie, these links were crucial, and because of the state 
of political life in Jakarta, this had meant cultivating links with 
those closest to the centre of power -- the Indonesian military 
leaders. To cut off military aid would be one step toward cutting 
off access to, and limiting political influence within, the 
Indonesian State. As Mackie contended: 
One of the singular features of the political system 
there is the degree to which power has become so narrowly 
concentrated at the centre and the operations of 
government.., so highly personalized, opaque and shut off 
from public scrutiny that it is necessary to have 
influential connections simply to find out what is going 
on, quite apart from getting things done. 2 
Nevertheless, Mackie urged Australia to use these links to put 
'quiet, persistent pressure on the Indonesian Government to 
liberalism its policies and broaden its political base'. Further, 
through personal and institutional links, Mackie contended that 
there was scope to put pressure for 'a more equitable distribution 
of the benefits of economic development', and to make 
representations over 'issues like political detainees, the 
limitations of press freedom, blatant corruption and the 
outrageously widening gap between rich and poor'. 
Further, and an important observation in view of subsequent 
writings on Australia-Indonesia relations: 
the government should do something to signalise[sic] our 
Mackie, J.A.C., "Principles and Policies: II", p.175. 
2 	Ibid., p.177. Mackie expressed this point often to the 
writer: Canberra, November 1980, Brisbane, September 1983, 
Canberra, January 1984. It must be said that Mackie also 
argued that to cut military aid would be a 'small price to 
pay (and a morally unobjectionable one) if it helps us to 
obtain significant political leverage that we would 
otherwise lack'. (Ibid., pp.177-178; these same sentiments 
were expressed in personal discussions between Mackie and 
the author). 
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uneasiness about the trend of recent events in Indonesia, 
but this should be done indirectly and at a more 
fundamental level by elaborating on the underlying 
rationale of the policies we are pursuing there, which 
must be couched in terms that are broader and more 
positive than merely cultivating Indonesia's friendship 
out of a vague feeling that we must keep on good terms 
with her. 1 
While Eldridge conceded that Mackie's views at this crucial period 
in Australia-Indonesia relations provided: 
an important framework within which emerging policy 
assumptions could be evaluated, ... it can under no 
circumstances be conceded ... that any one-sided 
relationship in Indonesia's favour and lacking in 
mutuality is inevitable or that no significant 
alternative to current policies can be conceived. 2 
For Eldridge, Australia's Indonesian policy seemed to have been 
consistent with the guidelines laid down by Mackie -- expressing 
criticisms of Indonesian affairs 'discreetly and in private' -- 
however, he asserted that this amounted 'to a fairly paralysing 
blend of lack of imagination and gutlessness'. 3 
Highly critical of the imbalance between the moral issues at 
stake here and overpowering joint Australian-Indonesian economic, 
political and military interests, Eldridge contended that pressure 
still could be brought to bear on Indonesia through diplomatic, 
social, cultural, business and professional channels, at both the 
bilateral and multilateral levels. However, he argued that 
although Australia and Indonesia would always be involved in a 
close relationship with each other, this need not always entail 
common or even compatible interests. Thus, positive steps needed 
to be taken to ensure an equality in the relationship. 
This included reassessing the granting of military aid, and 
the exchange of intelligence information on one level, while on 
another, stepping up campaigning for legal rights and scrutinizing 
a continuing economic assistance programme with a view to a greater 
redistribution of wealth. 4 In the regional arena Eldridge 
advocated the strengthening of diplomatic ties with small nations, 
1 	Ibid., p.178. 
2 	Eldridge, P.J., "An Alternative Approach", p.35. 
3 	Ibid., pp.34-35. 
4 	Ibid., p.36 ff. 
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and that 'Indonesian membership of any Southeast Pacific 
Association should be made conditional on Australian membership of 
ASEAN or some equally substantial quid pro quoi. 1 
Clearly, Eldridge was now not as constrained as Mackie in 
stressing the assumption of the importance of access and influence 
within the Australia-Indonesia relationship. In effect, however, 
Eldridge, rather naively, considered that Mackie's concern with 
this loss of influence was a basic weakness to his overall approach 
to the relationship. 2 Moreover, as Eldridge considered this 
approach tended, in most important respects, to '...coincide with 
the general drift of current policy and opinion with the Department 
of Foreign Affairs', 3 it was also a weakness at these levels, too. 
In a rejoiner, 4 Mackie considered that Eldridge's 'alternative 
approach' reflected a total disregard for Australia's national 
interests and the objectives of Australian foreign policy in the 
light of these interests. Further, he challenged Eldridge's policy 
prescriptions, arguing that they 'would merely create a 
gratuitously provocative and unnecessary adversary relationship 
with Indonesia, solely for the sake of demonstrating our higher 
moral principles, as we see them'. He was scathing in responding 
to Eldridge's notions of equal footing in ASEAN, strengthening 
regional ties and cutting military aid, suggesting he was riding 
'roughshod over the 'subtleties of Asian politics and culture', 
was unrealistic in talking of constructing a cordon sanitaire  
against Indonesia, and of scrapping 'incidental prospects of our 
policy like military and intelligence cooperation'. 5 
While there was no disagreement over the facts on which the 
analyses of Mackie and Eldridge were based, there were divergent 
interpretations. However, if there was one overriding theme that 
1 	Ibid, p. 51. 
2 	Eldridge, P.J., "An Alternate Approach", p.44. 
3 	Ibid., p.35. 
4 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Australia's Relations with Indonesia, A 
Comment", Australian Outlook, Vol.29, No.1, April 1975, 
p.109. 
5 	Ibid. 
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emerged from the arguments of both academics it was related to the 
valid observation: 
that internal political developments in Indonesia are not 
merely of humanitarian or ideological concern from a 
friendly outside standpoint, but must affect the shape of 
Indonesia's relations with the region, thus impinging on 
Australia's interests and very probably her domestic 
politics. 1 
Fundamental to the writings of both Mackie and Eldridge was the 
tenable notion that Australia was now compelled to respond to the 
moral issues at stake, quickly and without stepping back into the 
preoccupations engendered in our history and without embracing old 
racist attitudes and slogans related to 'threats from the north'. 
Many of these themes also concerned Bruce Grant who took a 
stance similar to that of Mackie. Between 1965 and 1973, when he 
became Australia's Ambassador to India, Bruce Grant was a regular 
commentator in the Age (Melbourne) on Australian defence and 
foreign policy, as well as a significant contributor to 
international conferences on international relations issues 
generally. In the late 1960s, Grant was a significant contributor 
to attempts to define and delineate Australia's national interests 
in a number of areas -- in foreign affairs and defence, in trade 
policy, in considerations of resources development, in policy on 
foreign investment in Australia and in Australian investment 
abroad. However, it was to defence and foreign policy, and 
Australia's relations with Asia, that Grant directed much of his 
intellectual energy. 
Grant's energy found expression during this period in his book 
Crisis of Loyalty, in which he effectively flayed much of the myth 
and rhetoric away from past Australian foreign policies, 
effectively exposing the inadequate way in which they were 
fashioned. 2 Grant also proceeded to give a general outline of 
future foreign policy objectives. Against this background, Grant 
incorporated a significant chapter on Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia3 and, instructively, described the Asian nation as 
1 	Eldridge, P.J., "An Alternative Approach", p.52. 
2 	Grant, B., Crisis of Loyalty, pp.3-6. 
3 	This chapter entitled 'Australia and Indonesia', was 
presented to the Conference on 'Australia and Indonesia', 
held at the Australian National University. (Canberra) on 
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having been a major factor in Australia's international relations 
since the Second World War in three ways. First, it set a number 
of tests for Australian foreign policy, which tended to avoid an 
antagonistic relationship. Second, it gave substance to what has 
long been called 'the threat from the north'. Third, the 
Indonesian 'cause' -- 'An effort ... to understand the 'idea' of 
Indonesia in a way which has not been done by Australia in respect 
of any other country' -- had captured the minds of scholars, 
writers and diplomats in Australia in a fashion: 
similar to that exercised on the British imagination by 
the Arab world in the first half of this century. 
Although each may be called romantic, the difference is 
obvious and revealing. While the cause of the Arabs 
appealed to the military and politically right-wing 
tendencies in British character, the fate of Indonesia 
has attracted the pacificist ((feminine?) 1 ) and 
politically left-wing tendencies in Australia character. 
While the Arab cause was especially interesting to 
British soldiers, scholars and writers who admire 
military virtues, the Indonesian cause has been 
especially interesting to Australian diplomats, and to 
writers and scholars attracted to the arts of 
peacemaking. 2 
Within this framework, Grant identified two elements in Australian 
foreign policy and public attitudes that had given rise to tension 
in the relationship. Australia has wanted Indonesia to be a 
successful, stable and prosperous nation, yet has not wanted that 
country to become dominant in Southeast Asia. Thus, Britain and 
America were used by Australia to keep her in balance with 
Indonesia. As Grant correctly affirmed: 
During the two main tests of will - the West Irian 
dispute and confrontation with Malaysia - the attitudes 
of these two powers were crucial. Failure to get their 
support on the first meant a failure for Australian 
foreign policy; on the second, their support meant 
success.' 
By the early 1970s, however, Grant considered events of September 
18-21 May 1970. 
1 	The word 'feminine', appearing in the version of the paper 
Grant gave at the ANU Conference, was deleted in the book, 
Crisis of Loyalty, p.83. 
2 	Grant, B., Crisis of Loyalty, p.83. 
3 	Ibid., pp.84 and 89. 
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1965, the rise of the 'New Order' and the subsequent receding of 
Australian fears of a dominant Indonesia had paved the way for 
confident state-to-state relations, and an Australian policy that 
was directed towards ensuring a prosperous and stable Indonesia. 
More importantly, however: 
it seems self-evident that a security capacity of any 
kind for Australia in Southeast Asia is impossible 
without the assent of Indonesia. This was not needed 
before ... it was possible to engage in various kinds of 
commitments without Indonesia's blessing ...[now] the 
intransigence of geography makes Indonesia's cooperation 
necessary. 1 
Clearly, Grant was observing an Australia in which the prospect of 
a complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia on the part of its 
traditional allies was raising some very fundamental questions. 
Australia, for the first time, was facing an identity crisis, 
uncertain of what political and military assets they had in Asia, 
and whether they had any role to play in Asia at all. As Grant 
argued in 1970 -- and something of which Indonesia was well aware - 
- a new policy had to be found, based not on power to contain but 
on a reciprocal willingness to find a balance in Asia. 2 
Like Grant, Hastings was conscious of these broader strategic 
concerns and the tension in Australia's budding relationship with 
Indonesia. A significant contributor to this debate, Hastings, 
however, focused his analysis upon specific issue areas. His 
articles in the Australian and later in the Sydney Morning Herald  
were accurate and incisive expositions of developments within the 
Indonesian Republic. On a broader scale, Hastings was concerned 
with issues related to Indonesia's socio-economic and political 
orientations during the mid-to-late 1960s (see earlier in the press 
debate). However, it was the foreign policy arena in particular, 
and specifically, the West Irian issue, which dominated Hastings' 
intellectual efforts both in the national press and the academic 
1 	Ibid., p.89. 
2 	Grant, B., "Australia at the Crossroads", Pacific Community, 
I (3), April 1970, pp.440-450. See also "Toward a New 
Balance in Asia. An Australian View", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol.47 (4), July 1969, pp.711-720, and "Australia's Defence 
Policy", Ouadrant, Vol.14 (1), January/February 1969, 
pp.37-41. 
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press. 
Writing in the wake of the recently conducted 'Act of Free 
Choice' in West New Guinea (see Chapter Three), Hastings saw West 
Irian and Papua New Guinea, each with different political 
destinies, as not only having an impact on each other but also as 
having the potential to 'create problems of a special nature in the 
management of Australia-Indonesia relations'. 2 With West Irian now 
part of the Indonesian Republic and Papua New Guinea still an 
Australian colonial dependency, problems were bound to arise, 
particularly as major changes in the status of Papua New Guinea 
were envisaged before the mid-1970s. Within this framework, 
Hastings argued that relations between these two parts of New 
Guinea would be influenced by three factors. First, by the rapid 
economic development of Papua New Guinea, and its commensurate rise 
in affluence. In essence: 
Too great a disparity in economic development rates over 
a period of increasing literacy and availability of 
information, is bound to make conditions on one side of 
the border appear more attractive to people on the other 
[thus] ... economic development for West Irian is not 
only desirable in itself but will help drain off tensions 
which otherwise find overt political expression. 3 
Second, relations could be influenced by the effects in West Irian 
of Papua New Guinea's independence and, third, by the politics of 
an independent Papua New Guinea. 
The second of these problems, in particular, concerned 
Hastings, with the elders of West Irian reminded of promises once 
made to them of an independent future and the younger generation 
deprived of the fruits of that independence. Thus, Hastings argued 
for limitations on contact between the Papua New Guineans and 
For example see, Hastings, P., "West Irian - 1969: The end 
of the line...?", New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and 
Southeast Asia - September/October 1968, pp.12-22; and 
"West Irian - Papua New Guinea: Problems for Djakarta - 
Canberra Relations", New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific 
and Southeast Asia - June/July 1970, pp.64-70. The latter 
paper was presented at the "Australia and Indonesia" 
Conference held at the ANU (Canberra) on 18-21 May 1971. 
2 	Hastings, P., "Problems for Djakarta-Canberra Relations", 
p.64. 
3 	Hastings, P., "Problems for Djakarta-Canberra Relations", 
p.67. 
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Irianese. This would include the discouragement of exchange visits 
during the period leading up to Papua New Guinea's independence, 
essentially to prevent unrest among the Irianese who would, in 
effect, be seeing unrestrained political decision making among 
fellow Melanesians across the border) Although these were 
hypothetical scenarios, Hastings contended they would all be marked 
by a high degree of unpredictability, calling for sensitive and 
close cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. 
5. 	Conclusions of the Academics  
This survey of these more important writings highlights a 
number of features of the academic interest in, and treatment of, 
issues arising from the Australia-Indonesia relationship. First, 
research on the relationship was limited, and it lacked continuity, 
particularly in the 1960s. This is surprising in view of the 
interest that developments in Indonesia's domestic and, to a lesser 
degree, foreign policies were beginning to generate in other 
arenas, especially the press. 
Second, when studies focusing on these developments began to 
emerge, the work of scholars in the social sciences (political 
science or related fields) not only paralleled the emergence of 
radical scholarship that questioned conservative thinking on the 
nature of development in the Third World, but saw this research 
concentrate increasingly on Indonesia as a major case in point. 
This inevitably led to a questioning of considerations -- whether 
diplomatic, commercial or humanitarian -- underwriting Australia's 
Indonesia policies, not least those which related to economic 
assistance. Nevertheless, the few economists like Arndt who 
contributed to the wider debate accepted the framework and 
substance of such policies. 
Arnst was, as an economist, primarily concerned with the 
economic effect of aid in the recipient country; in more instances 
than most, this was Indonesia. Within this context he was a strong 
advocate of the importance, essentially to the donor country, of 
building links between this aid and the export of goods, and with 
overseas investment. Arndt was never, in fact, one to deny his 
Ibid. 
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strong belief in this doctrine. 1 The point that stands out in all 
of Arndt's writings was the fact that in relation to the role of 
aid generally in the alleviation of poverty and economic 
development, he held firmly to the view that in terms of overcoming 
poverty the first task was the attainment of optimum economic 
growth; only when this had been done could any substantial, 
structural attacks on poverty be begun. Arndt was also a strong 
believer in the ability of 'the market', unfettered by government 
interference, to deliver the maximum benefit to the maximum number 
of people. 
However, more importantly, Arndt had not only carved out an 
intellectual niche for himself and his ideas in the academic arena, 
but also in government 2 and business circles 3 and among 
non-government organizations. 4 While it is difficult to assess the 
effect his evaluations in these areas had in other than broad 
terms, it can be argued that his doctrines did little to throw 
light on the social and political implications of aid in general 
and specifically on Australia's aid to Indonesia. Eldridge, on the 
other hand, focused specifically on these implications, as did 
Mortimer, Feith5 and Mackie. While the former began to effectively 
examine the official rationale behind Australia's aid in general, 
1 	Arndt, H.W., 'Australian Foreign Aid Policy', 31st Joseph 
Fisher Memorial Lecture, 1964, in H.W. Arndt, (ed.), A Small  
Rich Industrial Country; and "Australian Economic Aid to 
Indonesia", p.132 ff. See especially p.139 where he saw 
distinct advantages arising from the Tjilatjap industrial 
estate project, calling it a "marriage of official aid and 
private investment". 
2 	See for example, "Aid and the Official Conscience", 
Australian Ouarterly, Vol. 41, No.4, December 1969, pp.43-48. 
3 	"The Indonesian Economy: Problems and Opportunities for 
Australia", in H.W. Arndt, (ed.), A Small Rich Industrial  
Country, pp.218-227. (The Chartered Secretaries Research 
Lecture (1968)). 
4 	Arndt attended ACFOA seminars in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. See for example, Minogue, N., "Report of Seminar 
Organized by Australian Council for Overseas Aid in August 
1970", Mimeo., 22 September 1970. 
5 	See for example Feith's paper, "Growth and Development in 
Asia: Some Criticisms of Conventional Approaches", ACFOA 
Research and Information Service, No.3/73, Canberra, 1973. 
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his call for greater Australian involvement tended to underestimate 
the difficulties of access and influence stressed by Mackie. 
Mortimer's analysis was more brutal. He not only rejected the 
W.W. Rostow school of thought on development, but also Australia's, 
and in particular Arndt's, role in that process. While he conceded 
he was aware of the achievements made in economic growth in 
Indonesia in the early 1970s, Mortimer was more concerned with what 
he considered was of far more importance: the way that growth was 
being achieved, and its social and political legacies. This 
enabled Mortimer to reject not only the official assumptions 
underwriting Australia's aid policy but one of its strongest 
adherents, H.W. Arndt who, Mortimer asserted, typified: 
the vices of developmentalism in a fairly extreme form. 
He is strongly technocratic in orientation, a 
wholehearted believer in the virtues of growth, and 
closely identified with the policies of his own 
government and of those Southeast Asian regimes which 
operate according to the economic principles he 
favours.... 1 
While it would seem that Mackie trod a fine line between these 
extreme positions he was fully aware of their underlying premises. 
What concerned him, however, was what he considered to be the 
gratuitous and moralizing stance inherent in this dissenting 
opinion within Australia on Indonesian issues. 2 Predominantly 
concerned, within an international relations context, with broader 
questions of national interest, Mackie placed great emphasis on the 
importance of access and influence in the successful conduct of the 
Australia-Indonesia relationship. While this view paralleled 
official views in Canberra, Mackie advocated the use of such links 
to subtlely place pressure on the Indonesian Government to 
liberalise its policies in the face of criticism that emanated not 
only from within Australia but also the international arena. This 
argument makes a great deal of sense, and would have a greater 
chance of success in bridging the political and socio-cultural 
barriers between the two countries than any grandstanding gesture, 
including the reduction, if not cessation, of economic and military 
Mortimer, R., "Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholarship", 
p.177. 
2 	This observation emerged often in the many personal 
discussions the writer had with Professor Mackie throughout 
the 1980s. 
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aid. 
Two aspects of the academic community's role in the national 
debate had particular significance. First, while the strong 
ideological orientation of the discussion was responsible for a 
widening division within this small grouping, it did provide the 
theoretical framework in which Australia's Indonesia policies were 
increasingly discussed in other forums, including the press and 
Parliament, as noted in the preceding Chapters. Second, while the 
writings of these scholars were attempts to raise the level of 
public awareness of the issues involved, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the timing or substance of government policy was 
affected by their actions as a 'group'. However, individuals  
within the 'group' (notably Arndt and Mackie) might well have 
influenced policy, because of their contacts and status, and the 
kinds of policies they espoused. 
Non-government Lobby Groups' 
The second category of opinions and attitudes of relevance 
here came from those groups which were assembled for purposes other 
than those that centred on issues related to Indonesia, or to 
Australia's relations with that country. However, as with the 
unorganized individuals that could also make up this category, 2 a 
partial identity was shared due to their occasional interest in 
these broad Indonesian matters. The purpose here is only to 
identify these groups and individuals, rather than provide an 
exhaustive analysis of their emergence and interests. In doing so, 
it is with a view to, first, characterizing their perceptions of 
Indonesia, together with their major premises regarding Australia's 
position in regional affairs. Second, this will provide a backdrop 
to an examination of this same category of opinions and attitudes 
during the 1975-80 period. 
There are two major groups in this category -- non-government aid 
Groups whose interests in Indonesian issues and Australia-
Indonesia relations were peripheral to their major 
activities. 
2 	It was decided not to extend the study to this disparate 
group as it was considered, on an examination of selected 
writings and commentaries, that it would have had only a 
minimal impact on the domestic debate or on policy. 
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agencies and Non Government Organizations (NG0s) 1 , which includes 
the churches, the trade union movement, and the Returned Services 
League (RSL). Each group had a varying degree of interest in 
Indonesian matters during the 1950s through to the mid-1960s, 2 and 
this study examines whether or not, in the changed circumstances of 
post-coup Indonesia, these interests were sustained. 
1. Non Government Aid Agencies  
Since the 1960s, the number of groups in Australia that have 
taken an interest in overseas aid has risen dramatically. Of the 
groups established, over thirty were to become members of the 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACF0A), 3 including the main 
church-based aid groups, major non-church agencies and a number of 
professional and community groups. Their activities varied, with 
non-church groups mainly involved in raising funds and delivering 
programmes of aid. While the professional organizations maintained 
a specialized interest in aid, the community groups had an 
ancillary, although serious, commitment to aid. 
In domestic terms, the importance of the ACFOA membership lay 
in its representation, by the early 1970s, of significant sections 
of the Australian community, both in numbers and in terms of 
The roles of NGOs and aid agencies are examined in Eldridge, 
P.J., Indonesia and Australia, pp.121-155. The NGOs can 
vary in size and structure: groups may be small and set up 
to assist a specific project that has mobilized interest at 
the community level, for example the resettlement of 
refugees. Other groups or agencies are set up with the 
specific purpose of raising funds from the community and 
delivering aid to Third World communities. Still other 
groups concentrate their resources on raising awareness 
within the Australian community of Third World problems. 
Some organizations fall into one of two categories -- relief 
or development agencies. While the former attempt to be 
politically neutral and concentrate their response on 
meeting the requirements of victims of natural or man-made 
disasters, the latter direct their attention to long-term 
projects such as medical and education programmes, and 
agricultural schemes, and unlike the relief agencies, find 
it difficult to avoid political involvement. Yet, many 
agencies acknowledge the important role the political 
process has in development and accept the implications. 
2 	Viviani examines their respective roles during this period 
in her PhD thesis, "Australian Attitudes and Policies 
towards Indonesia", pp.120-129. 
3 	Eldridge, P.J., Indonesia and Australia, p.121. 
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influence on official policy. Through their field officers and 
counterpart organizations, ACFOA members were able to cast a wide 
net in their search for information on the mounting problems facing 
Third World countries. This process provided a framework of 
knowledge upon which discussion and deliberation within the NGO 
system was based. It also provided a basis for subsequent 
representation to government. 1 
Thus, the importance of these groups, whether in ACFOA or not, 
can be overstated, particularly as they developed views and 
attempted to mobilize government interest in relation to Indonesian 
issues. As Eldridge observed, they: 
provide[d] an alternative focus on development issues to 
that offered by government and business leaders ... 
present[ing] their ideas in a simple and popular form to 
fairly influential sections of Australian public opinion. 
Through contacts with the politicians, academics, trade 
unionists, student, church and other groups they have 
contributed towards forming an articulate minority of 
often dissenting opinion on policy towards Indonesia. 2 
In more general terms, one of their major concerns has been to 
transmit issues raised by the Third World back to the Australian 
Government and public. This process paralleled the growing 
economic and political power of this bloc of countries and its main 
aim has been to mobilize the political will in countries like 
Australia to support a more just international distribution of 
resources. However, this concern with justice and poverty was 
often matched by concerns over questions on human rights. And it 
was human rights issues, such as those that were engendered in the 
East Timor issue, which were to place a strain on this aid 
agency-government-public opinion nexus . 3 
The interest of aid agencies in the colony of East Timor was 
1 	Personal interview with Foreign Affairs official. 
2 	Eldridge, P.J., Indonesia and Australia, p.121. 
3 	Australian aid agencies were strong and unequivocal in their 
early opposition to Indonesia's actions in East Timor. A 
close examination of public opinion polls and the annual 
debate of ACFOA -- whose major members at the time included 
Community Aid Abroad (CAA), Australian Volunteers Abroad 
(AVA), Action for World Development (AWD), World Vision and 
the Australian Council of Churches (ACC) -- in the period 
following the invasion provides evidence that on such an 
issue the aid agencies reflected a very widespread public 
view (this is examined in Chapter Ten). 
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first aroused through the original and broader issue of Portuguese 
colonialism. In the early 1970s, in conjunction with the World 
Council of Churches (WCC), student l and church groups supported UN 
resolutions calling on the Portuguese administration to allow 
self-determination for all of its colonies. By the time the new 
Whitlam government had come to power, this interest had gained 
momentum, stirred by a complaint in the Australian Financial  
Review2 that two major Australian Companies -- BHP and TAA -- had 
been actively involved in dealings with the Portuguese colony, and 
it seemed likely that they had broken the UN resolutions, at that 
time supported by the Whitlam government. Within days, Action for 
World Development (AWD), with a handful of other ACFOA members, had 
called for the severing of all economic links with East Timor. 
They were soon joined in their protests by a number of Catholic 
Bishops who announced a subsequent tour of Australia by a 
Portuguese delegation, which was in Australia to promote trade. 
At the same time, another issue was taking an increasing grip 
on the agencies, and this related to an examination of, on one 
level, the role and activities of development aid in Third World 
countries and, on another, the development strategy being pursued 
by the Suharto government in Indonesia. The former caused some 
members within ACFOA to view their activities as needing to effect 
a balance between informing public opinion within Australia about 
some of the fundamental questions concerning development issues and 
their work in the field. The latter gave rise to a level of debate 
that not only embraced the dissenting views of Mortimer and Feith, 
but also broadened to focus on human rights, embroiling political 
parties, churches, the Australian press and the trade union 
movement. 
These seeds for support were fertilized within months of the 
1 	In 1968, the then National Union of Australian University 
Students commissioned and published a report by John Diment, 
a Sydney postgraduate student who had spent some time on the 
island. He considered the resolutions adopted by the UNGA 
at the end of 1966 were not without justifications: the 
resolutionS reaffirmed the right to self-determination for 
the peoples of Portuguese colonies, condemned Portuguese 
Government economic and political exploitation and 
violations against these people and called on other states 
to give them 'the moral and material support' they needed 
to overcome Portuguese domination. See Diment, J., "Timor 
- Oppressive Anachronism", National U, 22 July 1968, p.7. 
2 	Australian Financial Review, 15 May 1973. 
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emergence of the three political parties in East Timor in 1974. 
Ramos Horta established early links with Action for World 
Development in particular. Whitlam's meeting with Suharto in 
September, and his subsequent statement that they agreed that an 
independent East Timor was 'unviable', galvanized many aid agencies 
into activity. They then embarked on a campaign which promoted the 
East Timor cause for self-determination. The civil war in East 
Timor in August gave rise to concern within ACFOA, in particular, 
for the safety of the East Timorese people and it was soon, 
'together with the Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET) 
and the Australia-East Timor Association[,]... at the centre of 
pressure on the Australian Government over the Timor issue'. 1 
While ACFOA found strength in broad support for its campaign 
from the Australian churches, divisions were to arise within this 
element of emerging opinion on East Timor. 
NGOs  
• Churches2 
The Australian Council of Churches (ACC) had formed strong 
ties with the Indonesia Council of Churches following the founding 
of the latter organization in 1950. While the aims of this liaison 
were a concern for: 
• unity, service and mission ... it has been probably in 
the area of unity that the Council has produced the least 
creative results and the least creative thinking ... Too 
much discussion has been among confessional groups in the 
West while the main problem in realizing unity of the 
Church in Indonesia is how to unite the various 
'folk-churches' with their different cultural, 
linguistic, and to some extent confessional backgrounds 
at a time when the various ethnic groups in Indonesia are 
together involved in the process of nation building and 
modernization. 3 
While the response of the churches, through their statements and 
through direct mediation, always stressed their 'ministry of 
1 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue: II", p.249. 
2 	The author is grateful to the Archbishop of Brisbane (Sir 
John Grindrod), Rev. W. Stratford of the Queensland 
Ecumenical Council of Churches, and Ms J. Skuse of the ACC 
(Sydney) for their assistance in gathering information and 
documents relating to the ACC's activities. 
3 	ACC, "Indonesia", pamphlet produced by the Division of World 
Christian Action (ACC), NSW, 1972, pp.4-5. 
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reconciliation, appealing for mutual forgiveness, mutual respect 
and cooperation with regard to the future development of 
Indonesia', this nexus between culture and the processes of 
modernization were to be of major concern to the churches 
throughout the 1970s. This was paralleled however by an increasing 
awareness that: 
Indonesians are somewhat disillusioned and disappointed 
because the problem of development and modernization has 
not resolved itself very fast. 
Within this climate of feeling and thinking on the part of the 
church was 'a growing sense of urgency' that resolution be reached 
quickly, coupled with a desire that the church be 'politically 
relevant.., to cope with the hopes and aspirations of the people in 
a positive, critical, creative and realistic way'. 
Thus, the problems for the churches in relation to Indonesia 
were considered to be set in how they could: 
be integrated into the emerging modern Indonesian culture 
and at the same time how to penetrate the value system 
and the political, social and economic structures with 
insights based on the Christian faith / but acceptable to 
all because of their intrinsic truth.' 
This Christian faith, however, was to be put to the test as issues 
related to human rights, in particular Indonesia's political 
prisoners, became a most acute problem. This was exacerbated by 
debate, within the churches, related to Australia's defence aid to 
Indonesia after 1972. By 1974, the churches had expressed concern 
over these two growing issues, through written papers 2 and the 
signing of petitions. 
• 	Trade Unions  
Although individual trade unions were signatories to such 
petitions, the Australian Trade Union movement showed little public 
concern with the course of Australia-Indonesia relations, or with 
Indonesian issues in the period from 1966 to 1975. 3 While domestic 
Ibid., pp.5-6. 
2 	For example, see Anonymous, "Australia's Defence Aid to 
Indonesia" in Ibid., pp.1-4 (separate section). 
3 	Specifically, this refers to the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions, as reflected in its bi-annual Congress Agenda, 
Decisions and Minutes, 1965-75. An examination of the 
incomplete records of the ACFU (including The ACTU 
Bulletin), held in the University of Queensland (Fryer 
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issues dominated the agenda at each ACTU Congress, particularly 
economic and industrial matters, debate and resolutions in the 
area of international affairs, were dominated by the Vietnam war, 
conscription and compulsory military training, nuclear testing, 
South Africa and peace. 1 
While Indonesian issues were not raised by any trade union on 
the agenda of any congress in the late 1960s up until 1977, 2 there 
was a strong feeling of fellow-feeling for their Asian counterparts 
in the area of working conditions and standards of living. In 
1973, the ACTU Congress recognized the need to provide a solution 
to the problems facing workers in the Southeast Asian area and 
recommended support be given to the Voluntary Aid Agencies, and 
requests to the Federal Government for a dollar for dollar grant. 
Moreover, it resolved to raise funds to go towards the 
strengthening of trade union organizations in Southeast Asia, and 
called on the Australian Government to identify and quantify aid 
projects in developing countries which could receive Australian 
Trade Union Movement assistance, through local organizations, in 
these areas. 3 
While the unions (especially the waterside unions) had been at 
the forefront of the movement in the 1940s to have the Australian 
Chifley Government support the Indonesian nationalist movement 
during the revolution, 4 from this sketch, it seems clear that as a 
bloc of public opinion, the Australian Trade Union Movement during 
this period was more concerned with domestic issues, and the status 
of the workers (in Australia and abroad). There were, however, 
individual unions willing to put their weight behind criticism on 
some Indonesia issues. In 1965-66, the Seaman's Union spoke out 
Library) and the Trades Hall (South Brisbane), revealed no 
mention of these issues. 
1 	Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), "Consolidation 
of ACTU Policy Decisions, 1951-80", Document No. D46-80, 
(Industrial Printing and Publicity Co. Ltd., 1980), pp.3-4. 
2 	The ACTU Executive took decision on East Timor in November 
1975, and February 1976. See ACTU, Executive Report (for 
consideration by The Australian Congress of Trade Unions, 
1977), pp.6-7. 
3 	ACTU, Decisions, September 1973, pp.16-17. 
4 	George, M., Australia and the Indonesian Revolution, pp.36- 
37. 
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against the events taking place in Indonesia in the wake of the 
coup, while the issue of political prisoners in 1974 attracted 
support from the left and the right of the union movement. 
Nevertheless, no single union was to put a resolution on any of 
these issues at any intervening annual congress. 
• 	Returned Services League (RSL)  
The final group examined here is the RSL. Originally 
established to protect the interests of Australian ex-servicemen 
and women, the organization established itself in the Australian 
community, and became an important and influential pressure group 
in the 19505 and 1960s under conservative governments. It became 
deeply enmeshed in national politics during this period on a wave 
of strong nationalism and bitter anti-communism, both at home and 
abroad, and became a strong campaigner on foreign and defence 
policy matters. 1 In view of this rise to prominence, Teichmann 
considered: 
the RSL's ready access to the inner councils of 
conservative governments, their close links with serving 
officers for whom they acted as an indispensable lobby, 
their monopolistic control of patriotic economies[sic] 
and their pre-emptive assertion of special links with the 
Monarchy and the Established Churches all conspired to 
make them a pressure group and veto group to be reckoned 
with in any decisions or dialogues concerning their 
averred interest. The press treated them at all times 
with utter deference. 2 
Indonesian issues were often viewed within the context of a strong 
anti-communism. This was particularly evident from recommendations 
arising from the 50th National Congress in October 1965 and 
published in the RSL's Vigilance in early 1967. 3 Australia had only 
recently committed forces in Vietnam, and it had the wholehearted 
support of the RSL. The enemy was 'North Vietnam acting with the 
support and encouragement of Red China'. In the eyes of the RSL, 
there was abundant evidence of China's plan to 'liberate' the 
Millar, T.B., Peace and War, p.47. See also RSL Annual 
Report, 1965-80 passim. 
2 	Teichmann, M., "International Relations" in D.M. Gibb, and 
A.W. Hannan, (eds.), Debate and Decision: Political Issues 
in 20th Century Australia. Heinmann, Melbourne, 1975, 
p.191. 
3 	Anonymous, "The League and National Defence", Vigilance, 
Vol.3, December/January 1967, pp.29-31. 
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countries of Southeast Asia: communist subversion was to be found 
in Thailand, in the border areas of Malaya and in Laos. While it 
considered Burma and Cambodia were well within the Communist 
sphere, the RSL considered Indonesia was a shining example of a 
country where China's 'methods have been exposed and condemned by 
the Indonesians themselves following the abortive 30 September 
coup'. 
In the overall scheme of things, the RSL saw that 'the 
activities of Red China are not unlike those of Hitler in Europe 
prior to the Second World War', and found solace in history where, 
'in dealing with dictators (Mao Tse-tung,) the worst course is one 
of appeasement'. 1 In Australian domestic terms it saw the growing 
reaction to Australia's Vietnam policy as 'misguided', placing the 
blame for such a situation squarely on the shoulders of the 
government which had failed to undertake a 'thorough and 
imaginative campaign... to place before the Australian public all 
the facts and all the implications of the war in Vietnam'. 2 
RSL criticism of this failure, on the part of the Australian 
Government, also extended to its plans in relation to Papua and New 
Guinea. The RSL saw the eastern part of the island as 'a vital 
element in the front line of Australia's defence system' and called 
for a build-up of strength in indigenous forces. It also advocated 
the establishment of a comprehensive system of defence bases to 
permit the stationing of regular units of Australia's armed forces. 
Of particular concern here was that the border be secure and all 
necessary precautions be taken to prevent 'any form of 
infiltration'. 
Herein lay the dilemma for the RSL. While it considered it 
reasonable to assume that Indonesia's drift to left had been 
arrested, and held hopes of better relations in the wake of the 
coup and the strengthening of the military: 
we have been abundantly aware of the unstable nature of 
the Indonesian administration. It places us in a 
position where, while we work constantly for improved 
relations, we must take all those steps that are 
necessary to provide adequate defence should any further 
change occur in the Indonesian political situation. In 
no area is this more necessary than in the border region 
Ibid., p.29. 
2 	Ibid., p.30. 
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of New Guinea - West Irian. 1 
These themes -- communism, the new government in Indonesia, and 
Papua New Guinea -- were to re-emerge constantly over the next five 
years. 2 Early concerns with Indonesia's massive economic and 
social problems were balanced by those related to a resurgence of 
communist influence, and the RSL counselled the Indonesian military 
to be 'extremely vigilant'. 3 This situation became more acute upon 
notice of the British intention to withdraw from the area of East 
of Suez by the 1970s. The RSL was faced with three dilemmas: how 
what they saw as the resulting power vacuum was to be filled; how 
to ensure that Australia -- now carrying (along with New Zealand) 
the greater part of the burden of maintaining stability in the 
region -- would be accepted by our regional neighbours in taking on 
'the role that history has allotted us... in undertaking an 
international responsibility'; and how to batten down the 
strategic defence of the region, utilizing traditional allies such 
as Malaysia and Singapore, while finding ways to embrace Indonesia. 
While it was now considered vital that Australia: 
do everything [it] can to ensure the increasing goodwill 
of this great and potentially very powerful nation and to 
keep ourselves closely informed on political and military 
developments in that country, 
there was still an underlying concern about the 'sizeable degree of 
instability [that] continues to exist'. 4 These dilemmas were to 
occupy the RSL for some years, and took on a greater sense of 
urgency when it became clear that the USA was to wind down their 
military activities in Southeast Asia. It elevated the importance 
which social and economic development in Southeast Asia would play 
in eroding Communism, depicted an Australian movement towards 
isolationism -- or 'Fortress Australia' -- as 'an amoral concept' 5 
and, at best, 'a misnomer'. 6 In this context, Indonesia was 
Anonymous, "The League and National Defence", Vigilance, 
Vol.3, p.31. 
2 
3 
RSL, 
RSL, 
Annual Reports, 1966-70 passim. 
1966, 	p.21. 51st Annual Report, 
4 RSL, 52nd Annual Report, 1967, p.16. 
5 RSL, 53rd Annual Report, 1968, p.19. 
6 RSL, 54th Annual Report, 1969, p.17. 
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becoming of greater importance and in need of assistance in its 
economic and social rehabilitation. 1 By 1969, following President 
Nixon's expression of confidence in the Suharto government and its 
future role in regional stability, the RSL's national executive 
considered in its 1970 defence submission to the government that 
Australia: 
should, by every possible means, through economic aid, 
trade, business interest and investment, and cultural 
relations, seek to build on the good relations that at 
present exist between our two countries. 2 
The RSL, as did Nixon in relation to his own country's relationship 
with Indonesia, increasingly saw cooperation as the key to these 
relations, and this sentiment was echoed in its subsequent views on 
West Irian, the border situation and Papua New Guinea. Gone was 
the concern with Indonesia as a threat on the border, and 
discussion into the 1970s on Indonesian issues as they related to 
that part of the region was couched in terms which were highly 
sympathetic to Indonesia. 3 
Meanwhile, the RSL national executive continued to consider 
Communism as the major threat to Australia and the region, with the 
PKI, 4 and the Soviet presence in and interest in Southeast Asia and 
the Indian Ocean generating debate. 5 While it decreasingly saw 
Communism as monolithic, the RSL considered that 'Chinese - Russian 
conflicting aspirations may cause each to use its military strength 
to increase its political influence' in the region. 6 And the RSL 
executive in 1974 found no comfort in the new Whitlam government's 
optimistic assessments as they related to Australia's strategic 
situation, citing Sino-Soviet antagonisms, great power rivalies in 
the Indian Ocean, the Middle-East problems and the increasing 
RSL, 53rd Annual Report, 1968, pp.17-18. See also Ibid., 
p.19. 
2 	RSL, 54th Annual Report, 1969, p.19. 
3 	See RSL, Annual Report, 1969-1974, passim. 
4 	See RSL, 54th Annual Report, 1969, pp.18-19. 
5 	RSL, Annual Report, 1970, pp.18-19, 1971, pp.16-17, 1972, 
p.17. See also Anonymous, "1972 RSL Defence Paper", On 
Guard, Vol.11, December 1972, pp.4-5. 
6 	RSL, 57th Annual Report, 1972, p.17. 
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regional role of Japan in economic and political terms. 1 
Following the 60th National Congress in October 1975 the RSL 
saw peace and stability under threat in terms similar to those used 
a decade before: 
The collapse of South Vietnam and Cambodia and the 
virtual takeover by the communists in Laos will greatly 
encourage communist insurgents in neighbouring Asian 
countries. Already, terrorist (sic) campaigns on the Thai 
and Malaysian border areas have greatly intensified. 
China, Russia and Vietnam are committed to supporting 
wars of 'national liberation', in Burma, Thailand, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.... 2 
There was a distinct convergence between the RSL's characteristic 
emphasis on strategic and defence matters, and its firming view, 
through the late 1960s and early 1970s, of Indonesia's role in a 
region that was clearly undergoing substantial changes. Within 
this context two developments were taking place. First, the RSL's 
strongly held ideological views continued unchanged, coinciding 
with the rise and consolidation of Indonesia's right-wing 'New 
Order'. Second, this gave rise to a partial erosion of the 
ethnocentrism that marked the attitudes of RSL leaders during the 
1950s and early 1960s. 3 In essence, the paternalism remained, 
while the dislike of Asians seemed to be receding, simply because 
it served Australia's interests to have, economically and 
politically, a strong Asian State -- namely Indonesia -- to be, in 
the wake of the British and American decisions to withdraw, the new 
vanguard in the RSL's continuing fight against communism. This 
judgement strengthened into the 1970s, rather than weakened, as 
revelations concerning the 'New Order's' domestic role came under 
the critical scrutiny of many groups and individuals within 
Australia. 
While the RSL was a pressure group or an opinion leader on 
matters relating to strategic and defence matters, it is difficult 
RSL, 59th Annual Report, 1974, p. 12. See also C.J. Hines' 
Speech, "Australia sits on time bomb" in Reveille, Vol.47, 
15 August 1973, pp. 5,8 and 10. (Hines was the President 
of the NSW, RSL). 
2 	RSL, 60th Annual Report, 1975, p. 19. See also Ibid., 1976, 
p.21, and Hines, C.J., "Time to Wake Up", Reveille, Vol.51, 
June 1976, p.l. 
3 	Viviani reached this conclusion after examining RSL 
attitudes to Indonesia before the coup in 1965. 	See 
Viviani, N.,"Australian Attitudes and Policies", p.127. 
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to assess their influence on matters related to Indonesia. 
However, it could be generalized that as the 'New Order' gained in 
strength in domestic and international terms, it came to be seen 
increasingly by RSL leaders to be, as never before, a welcome part 
of the Western bloc. Moreover, such views would have reached those 
policy-makers who were constructing and conducting Australia's 
foreign and defence policies. 
Collective influence of Non Government Lobby Groups  
The effect that organised groups have on foreign policy 
remains problematical. While in principle the opportunity for 
influence is there, the closed nature of the decision-making 
process, the strength of the institutional interests concerned and 
the lack of resources for many of the more radical groups to 
sustain any pressure are factors that contribute to limiting their 
impact. Within this disparate group of organizations, the aid 
agencies emerge as the most dominant group but its contribution 
provided more context than influence in policy terms -- it has been 
easier to discover what these groups are than what their effect or 
influence has been on particular policies. 
While none of these groups seemed to have had an important 
impact on Australia's Indonesia policy during the period under 
review, the aid agencies in particular became a pivotal point for 
wider-ranging dissenting political activity. Such activity, 
however, was mainly centred on development issues but, as within 
the academic community, Indonesia came increasingly under scrutiny 
in the efforts of non-government lobby groups to widen 
understanding of, and establish contact to influence, the 
government's aid policy. 
Notwithstanding this, there is no documentary evidence of the 
impact of non-government lobby group activity on public opinion or 
to suggest that the alliances -- especially between the aid 
agencies and the churches -- gave rise to any concrete strategy to 
specifically address Australia's Indonesia policy. Moreover, the 
strong ideological sentiments inherent in many of the arguments 
presented on aid and, by implication, Indonesian issues, mitigated 
such links being formed with the RSL which, like the AIBCC, had 
views that coincided strongly with those of the government. 
Conclusion  
Non-government lobby group and community opinions throughout 
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this period reflected only sporadic interest in Indonesian issues. 
The interesting feature of community opinion was the way a negative 
preoccupation with Australia's security interests was juxtaposed 
with a concern for the stability and welfare of the Indonesian 
nation. This altruism dissipated towards the end of the 1960s but 
such a development was related more to a widening skepticism about 
the way which aid policy was being administered generally and 
growing doubts about whether aid was reaching the appropriate 
destination. However, neither view could be regarded as having 
guided the Australian Government in its framing of Indonesian 
policy, in either the security or foreign aid arenas. 
Such issues were of importance to an increasing number of 
groups and individuals. The most powerful, although perhaps not 
the most vocal group, was the business community which had 
appropriate links with the conservative government. Unlike those 
groups and individuals who adopted an increasingly dissenting 
position on Indonesian issues and Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia, this group -- as with public opinion generally -- 
followed the lead of successive conservative governments throughout 
this period. While dissenting opinion emerged, positions adopted 
over this period by groups like the non-government lobby groups and 
individuals like Eldridge and Mortimer lay in isolation, failing to 
attract broad public support. 
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PART THREE 
POLICY UNDER SIEGE: AUSTRALIAN POLICIES  
AND ATTITUDES DURING THE TIMOR DISPUTE (1974 - 1980)  
By the mid-1970s, global society at large had changed remarkably, 
and in ways of vital importance to Australia's international 
relations. However, as suggested in Chapter 3, while there was a 
growing realization in the late 1960s and early 19705 of the 
inadequacy of its traditional approach to the outside world, 
Australia's foreign and defence policies under the L-CP government 
were overtaken by events. The acceleration of Britain's 
economically-motivated military withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific 
region coincided with the American recognition of the failure of 
its Indo-China policies, the Nixon Doctrine, a withdrawal of US 
troops from Vietnam and the abandonment of its traditional approach 
to China. America's Cold War policies of containment, non-
recognition and economic boycott gave way to rapprochement and 
detente, lessening tensions not only between the USA and China, but 
also between the Americans and the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the old barriers were breaking down. On one level, 
Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Dr. Kissinger, both 
visited China, while unprecedented negotiations with the USSR 
focused on joint space ventures, trade agreements, the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and a treaty for the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. On another level, by December 
1972, and the election of the Whitlam Labor government, the Third 
World countries were exerting considerable pressures on the major 
powers, particularly in the United Nations, to introduce more 
social and economic equity into the international community. 
The L-CP government in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
therefore, had been conducting foreign and defence policy in a 
period of immense activity and change. That there was a conflict 
between its foreign policy and the changing world situation was 
well documented in Australia's policies and attitudes towards 
China. This was one area where Australia was torn between past 
assumptions and policies, and the need to adapt to world changes. 
But there were also other problems in continuing to adhere to past 
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assumptions while, at the same time, trying to adjust to a new 
global situation. This could not have been more evident than in 
Freeth's Soviet policy. 
Moreover, the eventual commencement of a withdrawal of 
Australian troops from Vietnam represented a significant change in 
defence policy thinking. Without a large allied military presence 
in Southeast Asia, it was no longer credible for the Australian 
Government to operate in terms of the traditional strategic policy 
of Forward Defence -- one of the major pillars of the foreign and 
defence policies of successive L-CP governments. While Australia 
was entering a new era in world politics, the political response 
was varied. Reassessments by conservative leaders were hamstrung 
by past beliefs and assumptions and by electoral pressures at 
home. 1 Even moderate change was difficult. Inevitably the 
coalition parties were both slow and hesitant to deviate from long-
standing foreign and defence policies. 2 Labor leaders, unlike the 
L-CP governments, welcomed the changes in the international 
environment, and did not view them with alarm or anxiety. 
Writing in 1972, having led the Labor Opposition since its 
shattering defeat in the 1966 election, Whitlam asserted 'We are 
entering a period of unparalleled complexity in international 
relations', and vowed a new start in foreign policy under a Labor 
government, because 'the slogans and shibboleths of the past, the 
self-deceiving moralizing of the cold war, can no longer pass as 
Refer, for example, to Fraser's statements of 10 March 1970, 
and April 1971 (CPD, H.R., Vol.72, 22 April 1971, p.1929); 
See also statements by Bowen when he was Foreign Minister 
(Ibid., Vol.75, 9 November 1971, p.3154); and Fairbairn, 
Minister for Defence (Ibid., Vol.77, 28 March 1972, p.1250). 
Also, refer to DLP views in its publication Focus, for 
example, 'The US Alliance', Focus, Vol.6, May 1973, pp.6- 
8; and 'The Singapore Debate', Ibid., pp.10-11 and 13-14. 
2 	Murphy, D.J., 'New Nationalism or New Internationalism, 
Australian Foreign Policy 1973-74', World Review, Vol.13, 
No.3, October 1973, pp.15-17. Professor J.D.B. Miller 
considers before it lost office, the L-CP had begun to re-
examine assumptions and make new assessments about 
Australia's international relationship. Miller, J.D.B., 
"Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities - 
II", International Affairs, Vol.50, July 1974, p.426. See 
also Miller, J.D.B., "Australian Foreign Policy: 
Constraints and Opportunities - I", International Affairs, 
Vol.50, April 1974, pp.232-233. 
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policy'. 1 Accordingly, the incoming Labor government set out to 
modernize and adapt foreign policy to current realities and took a 
large number of initiatives very early in its term of office. 2 
Shaped and driven by Whitlam as both Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, these policies reflected a Labor leader who: 
was determined to place Australia on the map to an extent 
not achieved since Herbert V. Evatt's time (1941-49); to 
make its own voice heard and respected in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America no less than in the Old World; in the 
Communist States no less than in the United States ... he 
believed that Australia in its conservatism and in 
deference to allies had passed by on the other side of 
the great human problems and movements of our time, and 
he was determined to change all that ... He saw the need 
for new policies, in their own right, and quickly set 
about implementing them. 3 
However, while Whitlam aimed to break from the conceptual and 
ideological constraints of the preceding years, stressing the need 
for a more independent stance in foreign policy -- less 
militaristic and open less to suggestions of racism, 4 by late 1974, 
'it became abundantly clear that very few of these intentions were 
likely to be translated into political reality in the foreseeable 
future' . 5 
1 	Gough Whitlam, 'Australia and Her Region', in John McLaren, 
(ed.), Towards a New Australia, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1972, 
p.2. 
2 	The tone of Australia's new 'independent' approach to 
foreign policy was set from the outset. The government 
quickly entered into diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic of China, (and later) North Vietnam, the German 
Democratic Republic and North Korea; had withdrawn 
Australia's military from Vietnam and its aid to Cambodia; 
removed Australia's infantry from Singapore; stopped wheat 
sales to Rhodesia; provided some indirect aid to South 
African liberation movements; hastened independence for 
Papua New Guinea; demonstrated systematic sympathy and 
support for Third World aspirations in the UN and elsewhere; 
formally opposed France's nuclear tests in the South 
Pacific; supported proposals for the creation of a zone of 
peace and neutrality in the Indian Ocean and the South East 
Asian region; and began negotiations with Japan for a 
treaty of friendship and cooperation. 
3 	Millar, T.B., 'From Whitlam to Fraser', Foreign Affairs, 
July, 1977, pp. 856-857. 
See Whitlam's Review of Foreign Policy Statement, CPD, H.R. , 
Vol.84, 24 May 1973, esp. p.2643. 
5 	Camilleri, J.A., An Introduction to Australian Foreign 
Policy, 2nd ed., Brisbane, Jacaranda Press, 1975, p.81. 
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Even though there had been a substantial reorientation of 
policies under the Labor government during this period, it was not 
as far-reaching as comment of the time suggested, reflecting more 
'an adaptive reaction to new trends in international politics 
rather than ... a conscious and coherent attempt to question or 
revise the foundations of Australia's diplomatic conduct'. 1 While 
Whitlam's desire to stimulate reform in Australian perceptions and 
interpretations of international society 2 was significant, he 
continued to embrace the basic foundations of Australian foreign 
policy and maintained that little had changed in its friendships, 
alliances and in its national interests. 3 
Indeed, foreign policy commentators have tended more to stress 
the elements of continuity in Whitlam's foreign policy than to 
emphasize those of change. Albinski, for example, believed that 
despite 'some new definitions, disections and methods', despite 
'real shifts of emphasis in both substance and style' and 
notwithstanding 'boasts of great achievement', continuity was 
1 	Camilleri, J., "Foreign Policy", in Patience A. and Head B., 
(eds.), From Whitlam to Fraser: reform and reaction in 
Australian politics. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
1979. While Whitlam's pronouncement suggested a radical 
reappraisal of Australian foreign policy, characterizations 
and explanations of Whitlam's policy have diverged 
considerably on whether in fact such a reappraisal took 
place. As it is not intended here to examine such analyses, 
refer to the following contributions: D.J. Murphy argues 
affirmatively in his 'New Nationalism ...' (1973); for 
arguments that centre on continuity in policy and the notion 
that external circumstances dictated changes, whichever 
party was at the helm of foreign policy, see Bull, Hedley, 
"The Whitlam Government's Perception of Our Role in the 
World", in Beddie, D.B., (ed.), Advance Australia - Where?, 
OUP, Melbourne, 1975. Arguments from the right are 
sustained by Santamaria, B.A., "Labor's First Six Months", 
Current Affairs Bulletin, July 1973. For a left-wing 
Marxist Critique refer to Catley, Robert and MacFarlane, 
Bruce, From Tweedledum to Tweedledee: The New Labor 
Government in Australia, ANZ Book Co, Sydney, 1974. Refer 
also to Camilleri, J., "In Search of Foreign Policy", Arena, 
Nos.32-33, 1973. 
2 	Address to the Australian Institute of Political Science, 
Canberra, 27 January 1973. Department of Foreign Affairs, 
News Release M/28, 27 January 1973. 
3 	In early 1973, Whitlam denied that these foundations were 
or could be altered by a change in government. See Whitlam, 
E.G., 'Opening Address', in McCarthy, G., (ed.), Foreign  
Policy for Australia: Choices for the Seventies, Sydney, 
Angus and Robertson, 1973, p.l. 
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preserved 'in the basic outlines of Australia's foreign policy'. 1 
Hedley Bull considered that while many of the more dramatic 
announcements made by the Whitlam government in foreign policy 
reflected changes in the 'means and modalities' of policy, it had 
not deviated radically from its predecessors in its perception of 
Australia's basic interests and obligations; 2 the Labor government 
simply emerged from the 1960s to make the adjustments needed in the 
new circumstances of the 1970s because it 'was less encumbered by 
its own past policies and more free to adopt new ones 1 . 3 
However, it has been argued that the similarities between the 
Labor government and its L-CP predecessors in foreign policy were 
more significant that the differences, and what differences did 
exist were 'more matters of emphasis and style than of substance 1 . 4 
To be sure, the constraints on Labor's foreign policy, as with its 
predecessors, were largely determined by events in the immediate 
region and by the nature of the States' system (and in particular, 
the relationships of the major global powers). But within these 
constraints, the Whitlam government's foreign policy 'responded 
creatively, imaginatively and sometimes, in the search of 
diplomatic novelty or Third World popularity, excessively to the 
opportunities which the new international situations afforded'. 5 
A close examination of the domestic context, as suggested by 
Camilleri, suggests Labor had two major objectives. First: 
it was anxious not to displease a broadly conservative 
population or the open hostility of dominant economic 
interests ... [second, it] had to give satisfaction to 
some of the more radical elements within the ALP, and 
this was achieved by the cultivation of a highly 
personalized and assertive style in the conduct of 
foreign policy. 6 
Albinski, H.S., Australian External Policy Under Labor, 
p.351. 
2 	Bull, H., "The Whitlam Government's Perception of our Role 
in the World", in Beddie, B.D., (ed.), Advance Australia - 
Where?, p.30. 
3 	Ibid., p.31. 
4 	See comments by Creighton Burns in Beddie, B.D., (ed.), 
Advance Australia - Where?, p.190. 
5 	Meaney, N., "The United States" in Hudson, W.J., (ed.), 
Australia in World Affairs 1971-1975, p.180. 
6 	Camilleri, J.A., An Introduction to Australian Foreign 
Policy, P.102. 
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While Whitlam's overall approach enabled major policy adjustments 
to accommodate the changes underway in the international arena, it 
also facilitated a greater degree of international and regional 
diplomacy. In this context, many of these changes -- in particular 
America's rapprochement with China -- made it easier for the 
Whitlam Government to pursue its own understandings with the major 
regional powers, as well as emphasizing, in pursuit of its own 
independent policies, the objectives which it saw as being 
important in Southeast Asia. 1 As the Whitlam Government moved to 
view, and to identify with , the countries of the region in its own 
right, the maintenance of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia 
soon emerged as one of the main considerations in Australia's 
regional policies, even if Australian and Indonesian views were to 
conflict on a particular issue. As Portuguese rule in East Timor 
and its other colonies began to collapse, relating Australia's East 
Timor policy to such an approach became an increasingly important 
concern for the Whitlam Labor government, as it did for Whitlam's 
L-CP successor in late 1975, J.M. Fraser. 
Chapter Seven of this study examines the East Timor crisis 
during the 1974-78 period. It is concerned to set Australian 
policies not only within an historical framework but also in the 
context of Australia's international environment. However, 
substantially domestic issues inevitably emerge as major 
considerations in these policies. The three following chapters 
examine the press, parliamentary debates and community debates on 
the East Timor issue. This is followed by the conclusion, in which 
an assessment is made of the influence of these factors on 
government policy during this controversial period. 
For criticism of Whitlam's approach to the Southeast Asian 
region see Harries, O., 'Australia's Foreign Policy under Whitlam', Orbis, Vol.XIX No.3, 1975, p.1092-1093. Refer 
also to Miller's analysis of regional reaction to Whitlam's 
concept for a regional community -- Miller, J.D.B., 
"Australian Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities - 
II", p.428. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EAST TIMOR (1974-1980)  
Introduction  
This chapter's main concern is with an examination of Australian 
Government policy towards East Timor, principally between 1974 and 
1978. However, for the purposes of analysis the chapter has four 
major components. In view of the nature of the problems that 
Australia's policy encountered, particularly as it related to the 
process of decolonization in the territory, the chapter commences 
with a sketch of East Timor's socio-economic and political 
development under the Portuguese. The pattern of colonial rule 
severely retarded such development and it was to emerge as a 
significant factor in Australian, Indonesian and Portuguese policy 
perceptions. The chapter also focuses attention on actual events 
in the territory during 1974 and 1975, and explains the dynamics 
underlying party political developments within East Timor. In 
doing so, it combines with an analysis of the changing nature of 
Indonesia's response to these developments as it moved away from 
political self-determination towards military invasion and, 
subsequently, integration. Finally, the chapter briefly examines 
the character and direction of Australia's policy, the possible 
options, and the domestic political pressures encountered by 
Australian Governments over the East Timor situation. 
A Background  
The island of Timor, lying immediately to Australia's north-
west, and west of New Guinea, is situated in the eastern part of 
the Indonesian Archipelago in the Lesser Sundas group (Nusa 
Tenggara Archipelago). The territory of East Timor is made up of 
the eastern half of the island, the enclave of Oecussi in 
Indonesian West Timor and the two smaller islands of Atauro and 
Jaco. With a population of 650 000 people, East Timor is similar 
in size to Guinea-Bissau, the former Portuguese colony which is now 
an independent republic in West Africa. 
The Portuguese landed in Timor in the early 16th century in 
pursuit of the sandalwood trade. The Dutch, for similar reasons, 
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later established a foothold on the western half of the island. 
The boundary between East (usually called Portuguese East Timor) 
and West (later called Indonesian Timor when it was absorbed into 
the United States of Indonesia in 1949), first set in a treaty 
between Holland and Portugal in 1859, was concluded in 1913 at the 
Hague Court of Arbitration in the agreement called 'Sentenca 
Arbital', following over two hundred years of hostile engagements 
over the sandalwood riches% Timor lay in indolent isolation until 
the Second World War. Although Portugal was neutral during the war 
(and thus also its colonies), Timor's perceived strategic 
significance2 drew it into the front line of the war, and the 
island was occupied by Australian and Japanese troops. For some 
thirteen months (December 1941 until January 1943), four hundred 
Australian commandos -- selflessly assisted by the Timorese3 -- 
engaged in guerilla warfare with 20 000 Japanese troops. However, 
with the withdrawal of the Australians in January 1943, the 
Timorese were subjected to a harsh Japanese military occupation 
which, coupled with the effect of famine brought about by the 
ruthless seizure of food by the Japanese, resulted in up to 60 000 
deaths. 4 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism. 
Queensland University Press, St. Lucia, 1978. pp.22-42. 
See also Hastings, P.," The Timor Problem - I", Australian 
Outlook, Vol.29, August 1975, pp.20-24. 
2 	The Australian Government at the time believed that the 
Japanese would use the island as a base for operations 
directed against Australia. However, James Dunn considers 
that 'had the Allies not intruded into the territory and 
transformed it into a war zone ... the Timorese would thus 
have been spared the devastating consequences of the 
military operations and occupation'. Dunn, James, Timor.  
A People Betrayed, The Jacaranda Press, Milton (Queensland), 
1983, p.22. Nicol shows that the Australian Government's 
hand was forced when it became suspicious of Japan's 
interest in establishing air links with the island. 
Moreover, citing Australia's official war history, Nicol 
notes that the Australian Cabinet at the time did not 
believe that the Japanese would respect Portuguese Timor's 
neutrality. Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, Viza, 
Melbourne, 1978, p.18. 
3 	Callinan, B., Independent Company, Heinemann, Melbourne, 
1953, pp.xxiv-xxvi. 
4 	Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, Canberra, Parliament of 
Australia, Legislative Research Service, July 1976, p.4. 
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The war had devastated East Timor; the main farms and 
villages had been destroyed, the economy was in ruins and the 
Timorese people, close to starvation, were completely demoralized. 
While the Portuguese returned to full control in 1945, post-war 
reconstruction was slow. Portugal had been economically weakened 
by the war, and its exclusion from the Marshall Plan for the 
reconstruction of post-war Europe, ensured there would be very 
little effort to 'develop' the territory. 
It was not until the 1960s that Portugal gave more attention 
to Timor's social and economic conditions. Facing increased 
pressure from the West through the United Nations to redress the 
colony's development problems, Portugal embarked in a belated 
development plan to rebuild its infrastructure, and to redevelop 
East Timor's agriculture and livestock resources. 1 However, such 
development was described as 'ill-conceived' 2 and 'superficial', 3 
and as giving no 'significant improvement in the lot of the 
majority of the population'. 4 
It was also in the mid-1960s that the Portuguese moved towards 
a comprehensive education system (primary, secondary and technical 
schools, and religious seminaries). Although Portugal's education 
system has been described generally as being inadequate and 
unsatisfactory, 5 it did provide the basis for the emergence in the 
1 	Freney argued that an abortive revolt in Viqueique in East 
Timor in 1959, combined with earlier outbreaks of liberation 
wars in all of Portugal's African colonies, was just as 
instrumental in directing the then Salazar regime in 
Portugal towards new 'development' policies in Timor as part 
of its overall colonial policy in the 1960s. Freney, D., 
"East Timor: 	The Modest Revolution", Australian Left 
Review, No.48, September 1975, pp.4-5. 	See also, Dunn, 
James, Timor. A People Betrayed, pp.33-34. 
2 	Hastings, P., "The Timor Problem - I", pp.24-25. 
3 	Freney, D., "The Modest Revolution", p.5. Bill Nichol, 
Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.29. 
4 	Dunn, J.S., "Portuguese Timor before and after the Coup, 
Options for the Future", unpublished paper, August 1974, 
quoted in P. Hastings, "The Timor Problem - I", p.25. Bill 
Nichol considered only ten percent of the population 
benefitted from Portugal's development policies. Nichol, 
B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.29. 
5 	Nicholl, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.24 and p.25. 
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early 1970s of a "politically conscious elite", 1 and it was to 
prove catalytic in the political developments of 1974-1975. While 
the nature of this educational process compelled students wishing 
to complete a tertiary education to go to Lisbon to further their 
studies (and, thus, heightening their political and social 
awareness) 2 , many Timorese who successfully completed secondary 
school chose to remain, to enter seminaries, become teachers, join 
government service or enlist in the army. 3 
Notwithstanding these developments, there was still little 
evidence of any significant improvement in the well-being or living 
conditions in the wider Timorese community. Portuguese efforts in 
East Timor were less than ambitious and its development, in 
comparison with other states at a comparable level, had been 
grossly retarded. 4 The limited progress that had been made 
benefited mainly the Chinese section of the population, the small 
Portuguese business community, and the coffee and copra planters 
who were predominantly Chinese 5 and Portuguese. However, the 
export of these primary products, as well as goods of marketable 
quality, did little to redress the imbalances of a chronic trade 
deficit. This task lay with Portuga1. 6 
Yet, it has been argued that agriculture and the exploitation 
of natural resources, generally, could have provided prospects for 
1 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.8. 
2 	According to Hastings ("The Timor Problem - I", p.26), in 
1975 there were seventy-seven Timorese students at tertiary-
level institutions in Portugal with thirteen, due to 
graduate at the end of 1975, expected back in Timor to 
practise as doctors, engineers, and scientists (political, 
agricultural and natural). 
3 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.8. 
4 	Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.7. Nicholl, B., Timor. The 
Stillborn Nation, pp.25-27. 
5 	Much of the important retail business, the rural trade-store 
business and the private transport section, was in the hands 
of the Chinese. For a detailed discussion of Timor's socio-
economic history see Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.12 ff and 
Hastings, P., "The Timor Problem - I", pp.29-30. 
6 	Nichol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.26. 
289 
economic 'development° The search for minerals and oil had been 
conducted intermittently by Australian, American and Japanese 
companies since the early 1900s. However, no commercial quantities 
in these resources had been discovered when the political climate 
in 1975 forced companies to cease their operations. 2 While it has 
been asserted that the development of small holder agriculture and 
animal husbandry had, with good management, the potential to enable 
East Timor to be self-sufficient, 3 by 1974 there was little 
evidence in the countryside of any Portuguese efforts to meet these 
challenges and to improve the level of agriculture. 
Party Political Developments within East Timor 
(April 1974-January 1975).  
While such conditions prevailed in the three decades prior to 
the coup in Portugal in 1974, there is no evidence to suggest that 
it created unrest among the Timorese and that it gave rise to any 
kind of discussion about nationalism or independence. Throughout 
this period the colony had been sealed off from the outside world. 
The colony's remoteness and linguistic isolation, together with the 
controlled measures of the Portuguese Administration, did much to 
keep the Timorese ignorant of, and unprovoked by, the liberation 
struggles in Asia and of, closer to home, the upheavals taking 
place in nearby Indonesia. 4 Before the coup, therefore, there was 
no organized nationalist movement as such was waiting in the wings 
to capitalize on the developments of 25 April 1974. In Lisbon on 
that day the conservative Spinola regime was installed following 
the overthrow of the Caetono Government by middle-ranking military 
officers. Apart from the recalling of the Directorate-General of 
Security (DGS - political police) and the Armed Forces Movement's 
Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, pp.7-8; Nicholl, B., Timor.  
The Stillborn Nation, p.27 and pp.30-31. 
2 	Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia  , P.191; Nicholl, B., 
Timor. The Stillborn Nation, pp.30-31. 
3 	Nicholl, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.30-31. 
4 	The only serious act of rebellion against the Portuguese 
Administration involved a group of indonesian refugees who 
were spawned by the embattled Permesta Movement in 1959. 
Some months after being granted political asylum, the group 
exploited discontent with the local administration and 
engineered an abortive uprising against the Administration. 
See Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, pp.11-12. 
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(AFM) disbanding of both the fascist corporate state party and the 
censorship commissions, the coup in Lisbon seemed to have had 
little impact on the administration in Timor. Unlike Portugal 
itself, there were no immediate sackings, the Governor was not 
recalled until some months later, and many of the old Portuguese 
officials remained to continue occupying their leading posts in 
Dili. 1 
Nevertheless, within a month of the coup in Portugal, three 
political groupings emerged in East Timor 2 -- The Association of 
Timorese Social Democrats (ASDT), the Timorese Democratic Union 
(UDT) and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). 
While Portuguese policy on the future of the colony was relatively 
uninformed at this stage, Portugal put forward three options for 
the future -- a continued association with the metropolitan power, 
independence, or integration with Indonesia -- around which 
political activities involving these groups 3 were to gravitate 
until civil war erupted in the territory, in August 1975. 
The ASDT, formed on 20 May 1974, claimed to have secured the 
support of Timor's civil servants, teachers, urban workers and 
students, and demanded immediate independence. 4 The Timorese 
Democratic Union was made up of those in the higher levels of the 
civil service, native chiefs, some influential Chinese businessmen 
1 	Dunn, James, Timor. The People Betrayed, p.56. 
2 	This account is based, among other sources, on Nicol, B., 
Timor. The Stillborn Nation, op.cit., Dunn, James, Timor.  
A People Betrayed, op.cit., and McDonald, H., Suharto's 
Indonesia, op.cit. 
3 	We are concerned here mainly with these major parties, 
although three other small parties were formed in East Timor 
between April 1974 and August 1975 -- the APMT (the Populas 
Association of Monarchists of Timor) renamed KOTA (Klibur 
Oan Timur Aswain -- 'Sons of the Mountain Warriors'); 
Partido Trabalhista (Labour Party) and the Aditla Party 
(Democratic Association for the Integration of East Timor 
into Australia). 
4 	Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.17. The organizing committee 
of ASDT consisted of nine people (most of who were full-
blooded Timorese) and included Francisco Xavier do Amaral, 
Nicolau Lobato, Aleixo Carte Real & Rui Fernandes. Jose 
Manuel Ramos Horta was not one of the original committee but 
he emerged as the group's best-known leader and spokesman. 
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and the greater part of the Portuguese community.' Formed on 11 
May 1974, UDT was essentially a union established to protect the 
status quo. 2 It initially wanted progressive autonomy, although 
always under the Portuguese flag. 3 The third group, Apodeti, was 
founded on 27 May 1974, and made up of relatives and friends of 
those Timorese who were involved in the insurrection of 1959 4 , some 
Timorese priests and a number of petty Kings and chiefs. 5 Its 
principal aim was for 'an autonomous integration into the Republic 
of Indonesia in accordance with international law' on the grounds 
of ethnic and historical links. ° 
While there is difficulty in estimating the relative 
popularity of the political parties from their early stages, there 
is evidence to suggest that UDT derived legitimate initial and 
popular support through its linkages to the village chiefs and 
township elites. From the outset, UDT was the most conservative of 
the three political groupings. It started out as a party strongly 
in favour of continued association with Portugal and was supported 
by most of the Portuguese and Timorese who were opposed to change. 
Due to increasing criticism by its opponents that UDT championed 
the continuation of East Timor's colonial status, the UDT 
leadership became increasingly drawn to the goal of eventual 
independence, and to the notion that the territory could be 
economically viable if foreign (principally Australian, American 
Hoadley, J.S., The Future of Portuguese Timor. Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1975, p.9. The group 
was founded by Mario and Joao Carrascalo, Francisco Lopez 
da Cruz, Domingos de Oliveira and Cesar Augusto da Costa 
Mousinho. 
2 	Hill, H., The Timor Story. Walker Press, Melbourne, 1976, 
p.4. 
3 	Manifesto, UDT (Dili, 11 May 1974), p.1, reprinted in 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.337. 
4 	See p.289 (footnote 4). 
5 	Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.20. Jose Osorio Soares was 
behind APODETI 's early activities and organization. Arnaldo 
dos Reis Aranjo, however, emerged as the group's founding 
president, with Hermenegildo Martins as vice-president and 
Casimiro dos Reis Aranjo (the President's son) as Apodeti's 
secretary. 
6 	Manifesto, Apodeti (Dili, 27 May 1974), reprinted in 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.326. 
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and Japanese) investment capital could be secured. 
However, the UDT leadership was slow to develop its 
international activities and contacts. These developments, 
together with a political program that saw the group concentrate 
its political activities in the towns and on those members of the 
administrative elite, saw its popularity rapidly diminish in the 
face of active and ambitious recruitment campaigns being conducted 
by the fast-rising ASDT group (called after 12 September 1974, the 
Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor, or Fretilin). 
At first, ASDT called for East Timor's right to progressive 
autonomy towards independence, although the leadership was divided 
over its timing. Due to its small following in the territory, 
early ideas of a plebisite to decide East Timor's future were 
disgarded. As the UDT developed a strong backing, principally in 
the rural areas, the ASDT leadership began to consider remodelling 
ASDT on the Mozambique Liberation Front, Frelimo. Instrumental 
here were Horta, who had spent two years in Mozambique, and a small 
group of left-wing Timorese students who had experienced Frelimo's 
ideology within dissident intellectual circles in Lisbon. East 
Timor's independence soon emerged to be the group's central focus 
and, in line with its more radical outlook, ASDT became the 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin). 
The ASDT/Fretilin leadership sought first among the Timorese 
leaders to establish international contacts -- initially with 
Indonesia, and then Australia l -- to further its early aim of 
progressive autonomy. However, press reports in Jakarta and 
Canberra that military elements within the Indonesian leadership 
would oppose independence for the former colony served only to 
strengthen the resolve of the ASDT, and in August 1974 propel it 
towards increased radical activities and rhetoric. 2 Initially, 
1 	Horta began visiting Australia in mid-1974 to forge links 
with Australians (within the Government, and outside it) 
sympathetic to his party's cause. By the end of 1974 he had 
cast his net widely in Australia for support: in the 
Australian Parliament (especially from Peacock); within 
voluntary aid organizations; among the churches; and in 
the trade unions. This is developed further in the next 
three Chapters. 
2 	Fretilin's move to a more radical position at this time 
coincided, and to some degree, reflected political changes 
taking place in Lisbon when the centre of power moved to the 
left with the resignation of conservative President Spinola 
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Fretilin promoted itself as the only legitimate representative of 
the Timorese people and its attitude towards other parties, in 
particular Apodeti, increasingly hardened. 
The political goals put forward by Apodeti were soon 
overshadowed by the independence programs proclaimed by Fretilin 
and UDT, and at the peak of its influence the pro-integrationist 
party was never able to secure more than a small proportion of the 
politically conscious Timorese. By September 1974 when it became 
apparent that military leaders in Jakarta opposed the emergence of 
an independent East Timor (this is examined below), Apodeti became 
a focal point for pro-Indonesian activities and: 
in spite of the ideals expressed in its original 
manifesto, Apodeti soon became the vehicle for overt 
Indonesian propoganda and a channel for covert subversive 
operations, presenting a measure of endorsement of 
Jakarta's political strategy for East Timor. 1 
While the Indonesian Government sought to pursue its goal of 
incorporation by influencing the political process within the 
territory, its subsequent attempts to promote by overt and covert 
means the political advantage of its internal client only served to 
induce a countervailing coalition between Fretilin and UDT. 2 
The Fretilin/UDT Coalition  
If the nature of their respective aims polarized the three 
groupings, then it also tended to exaggerate the differences 
between them in the early stages of their political development. 
In basic terms, the aims of UDT and Fretilin, and to a strong 
degree Apodeti, were rather similar, with a broad common ground 
linking their respective leaderships. This included their 
respective foundation 'constitutions' (manifestos), in which all 
made references to a support for human rights, freedom of 
expression and religious liberty, while denouncing corruption and 
and his replacement by Costa Gomes, Portugal's former army 
Chief of Staff. Gomes had the support of the Prime 
Minister, as well as Colonel Vasco dos Santos Goncalves and 
his left-wing Armed Forces Movement (MFA). Nicol, B., 
Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.171. 
Dunn, James, Timor: A People Betrayed, p.72. Indonesia's 
policies are examined in detail below. 
2 	Nicol, B., Timor: The Stillborn Nation, p.247. 
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racial discrimination. 1 There were also similarities in the 
backgrounds of the leaders, 2 with the majority remaining friends 
during the early months of the formation of the parties. 3 However, 
by late 1974, widening differences characterized these links, 
particularly between elements of the Fretilin and UDT leaderships, 
and were rooted in deepening suspicions and antagonisms related to 
each party's increasingly earnest struggle to extend its support 
base, particularly in the rural areas. 4 
While Apodeti did not seem to have the same level of support 
as the other two political groups, conflicting views emerged on the 
relative support enjoyed by ASDT/Fretilin and UDT. It was argued, 
for instance, that in the four-month period to December 1974, 
Fretilin's membership had ballooned and by mid-1975 'had the edge 
on its opponent largely because it was seen as the main 
independence party, and was also ... more aggressive, disciplined 
and purposeful in its political activities... 1 . 5 On the other 
hand, Nicol assessed that while Fretilin pursued a line that was 
critical of colonialism and strong on demands for independence, it 
'obscured the details of Fretilin's political manifesto, which ... 
tended to be vague on the question of post-independence political 
and economic structures'. When the Fretilin leadership did address 
these issues and moved 'to develop an image of the party as being 
constructive and well planned' it was designed more for overseas 
than domestic consumption, and did little to broaden Fretilin's 
See Jolliffe, J., East Timor, Appendix A: 	Founding 
Political Programmes of Apodeti, Fretilin, and UDT, 
pp.325-338. 
2 	A good account can be found in Jolliffe, J., East Timor, 
pp.61-69. 
3 	Van Dijk, L., "East Timor", Review of Indonesian and Malayan 
Affairs, pp.7-10. Van Dijk highlighted the parochialism of 
Timorese politics when he observed that these leaders were 
related in some way, and had all attended educational 
institutions together. 
4 	Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.21. 	There is also an 
excellent account of this transformation in Jolliffe, J., 
East Timor, pp.61-91. 
5 	Dunn, James, Timor: A People Betrayed, p.69. 
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support base. 1 On balance, it would seem Nicol's understanding of 
developments in East Timor in late 1974s was the correct one and 
was borne out by Fretilin's decision to form a coalition with UDT, 
in an attempt to overcome its electoral problems and to attract 
widespread support. 
The idea of forming a coalition with UDT had been discussed in 
the past by the Fretilin leadership as a way of overcoming the 
party's electoral problems. On such occasions, however, arguments 
put by conservative elements within the party (in particular by 
Horta) that Fretilin would benefit from UDT's popularity were 
overshadowed by counter-arguments that a coalition was against the 
spirit of the party's political manifesto. These ideological 
considerations, however, gave way to the realities of the situation 
and the need for Fretilin to improve its electoral stocks, and this 
emerged as the party's basic aim in forming the coalition. 
For its part, UDT at first showed little interest in the 
notion of a coalition. While UDT's original guiding principle was 
that the relationship between East Timor and Portugal be sustained, 
its plans were upset when the Portuguese (Pires) administration 
arrived in November 1974 to decolonize the territory. 2 In detail, 
UDT's program envisaged that East Timor would become self-
governing, but not independent, and that Portugal would retain a 
province on the island for 20 years. 
By the end of 1974, UDT, under pressure from the Pires 
administration to form a coalition with Fretilin, accepted the 
possibility of a transition to independence within five years, 
bringing it as close to Fretilin policy as the two parties had ever 
been. With friction and resentments developing between the two 
parties at both the popular (rural) and leadership levels, the 
Pires administration sought to divert this conflict and convinced 
both parties that a coalition between them would not only overcome 
their differences but (and playing on the now strong anti-
Indonesian sentiments of both parties) isolate the pro-Indonesian 
1 	Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, pp.81-83. 
2 	Colonel Lemos Pires was accompanied by four officers (Majors 
Adelino Coelho, Mota, Jonatas and Captain Ramos) and 
immediately established a military council. By February 
1975 they had established a Decolonization Commission and 
it provided the MFA with an effective mechanism for its 
decolonization program. 
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party, Apodeti, and reduce its influence. Thus, Colonel Pires and 
his team played an important role in bringing about the coalition 
between the two parties. Tactically, however, Fretilin's intention 
in forming the coalition was to secure the makings of a 
conservative and highly popular party and following its achievement 
on 22 January 1975, it provided an immediate upturn in Fretilin's 
support. While ever this increase in support was sustained in the 
long term: 
Fretilin had no worries. But if this did not happen, the 
party would have to have a total reassessment of UDT, of 
the coalition and of its own role in Timor's new 
politics. 1 
The Changing Nature of Indonesia's Response  
/April 1974 - January 1975)  
As these changes in political circumstances took shape in East 
Timor, it quickly emerged that Indonesia viewed the prospect of an 
independent East Timor with deep apprehension. Although Foreign 
Affairs Minister Malik gave written assurances in June 1974 that 
the Indonesian Government or people had no intentions toward 
expansionism or the occupation of other territories, and noted that 
the 'independence of every country is the right of every nation, 
with no exception for the people of Timor', by September that year 
Indonesia was actively intervening in East Timor's internal 
affairs. By December 1974, Malik had turned full circle and, 
rejecting independence as 'not realistic' in view of 'the 
backwardness and economic weakness of the population', declared 
that the former Portuguese colony had only two options open to it: 
union with Indonesia or the continuation of Portugal's control. 
Why did Indonesia change its course? What were her motives? 
Under both Sukarno and Suharto, Indonesian political attitudes 
towards the territory had always reflected a sense of complacency. 
When the Republic of Indonesia was declared independent by 
Nationalist leaders in 1945, it did not lay claim to, or challenge 
Portuguese colonial rule in, East Timor. On the contrary, as 
Indonesia pressed a claim to West New Guinea during the next two 
decades, it made the point of denying an interest in the territory 
and, as we noted earlier, maintained that its claim to West New 
Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.92. 
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Guinea was based on the territory's former position within the 
Dutch East Indies. 1 Following the overthrow of the Caetano 
Government in Lisbon in April 1974, the situation changed. 
While some Indonesian leaders, like the vice-president of the 
Indonesian Parliament, John Naro, promptly expressed the hope that 
steps would be taken by the Indonesian Government to 'find.., a 
special policy on Portuguese Timor so that finally that area will 
once again return to Indonesian control', 2 the Government spent the 
next two months gauging the internal political situation in the 
territory. It also secured the views of foreign leaders on 
decolonization and: 
gained the impression that the Portuguese would remain 
for some time and that, in any case, decolonization would 
probably lead to a continued Portuguese role in East 
Timor. To some Indonesians, especially in the Foreign 
Ministry, this likelihood took much of the heat out of 
the Timor problem. 3 
In this context, the Indonesian Foreign Minister's response to 
ASDT's diplomatic efforts is not difficult to explain. At a time 
also, when Indonesia, in its on-going search for economic 
assistance, was concerned for its international reputation, Malik 
was publicly prepared to guarantee an independent future for East 
Timor. In a letter dated 17 June 1974 it was stated that (in 
detail): 
(a) The independence of every country is the right of 
every nation with no exception for the people in 
Timor. 
(b) The government, as well as the people of Indonesia, 
have no intention to increase their territory, or to 
occupy other territories other than what is stipulated 
in their Constitution. This reiteration is to give 
you a clear view, so that there may be no doubt in the 
minds of the people of Timor in expressing their own 
wishes. 
(c) For this reason, whoever will govern in Timor in the 
future after independence can be assured that the 
government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain 
good relations, friendship and cooperation for the 
1 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.191. See also Dunn, 
James, Timor. A People Betrayed, pp.101-102. 
2 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.193. 
3 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.108. 
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benefit of both countries. 1 
However, Malik's gesture unwittingly contributed to an upsurge in 
Timorese nationalism, and the advent of a radical political 
movement (eventually styling itself Fretilin) saw this Indonesian 
goodwill transmuted into one of deepening apprehension. The basis 
for this, as we saw in Chapter One, lay deep in Indonesia's 
historical preoccupation with the security of its fissiparous 
archipelago. This was exacerbated by the influential role played 
by the military in the government and it emerged as a crucial 
factor in heightening Indonesian anxieties over developments in 
East Timor throughout the next eighteen months. 
Indeed, by August 1974, the Indonesian Government had assessed 
that an independent East Timor was not in Indonesia's best 
interests. The driving force of such a view was a small group of 
influential military figures who, while at variance with the 
official position adopted by Malik and his Foreign Ministry, 
exercised direct influence on President Suharto. For this group -- 
which included Major-General Ali Murtopo, Admiral Sudomo, Major-
General Benny Murdani and Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama -- the 
arguments for absorption were compelling and were crystallizing at 
the time of a proposed meeting, in September, for informal talks 
between Suharto and Australia's Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam. 
First, while the retention of links with Portugal would be 
counter to Indonesia's strongly held belief in the principle of 
self-determination, it was considered that this would be unlikely 
due to the Portuguese disposition of wanting to divest itself of 
financially draining colonial vestiges. Alternatively, this would 
leave the option of independence. However, the colony had been 
neglected under the Portuguese and its inhabitants had endured 
social conditions, nutrition, health and education standards that 
were extremely low. Further, as the bulk of the people were 
subsistence farmers and fishermen, unless large quantities of 
natural resources were found and exploited, it was unlikely that 
the island would remain economically viable and stable. 
Second, the colony's cloudy future concerned a security-
conscious Indonesia. On one level, there was an historical fear 
Documented in Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.66. 	Malik 
reinforced this in an interview with Hamish McDonald in 
August 1975 (Sydney Morning Herald, 18 August 1975). 
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that independence for the colony may stimulate secessionists to 
revive their activities in Indonesia's outer islands. 1 On another 
level, an independent East Timor under a weak, divided and 
aid-dependent government could become susceptible to subversion, 
externally inspired and promoted. In essence, East Timor could 
become a soft-underbelly, exacerbated further by a strong Chinese 
community which could establish links with China in the wake of any 
Portuguese attempts to establish relations with China. 
However, a counter to these arguments was one overriding 
factor -- a concern for Indonesia's international image, so 
assiduously nurtured under the guidance of Suharto and Malik. 
These Indonesian leaders wanted not only to bury latent regional 
fears of Indonesia's historical expansionist tendencies, but also 
to maintain strong financial links with the West. In essence, 
Indonesia did not want to take any action that could erode its 
position of international respectability. 2 Furthermore, few 
Timorese were interested in the possibility of Timor becoming part 
of Indonesia, as the Portuguese territory had been long separated 
from the remainder of the archipelago, 'exacerbating the ethnic and 
political differences between the peoples of the Portuguese and the 
Indonesian sides of the islands'. 3 Thus, in terms of culture and 
education, the Timorese had developed along different lines from 
that of their Indonesian 'cousins'. Moreover, the example of West 
Irian, politically and economically, offered little incentive to 
the Timorese to believe that integration with Indonesia would 
present any real prospect of working out an autonomous and 
productive political and economic existence within the Indonesian 
Republic. 
Consequently, Indonesia embarked on a low-key diplomatic 
offensive in the territory to improve its image and increase its 
Albinski, H.S., Australian External Policy Under Labor, 
p.107. According to the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (London), a fundamental and sustained 
concern in the decision to invade East Timor was that 
'Indonesia feared the example that an East Timorese 
independence movement might present to separatist movements 
in nearby Maluku and Salawesi...'. (Strategic Survey, 
Annual Report, I.I.S. Studies, London, 1975, p.48). 
2 	For a development of these themes see Hill, H., The Timor 
Story, p.9. 
3 	Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.26. 
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domestic influence while in the UN it prepared to negotiate with 
Portugal over East Timor's future. Fundamental to the former was a 
process of developing friendly working relations with the local 
Portuguese leadership in Timor, while gently nurturing the idea 
of attaching the territory to Indonesia as a province with special 
self-governing status. Paramount to the latter was the ongoing 
process of sounding out the attitudes of its neighbours towards 
decolonization in Portuguese Timor. In this context, Australia's 
response, carried with Whitlam to Indonesia in September 1974, 
could well have been crucial. 
With the shift to the left in September 1974 of the new 
regime in Lisbon, together that same month with the radicalization 
of the ASDT and the UDT's declaration that it favoured East Timor's 
independence, the Murtopo group began showing its hand. At one 
level, the Indonesian press expressed increasing concerns about the 
potential the Timor issue had to destabilize the immediate region2 . 
It agreed that: 
the Indonesian public can see annexation of Timor as an 
act of generosity -- one which would save the Timorese 
from Portuguese colonialism, domination by outside 
powers, infiltration by Communists, subversion by 
Chinese, deception by Fretilin political instability, 
poverty and general backwardness. 3 
At another level, the Murtopo group's plan to acquire East Timor 
emerged. The aim of Operasi Komodo, as it was called, was to bring 
about the territory's integration with the Indonesian Republic. 
Initially, the plan was more of a propaganda and political 
campaign than a military operation and it was conducted by Murtopo, 
who by October 1974 'had firmly taken control of the Timor 
'project' for the Indonesian Government, issuing press commentary 
and sending personal emissaries abroad to inform governments about 
Many of the Timorese elite and the Chinese were loyal to 
Portugal believing that the best guarantee of maintaining 
its economic superiority and distinct cultural identity was 
through links with Portugal. 
2 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.194. McDonald noted 
that one of the driving forces behind such an opinion was 
the Ali Murtopo group's newspaper, Berita Yudha. 
3 	Hoadley, J.S., The Future of Portuguese Timor, p.19. 
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Indonesia's concerns'. 1 Murtopo's brief also required a major 
diplomatic effort, designed to persuade the government in Portugal 
to understand and accept Indonesia's hardening views on the Timor 
issue. By mid-October, meetings in Portugal with the MFA's General 
da Costa Gomez (General Spinola's successor) and his Ministers, had 
secured Portugal's consent to an Indonesian plan to begin 
influencing opinion within East Timor, even though elements within 
the Portuguese Government (including the Decolonization Minister, 
Dr Almeida Santos) still wished to have East Timor's political 
future decided by an act of self-determination. 2 
During the remainder of the year, Indonesia's Operasi Komodo: 
took more definite shape ... Opsus3 took the leading 
role, with other agencies contributing where necessary. 
Ali Murtopo's network ran from Jakarta across to and over 
the border. Advising on diplomatic strategy were his 
political backroom team in the Jakarta academic-style 
institution, the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), which had become an important point of 
contact for foreign diplomats, academics and journalists 
... On the operational side, the operation worked out of 
the closely guarded AKA Building, Ali Murtopo's business 
headquarters in a quiet Jakarta suburb. 4 
By January 1975 Operasi Komodo was aimed at creating political 
destabilization in the territory through infiltration and 
intelligence activities. 5 A key role was being played by the 
Indonesian Consul in Dili which sought to strengthen the 
credibility of Indonesia's internal client, Apodeti, and to create 
an exaggerated impression of the extent of its activities and 
influence. At another level, Radio Kupang in West Timor was 
broadcasting almost daily commentary that branded Fretilin as 
'Communist' and UDT as 'neo-fascist'. At the same time, 
preparations for a full-scale military operation were being put 
1 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.195. See also Dunn, 
James, Timor: A People Betrayed, p.112. 
2 	For a description of Murtopo's talks with the Portuguese. 
See McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, pp.196-197. 
3 	Opsus was a Special Operations Unit that had emerged from 
a special intelligence cell within the Strategic Reserve 
Command (KOSTRAD) which, in the early 1960s, had been run 
by Murtopo, as a Major. 
4 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, pp. 198-199. 
5 	Ibid., p.199. 	See also Dunn, James, Timor. 	A People 
Betrayed, p.88, p.92 and pp.112-116. 
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into shape. 1 
Ironically, Indonesia's blatant attempt to promote by overt 
and covert means the political advantage of Apodeti and the 
benefits of joining Indonesia, only served to make Indonesia appear 
more threatening and aggressive and induce a countervailing 
coalition between Fretilin and UDT. This alignment in January 
1975, and the absence of any quantifiable political disorder in the 
former colony, denied Indonesia any credible justification for 
armed intervention. 	In any event, Indonesia still considered that 
the Portuguese Government was a major factor in determining the 
course of events in its former colony. Following early indications 
that Indonesia was preparing for force at this time, Suharto moved 
to restrain 'hawks' in Jakarta who were urging for immediate 
military intervention, and looked instead to the political 
negotiations due to take place in Macau in the middle of the year 
between the three main Timorese parties. While this saw a shift in 
the aims and activities of Operasi Komodo towards a political/ 
diplomatic strategy, including splitting the Fretilin - UDT 
coalition, 2 circumstances arose during the course of 1975 which 
provided Indonesia with the justification and opportunity for such 
intervention. 
Fretilin/UDT: From Coalition to Conflict (January - August 1975)  
Following its formation on 22 January 1975, the Fretilin/UDT 
coalition immediately repudiated Apodeti and the notion of 
integration with Indonesia, and aimed at pressing the Portuguese 
authorities to facilitate the process of decolonization and self-
determination. By the beginning of March, the newly-appointed 
Governor to Timor, Colonel Mario Lemos Pires conferred with the 
Committee on Decolonization in Lisbon, and by the end of the month 
events were gaining momentum towards a peaceful transition of power 
from the Portuguese to the Timorese. Indeed, by early May, a 
1 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.116. When the 
issue of a proposed invasion entered the public arena in 
Australia in late February -- due to leaked defence 
intelligence reports -- Indonesia temporarily abandoned the 
idea of military action and attention was directed towards 
a strategy of political manipulation (the issue of a 
military invasion is examined below). 
2 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.203. 
303 
meeting of the Fretilin/UDT coalition, Apodeti and the 
Decolonization Commission was convened, at which plans were 
discussed for an election in Timor in October 1976. With a 
Portuguese proposal some weeks later for a meeting of all 
interested Timorese parties in Macau, the stage was set for a 
peaceful transfer of power. However, any gains from this high 
level of diplomatic activity were to be subsequently eroded when, 
in May 1975, UDT withdrew from the coalition. As the reasons for 
this split, which marked the beginning of the end of Timor's foray 
into political independence, vary with interpretation, a brief 
discussion of the state of relations between, and the pressures on, 
the political parties in Timor is necessary at this point. 
In the early months of 1975, the coalition was able to gather 
increased support, particularly in the rural areas, and there did 
not seem to be any fundamental contradictions between its proposed 
transitional program for independence and that put forward by the 
Portuguese administration's Decolonization Commission. 1 However, 
the merger was a shaky one and the course of the territory's 
politics came under pressure from a number of areas. In 
particular, underlying and continuing UDT resentment and distrust 
of Fretilin was exacerbated by conflicts and tensions arising from 
increasing rivalry between left-and-right wing elements in Lisbon 
over the course of decolonization. The effect of this conflict in 
Portugal: 
inevitably came to be felt in East Timor, with UDT 
looking to the Spinolistas and the Christian Democrats, 
and Fretilin leaders identifying themselves with the 
Socialists and the new generation of MFA leaders. In the 
aftermath of the abortive right-wing coup by forces under 
the leadership of General Spinola, tensions inevitably 
began to emerge within the UDT-Fretilin coalition ... 
leading to suspicions by UDT leaders that MFA officers 
were conspiring to place Fretilin in the leading 
UDT 
decolonization role at the expense, if not exclusion, of 
2 
By this time, as we noted earlier, Indonesia's attitude had begun 
to change. Central to this change was a growing Indonesian 
perception of the revolutionary fervor of Fretilin's left-wing, 
which now included recently returned students from Portugal who had 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.98. 
2 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.89. 
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established links with left-wing elements within Australia. 
This perception manifested itself at a March meeting in London 
between Major-General Murtopo, senior Indonesian diplomats and 
Portuguese officials, including Dr Almeido Santos, the Portuguese 
Minister for Decolonization. At this meeting Portugal accepted 
integration as the best outcome and agreed not to obstruct 
reasonable efforts by Indonesia to promote integration. 1 From this 
point on, Independence was downgraded as a viable option by 
Indonesian spokespersons, and the focus of their statements, 
together with those emerging from the Indonesian press, turned to 
East Timor's backwardness and economic unviability. 
Notably, Antara portrayed East Timor as falling into the hands 
of leftist groups, who were using intimidation and threats to 
consolidate their authority. 2 The New Standard, like Antara, 
expressed fears of a communist takeover. However, by this time, 
Murtopo was claiming that while the territory should be 
incorporated into the Indonesian Republic for geographic and ethnic 
reasons, strategic considerations were of paramount importance. In 
particular he feared that an: 
area which is small and weak will easily fall prey to 
power plays of great powers. The adoption of integration 
into Indonesia might be the best solution for the 
implementation of decolonization. 3 
However, with Apodeti totally isolated and enjoying only the 
support of the Indonesian authorities, Indonesia realized it was 
losing influence -- and with it the likelihood of integration by 
non-military means -- and shifted the focus of its activities onto 
the right-wing parties in East Timor, in particular the 
conservative UDT leadership. By June -- having played on UDT's 
suspicious and prejudices against the far more radical Fretilin, as 
well as against the left Portuguese officers in control in Dili -- 
Indonesia had guided the UDT leadership (in particular Lopes da 
Cruz) towards favouring East Timor's integration with Indonesia. 6 
1 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.201. Jolliffe, J., 
East Timor, pp.112-113. 
2 	The Age, 28 February 1975. 
3 	The Age, 25 February 1975. 
4 	Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.298. McDonald, 
H., Suharto's Indonesian, p.203. 
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Throughout this four-month period, these developments 
coincided with, and continued to be reinforced by, intensifying 
Indonesian Government propaganda activity being directed at Timor, 
as well as by an upsurge in Jakarta press reports alleging that a 
'hate Indonesia campaign' was being waged by the Portuguese 
authorities in Timor. In the event, such claims were strongly 
denied by Portuguese officials and Timorese leaders, and by 
Australian journalists in Timor documenting events at the time. 1 
In the meantime, as the political situation deteriorated, the 
Portuguese authorities in Dili were receiving little guidance from 
Lisbon on the implementation of its decolonization policy. Indeed, 
with the new MFA leadership now concerned more with restructuring 
the metropolitan economy and society, little interest was being 
shown in the politics of East Timor. Inevitably, with the idea of 
conceding the former colony to Indonesia emerging to be an 
acceptable option to the Portuguese, Lisbon's initial proposal of a 
five year period of political development -- through local then 
national elections -- was considerably shortened, and was to be 
discussed at the decolonization talks in Macau in June 1975. 
The Decolonization Talks (May and June 1975). 
The first phase of talks on decolonization took place in Dili 
on 7 May, when the Decolonization Commission met with a 
Fretilin/UDT delegation. While Apodeti did not participate -- 
arguing it would do so only when the coalition accepted Timor's 
integration with Indonesia2 -- it was agreed that a transitional 
government be formed in October 1975, and that elections for a 
national consultative assembly be held a year later. The 
acceptance of a role for Apodeti was a sensitive issue at these 
talks with the Decolonization Commission pressing for Apodeti's 
presence at the next session of negotiations at Macau in June. 
Portugal also proposed that should Apodeti not be represented in 
the transitional government, it should then compete in the proposed 
assembly elections. Fretilin took issue with these proposals -- 
arguing that it was unacceptable to discuss decolonization with a 
party committed to 'recolonization' -- and the talks served only to 
See Chapter Eight. 
2 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.95. 
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put stress on what was an increasingly shaky coalition. 
The disharmony between Fretilin and UDT continued following 
these initial discussions. While this was due to the proposal that 
Apodeti have a role in the transitional process (with UDT favouring 
such a role and Fretilin against), 1 differences still existed 
between the two parties on the timing and nature of the transfer of 
power, with UDT favouring gradual movement towards self-government 
and Fretilin preferring a rapid transfer of power. 2 At the same 
time, moves by Fretilin to radicalize the coalition's education and 
agricultural programs alienated the UDT leadership, and gave rise 
to increasing incidents of conflict between supporters of the two 
parties in the townships of Dili, Maubisse and Oecusse, and in the 
countryside. 3 At the end of May, as Portugal moved with plans to 
hold further talks on transition in Macau, UDT unilaterally 
withdrew from the coalition, and it marked 'the beginning of a 
crisis slide in Timorese politics'. 4 While the coalition had 
ruptured -- precipitated in the main by its inability to reconcile 
its position for a united stance at the impending talks, and by 
mounting Indonesian pressure to destabilize the political situation 
in the territory -- the Macau talks took place from 26 to 28 June 
1975. Fretilin, however, chose not to participate. 
Fretilin's decision to boycott the talks seemed to centre on a 
strong opposition to the likely presence at the talks of Apodeti -- 
now being actively encouraged by the Dili administration to attend 5 
-- and it intensified a situation that could only have been further 
aggravated when, in a continuation of the dialogue initiated in 
March, the Portuguese held separate talks with Indonesian officials 
immediately following the close of the Macau conference on 29 June. 
While the main talks gave rise to a Constitutional Law for the 
1 	Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.299. 
2 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.95. 
3 	Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.115. 
4 	Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.300. 
5 	Ibid., p.300. 	See also Dunn, James, Timor. 	A People 
Betrayed, pp.95-96. 
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ultimate decolonization of East Timor, 1 the territory's fate rested 
largely on what was taking place behind closed doors between 
Portugal and Indonesia, and in discussions between the UDT 
leadership and Indonesian officials. 
A visit by three UDT leaders to Indonesia between 25 July and 
6 August 1975, in particular, seemed to seal Timor's fate when the 
visitors were told (on 2 August) by Indonesian officials, namely 
Murtopo and General Surono, 2 that Indonesia could not accept the 
prospect of an independent East Timor on its border, and, with a 
view to establishing an anti-Communist front, that steps be taken 
to link up with Apodeti. 3 Murtopo argued that Fretilin was a 
communist movement and that it was poised to launch a bid for power 
in mid-August. It was also conveyed to the UDT leaders that 
Indonesia would 'close its eyes' to any moves by anti-communist 
forces to counter such a development. 4 With this, UDT plunged 
Timor into a series of events which were to seal the territory's 
political and historical fate. 
The UDT Coup and the Ensuing Civil War (August - December 1975)  
On returning to Dili on 6 August, the UDT leaders found the 
situation was tense. Amidst continuing rumours of impending 
military action by Fretilin, the UDT leadership staged on 9 and 10 
Constitutional Law No.7/75 was promulgated on 17 July 1975. 
While it did not make reference to provisional government, 
the law set October 1976 as the date for a general election 
for a popular assembly which would then determine the 
territory's political future. Furthermore, Portugal's 
sovereignty would end in October 1978. Jolliffe, J., East 
Timor, P.116. See also McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, 
p.204. The progress made at the Macau talks is also 
detailed by Dunn in Dunn, J., Timor. A People Betrayed, 
pp.96-99. 
2 	Deputy Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces. According to 
R. Woolcott, Surono and Murdani were driven by the need not 
to have a communist dominated Fretilin in the archipelago, 
and drew parallels with Cuba. Harris, personal interview 
with R. Woolcott, Canberra, April 1988. 
3 	Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.298. 
4 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.205. See also Dunn, 
James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.167. 
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August a series of anti-communist rallies. 1 During the early hours 
of 11 August UDT moved to seize power, first securing arms from the 
police headquarters and then key installations in Dili and Baucau, 
including the airport and radio station. It broadcast an ultimatum 
to the Portuguese authorities, including in their demands immediate 
independence, the imprisonment of the Fretilin leadership and the 
expulsion of certain Portuguese officials that UDT considered were 
Communists. The Portuguese Government rejected the ultimatum and 
unsuccessfully called for talks with UDT and Fretilin. Fighting 
subsequently broke out in Dili and Baucau resulting in a large 
number of casualties, and UDT gaining control over the urban 
centres. The Portuguese administration failed to intervene. By 27 
August it was in a helpless and demoralized position and the 
Governor transferred the administration to the off-shore island of 
Atauro. 2 
It was at this time that the Antara agency announced that 
the leadership of UDT, together with that of two smaller 
parties, KOTA and Trabalhista l had formed a coalition on the Indonesian side of Timor. It called itself the Movimento 
Anti-Communista (MAC) and 'became the front for the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor on 7 December'. 2 The 
agency also stated that UDT President Francisco Lopes da 
Cruz, favoured the integration of East Timor with Indonesia 
and had called on Indonesia to intervene militarily to end 
the crisis. In the interim, Fretilin, seemingly in 
effective control of most of East Timor, established a 
'transitional administration', which coincided with 
Indonesian complaints of Fretilin attacks on 
Indonesian-Timor border villages. Shortly, thereafter, 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik began issuing what proved 
to be a precursory statement that Timor's potential for 
becoming a base for Communism was being realized. 
1. Klibur Oan Tinse Aswain (KOTA) and Partido Trabalhista (Labour Party). The former 
was a monarchist party in favour of retaining the liuris as traditional leaders. 
It was formed by former Apodeti leaders who broke away when it became clear that 
Indonesia would not restore the Liuris to traditional positions of power. 
2. Nichterlein, S., "The Struggle for East Timor: Prelude to Invasion", Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Vol.7, No.4, 1977, p.495. 
Jolliffe noted two major reasons for the Portuguese 
Administration's inaction: (i) it awaited the arrival from 
Lisbon of a peace-keeping mission which failed to arrive due 
to Indonesian obstructionism. It was not until 20 August 
that the next 'peace-maker' from Lisbon arrived (Dr Almeida 
Santos), well after fighting had begun in Dili; (ii) 
Portugal's (MFA) policy of apartidarismo (or political 
neutrality), in both Portugal itself and in its colonies. 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor, pp.125-126. See also Dunn, James, 
Timor. A People Betrayed, pp.171-172. 
1 
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In the intervening period Fretilin had, on 15 August, 
proclaimed a general armed insurrection against all 'traitors of 
the fatherland° and, within five days, its forces were occupying 
the Armed Forces Training Centre at Ailen after being joined by 
troops in Dili. On 20 August, Governor Pires and the remaining 
Portuguese military and civilian personnel had retreated to a small 
defensive area in the Dili port suburb of Farol where they were 
immediately overwhelmed by refugees and under sporadic gunfire. 
Within a week the Portuguese administration, driven by a sense of 
helplessness and frustration, fled to Atauro, leaving Fretilin to 
raid the Portuguese arsenal and take an estimated 15 000 weapons. 
By mid-September, having earlier mounted a counter-offensive, 
Fretilin had captured Dili and Baucau and controlled most of the 
territory. The UDT and Apodeti forces collapsed, their leaders 
either captured by Fretilin or having escaped to Australia or 
Indonesian Timor. By the end of September, Fretilin controlled 
virtually all of East Timor, with the exception of the Oecusse 
enclave and the island of Atauro. 2 
In the meantime, Indonesia resisted the opportunity presented 
by these developments to intervene militarily. While it was 
maintaining a naval presence off Dili by the end of August, and 
training Apodeti forces in the border region, the Indonesian 
President did not yield to pressures from his political and 
security advisers (notably Defence Minister Panggabean, Murdani, 
and, by this time, Malik3 ) to militarily intervene. 4 Suharto was 
mindful of the consequences of intervention -- not least in terms 
of the reactions of western banks -- and lent initially towards 
diplomacy in seeking a resolution to what was now clearly a 
political quagmire. At one level, Indonesia used its powers to 
obstruct Portuguese efforts to bring together an international 
peace force to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. 
At another level, Indonesia unsuccessfully attempted in early 
1 	Quoted in McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.206. 
2 	Ibid. 
3 	McDonald noted that by this stage, Malik 'feared being 
blamed if a more diplomatic path led into a quagmire'. 
McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.207. 
4 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue: I", p.215. 
McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.207. 
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September to pry an invitation from Portugal to restore order. 1 
Throughout this period, selected units of the Indonesian armed 
forces were on alert. After the failure of this latter 
initiative -- which coincided with an evident consolidation of 
control by Fretilin -- Indonesia undertook more direct efforts to 
protect its interests and by early October 'a new phase of the 
Timor war had opened.. 2 
On 7 October Indonesia successfully undertook its first major 
military operation against Fretilin forces when, in response to a 
Fretilin operation on 24 September that dislodged UDT forces from 
the border fort of Batugade, Saudi Yudha (formerly RPEAD) 
Indonesian Commandos -- with air and naval gunfire support -- 
mounted a successful counter attack. Within days several hundred 
Indonesian troops had crossed the border into East Timor and, on 16 
October, mounted a major assault on the East Timorese towns of 
Balibo and Maliana. 3 An entirely Indonesian operation, the 
principal military objective was to secure the regional centre of 
Maliana. 4 The operation involved a series of coordinated attacks 
by over 1 200 men5 on at least five other border towns between 14 
and 16 October. While the small Fretilin garrison of 40 men at 
Balibo quickly retreated in the dawn attack of 16 October, five 
Australian-based newsmen° remained to continue documenting the 
Indonesian military presence in East Timor -- the main reason they 
were there, 7 although such a presence was being vigorously denied 
1 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.208. 
2 	Ibid., p.210. 
3 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.228. 
4 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.210. See also, Leifer, 
M., Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p.157. 
5 	Estimates vary between 1 200 to 2 000 Indonesian troops, 
assisted by 100 Timorese partisans. See Nicol, B., Timor.  
The Stillborn Nation, p.306. Dunn, James, Timor. A People 
Betrayed, p.235. 
6 	Greg Shackleton, Tony Stewart and Gary Cunningham from HSV 
Channel 7 in Melbourne. Brian Peters and Malcolm Rennie 
were from the Channel 9 network in Melbourne. Shackleton 
and Stewart were Australian. Cunningham was from New 
Zealand. Rennie was a British citizen, as was Peters. 
7 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.240. 
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by the Indonesian Government. 1 
There have been a number of accounts of the circumstances 
surrounding the deaths of the journalists and it is possible to put 
together a consistent reconstruction of how and when they were 
killed. 2 It seems probable that during the assault by an 
estimated 300 Indonesian troops on Balibo, the newsmen remained in 
the village area to film. It is Dunn's reasonable belief that in 
doing so the five men were: 
presumably confident that their non-combatant status 
would be identified and respected ... after all 
[Indonesia] was Australia's nearest neighbour, and a 
great deal had been said in the previous two years about 
the 'close and friendly relations' that had developed 
between the two countries. 3 
However, while the newsmen had attempted to indicate their 
identities as non-combatant Australians -- by wearing distinctly 
civilian clothing and painting both the word 'Australia' and a 
rough sketch of an Australian flag on the house in Balibo in which 
they were staying -- they came under fatal gun-fire from the 
advancing Indonesian forces. In the circumstances, all credible 
evidence points to the conclusion that the journalists were not the 
victims of a misunderstanding or an accident, particularly when 
account is taken of McDonald's understanding that the Indonesian 
forces involved in the assault were 'under explicit orders to kill 
all witnesses to their covert intrusion into foreign territory'. 4 
Furthermore, this evidence also propounds that the Australian 
Government, through the Department of Defence's electronic 
Ibid., p.229. 	Dunn notes Indonesian Foreign Affairs 
Minister Malik's public denials in mid-October that 
Indonesian troops were involved in the border fighting, but 
believes Malik knew little of the covert operations being 
conducted under Operasi Komodo. 
2 	For an account of the incident, see inter alia, Jolliffe, 
J., East Timor, pp.166-177; Dunn, James, Timor. A People 
Betrayed, pp.233-239; McDonald, H., "Death at Balibo", 
National Times, 7 July 1979. See also Dale van Atta and 
Brian Toohey, "The Timor Papers", Part I, National Times, 
30 May - 5 June 1982; Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn 
Nation, pp.306-310. 
3 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.233. 
4 	McDonald, H., "Death at Balibo", National Times, 7 July 
1979. 
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surveillance system, 1 knew by 17 October of the assault on Balibo 
and the deaths of the five journalists 2 (this is examined in more 
detail below). 
Heavy fighting was to continue in the Balibo/Maliana region in 
the weeks after the original attack. Citing subsequent Indonesian 
warships bombardments and troop activity, and the lack of political 
and legal direction from Portugal, Fretilin announced on 28 
November 1975 the independence of East Timor from Portugal, 
renaming the territory the Democratic Republic of East Timor 
(DRET). In the meantime, while continuing its covert operations in 
East Timor, the Indonesians engaged in talks in Rome in early 
November with the Portuguese who not only refused to recognize any 
claim by Fretilin for recognition of sovereign status but seemed 
'to endorse Indonesia's right to be a principal party to the 
conflict'. 3 With this, the die appeared to be cast and when 
Fretilin asserted its independence, a 'provoked' 4 Indonesia reacted 
quickly. On 29 November, the Movimento Anti-Communista (MAC) 5 
declared East Timor a part of Indonesia. On 1 December, Malik 
stated that 'The solution to the Timor question is now the front 
line of battle'. 6 On 4 December, Indonesia's Information Minister, 
Mashuri, issued an authoritative statement in which the prospect of 
decisive intervention was signalled. 7 
Overt action did not follow immediately8 but began on 7 
The Defence Signals Division of the Department of Defence 
is located in Melbourne, Victoria. 
2 	See Hall, R., The Secret State, Sydney, Cassell, 1978, 
pp.149-150. 
3 	Leifer, M., Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p.157. 
4 	Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, p.446. 
5 	See p.308, (footnote 1). 
6 	For an account of this period see Jolliffe, J., East Timor, 
pp.208-215. 
7 	Full text of Joint Statement in Indonesian News, London, 
December 1975, pp.29-30. 
8 	Leifer, M., "Indonesia and the incorporation of East Timor", 
p.353, suggested that the invasion 'was almost certainly 
delayed for four days because of the impending brief visit 
to Jakarta by President Ford ... rais[ing] all kinds of 
speculation about the extent of consultation and even 
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December and was justified on the grounds that it was a response to 
requests from within East Timor to restore order there. 1 An 
Indonesian Government statement argued that it could not prevent 
'Indonesian volunteers from helping their brothers in East Timor in 
their struggle to liberate themselves from Fretilin oppression'. 2 
Such intervention by 'volunteers' attempted to resolve the issue of 
the political future of East Timor once and for all. Operation 
Sero . a3 saw 16 000 Indonesian troops invade with Indonesian victory 
envisioned in only a matter of days. A year later the nationalist 
resistance had fought thirty to forty thousand occupying troops to 
a stalemate. 4 According to the authoritative Australian 
journalist, Michael Richardson, by September Fretilin still 
controlled the bulk of the people and the territory. 5 
On the political side, the charade of 'integration at the 
collusion with the American President and his advisers on 
the imminent military enterprise'. Nevertheless, 'Ford was 
spared the embarrassment of being in Jakarta while the 
invasion of East Timor was proceeding'. Woolcott commented 
in an interview that Kissinger and Ford reputedly did not 
know about the impending invasion. Harris, personal 
Interview with Woolcott, Canberra, April 1988. 
1 	For a good account of the invasion see Dunn, J.S., The Timor 
Story, pp.69 ff. 	Woolcott indicated that Indonesia's assessments (principally through General Yoga) reflected: 
(i) a determination at the senior levels in Indonesia to stop the continued festering of what was considered to 
be a 'communist sore'; and 
(ii) that none of the major powers would try to stop them, including America, China, Japan and the USSR. 
Moreover, Woolcott indicated that while many of the member 
states of ASEAN encouraged Indonesia in its decision 
(particularly Malaysia), Singapore did not. 	Personal 
interview, Ibid. 
2 	An official communique issue in Jakarta, cited by the Age, 
24 December 1975. 
3 	Operasi Komodo had been replaced by Operasi Seroja. 
4 	Accounts of the fighting indicate that the first wave of 
Indonesian paratroops (about 1 000 men) was followed in late 
December by up to another 15 000 troops. It has been 
suggested (Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.75) that between 
30-35 000 Indonesian troops were in Timor by April 1976. 
To avoid UN condemnations, these troops continued to be 
officially referred to as 'volunteers'. 
5 	Richardson, Michael "FRETILIN' s Alive and Kicking", the Age, 
8 December 1976. 
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request of the people of East Timor', so reminiscent of the West 
New Guinea process, took about seven months. A provisional 
government, headed by Apodeti leaders and recognized by Indonesia, 
had been established in Dili on 17 December. By the middle of 
February 1976, it claimed that the island was under effective 
control. The rest was ceremony. On 31 May, an 
Indonesian-appointed provisional legislative met and voted in 
favour of integration, in the presence of journalists and diplomats 
flown in for 'a lightning three hour visit'. 1 This resolution was 
presented in a petition to President Suharto on 7 June, who 
accepted it as an expression of 'brothers joining with brothers'. 2 
This ceremonial process was extended with the despatch of an 
Indonesian mission 'comprising government officials, members of 
Parliament and representatives of functional groups... in a move to 
provide further window-dressing to this Wayang performance'. 3 Its 
task was to 'ascertain the wishes of the people of Timor', and was 
completed in good time for the formal admission of this 27th 
Province of Indonesia on 17 July 1976, a month before the 
anniversary of Indonesia's proclamation of independence. Of this 
whole situation, a stunned James Dunn 4 commented: 
In each case the delegations and a small accompanying 
group of diplomats - Australia and others declined to 
participate - were treated to a carefully orchestrated 
reception, which revealed absolutely nothing of the true 
situation in Timor, nor of the real feelings of the 
Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.83. Representatives of the 
United Nations were invited to attend (the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonization, the Secretary-General and the 
President of the Security Council). Until this point, both 
the UNGA and UNSC had endorsed East Timor's right to 
self-determination and called, on 11 December 1978, for 
Indonesia's unilateral withdrawal. The UN, however, began 
to prove ineffective and any support there was for East 
Timorese independence dissipated due to intensive Indonesian 
lobbying within the UN See Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, 
pp.79-85, for a full account of this activity in the UN. 
2 	Williams, J., News Weekly, August 1976. 
3 	Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.83. 
4 	A former Consul in East Timor, James Dunn was head of the 
Foreign Affairs Section of the Australian Parliamentary 
Library, and was to become a central figure of dissent over 
Australia's East Timor policy (See Chapter 10). 
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people. 1 
Despite these events, Fretilin military activity continued on a 
significant scale until the end of the period under review, 2 
compelling Dunn to again write: 
scant attention has been given to the humanitarian 
consequences of Indonesia's forced integration of East Timor 
which seems to be assuming the proportions of genocide. The 
case of East Timor presents, in relative terms, the most 
serious case of abuse of human rights, not to mention the 
right of self-determination, ever to have been inflicted on 
a people, in the crude guise of integration. 3 
Australia's Interest in East Timor 
A Background  
Before World War I, Australia's contacts with Portuguese Timor 
were of little substance, although since the early 1900s, the 
island of Timor has figured strongly, although intermittently, in 
Australian strategic perceptions. Early disquiet with rebellion on 
the island before World War 1, 4 served to exacerbate ongoing 
reports (particularly after the collapse of the Portuguese Monarchy 
in 1910) of an interest on the part of external powers in annexing 
the island, and reflected a deep-seated concern that the island's 
occupation by a potentially hostile power was detrimental to 
Australia's security interests. 5 This view subsided and lay 
Dunn, J.S., The Timor Story, p.83. Dunn held firmly to his 
contempt of this whole episode throughout the next decade, 
and confirmed as much in personal interviews with the writer 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
2 	See Kamm, "The Silent Suffering of East Timor", New York 
Times, 15 December 1981. 
3 	Dunn, JS., "East Timor - Notes on the Humanitarium 
Situation", Parliament of Australia, Legislative Research 
Service, Foreign Affairs Group, September 1979. 
4 	The rebellion, instigated by the powerful Timorese liuri  
trading class against Portuguese rule, raged for some two 
years. It was reported in the Melbourne Argus (12 December 
1912), which anxiously concluded that the trouble in Timor 
should be of particular interest to all Australians because 
'...Port Dili, the scene of the outrages, is closer to Port 
Darwin than Hobart is to Melbourne'. 
5 	At different times, the Germans, the Japanese and the Dutch 
were reported to have had territorial designs on the colony. 
Hastings, P., "The Timor Problem II: 	Some Australian 
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dormant until the late 1930s when Australia became wary of Japanese 
activities and intentions in the colony. By the Second World War, 
and for some years after, the island had resumed significant 
strategic importance in the context of Australia's defence. In a 
major speech on international affairs i to the House of 
Representatives in 1943, the Labor Minister for External Affairs, 
Dr H.V. Evatt indicated: 
As a result of the war, Australia must show a particular 
interest in the ... islands and territories that lie 
close to our shores. From the point of view of defence, 
trade and transport, most of them can be fairly described 
as coming within an extended Australian zone... Timor, 
part of which is Portuguese and part Dutch, was of 
importance to the overseas air service between Australia 
and Europe. This island, in enemy hands, is a constant 
threat to Australia. If properly placed within the zone 
of Australian security, it would become a bastion of our 
defence. In Portuguese Timor we appointed a special 
Australian representative in 1941. We also took all 
practical steps to assist its people... When Portuguese 
Timor was practically defenseless and the Japanese 
invasion of this neutral territory was imminent... The 
epic stand of our troops in the Timor hills will always 
be a source of legitimate pride to all Australians. 2 
Although Evatt's security zone was never realized nor a system of 
regional cooperation established in this area, 3 Australian consular 
representation on the island remained until 1971. In the meantime, 
Timor submerged once again to lay idle beneath the Australian 
consciousness. Thus: 
Australian attitudes had gone full circle ... In 1941 
Timor was regarded as being so vital to the country's 
defence that Australian troops actually engaged in an act 
of invasion, inevitably forcing the Timorese to endure 
the horrors of war and occupation ...[however]... because 
of British pressures and Portuguese suspicions, ambitious 
plans for a special postwar relationship never got off 
the ground. No priorities emerged ... as far as the 
policy-makers were concerned [and]... the East Timor 
colony drifted back to the obscurity of the last 
century. 4 
Attitudes, 1903-1941", Australian Outlook, Vol.29, August 
1975, pp.183-185. 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.176, pp.567-579, 14 October 1943. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.176, p.573 1  14 October 1943. 
3 	This function was provided in the zone east of New Guinea 
by the South Pacific Commission. 
4 	Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.136. 
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But more than this, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Australian 
Government was to show little interest in the Timorese people 
themselves and their socio-economic well-being under Portuguese 
control. 
In 1963, however, conflicting concern had emerged within the 
Australian Labor Party more broadly over the right of colonies to 
self-determination. Timor figured prominently in the Party's anti-
colonial calls, with its deputy leader, E.G. Whitlam, making a 
statement that was to return to haunt him just over a decade later: 
Eastern Timor must appear as an anachronism to every 
country in the world except Portugal... we would not have 
a supporter in the world if we backed the Portuguese... 
they must be told in no uncertain terms that the standard 
of living must be rapidly raised, and the rights of 
self-determination fully granted... through the UN. We 
must act quickly to meet this problem ... and not become 
bogged down in another futile argument l over sovereignty. 2 
This view was ALP Conference policy for the next three years, 
although, due to an increasing interest in Vietnam, it lapsed at 
the 1966 Federal Conference. Consequently, the ALP came to power 
in 1972 with no policy on East Timor. In the meantime, the Liberal 
government continued to show little interest in the colony. 
Indeed, due to increasing international pressure on Portugal's 
colonial policies (as well as the fact that Australia opened a 
mission in Lisbon), the Australian Government closed its Consulate 
in 1971, and began supporting UN resolutions, initiated in the 
mid-1960s, that called for the self-determination of Portuguese 
colonial territories. Jolliffe explained: 
This break with Liberal precedent became the established 
pattern after Labor came to power. However, although 
Labor publicly pursued a vigorous anti-colonial policy in 
the UN, Timor soon emerged as an exception to the rule. 3 
The potential for Portuguese Timor to expose this contradiction in 
the new Australian Labor government's foreign policy was realized 
in 1973 when press and community groups voiced criticism of 
Australia's economic links with the colony, which were it was 
A reference to 'the lessons of West New Guinea'. 
2 	The Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, given in Adelaide 1963; 
quoted in Hill, H., The Timor Story, p.3 and Dunn, James, 
Timor. A People Betrayed, p.134. 
3 	Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.245. 
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argued in contravention of the UN's stand. In response, Senator 
Don Willesee indicated that as far as the Labor government was 
concerned these UN resolutions did not refer to Portuguese Timor, 
only to Portugal's African colonies. 1 
This distinction, reflecting a 'co-existence of principled 
attitudes abroad and expediency closer to home', 2 was maintained by 
Willesee in a government response to the 1974 coup in Portugal 
when, in a reference to its implications for Portugal's overseas 
territories, he ignored the Portuguese colony of Timor. Moreover, 
the government's 'strong opposition to the perpetuation of 
unrepresentative colonial minority regimes° seemed only to focus 
on southern Africa. This was the only statement issued in the 
Foreign Minister's name until 30 October 1975, 4 twelve days before 
the Whitlam government lost power. Meanwhile, the enunciation of 
Australia's Timor policy fell to other spokespersons, namely 
Whitlam and W. Morrison, but not before Whitlam made his 
controversial visit to Jakarta in September 1974. While not 
intended to achieve spectacular and widely publicized results, 
Whitlam's arrival in Indonesia came, as we noted earlier, at a 
critical stage in the development of Indonesia's official attitude 
towards Portuguese Timor, and it was the security interest of 
Indonesia, not Australia, that were to influence the shape of the 
1 	CPD, Senate, S.56, 23 May 1973, pp.1824-1825. 
2 	Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.245. 
3 	AFAR, April 1974, p.288. 
4 	Foreign Minister Willesee made a Ministerial Statement to 
the Parliament on 30 October 1975 (CPD, H.R., Vol.66, 
pp.1609-1610, 30 October 1975). Up until that time only one 
other Ministerial Statement was made in the Parliament, and 
that was by Senator Wriedt on behalf of the Acting Minister 
for Foreign Affairs (Whitlam). In the period 29 April 1974 
until 30 October 1975, over thirty Questions were asked in 
the Senate on matters relating to the Portuguese/East Timor 
situation. Senator Wriedt fielded most of these questions 
up until 30 September. On that day Senator Sir Magnus 
Cormack was critical of the government's neglect in 
explaining its foreign policy (it had not done so since May 
1973) and of Willesee, specifically, for using the 'foreign 
policy device of getting an anonymous spokesperson to answer 
on his behalf' (CPD, Senate, S.65, 30 September 1975, 
p.776). Willesee subsequently responded to all of the 
remaining Questions, all in October, prior to his 30 October 
1975 statement. 
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Labor Government's Timor policy. 
The Whitlam-Suharto Talks in Wonosobo, September 1974  
It would be tempting to conclude that the Wonosobo talks 
brought about the change at that time in Indonesia's attitude 
towards East Timor. However, as it was argued here, as well as 
forcefully elsewhere% Indonesia's assessment that its interests 
would not be served if the territory sought its independence was 
due to developments within Portugal, its former colony and to 
divisions within Indonesia's ruling circles. Nevertheless, this 
meeting did lay the foundations for future understanding between 
Australia and Indonesia on East Timor, for: 
Whitlam told Suharto he thought the best solution would 
be for East Timor to join Indonesia, adding with somewhat 
less emphasis that the wishes of the Timorese should be 
respected and that public reaction in Australia would be 
hostile if Indonesia used force. 2 
An examination of what was concluded at this meeting is of 
particular interest not so much to draw attention to the options 
available to Whitlam, but to highlight the undercurrents of opinion 
within the bureaucracy. This gave rise to an early dilemma over 
what Australia's options were in any formulation of an East Timor 
policy. 
Although the theme of Whitlam's attitude toward the East Timor 
question was one of 'non-involvement', Australia was compelled by 
mid-1974 to formulate a policy on East Timor simply because 
developments in the territory at this time did not 'permit Canberra 
a totally detached attitude'. 3 However, this process was 
confounded by two contradictory notions: the ALP's traditional 
commitment to the process of self-determination and the 
implications to the region of a potentially unstable, economically 
fragile independent East Timor. Exacerbating this was Indonesia's 
hardening attitude and Whitlam's firm perception of Indonesia as a 
Hill, H., The Timor Story, p.8; 	Richardson, Michael, 
National Times, July 19-24, 1976, pp.11-12. 	See also 
Utrecht, E., "United States of Indonesia. The Pentagon and 
the Generals", Arena, No.42, 1976, p.77 ff. 
2 	McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.195. 
3 	Albinski, H.S., Australian External Policy Under Labor, 
p.106. 
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key nation in the region. As Whitlam had argued within weeks of 
the 1972 election: 
It goes without saying that the Number One [sic] 
objective of my government is to strengthen relations 
with Indonesia... one of the crucial factors which will 
determine the future of the South-West Pacific... and 
largely determine the future of the East Indian Ocean 
area for the rest of this century. 1 
It followed then that whatever the nature of Indonesia's disputes 
with other States in the region, with outside powers, or even with 
Australia, the latter: 
would establish a diplomatic framework in which it would 
be agreed, on both sides, that the long-term relationship 
should be maintained and strengthened despite the effects 
of particular disputes. 2 
Two other aspects of Whitlam's approach to Indonesia were embodied 
in his view of, and Australian attitudes towards, Southeast Asia 
generally. The first, according to Jolliffe, embraced two central 
themes: 'that trade was a more constructive tool in Southeast Asia 
than defence pacts... and that Indonesia and other of the ASEAN 
countries presented ripe fields for Australian investments, which 
should be exploited'. 3 The second reflected: 
his long-standing concern that ... disputes [such as 
Timor] ... could lead to a resurgence among Australians 
of the Asian threat preoccupation, imbued with racist 
overtones, which had in the 1950s and 1960s blighted the 
constructive development of Australia's relations with 
Asian countries.... 4 
Thus, the maintenance of the bilateral relationship was the main, 
if not only, consideration in policy, even when Australian and 
Indonesian views were in conflict on particular issues. As the 
Portuguese Empire, including East Timor, began to collapse, 
relating these policy objectives to the new situation became an 
increasingly important concern for Whitlam. 
Whitlam, E.G., Broadcast on Radio Australia, 22 December 
1972, "A Selection of Statements on Foreign Affairs by the 
Australian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr Whitlam, and the Special Minister of State, Senator 
Willesee". Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 8 
August 1973. 
2 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", Australian 
Outlook, Vol.30, No.2, 1976, p.201. 
3 	Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.246. 
4 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.203. 
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This task, however, seemed to have been completed in a single 
stroke when, on 5 September 1974, an Australian Foreign Affairs 
official announced to journalists that during the Whitlam-Suharto 
talks the Australian Prime Minister had said: 
an independent Timor would be an unviable state and a 
potential threat to the area. 
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister was thought: 
to have made clear that the people of the colony should 
have the ultimate decision on this future. 1 
The first statement formed the basis of Australia's East Timor 
policy2 for the remainder of the Whitlam government's tenure of 
office, and became a catalyst for the widening public debate on its 
inherent dilemma. It also ushered in a subtle redirection in 
Indonesia's policy, 3 publicly enunciated the following week when 
the Indonesian Home Affairs Minister said that his government was 
prepared to accept the Portuguese half of Timor island if that was 
the real wish of the East Timor people. Thus, there was a 
convergence of policies on what now was becoming known as 'the 
Timor problem'. 4 Yet, notwithstanding this framework of 
assumptions, and the timing in its enunciation, some found these 
precipitate developments perplexing. Peter Hastings, for example, 
asked 'why in the name of all that is cautious, the unseemingly 
Quoted in Hastings, P., "Whitlam treads dangerous ground 
on Timor", the Sydney Morning Herald, 16 September 1974. 
See also the Canberra Times, 9 September 1974. 
2 	Morrison first put the attitude and policy of the government 
on Portuguese Timor in October 1974 when, in response to 
criticism of the government's policy on self-determination 
from Peacock, he said they were 'based on the principles 
of the United Nations and Australia's support for the right 
of self-determination for all colonial people ... if the 
people of Portuguese Timor wish to associate ... with 
Indonesia, Australia would welcome this provided ... the 
decision were based on an internationally accepted act of 
self-determination. In short, the Government believes that 
the Timorese people should be allowed to proceed 
deliberately towards a decision about their own future...' 
(CPD, H.R., Vol.91, p.3046, 30 October 1974). 
3 	The Indonesian Government's only statement of policy up 
until the meeting was the letter, from Malik, which Horta 
brought back with him from Jakarta in June 1974. 
4 	Statement from the Indonesian Home Affairs Minister, General 
Amir Machmud. Quoted in Viviani, N., "Australians and the 
Timor Issue", p.200. See also The National Times, 19-24 
July 1975. 
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public haste to hand Portuguese Timor to the Indonesians?' 1 
Interpretations vary as to why Whitlam acted with such 
immediacy, with Viviani providing perhaps the most plausible 
analysis. First, she focused on Whitlam's dislike of small states 
and messy situations (the 'Balkanisation of Southeast Asia 12 
syndrome), and his close personal contact with President Suharto. 
Second, she considered 'institutional reasons' were fundamental -- 
specifically, the influence on Whitlam of the so-called 'Indonesian 
Lobby' 3 in the Department of Foreign Affairs. 4 Alternatively, 
Graham Freudenberg, 5 writing in 1977, principally on former Labor 
leader Calwell's conduct in relation to the messy West New Guinea 
issue in the early 1960s, offered a different dimension: 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 September 1974. 
2 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the East Timor Issue", p.203. 
3 	Herb Feith referred to such a 'lobby' group in a submission 
to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence, April 1982. Feith's depiction of the term was 
broader and included 'Indonesian watchers and former 
Indonesian watchers in other government departments and 
among service officers, and people of similar background in 
the academic and journalistic worlds'. More interestingly, 
however, he saw this 'group is held together by a common 
outlook and ethos rather than material interests. Its 
members' outlook is a coherent one [they] ... have a genuine 
affection for Indonesia and its people. And their concern 
to combat racism in Australia is idealistic'. Feith 
considered that such views first took shape in the early 
1960s when Sukarno was seen as a disaster and Suharto's 
accession to the Presidency as a 'Godsend' (H. Feith, 
Submission to the Secretary, Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence, Parliament House, Canberra, 2 
April 1982, p.7 (copy of letter with the writer)). 
4 	Viviani, N.,"Australians and the East Timor Issue", p.201. 
Dr Viviani, however, argues that although the Department 
of Foreign Affairs came down on the side of the integration 
proposal, it was incorrect to argue -- as some had done in 
early 1976 -- that the department dominated Australia's 
policy towards East Timor. She also qualified the high 
level of influence given by these interpretations to 
Furlonger and Woolcott -- respectively Ambassadors to 
Indonesia 1971-74, and 1974-76 -- whose views, Dr. Viviani 
suggested, were dominated by Whitlam. Dr. Viviani still 
maintains this argument. Harris, personal interview with 
Viviani, September 1986. 
5 	From 1961 to 1966, Freudenberg was Press Secretary to 
Calwell, and from 1967 to 1975 on Whitlam's staff, first as 
Press Secretary (1967-72) and then as Special Adviser 
(1972-75). 
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Sukarno had stepped up the pressure on West New Guinea to 
shore up his crumbling position at home; Calwell 
blundered into the controversy for a political advantage 
at home; Menzies used the issue to recover from his own 
near defeat at home. Within a year, Sukarno was to 
achieve incorporation of West New Guinea; over the next 
two years, Menzies steadily restored his supremacy; 
Calwell remained the Labor leader for four more years, 
but his decline from that day was deep, accelerating and 
irreversible. 
Thirteen years later in 1975, there was to be an echo of 
this strange affair. The Calwell catastrophe would deeply 
affect the attitude of Whitlam, as Prime Minister, to the 
problem posed by Indonesia's desire to incorporate East 
Timor. Whitlam, as Prime Minster, was determined never 
again to have a bar of the humbug humiliation and hypocrisy 
which had occurred over West Irian. 1 
Alan Renouf, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs at 
the time, put forward similar explanations. However, he was at 
odds with Viviani's assertion that such a lobby prevailed in the 
formulation of Australia's East Timor policy. Renouf stressed that 
in a brief given to Whitlam on the eve of the Wonosobo talks, the 
department analysed the prospect of East Timor's integration with 
Indonesia and 'concluded that if this were to happen through self-
determination, slow and careful political development under 
Portugal would be best. ,2  However, Renouf argues that Whitlam 
chose to ignore this advice in his discussions with Suharto, with 
the Australian Prime Minister preferring to stress, 'integration of 
East Timor but only through self-determination.' 3 In taking such a 
Freudenberg, G., A Certain Grandeur, p.18. 
2 	Renouf, Alan, The Frightened Country, p.442. 	While 
indicating that his role in determining the substance and 
direction of Australia's policy making on Indonesia was 
exaggerated, Woolcott put the view that a former Ambassador 
to Indonesia, Furlonger was, in 1972, the main architect of 
Australia's policy of East Timor's integration into the 
Indonesia State when the issue of decolonization was to be 
addressed. In the meantime, according to Woolcott, the 
department's Executive felt that it could not manipulate 
such a process and that it would have to take its natural 
course. In any event, self-determination would have to be 
kept to the fore. Harris, personal interview with Woolcott, 
Canberra, April 1988. 
3 	Ibid., p.443. According to Woolcott, Whitlam was working 
towards Indonesia and Portugal getting together with a view 
to preparing the East Timorese people for an act of self-
determination within a five year (minimum) time framework. 
More to the point, Whitlam had not addressed the issue of 
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position, Whitlam sought to merge two approaches -- integration and 
self-determination. 
This policy position was subsequently re-phrased by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs to emphasize that Australia's main 
concern was with self-determination in East Timor but that: 
voluntary union with Indonesia through an internationally 
acceptable act of self-determination would not serve the 
objectives of decolonization and regional stability.' 
For its part, the Department of Defence put forward an alternative 
view as a basis for policy. Analysts dealing with strategic 
planning and intelligence continued to see Timor as an important 
buffer and potential defensive outpost, with the Second World War 
providing the dramatic precedent. In fact, according to Hugh 
Armfield of the Age newspaper in Melbourne, some circles in the 
department were: 
strongly opposed to Timor becoming associated with 
Indonesia. They would prefer to see it independent.., they 
point to Portuguese Timor's closeness to Australia and to 
the fact that it was used by the Japanese in the last war 
for reconnaissance flights over Australia and could again be 
of strong strategic importance... they also believe that 
Indonesia is not as stable as other people (particularly 
Foreign Affairs) think and that there is a possibility of a 
government hostile to Australia emerging in Jakarta, which 
would make Portuguese Timor of vital importance. So they 
favour the colony being independent or in some way strongly 
linked with Australia.' 
In any event, while Whitlam's East Timor policy claimed that the 
Australian Government could only support a proper act of self-
determination, it prejudged the outcome of such a process by 
stressing that integration was the most acceptable option, which 
was by this time in keeping with Indonesia's preferred objective 
a factor that, notwithstanding Renouf's contention, would not have 
been lost on key influential officials in the Australian foreign 
policy-making process. 3 
a choice between incorporation without such an act of self-
determination (due to the circumstances such as those that 
arose) or another route. 
1 	Ibid., p.444. 
2 	The Age, 13 September 1974. 
3 	In particular, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta and the 
Head of the Indonesian Section within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in Canberra. 
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While Australia's East Timor policy came under scrutiny from 
both the press and the Parliament, 1 Whitlam was unmoved. However, 
it became increasingly clear over the next five months that the 
Australian Government had reached a point where -- having decided 
the best possible option for East Timor was its integration with 
Indonesia -- it needed to persuade domestic and international 
opinion of the merit of such a solution. Such a task become 
particularly difficult during these months because it was emerging 
that Indonesia 'was preparing for a situation where some of her 
leaders assessed she might have to use force in East Timor. ,2 
Indonesian Military Intervention : Early Australian Assessments  
In the meantime, increasing emphasis was being placed on such 
a likelihood by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra. 
Within months of the Wonosobo talks in September 1974, a working 
paper had been drawn up by the department and it became the basis 
of an abortive Australian attempt to prevent Indonesian military 
intervention in East Timor. The paper was a response to 
assessments from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, intelligence 
and other sources, that Indonesia was prepared to use force if 
necessary to prevent East Timor from emerging as a sovereign State, 
and it canvassed the option of independence for the former colony. 
By early March 1975, this draft had been expanded into a secret 
working paper and it had the endorsement of Foreign Affairs 
1 	See Chapter Eight and Nine. 
2 	Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, p.444. Dr. Viviani 
confirmed that official assessments were filtering through 
to Canberra following Whitlam's return from Indonesia in 
September 1974, that Jakarta was now opposed to independence 
for East Timor. Further, that intelligence assessments were 
directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to establish a 
clear understanding that Indonesia was prepared to use force 
to prevent this. Harris, personal interview with Viviani, 
September, 1986. 
Gregory Clark, a member of Whitlam's staff wrote in 1976 
that Indonesia drew up the invasion plan (Operasi Komodo) 
immediately after Whitlam and Suharto met in September 1974. 
National Times, 22-27 March 1976, p.12. In hindsight, and 
likely to have been confirmed by intelligence assessments 
referred to by Viviani, some of its manifestations appeared 
at this time, including financial aid to Apodeti, and the 
propaganda broadcasts into East Timor from Kupang, West 
Timor. 
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Minister Willesee who, by this stage, had expressed his concerns in 
what he believed was 'the most direct and critical action' relating 
to developments in East Timor during 'two meetings with Adam Malik, 
the first in New York and the second in New Delhi.° 
This paper -- which later formed the basis of a personal 
letter, carried by Ambassador Woolcott, from Whitlam to Suharto 
following the February invasion scare (see below) -- had two major 
themes. The first warned of possible consequences of an Indonesian 
use of force, or the threat of force, in dealing with the situation 
in Portuguese Timor. Repercussions included a deterioration of 
relations with Australia, international criticism, and unrest and 
resentment in the region. The second theme of the paper outlined 
measures for 'containing' the Timor problem. Unlike the brief 
Whitlam was given before his talks with Suharto in Wonosobo, the 
paper was based on the premise that independence would be the 
eventual outcome2 -- a reasonable assumption at this time because 
Fretilin and UDT had formed their coalition in order to carry the 
territory through self-government towards independence within ten 
years. Thus, with East Timorese independence a likely prospect, 
Australian policy, endorsed by Foreign Minister Willesee, was aimed 
at making the territory a client state of its neighbours, 
particularly Australia and Indonesia. 3 
The major strategy here included that the territory of East 
Timor be neutralized, 4 by linking it with the other non-communist 
Harris, correspondence with D. Willesee, Perth, November 
1986. On both occasions Willesee was leader of delegations 
to, respectively, the general debates of the 29th United 
Nations General Assembly, in early October 1974 (AFAR, 
Vol.45., No.10., October 1974, p.713), and the 31st Session 
of the ESCAP Commission, in New Delhi, on 25 February - 7 
March 1975 (AFAR, Vol.46., No.4., April 1975, p.202). 
2 	Hastings suggested that Whitlam received a 'very 
unsophisticated' briefing from the Department of Foreign 
Affairs prior to the first meeting (Sydney Morning Herald, 
19 November, 1974). 
3 	For a broader analysis of this concept, see Richardson, 
Michael, the National Times, 19-24 July 1976, p.9. 
4 	The paper proposed that Australia and Indonesia work 
together, using constructive influence to ensure that an 
independent East Timor would have its essential contacts 
with non-Communist nations in the immediate area, not with 
left-wing Portuguese colonies in Africa or with communist 
countries. 
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nations of the region -- Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines -- and making it dependent on these States for 
aid, trade and other development needs. Fundamental to this idea 
was a joint aid package which, it was intended, would be made up 
initially of three programmes -- food, foreign training for 
Timorese and health. The key to the development of this 'satellite 
state' strategy was for Indonesia and Australia to work closely 
with the Portuguese administration and to extend friendship to the 
Fretilin and UDT parties. All that remained was the opportunity 
for Australia to present these alternative proposals. 
The Invasion Scare and its Aftermath 
By early 1975, two events had propelled policy-making circles 
in Canberra headlong into their first major crisis in the 
relationship since the Sukarno period. First, in the merger 
between Fretilin and UDT lay the potential collapse of Australia's 
East Timor policy, particularly if it was an indication that the 
major political force in the territory now tended towards 
independence. Second, a report in the Sydney Morning Herald in 
February by Peter Hastings of an impending Indonesian invasion of 
East Timor' provoked a major reaction within the Australian 
community. 2 Together, these developments raised serious doubts 
about the sustainability of the preferred option of integration. 
The Foreign Affairs and Defence establishments were immediate 
in their responses. The former, prodded by an anxious embassy in 
Jakarta, 3 were distressed that relations 'so assiduously cultivated 
by a generation of Australian diplomats', 4 were in prospect of 
breaking down. The latter considered an invasion would erode 
recent assessments that Australia's strategic environment was 
benign, and place Australia's defence aid programme with Indonesia 
See the Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 1975, the Age, 
22 February 1975. Nicol notes that the source of Hasting's 
article was confidential material obtained from an officer 
within the Joint Intelligence Organization in the Department 
of Defence. Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.284. 
2 	This reaction is examined in more detail in the following 
three chapters. 
3 	Harris, personal interview with K.C.O. Shann, Canberra, 
November 1980. 
4 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.221. 
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in jeopardy, particularly if these developments sparked off public 
debate. 1 
Against this background the government's response to the 
reports of an impending invasion was two-fold. Its public response 
took the form of a policy statement, and it was enunciated during, 
and probably only due to, the urgency debate mounted in the House 
of Representatives by Peacock on 25 February 1975. Delivered by 
Morrison, 2 and differing in degree from Whitlam's stance, the 
statement put the view that Australia 'must support a measured and 
deliberate process of decolonization in Portuguese Timor through 
arrangements leading to an internationally acceptable act of self-
determination'. 3 At another level, Whitlam employed more discrete 
diplomatic channels and wrote to Suharto with the proposal that, 
with UN approval, Indonesia, Portugal and Australia cooperate to 
underwrite East Timor's independence (through self-determination) 
by means of the provision of the joint aid package. Whitlam also 
expressed the view that if the Timorese chose independence, the 
territory would in practice, finally, become a client state of 
Indonesia. 4 The letter, as noted earlier, also warned against the 
use of force to take over Timor. While Indonesia rejected the 
proposal when the two leaders met for a second series of talks in 
Townsville (Australia), between 3-5 April 1975, Whitlam received 
Suharto's personal assurance that force would not be used. 
By all accounts, Whitlam's stance on the East Timor question 
at the talks had not changed. He continued to emphasize 'that 
there should be no departure from an internationally acceptable act 
of self-determination'. 5 It has been well argued, however, that 
because the Australian Prime Minister continued to believe the 
territory's integration with Indonesia was the preferable option, 
he 'was less scrupulous in his concern about the means 1 . 6 Thus, 
1 	Ibid., p.210. 
2 	The Minister for Science. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.97, p.644, 25 February 1975. This debate is 
examined more closely in Chapter Nine. 
4 	Renouf, A., The Frightened Country, p.445. 
5 	Ibid., p.445. 
6 	Richardson, M., National Times, 19 July 1976. 
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while Whitlam sought and received Indonesia's undertaking that it 
would not use force in the former colony, he refrained from 
criticizing Indonesia's conduct in East Timor at the time. 1 As we 
noted earlier, by April 1975, an important strand of Indonesia's 
strategy in East Timor -- and a matter on which Whitlam would have 
been fully and reliably informed -- was its propaganda campaign and 
the subversive activities of Operasi Komodo which, together, were 
being directed towards destabilizing the political situation in the 
territory. 
Australian Domestic Political Pressures  
In the meantime, whether it was due to dissatisfaction with 
this policy, or concern over whether the government meant it, 2 in 
March 1975, a delegation of Labor Party Members from the Caucus 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee visited East Timor to assess 
the prospects for such a process. Although hosted ostensibly by 
Fretilin people, the delegation had meetings with other East 
Timorese leaders, and had the opportunity to witness the relative 
support for each party at mass demonstrations staged to coincide 
with their visit. It also had talks with the Portuguese Governor 
who, in what would be a real test of the depth of Australia's 
intentions, requested the Australian Government to reopen its 
consulate in Dili. On their return, the delegation briefed both 
Willesee and Foreign Affairs officials and urged that serious 
consideration be given to such a request. However, the decision 
Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, p.152. 
2 	There was, by now, a lack of cohesion in support of a policy 
that not only expressed a preference for integration but 
also supported the right of the East Timorese to self-
determination. Its schizophrenic nature seemed to assure 
its acceptance from all quarters, by the Indonesians for the 
purposes of reinforcing their distinct movements towards 
incorporation, and at home, where the concern of Ministers 
such as Willesee and, increasingly, Morrison and Hurford 
(CPD, H.R., V.91, p.3049, 30 October 1974), was deepening 
over the welfare of the Timorese and their future. In this 
regard, Willesee in particular was anxious; more so, it 
appears than was Whitlam (Harris, personal interview with 
Viviani, September 1986). This division within the Labor 
leadership found parallels in the Liberal party leadership, 
with Peacock embracing a view similar in substance to 
Willesee's, while Fraser, particularly after the 1975 
election, pursued the Foreign Affairs line of integration 
(See the Age, 13 October 1976 and 7 December 1976). 
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rested with Whitlam, who in rejecting it stated that 'to reopen it 
now could be misinterpreted. Political interests in Portuguese 
Timor could seek to use our presence to involve us to an extent 
which I do not feel would be appropriate for Australie. 1 
This was arguable. In view of the argument that developments in 
Timor had little potential to influence regional affairs, the 
reopening of the consulate would have had only a limited effect. 
Yet, if developments in the colony took a turn for the worse, 
Australia would not have been able to avoid any kind of 
involvement. Thus, a presence may have given the Australian 
Government the capacity to perhaps influence the actions of the 
political groups in Timor and those observing them from outside, 
especially Indonesia. To have had 'a man on the ground' would have 
overcome the confusion that surrounded these, now inevitable, 
developments and he would have perhaps offered less conflicting 
advice on their implications. 2 On another level, Australia could 
have given and administered badly needed humanitarian assistance 
through such a mission. 3 
These arguments reflected tangible Australian interests and 
were canvassed persistently by the Australian press. 4 But nothing 
was done by Whitlam, even following the admission by Woolcott in 
March 1975 that the closing of the consulate 'might have been a 
mistake'. 5 As the Timor crisis deepened, it was becoming clear 
that Whitlam had resolved to discourage any kind of Australian 
The Australian, 24 March 1975. 
2 	These sentiments were expressed by Dunn in a personal 
interview with the author, November 1981, and by Fry, 
November 1981. Also held to be important by Hastings, 
discussion with author, November 1981. 
3 	While it is not clear who exactly decided that the consulate 
should not be re-opened, Viviani argued that to have done 
so, and to have instituted an aid program would only have, 
'arouse[d] Indonesian suspicions as to Australia's 
intentions and particularly its support of Indonesian 
policy, and a re-opened consulate could become the focus of 
pressure by Timorese parties' (Viviani, N., "Australians and 
the Timor Issue", p.211). 
4 	
See, for example, the Australian, 21 March 1975, 24 March 
1975, 4 April 1975; the Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 
1975; 25 March 1975, 7 April 1975. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 March 1975. 
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presence in the territory. In all probability, this centred on his 
increasing awareness of Indonesia's subversive activities in East 
Timor and his concern that Australia could become irreversibly 
enmeshed. Thus, following his talks with Suharto in Townsville, 
the need to avoid offending or provoking the Indonesian Government 
over the East Timor question emerged as the central plank of 
Whitlam's policy. In the circumstances, particularly following the 
failure of the Macau conference in June 1975 -- which was to have 
been a key element in the 'negotiations strategy' being pursued 
through the first half of 1975 by both the Indonesian and 
Australian Governments -- it would be less than fair to the 
Australian Government to suggest it had any other credible policy 
options. As far as Whitlam was concerned, Australia had no major 
strategic or political interest in whether East Timor was 
independent or integrated with Indonesia but it did have an 
important national interest in ensuring that it would not be drawn 
into a permanently hostile relationship with Indonesia. 
In the meantime, growing links between Australian politicians 
and the Timorese (mainly Fretilin): 
encouraged the latter to think, not unreasonably in the 
circumstances, that the Australian Government could be 
brought to shift its stance away from preferring 
integration to supporting independence. A sober 
judgement in Australia would have seen this as most 
unlikely. In addition, there seems little doubt that 
some Australians urged the Timorese to go for 
independence, without considering the costs of this 
sufficiently and with little prospect of converting their 
own Government to this view. 1 
In this context, it appeared that Peacock, the Liberal Party 
spokesperson on Foreign Affairs, had been taking a far greater 
interest in the Timor situation than any Labor Minister. He went 
as far as to meet with Horta, extending to him a good deal of 
encouragement. This, while maintaining a stand in opposition to 
the government's policy on Timor, 2 gained him firm political 
ground as did the latter for the Country Party's Ian Sinclair, 3 
although the essential tenets of their own Timor policy were not 
1 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.211. 
2 	See, for example, CPD, H.R., Vol.93, pp.640-643, 25 February 
1975. 
3 	The Deputy Leader of the Country Party, Ibid., pp.645-647. 
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substantially different to those of the government. Peacock, in 
particular, never extended support for the right of the Timorese to 
independence, only self-determination. However, it can be argued 
that his actions may have created the impression in the minds of 
the Timorese that a Liberal-Country Party government would be more 
favourable in its assessments of their aspirations for independence 
than the Whitlam government -- an important point in view of 
subsequent political developments in Australia. 
The UDT coup in August 1975, and the ensuing public debate 
within Australia, impelled the Australian Government to issue a 
further statement. With Ambassador Woolcott counselling 
restraint, 1 and notwithstanding a Portuguese request that Australia 
convene a meeting of the warring parties, Whitlam explicitly 
rejected any Australian involvement, as it: 
Could lead to a situation where Australia was exercising 
a quasi-colonial role in Portuguese Timor... we, for our 
part, understand Indonesia's concern that the territory 
should not be allowed to become a source of 
instability... Indonesia's concern about the situation 
has now led her to offer, if Portugal so requests, to 
assist in restoring order there... none of the three 
political groups in the territory has shown any genuine 
willingness to work with the others. 2 
Thus, although Australia was not a 'party principal' to the East 
Timor question (and its increasingly dire implications), Whitlam 
was, in an effort not to prejudice Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia, prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to maintain 
Australia's passive role. 
Members of the ALP Caucus Foreign Affairs Committee, which had 
been to Timor in March were incensed by this speech and wrote a 
letter to Whitlam accusing him of being unrealistic in expecting 
Portugal to re-exert control. They argued that Australia, now 
respected by all of the parties to the conflict, would be in a good 
Dunn, James, Timor. A People Betrayed, pp.188-190. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.493, 26 August 1975. Jim Dunn told 
the author that Whitlam was instrumental in stopping (him) 
accompanying a representative of the International Red Cross 
into East Timor at the time of the fighting. Whitlam wanted 
to close off any avenue that would lead to any Australian 
involvement (official and, if possible, unofficial). 
Harris, personal interview with Dunn, Canberra, November 
1981. 
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position to mediate. 1 In the House of Representatives late that 
afternoon, Peacock criticized Whitlam's statement because it was 
'not only bereft of idealism, but ... also completely denuded of 
realism', and argued that Australia had two policies that were 
mutually exclusive: one of self-determination for the Timorese, 
and the other a policy of allowing for the integration of the 
Timorese people into Indonesia. 2 Moreover, Peacock for the first 
time advocated a role for ASEAN and the UN which drew Whitlam later 
to argue, of the former, 'Nothing... would lead us to believe that 
these countries considered that they could play a useful role at 
this stage'. Of the latter, he ruled out any suggestion of a UN 
role, preferring to suggest that 'Portugal should maintain its 
responsibilities to the territory 1 . 3 Peacock also reaffirmed his 
belief that Australia should reopen its consulate in Dili. 
These arguments gave rise to an intense debate in the 
Australian Parliament, fuelled by questions from Anthony and Fraser 
who, displaying sympathy with the Indonesian line, portrayed events 
in East Timor as an ideological power struggle and asked Whitlam 
whether he was going to accept, 'so close to Australia', a 
situation in which a communist Fretilin took over Timor. 4 However, 
Whitlam refused to be baited, and signalling the worst of all 
possible outcomes concluded that: 
The Indonesian Government has expressed its willingness 
to assist... The Indonesian Consul in Dili has been 
under great pressure, remaining behind after the 
departure of the Portuguese. The last of three appeals 
addressed this week by the Portuguese Government to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations has spoken of the 
need for international intervention to effect a 
ceasefire. The Indonesian Government, which over the 
past year has expressed repeatedly its intention not to 
intervene in Timor, may thus be turned to as the only 
force capable of restoring calm in the territory. 5 
It has been argued that had Indonesia intervened at this time, as 
The Age, 28 August 1975. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.510, 26 August 1975. See also Viviani, 
N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.218. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.565, 27 August 1975. 
4 	Anthony, CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.685, 28 August 1975 and 
Fraser, Ibid., p.689, 28 August 1975. See also Chapter 9. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.688, 28 August 1975. 
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seemed to be Whitlam's public wish, 1 much of the outrage in public 
opinion that erupted when Indonesia eventually did invade (both in 
Australia and abroad), would not have arisen. 2 As it turned out, 
Indonesia's decision to wait (essentially Suharto's, 3 under 
increasing pressure from 'hawks' in Jakarta), based on the 
calculation that Indonesian intervention would be made easier if 
the fighting was to run its natural course, proved to be an 
incorrect one. 
Notwithstanding this curious orientation of events, this 
exchange in the Parliament ushered in a period in which the 
government came under intense public pressure and criticism, 4 with 
public anger and criticism directed also towards the Indonesians. 
This put the Department of Foreign Affairs, particularly, under 
enormous pressures -- from Indonesian officials and Australian 
public opinion -- and some disagreement emerged. In essence, 
Australia's dual policy of integration and self-determination at 
the Ministerial level was creating schisms within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, with officers on the Indonesian desk and others 
with a background in Portuguese and African affairs also pursuing, 
respectively, integration and a greater commitment to the notion of 
self-determination. However: 
The overall effect was to take no initiatives, to do 
whatever was done as secretly as possible and to discourage 
public debate. Any government statements on Timor always 
McDonald has argued that Whitlam sent Suharto 'a private 
message saying that nothing he said earlier should be 
interpreted as a veto on Indonesian action in the changed 
circumstances'. McDonald, H., Suharto's Indonesia, p.207. 
2 	Richardson, Michael, The National Times, July 19-24, 1976, 
p.14. 
3 	Harris personal interview with Woolcott, Canberra, April 
1988. Mr Woolcott also indicated that it was his role in 
the pre-invasion period to, through representations, 
'restrain' Indonesia (which angered the Indonesians). Yet, 
he also indicated that the bases of his representations were 
the Embassy's assessments of the circumstances at the time, 
including: 
(i) Portugal's abdication of their colony; 
(ii) the geostrategic situation concerning East Timor; and 
(iii) arms being shipped from Mozambique. 
These factors, according to Woolcott, made it 'inevitable' 
that Indonesia would invade. See also Nicol, B., Timor.  
The Stillborn Nation, pp.262-263. 
4 	See below. 
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referred to Indonesia's interests above those of the people 
of East Timor, although there was always token references to 
'self-determination' - a very vague concept. Australia 
always maintained it was not a party principal in Timor, 
while knowing well that whatever Australia did would be 
crucial. 1 
This pusillanimous attitude embittered Willesee, who found respite 
in absences from the country on Foreign Ministry business. 2 
Willesee's inclination was to make a stronger public commitment to 
the principle of self-determination but he was severely handicapped 
by the presence and attitude of Whitlam. However, with increasing 
reports of Indonesian military activities in East Timor in late 
September, and the subsequent deaths of the five journalists at 
Balibo on 18 October, the extent and consequences of Whitlam's 
policy were brought realistically, and tragically home to his 
Foreign Affairs Minister, 3 and they found powerful expression in 
his only statement on East Timor, on 30 October 1975, to the 
Australian Parliament. 4 
Yet, Australia knew that the Indonesian troops were active in 
East Timor by October 1975, at least two months before the 
full-scale invasion. It has been suggested that this information 
came from 'special briefings' given by well-placed Indonesians, the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta, Australian intelligence and other 
non-Indonesian sources. 5 The Whitlam government's reticence about 
the ugly side of Indonesia's incorporation programme was well 
illustrated by a well-informed Australian journalist, Bruce 
Juddery, who reported that the ministerial statement of October 
1 	Hill, H., The Timor Story, p.12. 
2 	Harris, personal interview with Viviani, September 1986. 
3 	Willesee was deeply shocked by the deaths of the journalists 
because, as he put it to the author, each one of his own 
five children was involved in journalism, one way or 
another. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.65, pp.1609-1610. This statement also ended 
a period -- which began with Sir Magnus Cormack's criticism 
that the Foreign Affairs Minister was never available in the 
Parliament to present, or respond to criticisms of, 
Australia's Timor policy -- in which Willesee ensured he was 
in the Parliament to answer all questions in the Senate on 
East Timor (30 September 1975 - 30 October 1975). 
5 	Harris, personal interview with J.S. Dunn, Canberra, 
November 1981, and personal interview with Viviani, 
Brisbane, September 1986. 
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1975 was so altered to conceal the fact that Australia knew 
Indonesian troops were active in East Timor, before the invasion of 
7 December 1975. Ambassador Woolcott, in a leaked telegram to 
Foreign Affairs on October 19, advised: 
Although we know it is not true, the formal position of 
the Indonesian Government is still that there is no 
military intervention in East Timor. If the Minister 
(for Foreign Affairs) said or implied in public that the 
Indonesian government was lying, we ... would be regarded 
as having acted in a way which would stir up 
international opinion against Indonesia. Such a 
statement would also stimulate hostility to Indonesia 
within the Australian community, which has been our 
policy to minimize. 1 
Indeed, Willesee was to have said on 30 October, that he had seen 
reports suggesting a degree of Indonesian military involvement, and 
that he regretted this development. Following Woolcott's 
interposition, his final statement to Parliament said only that: 
'the government has viewed with concern widespread reports that 
Indonesia is involved in military intervention in Portuguese 
Timor' . 2 
While Willesee later considered that 'Because of the differing 
attitudes of Whitlam and myself over Timor the going was not made 
easy for the department and maybe bewildered Indonesia as well', 3 
the latter may well have been quietly confident in having allies in 
Whitlam, and the Department of Foreign Affairs, including Woolcott. 
As Willesee's private secretary at the time concluded, principally 
regarding the relationship that existed between these major actors 
in the foreign policy-making process: 
It seemed clear that Mr Whitlam, Mr Woolcott and the 
Department were joined in their belief that maintenance 
The Canberra Times, 31 May 1976. Woolcott indicated that 
during the pre-invasion period his role was to secure 
domestic opinion acceptance (of developments in East Timor) 
as part of Australia's policy-making process, bearing in 
mind Australia's long-term interests. If Indonesia was to 
use force, then the Australian Government would have to find 
ways to minimize the impact. In the meantime, Indonesia was 
not displaying any degree of competence in explaining what 
they were doing -- so it was for Australia to take this up, 
giving the Australian public the details of what was 
happening, and to explain. Harris, personal interview with 
Woolcott, Canberra, April 1988. 
2 	CPD, Senate, S.66, 30 October 1975, p.1609. 
3 	Harris, correspondence with Willesee, November 1986. 
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of the relationship with Jakarta was the paramount 
consideration in Australian policy, but this three-way 
mutual support made reassessments of policy difficult if 
circumstances changed ... one might have been excused for 
believing (on the evidence of Woolcott's role...) that 
[he] was more assiduous in putting Indonesia's views to 
Australia than he was in pressing Australia's views on Indonesia. 1 
Senator Willesee's 30 October statement was the last substantial 
statement by the Labor government on East Timor before the domestic 
crisis that resulted in the appointment of a Liberal 'caretaker' 
government on 11 November, 1975. 
At the time of the invasion, Whitlam, now Opposition leader, 
was quick to blame the caretaker government: 
We all know Indonesia's ... obsession with any movement 
... described as communist ... And Mr Anthony's ... and 
Mr Fraser's use of the terms have undoubtedly confirmed 
and exacerbated Indonesia's attitudes. 2 
Whitlam, of course, was referring to the introduction three months 
earlier of an old strain in the conservative parties' foreign 
policy -- the spectre of a communist takeover in Timor -- and it 
was to set the pattern for the continuing debate on East Timor 
during the Fraser government period. Yet, although Whitlam was 
'absolutely satisfied' he did as much as he could for a peaceful 
settlement of the Timor problem, 3 the web of things said and left 
unsaid by Whitlam throughout the previous eighteen months 
concerning East Timor and Indonesia's intentions, plans and 
activities, cast a towering and profound shadow over his defence. 
The implications of the decolonization of Portuguese Timor 
clearly presented the Australia-Indonesia relationship with its 
greatest challenge since the rise of the 'New Order'. The Whitlam 
government sought from the outset, however, to avoid any 
involvement that could have led to a confrontation with Indonesia. 
While the ALP had, for more than a decade, consistently given 
strong support to the right of self-determination and independence 
for dependent territories, the Whitlam Government was, to say the 
least, guarded in its statements concerning the future of 
1 	Viviani, N., "Australians and The Timor Issue", pp.220-221. 
2 	The National Times, 19-24 July 1976. 
3 	In a conversation with the author, Whitlam still maintained 
this view. Harris, telephone interview with Whitlam (Paris, 
France), September 1986. 
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Portuguese Timor. 
However, public statements that did emerge from government and 
departmental sources made it abundantly clear that while Australia 
favoured the Indonesian arguments for integration, Whitlam believed 
in self-determination. Thus, although it was officially determined 
to step back from a situation that might risk conflict with 
Indonesia, by seeking both, Australian policy failed, and led the 
Australian Government inevitably to tolerate the use of force by 
Indonesia to bring about an end which Indonesia's meddling and 
subversion had failed to achieve. 
The Fraser Government, 1975-78  
Introduction  
The Indonesian attack on Dili occurred only days before the 
Australian General Election and the victory of the Fraser 
Government, and during the vacuum created in Australian politics by 
the sacking of the Whitlam government. In a statement issued by 
the Indonesian government, it was argued that 'Indonesian 
volunteers [could not be prevented] from helping their brothers in 
East Timor in their struggle to liberate themselves from Fretilin 
oppression.° Ten days later, a provisional government was 
established, headed by the chairman of Apodeti and recognized by 
the Indonesian Government. On 31 May 1976, the newly created East 
Timor People's Representative Council resolved in its first plenary 
session to incorporate the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, 
now considered to be under effective Indonesian control, into 
Indonesia. Presented as a petition to Suharto on 7 June, this 
resolution presaged an Indonesian mission despatched to the former 
colony to 'ascertain the wishes of the people of East Timor'. It 
was only a matter of weeks before the formal admission, on 17 July 
1976, of the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. 
While the Fraser 'caretaker' government feigned surprise and 
shock when it learnt of the Indonesian invasion, Whitlam said he 
deplored it. Foreign Minister Peacock issued a statement saying 
that the Australian Government 'deeply regrets the course which 
The Times, 8 December 1975. See also Decolonization in East 
Timor, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 
March 1977, p.39. 
339 
events in East Timor have taken', 1 and disavowed all L-CP 
responsibility for the tragedy that had unfolded in East Timor, 
saying the caretaker government had inherited the Labor 
government's mantle. The government then moved quickly to adopt a 
more active stand on the issue by expressing Australian Government 
opinion openly and firmly to the Indonesian Government, and by 
encouraging United Nations mediation. Australia's position was 
later broadened to include two other points -- the requirement that 
Indonesia withdraw all forces from East Timor and that humanitarian 
aid be administered to the East Timorese people through the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This four-point 
policy was adhered to, with modification to that aspect of the 
policy related to aid, by the Fraser government for the next ten 
months and until the first meeting between Suharto and Fraser, in 
Jakarta, in October 1976. 
A Background to Policy 
In opposition, the coalition's tactical position on the Timor 
question had been one of strength. Not being the government, it 
was not required to make the hard decisions. Taking the high 
ground, and without actually condemning a pro-Indonesian 
settlement, Peacock chided the Whitlam government in September 1974 
for prejudging and constraining an act of self-determination. The 
shadow Foreign Affairs Minister cited the Timor issue as an 
instance of the Labor government's inconsistency and 'hypocrisy', 
of mouthing grand anti-colonialist principles, but behaving 
otherwise. 	For Peacock, the Prime Minister's 'sanctimonious self- 
righteousness does not bear scrutiny'. 2 
In the heated debate on East Timor in the Parliament in 
February 1975, Peacock accused the Whitlam government of having 
shown no interest in the aspirations of local political movements 
in Timor, and Whitlam himself of having given approval, in his 
discussions with Suharto in September 1974, for Indonesia to take 
over the Portuguese territory. The Shadow Foreign Minister, 
however, offered no concrete suggestions for government action on 
the issue. That the Opposition faced the same dilemmas as those 
1 	The Australian Financial Review, 9 December 1975. 
2 	The Age, 2 October 1974. 
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faced by the Whitlam government was reflected in Peacock's speech: 
while he stresse0_ that the 'highest possible priority' be accorded 
Australia-Indonesia relations, Peacock also referred to the 
importance of an unhindered act of self-determination. 1 
By September 1975, however, with civil war raging in East 
Timor, Peacock had allegedly told Indonesia in a private meeting in 
Bali2 that they shared an 'understanding' over Timor, and that he 
was satisfied with the thrust of Whitlam's policy on the former 
Portuguese colony. 3 If it took place, 4 this meeting, together with 
a statement to the Parliament in October 5 -- in which he indicated 
that the Opposition, like the government, understood the Indonesian 
position -- revealed Peacock in a different light. Gone were the 
sympathies and interests of a man who less than eight months before 
had initiated, as a matter of public importance, a debate in the 
Parliament on impending Indonesian actions. Peacock's stance and 
proposals6 during the months straddling the UDT coup only served to 
suggest they were little more than attempts to make domestic 
political mileage. 
Peacock's October statement, inevitably found approval in 
Jakarta, on a number of counts. First, it ruled out full 
independence for the former Portuguese territory and undermined 
Fretilin's claim to have secured legitimacy and popular support on 
CPD, H.R., Vol.93, p.640, 25 February 1975. 
2 	Peacock met with Harry Tjan and Jusuf Wanandi of the Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies which was based in 
Jakarta, and headed by Ali Moertopo. In an interview with 
the author, Tjan did not deny such a meeting took place but 
he was evasive about details of the meeting. Harris, 
personal interview with Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jakarta, 
November 1981. 
3 	The National Times, 2 May 1977. 
4 	The National Times noted Peacock's denials that such a 
meeting took place but considered that the record of 
interview taken by the Indonesians was important despite 
Peacock's denial. See Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn 
Nation, p.312. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, pp.1659-1660, 2 October 1975. 
6 	Advocating a role for the UN and ASEAN, and the re-opening 
of the Australian Consulate. 
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the basis of its military successes in the civil war. 1 Second, it 
contained no condemnation of the now persistent and well-founded 
reports of Indonesian military intervention and sabre rattling. 
Finally, it did not call for a United Nations solution to the 
problem. Importantly, following Whitlam's dismissal, Peacock, now 
interim Foreign Affairs Minister, abstained from making any strong 
criticism of Indonesia or supporting any of the critical remarks of 
his Labor predecessor, Senator Willesee, on Indonesian activity in 
East Timor. Peacock continued to show considerable sympathy for 
the Indonesian position when, on 26 November, he stated that he 
felt 'Indonesian patience to date with the civil war occurring in 
its archipelago is something to be noted'. 2 During the remainder 
of November, the 'caretaker' Fraser government followed closely the 
approach of non-involvement adopted by its predecessor, doing 
little to counsel a moderate Indonesian position. Moreover, on 29 
November, Peacock announced that the caretaker government did not 
recognize Fretilin's 28 November claim for independence. 3 
The Fraser 'Caretaker' Government  
During its short tenure, the Fraser 'caretaker' government 
claimed its hands were tied on Timor policy by the Labor line. 4 
This, together with its emerging 'understanding' of Indonesia's 
concern, and its silence about continuing violence in Timor, were 
predictably interpreted by Indonesia as a sure signal that the 
Australian Government would not voice criticism if covert 
1 	See also Peacock's statements in late October 1975, in which 
he considered there were only two alternatives for East 
Timor : (a) establish a State of East Timor, which would 
have a well-defined treaty association with Indonesia; or 
(b) the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia with the 
agreement of the Timorese. The Liberal Party, therefore, 
would not accept, and had never envisaged accepting, a fully 
independent East Timor. Peacock went on to say that 
anything outside these limits would be either unprincipled 
or unrealistic. (The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 November 
1975). 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1975. 
3 	Backgrounder, Department of Foreign Affairs, No.19, 5 
December 1975, p.11. 
4 	The Fraser 'caretaker' government was confined by the 
conditions the Governor-General (Kerr) had imposed on Fraser 
when he granted him the interim mandate to govern. 
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intervention were extended to invasion by invited 'volunteer 
forces'. 1 In the event, the Fraser administration feigned surprise 
and shock when it learnt of the Indonesian invasion. Peacock's 
statement on the day of the invasion (7 December) dissolved all L-
CP responsibility for the tragedy, saying the caretaker government 
had 'inherited the Timor crisis at the 11th hour'. Moreover, while 
he expressed concern at the use of force by Indonesia, Peacock 
considered there had been mitigating circumstances. 2 Subsequent 
government statements on the invasion were careful not to condemn 
Indonesia's actions. 
On 12 December 1975, however, Australia's East Timor policy 
under the 'caretaker' government appeared to change, at least at 
the public level, when it voted with the majority in a UN General 
Assembly resolution which was critical of Indonesia's action and 
called for a withdrawal of its troops. 3 This was a setback for 
Indonesia and paved the way for subsequent Fraser government policy 
following its confirmation to office by a massive majority at the 
13 December General Election. Indeed, the L-CP attitude changed 
from one of extenuation and muted criticism of Indonesian 
intervention to one of persistent expressions of concern. In early 
1976, the public image that the Fraser government was attempting to 
cultivate was summarized by Peacock in the Federal Parliament: 
the government believes that there should be a cessation 
of hostilities, thus putting an end to bloodshed; a 
resumption of international humanitarian aid, preferably 
through the return to East Timor of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross Society; a withdrawal of 
Indonesian forces; and a genuine act of self- 
determination. 4 
While the Indonesian Government was genuinely surprised and angered 
at this radical shift in policy, 5 the Fraser-Peacock position 
implicitly argued that any endorsement they may have earlier given 
to Indonesian aims did not anticipate a full-scale invasion. Such 
a position was calculated to assuage growing hostility in the 
Harris, personal interview with Dunn, Canberra, November 
1981. 
2 	The Age, 8 December 1975. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 December 1975. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.98, 4 March 1976, p.568. 
5 	The Canberra Times, 20 December 1975. 
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Australian community but it also assumed that Indonesian 
displeasure at Australia's stand would be short lived. 
Australian Government Disapproval and Admonition of Indonesia  
The ambiguous nature of this policy development, however, 
dominated the public debate on foreign policy in the early months 
of the Fraser government. 1 It strained relations with Indonesia 
and created a soured atmosphere marked by recriminations and the 
leaking of official documents. 2 Yet, the range of policy options 
for Australia was extremely narrow, even more so than before the 
Indonesian invasion. The choice was between silent acquiescence, 
inflaming further domestic criticism, or the encouragement of an 
active role by the United Nations. This would maintain 
international attention on the issue and, in view of the large UN 
majority opposed to its actions in Timor, embarrass Indonesia. 
Whatever it chose to do, the government could not hope to 
emerge with much credit for success. It could not fully satisfy 
any of the interested parties -- Indonesia, Fretilin, its 
Australian supporters, or humanitarian groups. Arguably, 
therefore, the Australian Government chose the best of an unhappy 
range of options in the period up to the October 1976 meeting. 
Open abandonment of its principles and open acceptance of the line 
1 	It was not until 1 June 1976 that Fraser made his first 
major statement on foreign policy, setting the tone and 
direction of Australia's policies for the next four years. 
While the favourable international environment of the early 
1970s enabled Whitlam 'greater flexibility' and 'new 
opportunities' for change, independence and regional 
cooperation, by 1975 the climate had changed considerably. 
Detente between America and Russia had begun to sour; the 
Middle East moved from crisis to crisis; weapons technology 
and the arms race were advancing apace; world recession 
heightened economic rivalry between the Western nations; and 
Sino-Soviet animosities increased. And it was against this 
background that Fraser made his statement. (CPD, H.R., 
Vol.99, pp.2734-2744, 1 June 1976). 
2 	The most embarrassing leak occurred while Fraser was in 
China in June 1976. Fraser was reported to have described 
the Indonesian leadership, in discussions with Chinese 
officials in Peking, as 'ineffective and unstable'. (the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 29 June 1976). Alan Renouf, then 
Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs revealed to 
the writer that Fraser considered he was responsible for the 
leak. Harris, personal interview with Renouf, Sydney, 
November 1980. 
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favoured by the Indonesians would have been more discreditable than 
the ineffective upholding of principle, and would have provided 
even less of a basis for resisting similar moves in the future, if 
they were to arise. 
In contrast to its public statements concerning the completion 
of the decolonization process, however, the Fraser government's 
actions left few doubts that there were differences between the 
administration's private and public position. The visit to East 
Timor by the UN Special Representative, Winspeare Guicciardi and 
the confiscation of a Fretilin radio transmitter in Darwin, firmly 
illustrated this point. In late January 1976, Guicciardi visited 
towns in East Timor which the Indonesians had held for several 
months, including Dili and Manatuto. Fretilin was anxious to have 
the UN envoy visit its territories, but the Australian Government 
first seized a mobile transmitter unit which had been used to 
monitor messages from -- and to send messages to -- Fretilin, 1 
making communications difficult. It then refused on safety 
grounds to fly Guicciardi to Fretilin-held territories of East 
Timor. 2 The UN official's mission was aborted on 7 February, 
against a background of growing criticism that the Australian 
Government had ruined what chance there was for an effective UN 
role in the East Timor problems. 3 
Moderating Criticisms and de facto Recognition  
By October 1976, and the meeting between Fraser and Suharto, 
the Australian Government had decided that little would be gained 
and a great deal lost in Australia-Indonesia relations if the 
resultant criticisms were to persist. It decided, therefore, that, 
without condoning Indonesian actions or formally recognizing 
Indonesia's integration of East Timor, it would refrain from public 
1 	The Canberra Times, 24 January 1976. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1976. 
3 	To be fair to Peacock, however, he had urged Indonesia to 
allow Guicciardi to visit East Timor. This drew an angry 
response from Malik who insisted that Indonesia had been 
invited by the provincial government in East Timor 'to 
declare its sovereignty over the territory' (the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 15 January 1976). 
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censure. At the conclusion of the talks, Fraser told a Jakarta 
press conference that he saw no need to continue to state his 
government's four-point policy, as it was 'on the record (and] I 
don't wish to restate it. The important thing is to look to the 
future and work to the future. ,2 
An important element in this decision was the attitude of the 
United States. It will be recalled that the emergence of the 
Suharto regime in the 1960s was considered by the USA and its 
allies as a major breakthrough in their attempts to overcome the 
Communist threat in the Southeast Asian region. Indonesia's 
strategic importance grew with the withdrawal of the United States 
from Vietnam. By the mid-1970s and with an increasing Soviet 
presence in the region, Indonesia had secured its place (and the 
appropriate level of military assistance) in the Western alliance's 
Southeast Asian defence strategy. 3 
It was, therefore, inevitable that the USA would adopt a 
position supporting Indonesia's actions in East Timor in the period 
leading up to and including the invasion. 4 So too was the warning 
to Fraser in August 1976 that it would not tolerate a deterioration 
in Australia's relationship with Indonesia. 5 In a visit to 
Washington that month, Fraser was told such a deterioration would 
have serious effects on the strategic position of the United 
States, and that Australia's opposition to Indonesian claims that 
East Timor had been integrated into Indonesia should end. 6 
While Fraser favoured maintaining his two-policy approach, his 
attempts to smooth over problems in the relationship ran aground 
when an official Indonesian spokesperson made a statement designed 
to make the Australian Prime Minister admit his private position in 
the public arena. Only minutes after Fraser left Jakarta for 
1 	Peacock reaffirmed the government's four-point policy on 
several occasions during this period. See Chapter Ten. 
2 	The Age, 11 October 1976. 
3 	This is not to imply Indonesia entered into any formal 
security relationship. 
4 	It will be recalled that President Ford and Dr Kissinger 
were in Jakarta only days before the invasion. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 1976. 
6 	Ibid. 
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Canberra, Lt. General Sudharmono publicly announced that Australia 
had recognized the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. 1 
Although Fraser repudiated the statement, it gave rise to a bitter 
public and parliamentary debate in Canberra. Allegations and 
counter-allegations about secret understandings between the Whitlam 
and Fraser administrations with the Indonesian Government pervaded 
the debate and kept the Timor issue alive. So too did arguments 
about the propriety of, earlier in the year, the leaking of a cable 
from the Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, in which he 
urged the Australian Government to place realpolitik above 
idealism, and to accept the inevitability of the incorporation of 
East Timor into Indonesia. 2 
While Fraser denied that Sudharmono's claims had any 
foundation, he did not again, during the period under review, 
publicly restate Australia's policy. By late October, with such 
developments having had the opposite impact on Australia-Indonesia 
relations to that intended, Peacock all but conceded defacto 
recognition of East Timor's integration into Indonesia. While he 
too argued that the Australian Government had not given defacto 
recognition, 'for quite practical reasons such as the provision of 
humanitarian aid and the reuniting of families, we have to accept 
certain realities'. In essence, if Australia's policies were to be 
effective they: 
must take into account the regional environment in which 
it is to function and although preserving our position on 
principle it has not and does not serve Australia's 
interests to place itself on a massive collision course 
with its largest regional neighbour. Some people clearly 
baulk at that viewpoint but it is a political reality and 
one we would do well to acknowledge.' 
In the following months, and with the objective of repairing the 
relationship, the Fraser government moved to assist the Indonesian 
position by closing down Australia's Telecom link with Fretilin in 
The Canberra Times, 12 October 1976 and the AFR, 12 October 
1976. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 16 January 1976. The Prime Minister was 
put on the spot by this leak and to have adopted this advice 
would have run counter to the Australian vote at the UNGA 
in December 1975. Fraser publicly rejected the Woolcott 
line. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.101, 20 October 1976, p.2016. 
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Timor and abstaining on a UN vote on the Timor issue. 1 While 
Peacock argued in March 1977 that the relationship was now 'soundly 
based', the previous months gave rise to allegations, contained in 
the recently released Dunn report, that Indonesian troops had been 
involved in atrocities during their invasion of Dili in December 
1975. 2 This brought a sharp reaction from Indonesia who considered 
that this contradicted Fraser's position in October and, through 
Foreign Affairs Minister Malik, threatened mass demonstrations and 
reprisals against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. 3 
By the second half of 1977, these concerns over alleged 
Indonesian excesses were being expressed by many Australians, 
including some L-CP backbenchers. A parliamentary call for a 
debate on Indonesia's behaviour was turned away by the government 
which also refused to become involved in a subsequent attempt by 
parliamentarians, right across the political spectrum to mount a 
fact-finding mission to Timor. Clearly, by this time, the 
Australian Government's strategy to rebuild the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship was under siege. 
Meanwhile, through actions instigated by the Fraser 
government, the East Timor lobby4 found more substance for 
criticism of appeasement: the Australian Government's refusal to 
protest the deaths of the five Australian journalists, said to have 
been murdered by Indonesian troops in October 1975; the ordering of 
Commonwealth Police to seize, on two occasions, radio transmitters 
in Darwin which were the sole contact Fretilin forces in East Timor 
had with Australia; the ordering of the seizure of ships chartered 
by aid groups which tried to take medical and other humanitarian 
aid to the blockaded East Timorese people; the banning of Fretilin 
See the Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 1976 and 19 
November 1976. The Australian Government considered the UN 
Resolution was neither 'realistic or constructive'. 
Backgrounder, No.67, p.10. 
2 	This followed the visits to Portugal by Labor MP, Gordon 
Bryant, and Jim Dunn. The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 
1977. The Canberra Times, 28 January 1977 and 23 February 
1977. See also Chapter Ten. 
3 	Australia's Ambassador, Woolcott, was also called in and 
given a verbal reprimand. The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 
March 1977. 
4 	See Chapter 10. 
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leaders, from the UN and elsewhere, from visiting Australia. The 
government also abstained, in November 1977, from a UN vote 
strongly rejecting (61 votes to 26) the integration of Timor into 
Indonesia. 1 
In January 1978, the Australian Government recognized East 
Timor as Indonesian territory, 2 formalising a situation that had 
existed for well over a year -- a year in which the Fraser 
government had given all essential support to Indonesia's position 
on East Timor, while officially refusing to recognize its claims. 
The Fraser government was held back from formally supporting 
Indonesian policy by opposition within the party, UN and community 
opinion. 
The recognition of Indonesia's actions was, for the Australian 
Government, therefore, a matter of timing. This was something 
Indonesia did not fully understand. Looking back on Fraser's 
policy, it is possible to discern slow movement to recognition. In 
essence, Fraser intended all along to help Indonesia until domestic 
and international opinion accepted Indonesia's claims. From the 
moment of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, the importance 
attached to relations with Indonesia made this stand inevitable. 
No-one would risk open military confrontation, souring relations 
for a very long time in the process. In these circumstances, the 
argument to support Indonesia and use our influence to mitigate the 
worst elements of Indonesian violence became inevitable. 
Australia's Indonesian Policy, 1978-80  
In May 1979, Australian foreign policy now increasingly 
dominated by other complex and varied issues, 3 Fraser and Suharto 
1 	The Canberra Times, 12 December 1977. 
2 	"News Release", 20 January 1978 in Statements on Foreign 
Policy, AGPS, Canberra, 1978. 
3 	These included the invasion of Kampuchea by the Soviet- 
backed Vietnam in late December 1978, following mounting 
hostilities in 1978; the stream of refugees from Vietnam, 
now also from Kampuchea; China's punitive attack on Vietnam 
in February 1979; the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and 
rising concerns over the 'Islamic Revolution'; the seizure 
of the American Embassy in Iran; the Soviet-backed coup 
against the existing Marxist regime in neighbouring 
Afghanistan in December 1979. This gave rise to a renewed 
emphasis in Australian foreign policy on the Soviet 'threat' 
and a compliance with the USA call for a boycott of the 
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met for informal talks in Bali. Returning from what was described 
as an exercise in regional diplomacy, intended to smooth over, if 
not altogether remove 'some of the politically embarrassing litter 
in Australia's northern neighbourhood', 1 the two leaders agreed to 
end nearly three and a half years of strained relations and to re-
establish close official ties. 
In what was clearly a signal for final rapproachement between 
the two governments, Fraser played down the significance of anti-
Indonesian sentiment in sections of the Australian community, and 
foreshadowed a positive Australian response to any Indonesian 
request for development assistance. Moreover, in a statement 
during a press conference immediately following their 'constructive 
and forward looking' talks, Fraser stated his conviction that the 
delineation of the continental shelf boundary between Australia and 
Indonesia, and the reunion of East Timorese families in Australia 
would be settled satisfactorily between the two countries. 2 Fraser 
and Suharto also found common issues of major regional concern, 
particularly the Indo-China problem, and paved the way for 
discussion on the likelihood of an intensification of defence 
cooperation between the two countries. 3 
Within months, planning was underway for a high-powered and 
unpublicized seminar, to be held in November, on Australia-
Indonesia relations, and organized by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. Held in Canberra it was closed to the press and attended 
Olympic Games, to be held in Moscow in 1980. 
1 	Michael Richardson in the Age, 14 May 1979. Apart from the 
East Timor issue, Richardson was referring to ASEAN's 
campaign of agitation (principally through Malaysia and the 
Philippines) against the Fraser Government's import 
restraints on ASEAN manufactured and processed products, 
and the vehement campaign within ASEAN (led by Singapore) 
against the restrictive aspects of Canberra's international 
civil aviation policy. 
2 	Indonesian Times, 14 May 1979. 
3 	The Age, 15 May 1979. Richardson disclosed that Suharto 
suggested to Fraser that Australia and the ASEAN States 
standardize their defence equipment. Indonesia had been 
urging its ASEAN neighbours for some time to coordinate 
their defence procurement programs by acquiring similar 
equipment, mainly from the USA and Europe. It was the first 
time, however, that such a high-level approach had been made 
to include Australia in such an arrangement. 
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by senior government officials and academics from Australia and 
Indonesia. While it was seen by many in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs as setting the seal on the post-Timor era, paving the way 
for the improvement in relations signalled by the two leaders in 
May, the relationship continued to be bedeviled by the aftermath of 
Indonesia's actions in East Timor into the 1980s. 1 
Conclusion  
Developments in East Timor throughout this six-year period 
highlighted certain general dilemmas and underlying weaknesses in 
Australia's relationship with Indonesia. Concerned that its 
territorial integrity was under threat, Indonesia showed that it 
was prepared to use an uncompromising stance and to adopt force to 
defend its interests if it could not achieve its objective by other 
means. 2 In such circumstances, Australia had two possible 
In October 1979, a report prepared by the Foreign Affairs 
Research Group of the Australian Parliamentary Library, was 
critical of Indonesian policies to starving the Timorese 
Fretilin resistance and its supporters into submission. The 
report was incorporated in Hansard at the request of the 
ALP's Tom Uren (See the National Times, 20 October 1979); 
in November, the Sydney Morning Herald correspondent, and 
former diplomat Peter Rodgers, in a series of graphic 
reports brought to the Australian public the appalling 
conditions endured by the people of East Timor, raising 
questions concerning widening reports about Indonesian 
policies of starvation and genocide in East Timor (the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 31 October 1979, 1 November 1979. 
See also the Australian, 3 November 1979; the Age, 2 
November 1979); in June 1980, due to a broadcast, based on 
incorrect information and attributed to ABC correspondent 
Warrick Beutler, by Radio Australia, the Indonesian 
Government closed the ABC's Jakarta office, and refused to 
renew Beutler's visa (see the Canberra Times, 23 June 1980); 
in October 1980, evidence implicating Indonesia emerged on 
the 1975 disappearance of Australian journalist, Roger East 
(See the Canberra Times, 23 October 1980). In late 1981, 
reports of a 'pacification' campaign in East Timor by 
Indonesian forces involved atrocities and was giving rise 
to a serious famine (See the Australian, 9 October 1981 and 
3-4 October 1981). 
2 	Indonesia moved systematically to protect what it considered 
to be its best interests: it established contacts with UDT 
and Apodeti officials following its early and unsuccessful 
contact with Fretilin; held discussions with Portugal in 
Indonesia, as well as in London, Rome and New York; and it 
used the media as a vehicle to provide evidence that East 
Timor was a threat to regional and domestic security, and 
to develop internal support for its position. 
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approaches. One placed emphasis on principle and argued that the 
Australian Government should adopt an honest and firm stance, 
pursuing a policy of open criticism of Indonesian actions -- even 
if such criticism was to lead to a deterioration in the 
relationship. 
The second approach stressed pragmatism and claimed that 
Australia should maintain good relations with Indonesia because of 
Indonesia's geo-political strength and its significance in the 
Southeast Asian region. On this basis, such issues as West Irian's 
'Act of Free Choice' in 1969, political prisoners, and the 
integration of East Timor into Indonesia should not be allowed to 
obscure the nature of Australia's interests in the region. While a 
sharp distinction was drawn between principle and pragmatism and, 
in practice, the Australian Government pursued the pragmatic 
approach, the conduct of Australia's East Timor policy left much to 
be desired. On the question of accepting political responsibility 
in the region, Whitlam adopted an isolationist posture. Indeed, 
Whitlam considered his government was not 'a party principal in 
Portuguese Timor', and disavowed any Australian interest in what 
the outcome in the territory might be. However, while Whitlam's 
underlying concern was the significance of the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship, by failing to emphasize that he would be concerned 
about the means by which the outcome was achieved, Whitlam deprived 
Australia any flexibility in the dispute, although it lacked any 
credible policy options. Nonetheless, Whitlam 'did not talk one 
way while acting in quite another', 1 an approach adopted by the 
Fraser government following the Federal Election in December 1975. 
The basis, if not the origins, of the L-CP stance differed 
considerably from that of the ALP. In August 1975, Peacock argued 
that, in so far as East Timor had security and strategic 
consequences beyond its territorial boundaries, its future was 'of 
legitimate concern to the countries of the region'. 2 Under the new 
Fraser administration, Australia's East Timor policy became 
Mackie, J.A.C., "Australia's Foreign Policy, From Whitlam 
to Fraser", Dyason House Papers, Vol.3, No.1, August 1976, 
p.5. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, 26 August 1975, p.509. Peacock focused 
on three areas of major concern : the Soviet presence in the 
Indian Ocean, Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia and the 
territory's links with left-wing elements in Portugal. 
352 
ambiguous: its public (four-point) policy called for the 
completion of the decolonization process. At the private level, it 
indicated little intention to implement its declared policy. The 
basic feature of Australia's East Timor policy under the Fraser 
administration was its domestic orientation. The conduct of the 
policy, however, illustrated the conflict between domestic image 
building, and maintaining a consistent foreign policy, with the 
result that both suffered. Moreover, it did little to improve the 
relationship between Australia and Indonesia, and invited America's 
admonition. 
Thus, until 20 January 1978, and formal recognition of 
Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, the Australian L-CP 
Government fell back on the formula that 'friends can disagree'. 
ySuch disagreement on the government-to-government level, however, 
took place against a background of increasing criticism and 
disquiet among Australians towards Indonesian policies. The 
majority of those Australians in the 1974-75 period were on the 
left or in the centre of the political spectrum. The invasion of 
East Timor and the ambiguous nature of the Fraser government saw 
this criticism escalate and broaden to include critics right across 
the political spectrum. The strength and influence of these views 
are next to be examined. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EARLY IMPRESSIONS AND LASTING INTERPRETATIONS:  
THE ROLE OF THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS  
Introduction  
This chapter examines press opinion on the East Timor issue as it 
developed between 1974 and 1978. 1 It is also concerned, as in 
Chapter Four, with the press' role in reporting statements and 
actions concerning policy, and in assessing specific questions 
arising from official and public debates. The Chapter also seeks 
to establish whether the press was used by those involved in the 
formulation of policy to influence public opinion. However, while 
there is concern with the press' role as a forum and conveyor of 
information, the emphasis is less on the quality and depth of news 
reporting -- it is considered that this is presented adequately in 
other chapters2 -- than with the manner in which the press handled 
the information about East Timor, and the way it defined the major 
issues as they emerged to dominate the Australian agenda. 
Beginning of Change in East Timor  
Until April 1974 and the coup in Portugal, very little 
attention had been given to the Portuguese colony of East Timor by 
the Australian press. However, with the emergence of the three 
political groupings -- Apodeti, ASDT (later Fretilin) and UDT -- 
some of the major newspapers began forming strong views about the 
kind of future that lay ahead for the former colony, including 
advice for those considered to have had any kind of stake in the 
impending decolonization process. 3 The Sydney Morning Herald, for 
instance, in mid-June, editorialized that East Timor, 'a pathetic 
remnant of the colonial era', was in a transitory state and that if 
the process was not handled properly it could pose serious problems 
Without exception, the press debate on Indonesian issues 
during this period was dominated by East Timor. 
2 	See Chapters Seven and Ten. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 1974; the Australian, 29 
June 1974; the Nation Review, 15 August 1974. 
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for Jakarta, Canberra and Lisbon. 1 
The Sydney Morning Herald, however, would not advocate 
independence. In a view that was shared by others in the press who 
took an early interest in the matter, East Timor's chronic economic 
problems were seen to be a major obstruction to such an outcome, 
compelling the judgement that East Timor's future lay in 
integration with Indonesia. Such a step depended very much on the 
attitude of the Indonesian Government which, in the view of both 
the Mercury2 and the West Australian, 3 very likely would not be 
prepared to accept the economic or political responsibility. 
Only the Sydney Morning Herald 4 and the Age5 made any direct 
reference to Australia's position in what was an increasingly fluid 
situation. The Sydney Morning Herald° pragmatically considered 
that while there were 'vital matters of security and communications 
for Canberra to consider', its underlying concern should be with 
unresolved negotiations between Australia and Portugal on the 
seabed division in the Timor Sea. Notwithstanding this, the Sydney 
Morning Herald also argued, as did the Mercury 7 and the Advertiser, 8 
that whatever issues were involved, regard had to be extended by 
Canberra to the wishes of the Timorese people, without losing sight 
of Australian interests and responsibilities. 
Such pragmatism formed the basis of early press attitudes and 
set the scene for the period leading to the first Whitlam-Suharto 
talks in September 1974. Interestingly, some in the Australian 
press began to focus on the lobbying activities, in Australia and 
Indonesia, of the Timorese political groups, as they attempted to 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 1974. 
2 	The Mercury, 28 June 1974. 
3 	The West Australian, 28 June 1974. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 1974. 
5 	The Age, 26 June 1974. 
6 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 1974. 
7 	The Mercury, 28 June 1974. 
8 	The Advertiser, 2 July 1974. 
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secure political and economic support. 1 The Sydney Morning Herald 2 
was quick to observe that Australia, unlike Indonesia, was 
cautious, if not unenthusiastic about such activities (in 
Indonesia, they received front page coverage, and of course Foreign 
Minister Malik's understanding). 3 The most incisive account and 
explanation for Australia's reticence was provided by Helen Hill in 
an article published in the Mercurv 4 . Hill argued that Canberra, 
ever mindful of Indonesia's developing attitude on the matter, was 
concerned not to become officially identified with any particular 
faction within East Timor, and cynically concluded that it was more 
than likely that 'the discovery of oil off Timor could be the 
crucial factor in deciding the attitude of the Australian 
Government despite its anti-colonial statements in the UN'. 
The Whitlam-Suharto Talks  
While information was sparse in Australia on developments and 
conditions in East Timor, several newspapers attempted to clarify 
some of the major issues. On the whole, it was considered that 
events were shaping up for a dispute in the former Portuguese 
colony, and that the decolonization process did not guarantee a 
smooth transition to independence. Thus, when it was announced 
that Whitlam would hold talks with Suharto in Jogjakarta, few in 
the press had any doubts that the issue would dominate their 
agenda. Some of the better informed press, in the period leading 
up to the visit, provided their readers with a balance sheet of 
carefully weighed arguments of Australian and Indonesian interests 
in the issue. 
1 	See for example the Sydney Morning Herald (22 July 1974) and 
Peter Hastings' report on Ramos Horta's activities in 
Australia, which included attempts to secure broad support 
for the notion of independence through meetings with Liberal 
and Labor MPs, and middle-level officials from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. See also the Canberra Times  
report on the Apodeti visit to Jakarta (2 September 1974). 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 July 1974. 
3 	See Sinar Harapan, 17 June 1974; 12 June 1974, which was 
quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald, 22 July 1974. Refer 
also to Chapter Seven. 
4 	The Mercury, 15 August 1974. 
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The Agel considered Australia's interests derived in part from 
factors related to geographical proximity and also from broader 
commitments, including our relations with Indonesia. The Canberra  
Times stressed that Indonesia's internal security interests more 
acutely centred on the implications of the proposed decolonization 
process for the status quo in the territory. 2 In this regard, 
while the Mercury3 and the Age 4 acknowledged Indonesia's public 
announcements of a policy of non-interference in the affairs of 
East Timor, both provided insights into a private debate that they 
felt had to be going on in Indonesia and which advocated 
incorporation, particularly if this were seen to serve Australian, 
Indonesian and Timorese interests. For The Sun, such behaviour 
would be circumscribed by Indonesia's desire for international 
respectability. It thus concluded, on the eve of the Suharto-
Whitlam talks, that the focus of any discussion of the matter would 
include consideration of how to bring Portuguese Timor into the 
Indonesian Republic, through legitimate means. 5 
The Sydney Morning Herald ° was still more pragmatic. While 
the talks would be 'quiet, earnest and exploratory', both countries 
had a continuing interest in regional stability and in the role 
they needed to play to maintain it. Moreover, putting the Timor 
issue into some kind of historical context, the Sydney Morning 
Herald saw it only as another, yet important, phase in the 
evolution of the Australia-Indonesia relationship. However, it 
acknowledged that this phase faced a fundamental problem: the 
tendency for Canberra to be 'blind ... to mounting concern on the 
part of some politically vocal Australians' over developments in 
Indonesia. Thus, Whitlam's task, in historical terms, could prove 
to be fraught with difficulties. While the Sydney daily counselled 
Whitlam to embrace the ideas behind such criticisms (principally, 
1 	The Age, 5 September 1974. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 4 September 1974. 
3 	The Mercury, 5 September 1974. 
4 	The Age, 5 September 1974. 
5 	The Sun, 6 September 1974. 
6 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 1974. 
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over issues such as corruption and political prisoners) it warned 
him to transcend them in reaching any understanding with Suharto 
over East Timor. 1 
This theme was also pursued by the Australian and the Age. 
The former called on Whitlam to tread carefully. It suggested that 
on such issues Whitlam could 'try to exert some persuasive but 
absolutely private influence on President Suharto', bearing in mind 
that he needed to try to make up for ground lost with his early 
forays into international diplomacy, which included, among other 
things, his 'grand concept of a broad Asian forum', and resulted 
only in 'frighten[ing] the hell out of the Indonesians'. 2 The Age  
tended to the view that, in relation to Timor, Whitlam was an 
observer and stressed that a solution lay only with Indonesia. It 
predicted that as both leaders had shown themselves to be 
pragmatists in their relations to date, they would be anxious to 
ensure a measure of cooperation rather than to impose their 
principles on each other. 3 
It was considered by the more authorative journalists 4 of 
those who accompanied the Prime Minister that mutual tolerance was, 
at the very least, a strategic imperative for Australia, and it 
emerged as a major theme in much of their reporting about the Prime 
Minister's visit to Indonesia. 5 However, in dealing with 
Indonesia, Whitlam was driven by a sense of co-operation that went 
far beyond arid national interests -- he embraced the notion that 
if Australia could not make a success of its relations with 
Indonesia, it could quite likely fall short in its dealings with 
the rest of Asia. The nature of the relationship was such at the 
time of Whitlam's visit that, due to mounting Australian domestic 
criticisms of Indonesia, neither Whitlam nor the relationship could 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 1974. 
2 	The Australian, 5 September 1974, and the Age, 5 September 
1974. 
3 	The Age, 6 September 1974. 
4 	In particular, Peter Hastings and Michael Richardson. 
5 	Refer, for example, to the Age, 5 September 1974 and the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 1974. See also the 
Advertiser, 6 September 1974 and the Mercury, 6 September 
1974. 
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afford any controversy. While this foreshadowed an exchange in 
which Indonesian views would be predominant, the Canberra Times  
reminded the Prime Minister that while 'Understandings reached at 
the political level are valuable[,] ... their real worth has to be 
judged by the degree to which they reflect or influence popular 
attitudes' . 1 
The eventual agreement between Whitlam and Suharto that the 
best and most realistic future for Timor was an association with 
Indonesia, drew some predictable responses. The Age's Hugh 
Armfield highlighted the arguments prevailing in Canberra that an 
independent East Timor would attract external influences and would, 
therefore, not be in the region's interests. 2 Michael Richardson 
stressed the implications that developments within the territory -- 
in particular the decolonization process and the abilities of the 
political parties to harness popular support -- would have on the 
perceptions and actions of both Australia and Indonesia. In this 
regard, he considered the next twelve months would be a testing 
time for Australia's relations with Indonesia. 3 Richardson 
reasoned that such an issue increasingly concerned powerbrokers in 
Jakarta, and he was convinced that those in the regime who were 
opposed to East Timor's independence were also very influential. 
Richardson was of the view that with Whitlam's attitude 
clearly conditional in nature, and the new government in Portugal 
displaying little interest in the territory, 'the opportunities for 
Indonesia to exercise a legitimate influence on Timorese public 
opinion have expanded'. However, the temptation and openings, he 
warned rather prophetically, also existed for Indonesia to 
undertake clandestine activities and apply pressures that, in 
effect 'would cross the grey line separating legitimate influence 
from intervention in the internal affairs of a tiny territory, by a 
big, bullying neighbour". 4 
In the Sydney Morning Herald, 5 Peter Hastings was critical of 
1 	The Canberra Times, 6 September 1974. 
2 	The Age, 13 September 1974. 
3 	The Age, 29 October 1974. 
4 	The Age, 29 October 1974. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 September 1974. 
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Whitlam's haste in announcing the unviability and potential 
instability of the colony. Yet, he considered the basic tenets of 
the Prime Minister's approach represented 'the tidiest solution'; 
his criticism centred more on its public expression: 
For the Prime Minister to voice such views publicly, in 
view of the increasingly anti-Indonesian attitudes 
shared by many in his own party, let alone by others in 
Australia, was somewhat incautious. 
Further, such publicly expressed sentiments would not reassure 
fledgling regional micro-States, like Tonga and Western Samoa 
which, on paper, and in terms of potential, looked less viable than 
East Timor. This was a theme he developed in mid-November when, in 
a series of articles he put it to his readers, that for East Timor 
to find its feet: 
it will need aid, and there is only one place to which 
the new political elites of all persuasions are looking 
and that is Australia which, rightly or wrongly, they 
feel is indebted to the Timorese for help and assistance 
rendered Australian forces in World War 11.1 
But Hastings went on to identify what was a crucial element in the 
whole East Timor equation when he said Jakarta's fear of communist 
influence was a consideration that a 'wise Australian policy must 
take [into] ... account'. In the meantime: 
the question is whether Jakarta will wait and see whether 
the Portuguese Timorese will opt for incorporation ... or 
for continued association with Portugal for a period, 
followed by independence... For some in Jakarta, timing 
is now crucial and there are those urging emergency 
tactics including the use of force. 2 
By late January 1975, the Sydney Morning Herald 3 had reported that 
the cancellation at the end of the month of the visit to Timor by a 
parliamentary delegation indicated in Australia 'a new political 
awareness of Indonesia's sensitivities over the complex Timor 
problem'. For Hastings, an added complexity resided in the 
upcoming elections in Portugal, in which it was likely that the 
communists could secure 15 to 25 percent of the vote. This would 
not mean a communist government, but it would mean communist 
representation in the Cabinet, with links to leftist elements in 
Portuguese society. He reasoned this did not augur well for the 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 November 1974. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 1974. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1975. 
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Indonesian Government where a developing fear of communist 
subversion arising from possible communist activities in East Timor 
constituted 'a real political factor, just as Jakarta's fears of 
fragmentation in eastern Indonesia are real political factors'. 
Hastings concluded all this was pointing to the possibility of 
Indonesia 'tak[ing] out Portuguese Timor in the same way and with 
the same ease as India took out Goa in 1961' -- something that was 
clearly not in the interests of the region. 1 
The Invasion Scare and the Second Whitlam-Suharto Talks  
By the end of January 1975, UDT and Fretilin had merged. But 
generally the press, surprisingly, were offering no analysis of the 
implications of this development. One exception was the Canberra  
Times which positively evaluated the chances of independence for 
East Timor, now that such a merger had the capacity to counter 
Indonesia in its quest for popular opinion. 2 However, the report 
by Peter Hastings in the Sydney Morning Herald 3 of an impending 
Indonesian invasion, jolted the press into a deeper and more 
intensive discussion, and it was sustained up until the second 
Whitlam-Suharto talks, in Townsville, in April 1975. 
In a single article, Hastings had provided a catalyst for 
movement at a variety of levels, including: in Australia, an 
urgency debate in Parliament, press speculation and the 
mobilization of groups in the Australian community at large; and, 
in Indonesia, a measure of anger and hostility. In his article, 
based on 'increased foreign press awareness ... letters one 
receives from interested observers and ... inevitable leaks in 
Jakarta itself', Hastings put to his readers the belief that: 
the Indonesian Government is seriously considering taking 
out Portuguese Timor in a military operation in the not- 
too-distant future. 
He placed such a development squarely on the shoulders of both 
Whitlam and Suharto: the Indonesian leader for miscalculating that 
the colony would 'succumb to propaganda broadcasts and infiltration 
tactics [and] ... fall like a ripe apple', and the Prime Minister 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 January 1975. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 28 January 1975. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 1975. 
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for assenting to this process. In essence: 
Jakarta's miscalculations have to some extent been those 
of Mr Whitlam, who has contributed to the situation with 
his positive mania for giving away things that are not 
Australia's to give away, subsequently hoping that the 
resultant mess can be swept under the carpet. 
The Sydney journalist considered that such a proposal would have 
severe strategic implications on two levels. The first related to 
the attitudes of the global and regional powers, as well as to the 
possibility that 'the most important achievement of the new-order 
Indonesian government, regional equilibrium, ... would badly 
fracture'. Integral here, and second, was the prospect of an 
erosion of the growing sense of regional trust and stability which 
had slowly emerged in the wake of Vietnam. Yet, Hastings 
acknowledged fully the Suharto regime's now real concerns that an 
independent East Timor would 'act as a Trojan horse for communist 
interference and as a possible incentive to East Indonesian 
separatists'. Clearly, Hastings articulated Indonesia's dilemma 
very well. 
The reaction of the Australian press to Hastings' revelations 
were mixed. The editorial of the Australian confirmed intelligence 
reports which supplemented Hastings' sources and shared his concern 
when it said 'A campaign of gentle persuasion, aimed at winning the 
hearts and minds of the Timorese, is one thing; armed intervention 
is another ...'. 	It called on Whitlam to step in and put pressure 
on Jakarta against such a course of action for many of the major 
reasons put by Hastings: The Canberra Times 2 considered that 
'Indonesia is more interested in denying Timor as a base to a 
potential enemy than in the use it could make of it itself' and did 
not rule out a military takeover. The Sydney Morning Herald's 
editorial3 was typically blunt: 
Jakarta is either embarking on a clumsy propaganda 
campaign to justify a military takeover in Portuguese 
Timor, or is testing the water for international 
reactions. In either event ... President Suharto should 
not be allowed to delude himself that he can repeat in 
Timor President Sukarno's coup in New Guinea without 
1 	The Australian, 26 February 1976. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 26 February 1975. 
3 	Very likely to have been written by Hastings himself. 
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incurring grave risks: 
Creighton Burns, writing in the Age, 2 considered there were three 
reasons why it was unlikely that Indonesia would undertake such a 
severe action, in the short term. In the first place it would, 
technically, be an act of aggression against Portugal, as long as 
Portugal retained its colony. Second, Indonesia would be loathe to 
jeopardize its progress in establishing itself as a regional power, 
a likely consequence of any invasion. Third, with East Timor 
gripped by the typhoon season, there would be logistical problems 
in any maritime or air activities. However, Burns argued, if 
Indonesia, in the long term, deemed it necessary to engage in such 
action, she would be able to take the colony militarily 'between 
breakfast and lunch ... tomorrow, if they chose'. In such 
circumstances, and a view which was shared and put by Mungo 
MacCallum, neither a Portuguese garrison nor a 'disunited 
unprepared Timorese nationalists' outfit could mount any kind of 
resistance campaign to repel an invasion. 3 
Underlying Burns' views were two further considerations. 
First, Indonesia was in the process of a campaign of 'psychological 
confrontation' against any kind of movement in East Timor towards 
independence. In effect, they were 'trying to preserve, or create, 
a political position there rather than invade the island'. Second, 
unlike the Sydney Morning Herald, 4 Burns considered the 'leak' of 
the invasion was calculated to signal to the Indonesians that they 
should take matters easily and quietly, and to create a 
demonstration of aroused Australian public opinion. This would 
enable the Australian Government to argue to the Indonesians that 
public opinion in Australia would not accept anything less for the 
East Timorese than self-determination -- clearly a creditable 
alternative for a Prime Minister (and his government) trying to 
shed themselves of a policy that had been eroded by events in East 
Timor following its enunciation during the first Whitlam-Suharto 
1 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1975. 
2 	The Age, 26 February 1975. 
3 	The National Review, 20 February 1975. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1975. 
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talks. 1  
Mungo MacCallum pursued the second of Burns' two points, 
indicating his belief that the 'leak' from the Defence Department 
postponed, if not prevented altogether, what was to be an 
inevitable invasion. This relieved a situation for Whitlam who, if 
such an invasion had taken place, would have had to absorb a great 
deal of the blame. 2 While not condoning such an action by 
Indonesia, Dennis Warner set down his understanding of the 
'reality' of the East Timor problem, at least as the Indonesians 
saw it. In essence: 
Let there be no doubt about it - if the Indonesian 
military leadership believes that Portuguese Timor may 
fall under communist influence ... then their troops will 
move in and take over ... In protection of what it 
regards as its own vital national interests ... The Cold 
War may be dead and buried and detente the order of the 
day, but the generals have not forgotten how close the 
Indonesian Communist Party came to power a decade ago. 3 
Warner concluded with the view that although Whitlam and his 
government may have felt comfortable with a strategic assessment 
that denied the existence of a threat for at least another 15 
years, seen from Jakarta, South-East Asia did not look so tranquil. 
Indeed, from the Indonesia perspective, it was the opposite, with 
threats to peace and security as formidable as ever, and East Timor 
representing the most immediate threat. 
The Age editorial 4 was not convinced by Indonesia's subsequent 
denials of an armed takeover, with reports of invasion exercises 
and army road building plans on the Indonesian side of Timor, only 
making 'the Timor puzzle more plotty and difficult to understand'. 
Moreover, it had only just been revealed that the Age's South-East 
Asia correspondent, Michael Richardson, and an ABC team were 
refused entry into Indonesian Timor, and it compelled the Age to 
conclude that this 'denial of access ... is beginning to look 
If this was not a true depiction of Whitlam's strategy at 
the time, then there would have been every likelihood that 
he would have defended his policy during the censure debate, 
initiated by Peacock on 25 February 1975. In the event, he 
did not (see Chapter Nine). 
2 	The National Review, 20 February 1975. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 February 1975. 
4 	See also Helen Hill, the National Review, 7 March 1975. 
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positively sinister'. 1 
Apart from the Age, 2 the press in general fell silent. The 
Sydney Morning Herald was one of the few newspapers 3 to pursue 
Indonesia's reaction to these events. According to Michael 
Richardson, in a lead story in March: 
The Indonesian government has been angered by what it 
alleges is an anti-Indonesian conspiracy being mounted by 
the left wing of the Australian Labor Party, certain 
defence and intelligence officials in Canberra, senior 
figures in the Opposition parties including ... Peacock, 
and some Australian journalists. 4 
However, such reactions were to emerge at the centre of Australian 
press coverage of the second Whitlam-Suharto talks, in April, in 
Townsville, Queensland. 
The Ages put it to its readers that although developments in 
Indo-China, and economic and diplomatic relations with China and 
Japan, would dominate the agenda of discussions between Whitlam and 
Suharto, the most politically sensitive issue listed for discussion 
was the decolonization of East Timor. The Melbourne newspaper, 
like the Courier-Mail 6 and the Advertiser, 7 argued that both leaders 
would be keen to defuse the Timor issue, as neither Australia nor 
Indonesia had much to gain politically from any kind of 
confrontation over what was considered to be such a small part of 
the Indonesian archipelago. However, as the Age rationalized, the 
biggest problem facing Whitlam and Suharto lay in drawing up a 
solution that would not only accommodate Indonesia's fears of a 
leftist Government in East Timor, but would also embrace the notion 
of self-determination. 8 
The Age, 4 March 1975. 
2 The Age, 	5 March 1975, 	10 March 1975, 12 March 1975, 	17 
March 1975 and 20 March 1975. 
3 See this story also in the Age, 1 March 1975. 
4 The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March 1975. 
5 The Age, 3 April 1975. 
6 The Courier-Mail, 3 April 1975. 
7 The Advertiser, 4 April 1975. 
8 The Age, 3 April 1975. 
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It seemed, though, that the press were more interested in 
reporting Suharto's assurances that Indonesia had no territorial 
ambitions, 1 and the strongly held view that Australia had 
'overreacted' to reports of an impending invasion. 2 The Age, 
nevertheless, assured its readers that Whitlam, for his part, 
deduced from his meetings with Suharto that Indonesia's sabre-
rattling was 'histrionic rather than serious', and that he had 
explained 'the importance of his qualification ... in private 
talks' during their September meetings that, although Timor's 
future may well be with the Indonesian Republic, it must happen on 
the basis of an internationally acceptable act of free choice by 
the Timorese. 3 Although many newspapers were still critical of 
this aspect of the discussions in September, most concluded that 
there were signs that common grounds for accord had been reached, 
and that the Timor problem, as an explosive issue between the two 
countries, had finally been defused. However, these signs were 
quickly eroded by events leading to and surrounding the UDT coup in 
August 1975. 
The UDT Coup and Its Aftermath  
Press reporting in the wake of the talks was taken up by 
domestic political issues and little attention was paid to 
developments unfolding in East Timor -- although the breakdown of 
the UDT-Fretilin merger and the circumstances surrounding the 
scheduled talks in Macao, in June 1975, generated some interest. 4 
On 12 August, however, the Australian press reported with concern 
that UDT had mounted a coup in the East Timor capital of Dili. The 
coup, and the ensuing fighting between UDT and Fretilin forces, 
began a period in which Australian press coverage increased 
noticeably, as did the number of first-hand reports emanating from 
the war-torn territory. At the centre of this group of journalists 
The Age, 5 April 1975. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April 1975; the Mercury, 4 
April 1975; and the West Australian, 5 April 1975. 
3 	The Age, 5 April 1975. 
4 	See the Canberra Times, 30 May 1975 and 30 June 1975; the 
Age, 1 July 1975, and Peter Hasting's article in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 12 June 1975. 
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and observers, 1 was a nucleus of Australian-based reporters and 
foreign correspondents like Hamish McDonald, 2 Michael Richardson, 3 
John Hamilton4 and Gerald Stone. 5 Their coverage of events on the 
island represented careful and useful assessments of events as they 
unfolded. Editorial opinion during this period also contributed to 
the shaping of Australian news coverage of the East Timor issue. 
However, in the first month following the UDT coup, 
journalists were prevented from going to East Timor, 8 and this gave 
rise to a press coverage that, in relying extensively on a volley 
of eye-witness accounts from refugees and on Indonesian newspapers, 
was extremely sensationalist. 7 It was not until the first Red 
Cross teams and journalists were able to reach the war-torn 
territory that more balanced accounts began to emerge, documenting 
the tragedy that was unfolding in East Timor. While the main focus 
•of this coverage was on the extent of the fighting that had taken 
and was taking place8 , as well as the nature of Fretilin's rule 9 , 
These included James Dunn, Jill Jolliffe, Grant Evans and 
Helen Hill; Australian aid personnel from the NGOs and 
parliamentary delegations. See below. 
2 	Of the Sydney Morning Herald and The National Times (John 
Fairfax). 
3 	The Age's Southeast Asia correspondent (John Fairfax). 
4 	The Herald (Melbourne, Herald and Weekly Times). 
5 	Consolidated Press (The Bulletin and TCN Channel 9, Sydney). 
6 	Hill, H., The Timor Story, p.12. 
7 	See for example, the Australian's coverage: "Timor 
Slaughter" and "Babies Beheaded with Cutlasses" (26 August 
1975); the West Australian: "Bloodbath' in Dili" (26 
August 1975), and "Refugees Tell of Carnage" (26 August 
1975). The information upon which these stories were based 
came from refugees who had been evacuated to Darwin on the 
refugee ship Lloyd Bakke. The Indonesian newsagency Antara 
was the source of a story in the Daily News (10 September 
1975) which reported (contrary to other press reporting at 
the time), Fretilin control in East Timor only extended to 
a narrow coastal strip on the northern areas of East Timor, 
with the Indonesian-backed Apodeti in control of the 
remainder of the territory. 
8 	The most authoritative accounts came from Michael Richardson 
in the Age, 26 August 1975, 5 September 1975, and 9 December 
1975. 
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increasing attention was directed toward investigating widespread 
allegations and rumours of Indonesian military involvement in the 
border fighting. 1 
Throughout this period the majority of press correspondents 
came to the conclusion that, before the UDT coup, a decision had 
been made by influential elements within the Indonesian Government 
to covertly exploit the political unrest in the territory. It was 
agreed that this would serve to create a situation so chaotic that 
Indonesian intervention could be readily justified. Moreover, 
editorial opinion became increasingly cynical about the Australian 
Government's transparent calls for Portugal to reassert control. 
As the Age noted: 
This may be a desirable objective as a prelude to an act 
of choice; it may also be difficult to reconcile with 
current realities [with] ... East Timorese ... locked in 
a bloody conflict and at the same time inviting the 
attention of Indonesia's interventionists. 2 
This was a concern also expressed by Hastings and Dennis Warner. 
Both saw a situation developing that not only put pressure on the 
Indonesian Government -- already under added stress as Suharto 
attempted to moderate hawks in Jakarta who, fearing a threat to 
Indonesian and regional stability, were pressing for a 'quick 
surgical strike' to restore order3 -- but also on the Australia-
Indonesia relationship. 4 As Richardson had argued in late August: 
The unpalatable conclusion the Whitlam government must 
reach is that if it fails to protest against use of force 
it may stir up a hornet's nest of criticism in Australia 
9 	See, for example, John Hamilton's "My Mad, Mad War", the 
Herald, 27 September 1975 and John Edwards' "Timor - A New 
Vietnam" the National Times, 29 September 1975. 
See, for example, the Australian, 24 September 1975; the 
Canberra Times, 29 October 1975 and 25 November 1975; the 
Herald, 27 October 1975; and the Sydney Morning Herald, (18 
August 1975 and 3 November 1975) which put strong national 
interest arguments as to why Indonesia should, in view of 
the perceived communist threat, be actively involved in the 
territory. 
2 	The Age, 23 August 1975. 
3 	The Age, 26 August 1975; the Sydney Morning Herald, 25 
August 1975. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 November 1975 and 6 November 
1975. 
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and, if it protests at all, it will find itself keeping 
company with a select vanguard of States which Indonesia 
eyes with intense suspicion. 1 
In the following months, early divisions in the press over 
Whitlam's rejection in August of any kind of mediating role for 
Australia in the issue2 (accompanied by charges that Fraser and 
Anthony were inciting Indonesia by referring to the emergence of 
Communism in East Timor3), coincided with: sustained press opinion 
which stressed that Australia and Indonesia should continue 
pressuring Portugal to take some action in East Timor; 4 Portuguese 
attempts to mount a regional peacekeeping force and to get 
negotiations underway between the Timorese parties; as well as, in 
October, increased military activities in the border regions, amid 
denials by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Malik, that the Indonesian 
military were 'active in East Timor'. 5 By the end of October, 
however, there was mounting evidence that Indonesia was militarily 
involved in the territory, 6 the key incident during this period as 
far as Australia was concerned being the deaths at Balibo of the 
five Australian journalists. 7 Indeed, as the Sydney Morning Herald  
editorialized: 
The Age, 26 August 1975. 
The Canberra Times, and the Sydney Morning Herald for 
example were critical of Whitlam and called for Australian 
mediation (27 August 1975), while the Age (28 August 1975) 
urged a UN role, and the Australian argued that 
interventionally, Indonesia was 'almost an international 
obligation' (30 August 1975). 
See Chapters Seven and Nine. 
See the Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1975 and the 
Canberra Times, 27 August 1975. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 1975. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1975. 
Greg Shackleton, Tony Stewart and Gary Cunningham from HSV 
Channel 7 in Melbourne, and Malcolm Rennie and Brian Peters 
from the Nine Network. Shackleton and Stewart were 
Australian citizens. Rennie and Peters were British, and 
Cunningham a New Zealander. For an account of the tragic 
circumstances surrounding their deaths see Jolliffe, J., 
East Timor, pp.167-177 and pp.233-241. See also Hamish 
McDonald, 'Death at Balibo', the National Times, 7 July 
1979. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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The fate of the five Australian newsmen has focused 
public attention on the crisis in Portuguese Timor. 
Those Australians who doubted the gravity of the 
situation there since August, who declined to recognize 
an Australian interest in ending the colony's bloody 
discord or who failed to appreciate the depth of 
Indonesia's concern have had a rude awakening. ... 1 
While the circumstances surrounding the tragedy were shrouded in 
mystery, the expectation in the Australian press2 was that it would 
compel the Australian Government to take a firm stand against 
Indonesia. It was soon clear, however, that this would not 
happen. 3 This caused an outcry in the Australian press, because of 
reports and allegations that the journalists had been deliberately 
killed. The unexplained circumstances surrounding their deaths, 
however, as well as Indonesia's unwillingness to assist in 
resolving them, saw the issue kept to the forefront in subsequent 
press analyses of Indonesia's actions in East Timor. In the 
remaining weeks until the Indonesian invasion, it served to 
generate larger moral questions about the actions of the 
Indonesians, as well as the Australian Government's willingness to 
acquiesce in them. 4 
The Invasion  
The depth of coverage accorded events in Timor during the 
second half of 1975 was affected by two factors: domestic political 
issues in Australia -- in particular, the political turmoil in 
which the Whitlam government was immersed -- and events taking 
place in Indo-China, not least the fall of South Vietnam. In the 
same way, the sacking of the Whitlam government and the federal 
election that followed, overshadowed the Indonesian invasion of 
East Timor. While this event and subsequent Indonesian military 
activities rendered press access to the territory impossible, news 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 1975. 
2 	See Robert Duffield's column in the Australian, 11 November 
1975. See also Peter Hastings' views in the Sydney Morning 
Herald, 6 November 1975. 
3 	Refer to Chapters Seven and Nine. 
4 	Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.177. 	See, for example, the 
Canberra Times, 28 November 1975; 	the Sydney Morning 
Herald, 10 November 1975. 
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coverage of developments in the former colony were sustained by the 
majority of Australia's newspapers on two levels. 1 On one level, 
Fraser's opposition to the invasion in January 1976 served to keep 
press interest in the issue alive, as did Australia's activities in 
the UN, which were aimed at seeking a solution to the events taking 
place, and Indonesia's movement towards the official incorporation 
of East Timor into the Republic. On another level, the strong 
partisan debate within Australia maintained the momentum of press 
concern, as did Australia's four-point Timor policy, and the final 
official recognition of Indonesia's annexation in January 1978. 
When Indonesia invaded East Timor, the Australian press 
reaction was harsh. The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 in a shift from 
its earlier stated views, called on the Australian Government to 
'express with force and precision our condemnation of [such] ... an 
act of aggression', while The Herald 3 in Melbourne urged 
condemnation, effective action at the UN to establish a 
peacekeeping force on Timor, and an immediate aid-and-comfort 
program for the Timorese people, mounted in Australian aircraft and 
ships. Moreover, it called for a genuine act of self-determination 
for the people of East Timor. The Canberra Times 4 attacked 
Whitlam, calling him a 'Pontius Pilate', and it drew parallels 
between Indonesia's 'slaughter in Timor' and the Soviet Union's 
interventionist policies since the mid-1950s. Further, it 
condemned Australia's responses to the problem, under both the 
Whitlam and Fraser (interim) governments, as 'appeasement'. 
While the Australian5 considered that any complaint to 
Indonesia by Australia would be nothing but 'crocodile tears', the 
1 	An examination of the press debate on the incorporation 
(although minimal) is only briefly undertaken here; press 
views on the ensuing partisan debate in Australia is not 
undertaken. They are examined in the wider contexts of the 
issues examined in Chapters Seven through Ten. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 1975. 
3 	The Herald, 8 December 1975. 
4 	The Canberra Times, 8 December 1975. 
5 	The Australian, 8 December 1975. 
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West Australian l drew strong parallels between what had happened in 
East Timor and the West Irian takeover in 1962. 2 In this context, 
the Sydney Morning Herald considered Indonesia's action: 
has a sharp and frightening lesson for Australia. It is 
that if Indonesia ... decided to take over by force of 
arms an area considered vital to Australian security, 
Australia lacks the military strength to prevent it. 
Papua New Guinea is such an area. 3 
The press in general agreed, however, that Indonesia's decision to 
impose her own solution on the problem by force should have 
surprised nobody and was seen clearly to have been no more 
justifiable or palatable for having been foreseen. But of much 
greater moment for some was the future of Australia-Indonesia 
relations. On one level, concern was expressed that there be no 
further schism in the relationship by way of a cessation of 
economic and defence assistance programs. 4 On another level, East 
Timor was to be seen as a watershed, as it revealed two fundamental 
aspects about the relationship. First, Indonesia had little regard 
for Australian views when it believed vital regional security 
interests were at issue. Second: 
even over problems like Timor, in the proper and peaceful 
solution of which Australia has a legitimate interest, 
this country is largely impotent. And Indonesia knows 
it . 5 
Early in 1976, the pattern of the Indonesian takeover of East Timor 
was crystallizing. A provisional government was set in place by 
mid-December, with Apodeti dominating its ranks, and an act of 
self-determination was planned within a year -- with the results 
not expected to be any different to those of the act of 'free 
choice' in West Irian in 1969. Moreover, the United Nations' 
special representative, Dr Vittorio Guicciardi, was expected to 
visit both Jakarta and East Timor by the middle of January, in the 
wake of an Indonesian party led by Foreign Affairs Minister Malik. 
1 	The West Australian, 9 December 1975. 
2 	
See comments similar to these in the Advertiser, 10 December 
1975. 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 1975. 
4 	
See, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald, 13 December 
1975. 
5 	Ibid., See also the Age, 30 December 1975. 
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These events, together with sustained Indonesian attempts to 
overcome the resistance being mounted by Fretilin, seemed to 
indicate an inevitable incorporation of the Portuguese colony into 
the Indonesian Republic. 
The Australian press, however, in the early months of 1976, 
looked beyond this inevitability and became entranced with a vision 
of the 'horror of carnage and mutilation by Indonesian forces° 
during the December invasion. Jill Jolliffe, writing in the Age, 
presented a picture of 'premeditated and systematic destruction', 
and recounted the horrors of events that had enveloped the colony. 2 
The National Times presented to its readers a picture of 
'indiscriminate killing and looting' by Indonesian soldiers, 
suggesting that the invasion was 'marked by a breakdown in 
discipline and tactical command'. It also warned: 
Fretilin ... does possess enough to carry on a nasty 
guerilla war, and it ... still has at least 2000 men left 
of its frontline forces. The big question is their will 
to fight and the degree of cover they will be given by 
the Timorese people. 3 
It also directed strong criticism at both the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments for suppressing 'the knowledge they have had of the 
ruthless nature of Indonesia's intervention'. Michael Barnard, 
writing in the Age, took it further, arguing that: 
some of our basic ideals ... - including concern for the 
oppressed and a regard for human rights - are patently 
dying in the towns and jungles of East Timor ... buried 
by the day with the tragic victims of the Timorese civil 
war and worse, of the ruthless jackboot intervention of 
Indonesia ... without mincing words, appeasement is the 
crux of Australia's policy toward the Timor problem. Our 
long-term relationship with the 'giant', Indonesia, has 
been the governing principle throughout. It has been a 
case of 'don't rock the boat', carried to the extent even 
of not hauling a drowning man on board. 4 
These two themes -- the war in Timor, and Australia's reticence to 
respond to developments in the Portuguese colony -- dominated press 
Jolliffe, J., the Age, 5 January 1976. 
2 	The Age, 5 January 1976. The source of her accounts was 
radio messages being beamed to Darwin from East Timor. See 
also the Canberra Times, 6 January 1975 and the Age, 14 
January 1976. 
3 	The National Times, January, 5-10, 1976. 
4 	The Age, 10 January 1976. 
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opinion for the next six months. 
The Daily Telegraph l considered that there was no excuse for 
Australia's continued silence over the atrocities being committed 
on the East Timorese people by Indonesian troops. It demanded that 
Australia 'voice ... condemnation in the strongest possible terms', 
considering the Indonesian invasion turned what was an internal 
affair -- the civil war -- into a situation that was marked by 'an 
act of aggression by a strong country against another that is small 
and defenceless'. The Sunday Telegraph, citing the radio reports 
from East Timor, considered that 'token approaches to the UN and a 
cursory glance at our nearest northern foreign neighbour' were not 
enough and argued that the Australian Government should pursue 
other channels open to it, short of military intervention, to 
intercede. 2 
While the Age, 3 shared the views of the Daily Telegraph, 4 it 
put the blame for events in East Timor squarely on the shoulders of 
the Portuguese when it editorialized: 
It is a reality that had it not been for Portugal's 
scandalous dereliction of responsibility, thousands of 
Timorese would not have been slaughtered or driven from 
their homes. 
Yet, it was resigned to the prospect that Timor's fate was certain 
to be sealed by Indonesia's actions, considering that any role for 
the UN was extremely doubtful. The Sydney Morning Herald expressed 
a similar view. It was particularly troubled by the erosion of any 
kind of morality. To be sure: 
Our national interest calls for a close and cordial 
relationship with Indonesia; high principle, for 
Timorese self-determination or, at the worst, freedom to 
settle differences without foreign military intervention. 
High principle is the loser.... 5 
Two incidents fanned this inflamed opinion during the remainder of 
January -- the banning of the Age and the Sun/Herald (Melbourne) 
1 	The Daily Telegraph, 5 January 1976. 
2 	The Sunday Telegraph, 11 January 1976. 
3 	The Age, 13 January 1976, 15 January 1976, and 16 January 
1976. 
4 	The Daily Telegraph, 5 January 1976. 
5 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 January 1976. 
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correspondents, Michael Richardson and Bruce Wilson, and the 
leaking of a cable sent to Canberra by the Australian Ambassador in 
Indonesia, Mr. Richard Woolcott. 1 
Believed to have been decisions made at the insistence of the 
Indonesian Defence Department and the State Intelligence
•Coordinating Body (BAKIN), both Wilson and Richardson were 
blacklisted because their reports on the Timor conflict were 
considered to be biased in favour of Fretilin. 2 Richardson in 
particular was singled out for his dispatches, over a two-week 
period, on events straddling the Indonesian invasion of 7 December. 
It was noted by the Age that Indonesia alleged that such reporting 
'stirred public opinion in Australia, creating problems for 
Indonesia in the context of her relationship with Australia'. 3 
The Age newspaper defended its correspondent powerfully, 
considering his reporting was marked by 'honesty and distinction'. 
Further, it considered that: 
The function of the correspondent is to report the news. 
If accurate and impartial reports 'stir up' public 
opinion, it is the newsmaker, not the newsbreaker, who 
should look to his conscience ... The United Nations is 
entitled to be extremely skeptical about protestations of 
good faith from a government which refuses to allow 
experienced and impartial correspondents to report the 
facts . 4 
Colin Bednall, in defence of his colleague, found Indonesia's 
Two further cables were leaked during the year: one in 
April, revealed that Woolcott was advising the government 
as early as July 1975 that 'we are dealing with a settled 
Indonesian policy to incorporate East Timor' (the Sun, 1 May 
1976). In May it was leaked that Woolcott advised 'that 
though Australia knew Indonesia was lying in its insistence 
that Indonesian forces were not operating in the territory, 
it should not say so publicly' (Bruce Juddery, the Canberra 
Times, 31 May 1976). 
The Age, 14 January 1976. 
3 	Ibid. Richardson considered the allegations of bias were 
'vague ... but emphatically deny that my reporting of the 
Timor conflict has been unfair or inaccurate ... last year 
I spent about four weeks writing about Timor from the 
Portuguese side of the border [and] ... about 12 weeks 
looking at the situation from the Indonesian side, either 
in Jakarta or in Indonesian West Timor' (the Age, 14 January 
1976). 
4 	The Age, 15 January 1976. 
1 
2 
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actions 'offensive', and drew parallels between Indonesian actions 
towards West Irian and those against East Timor. Critical of the 
Indonesian concern to liberate Portuguese Timor, Bednall, rather 
emotionally, told his readers 'The Timor putsch[sic] suggests that 
the military and commercial ambitions of the generals clustered 
around Suharto are not very different from those of Sukarno'. 1 
A leading article in the Canberra Times 2 by Bruce Juddery, on 
the eve of Peacock's visit to Jakarta, shifted public attention 
away from these bans towards the role of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs in the Timor issue, and caused a storm in the press. 
Woolcott, in a leaked cable, had advised Australia that: 
The emphasis should now be on accepting the inevitability 
of Timor's incorporation into Indonesia, letting the dust 
settle and looking ahead, while taking what steps we can 
in Australia to limit the further growth of hostility 
towards Indonesia within the Australian community. 
Woolcott had put it to his political leaders: 
It is a choice between what might be described as 
Wilsonian idealism or Kissingerian realism. The former 
is more proper and principled but the longer-term 
national interest may well be served by the latter. We do 
not think we can have it both ways. 
It seemed that pressure from the Indonesians for Australia to 
counter anti-Indonesian sentiments in Australia prompted the cable. 
Particularly offensive to the Indonesians, and gaining currency in 
Australia, was 'that another Vietnam is in the making in Timor', 3 
and 'that Papua New Guinea and East Malaysia are next on the list 
and that the Indonesian invasion is analogous with the Japanese 
occupation of East Timor during the War'. 4 Of particular concern 
to the Indonesians, however, was -- using Woolcott's words -- 
'whether, privately, we still sympathize with their objective, even 
if we cannot condone the means they have adopted in pursuit of 
it' . 5 
The Australian press reaction to this public ventilation of 
1 	The Age, 19 January 1976. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 16 January 1976. 
3 	Woolcott's words. 
4 	Juddery's words. 
5 	The Canberra Times, 16 January 1976. 
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Woolcott's realpolitik was mixed. However, the leak not only 
generated debate, it compelled those in the press to structure 
their arguments within Woolcott's framework of 'Wilsonian idealism 
Kissingerian realism'. Denis Warner, for example, writing in 
the Courier-Mail l considered that although the savage fighting for 
East Timor was 'to be deplored', the Indonesian action in the 
colony had to be placed into perspective. That is, 'an independent 
East Timor would have been a dangerous, festering sore'. Clearly, 
a 'realist', Warner considered Australia faced a fait accompli in 
the colony, and shifted his argument towards our longer-term 
national interests. In essence these: 
national interest[s] now dictate that whatever our 
sentimental feeling for the aspirations of the Timorese 
people we should start rebuilding our damaged bridges 
with Jakarta. 
Fundamental to Warner's view was Indonesia's importance to 
Australia's security. A friendly Indonesia would be 'a barrier on 
the way to Australia that any foe must cross. An unfriendly 
Indonesia could be a bridge across which a hypothetical enemy might 
one day walk'. 
While Peter Hastings considered Woolcott's language to be 
'pretentious', the Ambassador's advice 'made good, if unpalatable, 
sense. ,2  The Sydney journalist advocated an Australian acceptance 
of the inevitable -- an Indonesian stranglehold on the Portuguese 
colony. If we did not accept this and moved towards Wilsonian 
idealism, playing the 'highly dangerous game of gathering support 
regionally and in the UN for a Fretilin-dominated independent East 
Timor', then Australia could expect to be faced with a dependent, 
warring state, actively seeking tutelage from powers like China, 
North Vietnam and North Korea. It would also be faced with an 
Indonesia that 'would regard Australia with enduring resentment, as 
being the prime cause of its problems'. Thus, for Hastings, a 
'principled' stand would embroil us in an issue that did not affect 
our security. Besides, 'except for humanitarian considerations, it 
is a bit late in the day for principles'. 
Not all the press shared these blunt opinions, although most 
papers published letters (to the editor) which reflected similar 
1 	The Courier-Mail, 17 January 1976. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 January 1976. 
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views, as well as a deepening public anger. The Age' found that 
'the Woolcott message is a deeply disturbing document', 
particularly its inferences of Indonesian territorial ambitions, 
and that 'Canberra has been involved in an exercise of hypocritical 
double talk'. The editorial suggested that the real question 
facing Australia, was whether Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia was worth having if it was being built on such 
'disreputable foundations'. Moreover, Australia could only succeed 
in provoking Indonesia's disdain if we succumbed to its demands. 
As it forcefully argued, reflecting on Indonesia's 'unenviable 
record of suppression ... a Government as well versed in 
realpolitik as Indonesia is more likely to regard a compliant 
Australia with contempt than with respect. Certainly the rest of 
the world will'. 
The Canberra Times2 shared these views, however, considered 
that while 'Great Powers may be able to afford such sophistries ... 
it is doubtful that 'middle powers' such as Australia can do so'. 
It then focused attention on the only real assets it considered 
Australia had -- credibility and its word. Both, it put forward, 
were eroded by the actions of the Whitlam and Fraser governments. 
Nevertheless, it believed Woolcott's suggestion that the Australian 
Government should take steps to manage Australian public opinion 
(something the Age3 found appalling), 'a worthy purpose'. 
Press reactions to the leak died down but not before the Prime 
Minister made his strongest public statement on Timor. 4 Whether 
this was what was intended by the leaking of the Woolcott cable or 
not, Fraser's stated opposition to the Indonesian invasion 
maintained the focus on Australia's East Timor policy. Much press 
discussion on Australian policy towards the problem of self-
determination turned substantially upon the distinction between 
'principle' and 'expediency'. While it caused some in the press to 
speculate on how far the Fraser government was prepared to go in 
standing in firm opposition to Indonesia, it also drew others to 
1 	The Age, 20 January 1976. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 17 January 1976. 
3 	The Age, 19 January 1976, and 20 January 1976. 
4 	The Age, 22 January 1976. 
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consider Australia's narrow options in responding to the marked 
deterioration of the bilateral relationship. Moreover, if there 
was to be a rapprochement, many in the press began questioning when 
and how the Australian Government would reconsider its position -- 
recognizing Indonesian control over East Timor -- and move to patch 
up the relationship. 1 
In this context, the government's transparent moves towards 
such a reconciliation -- through the rendering of assistance to the 
UN special envoy, 2 its motions in the UN, 3 through its firm and 
unequivocal response to the Fretilin transmitter issue4 , as well as 
to attempts by the trade union movement and ACFOA to raise and send 
aid to the Fretilin-held areas of East Timor5 -- drew sustained 
press coverage and debate on the true motives of the Fraser 
government. 
Meanwhile, Peacock recovered the reins of Australia's 
Indonesia policy -- a policy described by the Canberra Times as: 
a 'two-level' policy ... on the one hand, and quite 
admirably, the Foreign Minister and his Ambassador 6 
continue to insist that the people of East Timor must 
choose their own future and that 'all outside forces' (Mr 
Harry's euphemism for what Jakarta, equally 
euphemistically, calls 'volunteers') should be withdrawn 
from the territory. On the other hand, Mr Peacock goes 
1 	See Peacock interviews with: Bruce Juddery, the Canberra 
Times, 1 March 1976; and with Peter Hastings, the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 1 March 1976. 
2 	See, for example, the Age, "UN party offers best hope", 30 
January 1976; the Australian, "UN envoy gets help on Timor", 
2 February 1976; the Age, "We get tough: Help envoy to reach 
FRETILIN, Indonesia told", 30 January 1976. 
3 	The Canberra Times, "Window-dressing for the public to mask 
the cynical realities", 30 January 1976; the Sydney Morning 
Herald, "Aust. policy switch over East Timor", 6 September 
1976. 
4 	See the Age, "Timor: at last a touch of action", 30 January 
1976; and the Sydney Morning Herald, "Australia will not 
allow new radio link", 29 January 1976; the Age, "FRETILIN 
Radio Link seized in Darwin", 2 October 1976. 
5 	The Canberra Times, 27 February 1976; the Australian, 26 
April 1976; the Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 1976; and 
the Canberra Times, 24 May 1976. 
6 	A reference to Ralph Harry, Australia's permanent 
representative to the UN. 
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to considerable lengths ... to insist that disagreements 
over Timor have to be seen in perspective and certainly 
not as a reservation about the relationship between our 
two countries. 1 
While this put the Foreign Affairs Minister under intense scrutiny 
within the Parliament, 2 from the public3 and from the Indonesians, 4 
he sustained such a policy up to, and beyond, the Prime Minister's 
meeting with Suharto in Jakarta in October 1976. 
The Fraser-Suharto Meeting 
This meeting generated a great deal of press speculation. It 
centred in the main on whether or not the visit would be used as a 
basis for a fresh approach between the two countries, as well as to 
convince Australian opinion that the East Timor issue was only an 
aberration, and not a continuation of the days when West Irian and 
confrontation dominated the relationship. As Sam Lipski put it: 
Mr Fraser has the invidious task of deciding whether and 
how to respond to Indonesia's desire to put Timor behind 
us, treat the incorporation of the former colony ... as a 
fait accompli, and, following the dictum expounded by Mr 
Fraser himself that realism is the cornerstone of 
Australian foreign policy, accept the new realities. 5 
Generally, many in the press placed great importance on the meeting 
between the two leaders and saw it as an exercise in 'fence 
mending'. 6 Michael Richardson, in particular, considered a crisis 
of confidence had soured the rapport between the two men, sending 
the relationship between Australia and Indonesia to its lowest ebb 
since confrontation. 7 Thus, that realpolitik took over the issue 
at the talks pleased many in the Australian press. With Fraser 
1 	The Canberra Times, 17 April 1976. 
2 	See Chapter Nine. 
3 	Refer to Chapters Seven and Ten. 
4 	See Chapter Seven. 
5 	The Australian, 20 September 1976. 
6 	The Age, 7 October 1976. 
7 	The Age, 5 October 1976 and 11 October 1976. 
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indicating that the two countries now had 'to look to the future', 1 
the press interpreted the substance of the talks to have reflected 
an effective Australian acceptance of Indonesia's takeover of East 
Timor. Indeed, for the Age, 2 Mr Fraser's: 
talks have not only firmed up the government's de facto 
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty; they clearly raise 
the question, if not the prospect of early de jure 
recognition ... to Mr Fraser, the Timor chapter is 
effectively closed. 3 
Fraser's denial that this was the case upon his return -- 
essentially for domestic consumption -- caused consternation among 
the press corp, not least among those who had accompanied him to 
Jakarta. The feeling was evident that the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Affairs Minister Peacock were clearly stalling over the 
issue -- particularly evidenced by refusals to restate Australia's 
four-point policy -- and it served only to annoy the Indonesian 
leadership, while providing continued nourishment to Australia's 
vocal pro-Timorese activists. 4 While many called for a clearer 
statement on Australia's policy, 5 the West Australian clearly 
summed up the situation that had overtaken events upon Fraser's 
return from Jakarta: 
It is hard to say that Mr Fraser's visit to Indonesia was 
a diplomatic failure when each side is able to interpret 
his conversations there according to its own lights. 
That is the ultimate refuge of leaders who meet to 
explain mutually untenable positions. 6 
But what concerned seasoned reporters like Laurie Oakes and Doug 
Wilkie was that it was becoming increasingly obvious that Fraser 
The Age, 12 October 1976. 
2 	See also editorials of the Canberra Times, 11 October 1976, 
the Courier Mail, 11 October 1976, the Financial Review, 
11 October 1976 and the Sydney Morning Herald, 12 October 
1976. 
3 	The Age, 11 October 1976. 
4 	See the Advertiser, 12 October 1976; the Sydney Morning 
Herald, 12 October 1976 and the Canberra Times, 12 October 
1976. See also strong criticism of these activists by the 
Age, 13 October 1976 (editorials). 
5 	See, for example, the Courier Mail, 13 October 1976 and the 
Mercury, 13 October 1976. 
6 	The West Australian, 13 October 1976. 
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was trying to indicate to the Indonesians that Australia had 
accepted its takeover of East Timor, while at the same time giving 
the impression at home that this was not the case. 1 
The parliamentary outcry generated by such a strategy 2 kept 
Australian policies and attitudes under the scrutiny of the press 
for some weeks. On one level, the charges and counter-charges that 
flew about the Parliament were intensely reported, 3 while on 
another level, broader assessments were being made on the state of 
the Australia-Indonesia relationship in the wake of the turbulent 
events of the previous year. 4 The pursuit of East Timor as an 
issue in this way, however (receiving political, press and public 
attention5 ), meant that it became a domestic political football, 
used principally by the political parties to criticize, embarrass 
or distance themselves from the major players and issues. 
Through the next fourteen months to January 1978, when 
Australia recognized the incorporation of East Timor, the press, 
together with activists within the Parliament and the wider 
community, 6 attempted to keep Australia's East Timor policy as a 
live issue. The findings of James Dunn and Labor MP Gordon Bryant 
that the Indonesian military had committed atrocities in East Timor 
were widely reported in the press early in 1977 7 -- as were the 
See the Sun, 13 October 1976, see also Claude Forell's 
comments in the Age, 14 October 1976. 
See Chapter Nine. 
Ibid., See the Age, 14 October 1976, 15 October 1976; the 
Canberra Times, 14 October 1976; the Sydney Morning Herald, 
14 October 1976, 15 October 1976. See also Hamish McDonald 
(Age, 18 October 1976) for a detailed report of Indonesia's 
reaction to this domestic infighting; the Courier Mail, 
22 October 1976; the Canberra Times, 20 November 1976. 
See, for example, Michael Richardson's report in the Age, 
7 December 1976. 
5 	For example, the Fraser government's actions in closing 
down the telecom link with Fretilin and its abstention from 
the vote in the UN on the Timor issue drew a barrage of 
domestic criticism. See the Age, 8 November 1976 and the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 19 November 1976. 
6 	See Chapters Nine and Ten. 
2 
3 
4 
7 	See, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 
1977; the Australian, 20 January 1977; the West  
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views of people from the wider community, letters from whom were 
published regularly throughout the year -- and served to hinder 
Australian Government efforts to submerge the Timor issue. 1 
While the outcome of Dunn's representations to the US Congress 
was not a success, 2 Indonesia's strong reaction was of immediate 
interest to some in the press. 3 The Sydney Morning Herald in 
particular, considered it not only reflected that 'the shadow of 
Timor still lies across Australia-Indonesia relations' but it also 
was a measure of 'the failure of the policies of appeasement 
pursued by Mr Whitlam and Mr Fraser alike'. 4 . Foreign Affairs 
Minister Malik's threat of reprisals against the Australian Embassy 
in Jakarta was considered by the Age to be nothing less than 
'blackmail', highlighting the inescapable point that Malik was: 
introducing into the diplomatic sphere the very heavy-
handedness that he so fiercely denies his troops used in 
the military sphere in their conquest of East Timor, 
where the deaths of five Australian[s] ... have still not 
been satisfactorily explained. 5 
The Dunn issue generated a flurry of letters to the editors of many 
Australian newspapers supporting his position, while directing 
criticism towards the Indonesian Government's 'temerity' and the 
Australian Government's 'gutlessness'. ° Dunn's testimony to the US 
Congress in particular generated strong criticism of the Australian 
Government from the Sydney Morning Herald when, in a view similar 
Australian, 29 January 1977 and 1 February 1977. 
The Age, 22 February 1977; the Canberra Times, 14 March 
1977. 
2 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.258. 
3 	The Age, 16 March .1977; the Canberra Times, 16 March 1977; 
the Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1977. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1977. 
5 	The Age, 17 March 1977. See also the Mercury, 17 March 
1977; the Age, 18 March 1977. 
6 	The Canberra Times, 31 March 1977. (Letter from Lois M. 
Parker, Fisher, ACT). For alternative views see letters to 
the Age (24 March 1977) from John F. Henderson and from 
Professor Arndt (22 March 1977). 
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way. 
Such sentiments were at the core of attempts by the Australian 
Journalists' Association to mount an independent inquiry into the 
deaths of the five journalists. In the words of the AJA Federal 
Executive in July 1977, it had: 
become clear that the Australian Government has no 
intention of conducting a serious investigation.... 4 
While strong partisan debate continued, generated in the main by 
the leaking, yet again, of secret cables implicating Peacock in a 
meeting with two Indonesian officials from the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, 5 news reports on the East Timor issue 
quickly subsided in the remaining months of 1977. Press attention 
began to focus increasingly on Australia's broader relations with 
ASEAN, 8 the United States' Asia-Pacific policies, 7 Indo-Chinese 
refugees8 and Indonesian domestic issues. 9 Moreover, by early 1978 
The Canberra Times, 13 April 1977. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, "Wanting to have our cake and eat 
it too, over Timor" (12 April 1977) and "Combining reticence 
and rhetoric" (13 April 1977). 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 1977. 
4 	The Sun News-Pictorial, 22 July 1977. 
5 	The Courier Mail, 2 May 1977; the Canberra Times, 3 May 
1977 and 4 May 1977; the Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 77; 
the Age, 3 May 1977 and 4 May 1977; the National Times, 
27 May 1977; the Sun, 4 May 1977. See also Chapter Ten. 
6 	The Age, 1 July 1977, 5 July 1977, 14 July 1977 and 9 August 
1977. 
7 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 July 1977; 	the Age, 13 
September 1977. 
8 	The Age, 8 August 1977. 
to those subsequently put forward by the Canberra Times i and Peter 
Hastings, 2 it argued: 
One does not need to dissent from the general proposition 
that a good relationship with Indonesia is important to 
feel extreme distaste at the lengths to which the Whitlam 
and Fraser Governments have gone in pursuit of it ... Our 
Indonesian policy has been conducted, and continues to be 
conducted, not only in a nationally humiliating way but 
also3  in a singularly unskillful and counter-productive 
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a great deal of press attention was focusing enthusiastically on 
the re-election of President Suharto to his third presidential 
term. On the Australian recognition of East Timor's integration 
into the Indonesian Republic the Sydney Morning Herald, in one of 
the few, but representative, commentaries l made, lamented: 
Our gestures of disapproval, adequate or not, achieved 
nothing; our continued disapproval can change nothing - 
though it would harm a relationship of the utmost 
importance to us. Recognition may leave sour thoughts in 
the mind; at least it acknowledges that we must live in 
the world as it is ... To some it may seem that, in a 
conflict between principle and expedience, principle has 
come off worse again [but] ... in a conflict between what 
cannot be done and what can be done, realism has had to 
prevail . 2 
Conclusion  
Press reporting on the East Timor issue went through a number 
of distinct stages. The first coincided with the period leading to 
and including the merger between UDT and Fretilin, and saw an 
increase in press interest in developments in the former Portuguese 
colony. The second was the period of civil war in East Timor, 
during which time first-hand reporting became an important source 
of information for Australians on events taking place in the 
territory. The third stage was concomitant with the Fraser period 
in government, straddling the October 1976 Fraser-Suharto talks, 
and ending with Australia's de facto recognition of East Timor's 
integration into the Indonesian Republic. 	Earliest press comment 
on the East Timor issue emerged through news items and the 
occasional editorial comment. While the former attempted to glean 
information about developments from the few reports available in 
Australia, editorial views focused on some of the early issues 
involved -- in particular, that of the process of decolonization. 
While some in the press ruled out any prospect for independence, 
9 	The National Times, "Has Suharto lost the support of his 
Generals?", 15-20 August 1977; "Cynicism dominates 
Indonesia's tenth anti-corruption campaign", 24-31 October 
1977. 
1 	See Michael Gratton, the Age, 23 January 1978; Dennis 
Warner, 	the Courier Mail, 23 February 1978; 	Michael 
Barnard, the Age, 28 January 1978. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 January 1978. 
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others insisted on a decent process of self-determination for the 
East Timorese. At the forefront here were the Sydney Morning  
Herald and the Canberra Times. 
In the period between the first and second Whitlam-Suharto 
talks, straddling the invasion scare of early 1975, it was becoming 
evident to the Australian press that a process of decolonization 
would not guarantee a smooth passage to self-determination, least 
of all independence. This saw a hardening of press attitudes on 
the East Timor issue and, through numerous articles and editorials 
that critically evaluated the major issues, gave rise to valuable 
attempts to inform domestic opinion. Fundamental to this process 
during this four-year period were the authoritative views of 
Hastings and Richardson. 
Richardson's first-hand reporting was an impartial source of 
information, contrary to that emanating from Jakarta and Canberra 
about developments taking place in East Timor, especially during 
the civil war. 1 For his part, Hastings was at the centre of 
several attempts by government (in one important instance, by the 
Department of Defence) to manipulate developments surrounding, and 
public opinion concerning, East Timor. 2 In this way, the press 
attracted the ire of the Indonesian Government, which was taking an 
increasingly critical view of the tone and emphasis of Australian 
press reporting. While such reporting focused on developments in 
East Timor it also paid attention to the anti-Indonesian views of 
many in the Australian community. 
A major development for the Australian press, however, that 
deeply influenced its perceptions of Indonesia's behaviour, was the 
deaths of the five journalists. And it emerged as a major factor 
• in the press' continuing coverage of the East Timor issue. Yet, in 
the months preceding the Indonesian invasion, while the press 
played an important and influential role in informing the public 
See, for example, his article in the Age (26 November 1975) 
on the Indonesian attack on the East Timor town of Atabae. 
Indonesia continued to deny its military forces were 
involved in any fighting in East Timor 
2 	Nicol, B., Timor. 	The Stillborn Nation, p.283. 	Nicol 
convincingly argues that the Department of Defence used 
Hastings to publicize its thinking on the strategic 
importance of Timor to Australia, at a time when the 
Department was being asked to contribute little in the 
formulation of Australia's Timor policy. 
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about the issue (as well as providing a forum for debate), it could 
not be argued that it was able to exercise direct influence on the 
Whitlam government. However, the same could not be said about the 
post-invasion period. 
Early reporting was undiscriminating, and throughout 1976 it 
directed criticism at the Indonesians as well as the Whitlam and 
Fraser governments. Questions were raised about the morality of 
the actions of all three governments and gave rise to speculation 
as to how far the Fraser government, notwithstanding its Four-Point 
policy, was prepared to go to acquiesce to Indonesia. Meanwhile, 
press attention continued to focus on developments in East Timor as 
well as on a deteriorating Australia-Indonesia relationship. 
At the forefront were Warner and, ironically, Hastings who 
were less concerned about the ambiguous natureof the Fraser 
government's policy (unlike Oakes and Wilkie) than about restoring 
stability to the relationship. The continued debate in Australia, 
on East Timor, became of principal interest to the press (over and 
above developments in East Timor) and fuelled lively news and 
editorial opinion. This gave rise to a period in which there was 
considerable interplay between the press and groups and individuals 
in the wider community. Inevitably, press scrutiny of the Fraser 
government's policies became increasingly negative and eroded 
Australian government hopes for a public consensus on the substance 
and direction of its East Timor policy. In this situation, the 
Australian press not only defined the critical issues, but also 
emerged as an important component of a domestic environment that 
was, throughout the period under review, hostile to any kind of 
Australian Government accommodation of Indonesia's actions. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ACRIMONY AND CONFRONTATION: THE PARLIAMENTARY  
DEBATE  
This chapter describes and analyses the attitudes of Members of the 
Federal Parliament on Indonesian issues between 1974 and 1980. The 
principal issue examined is East Timor and, accordingly, the 
chapter is divided into two periods. The first, from 1974 to 1975, 
covers the period leading up to the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor. The second covers the period of the new Fraser 
administration, principally up until 1978, when it extended de 
facto recognition of East Timor's integration into Indonesia. 
While the content and style of parliamentary attitudes and 
opinions are studied, it is of importance also to establish the 
effectiveness of the collective role of Parliamentarians in the 
wider campaign to influence Australia's East Timor policy. While 
it was noted earlier that the forum of Parliament can be used by 
MPs seeking to influence foreign policy decisions, it remains 
arguable whether this has an effective impact on policy. In this 
context, the degree of cohesion and differences in opinion in each 
party and between the parties is of interest, as too is the role of 
the extra-parliamentary wings of the parties in the formation and 
criticism of policy. 
A. 	The Pre-Invasion Imbroglio: Evolving Ideological and  
Politico-Strategic Perceptions  
Events in Timor failed to mobilize any serious debate in the 
Australian Parliament before the Suharto-Whitlam talks of September 
1974 in Wonosobo. Even the rise and fall of the Fretilin-UDT 
merger, which straddled the invasion scare of February 1975, failed 
to generate interest beyond that aroused by Peacock's urgency 
debate later that month. It took the UDT coup of 12 August, 
immediately prior to the opening of Parliament for the Budget 
session, to ignite discussion. 
Early Parliamentary Activity  
The Opposition's response to the outcome of the September 
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talks, however, was far from immediate, with the only hint of 
interest in developments in Portuguese Timor emerging six weeks 
later in October. 1 This preceded a vigorous attack, however, by 
Peacock on Whitlam's tardiness in acknowledging East Timor's right 
to self-determination. Peacock was especially critical of the 
hypocrisy and inconsistencies inherent in the Labor Government's 
tendency to call for such rights generally, only to yield to 
pressure from more powerful States, as was the case with the Baltic 
States and Soviet 'colonialism'. 2 
This drew an immediate response from Morrison, 3 who defended 
these charges with what was to be the first policy statement made 
by the government in respect of East Timor in the Australian 
Parliament. Morrison argued with carefully chosen words that the 
government's attitude on East Timor was based on UN principles as 
well as Australia's support for the right of self-determination. 
Moreover, in a signal that it did not wish to become involved in 
the evolving situation, Morrison put the ambiguous view that the 
Australian Government did: 
not seek any special position in Portuguese Timor and it 
believes that it is the views and attitudes of the people 
of Portuguese Timor that should be decisive. The 
Government has indicated that if the people of Portuguese 
Timor wish to associate themselves in some way with 
Indonesia, Australia would welcome this... provided ... 
that the decision were based on an internationally 
accepted act of self-determination. 4 
The Minister was joined by the ALP backbencher, C.J. Hurford5 , who 
was troubled by Indonesia's hardening attitude towards East Timor 
in the wake of the Wonosobo discussions. In what could only be 
viewed as an aggravation of the clear division between Whitlam and 
some Members in the government, Hurford referred to Adam Malik's 
earlier stance of non-interference, and subsequent post-discussion 
reports that Indonesia was looking to integration. He carefully 
1 	In a question from W. Sneddon, the Leader of the Opposition, 
(the Liberal Member for Bruce, Victoria, and later Sir 
Billy) to Whitlam. CPD, H.R., Vol.91, p.2716, 22 October 
1974. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.91, p.3044, 30 October 1974. 
3 	Ibid., pp.3045-3046. 
4 	Ibid., p.3046. 
5 	The Labor Member for Adelaide (SA). Ibid., p.3049. 
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and perceptively noted the role that domestic factionalism had 
played in this 'curious departure' from the Malik position, and the 
potential for problems presented by any awakening political 
activity in the once dormant colony. Hurford, however, was equally 
precise in consistently pointing to Australia's commitment to 
self-determination, and proceeded to play down the colony's 
economic unviability and, in strategic terms, its potential as a 
problem on the doorsteps of both Indonesia and Australia. 
Although Hurford found support across the floor in the 
Opposition backbencher J. Corbett, 1 the issue quickly foundered. 
Timor was raised only once during the remainder of the session, 2 
with attention given to other Indonesian matters. Inevitably, 
frustration crept into the Opposition's attempts to generate 
debate, not only on the East Timor issue, but on foreign policy 
matters generally. This was particularly noticeable in a speech in 
mid-November by a former diplomat, D.M. Connolly3 . In a complaint 
that was to arise on many occasions over the next year, he put it 
to the House of Representatives that although in the history of 
Australia: 
There has always been an unfortunate tendency to delude 
ourselves into believing that Australia can stand aloof 
and shut herself away from the world's problems ... it is 
the responsibility of all governments, regardless of 
their political colour to ensure that they bring to the 
attention of the Australian people, through the 
Australian Parliament, the activities, the problems and 
the solutions which the government of the day sees as 
being best fitted to the interests of this nation. 
Although it had been in power for nearly two years, apart from 
sporadic comments by Morrison on a variety of foreign policy 
issues, the Whitlam Government made only one foreign policy 
statement to the House of Representatives. 4 Despite the fact that 
the Foreign Minister was seated in the Senate, the opportunity to 
1 	The Country Party Member for Maranoa (Queensland). CPD, 
H.R., Vol.91, p.3030, 30 October 1974. 
2 	Questions put to Whitlam (Minister representing the Foreign 
Affairs Minister) from Peacock on Australian Government 
consultations over the future of Portuguese Timor (Ibid., 
p.3135), and the visit to Australia by Fretilin leader, 
Ramos Horta (Ibid.). 
3 	Ibid., Vol.91, p.3437, 13 November 1974. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.84, pp.2643-2651, 24 May 1973. 
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debate the East Timor issue in the Senate was not taken up by the 
Opposition. 1 This situation, however, meant that Willesee had to 
respond to only one question in the Senate on East Timor in 1974. 2 
On the evidence it seems that the government's circumspection in 
the Parliament was an attempt to keep tight constraints on the 
issue, and although Fretilin's Ramos Horta timed his visit to 
coincide with the sitting of the Australian Parliament, it seems, 
if parliamentary activity was any guide, that the Government had 
achieved its aim. 
The Invasion Scare  
The first parliamentary session of 1975 followed the merger 
between Fretilin and UDT, straddled the invasion scare and the 
second Whitlam-Suharto meeting, and ended before the UDT coup of 
August 1975. While the merger threatened to erode Australian and 
Indonesian policies, and coincided with strengthening political 
support within Timor for independence over self-determination, it 
failed to generate any interest in the Australian Parliament. It 
took Peter Hastings' revelation in February, that the Indonesian 
Government was proposing a military solution to developments in 
East Timor, 3 to provoke any kind of reaction on East Timor. The 
Opposition launched a scathing attack on the government and its 
apparently equivocal attitude towards the future of the Portuguese 
colony. At the forefront, and regaining his earlier momentum, was 
Peacock. He was particularly critical of the Whitlam government's 
'failure to take urgent action to ensure a solution in accordance 
with the wishes of the local people and in the interests of the 
region'. 4 Moreover, Peacock claimed that Whitlam had compromised 
Australia's position in his talks with Suharto, and accused the 
1 	For an analysis of the influence of the Senate on foreign 
policy-making during the Whitlam government period, see 
Albinski, H.S., Australian External Policy Under Labor, 
pp.278-279. Albinski notes that Labor did not hold a 
majority in the Senate, however, the Opposition used the 
Senate to distract the government on predominantly internal 
policy subjects. 
2 	Question from Senator J.A. Mulvihill (ALP, NSW) on the issue 
of self-determination and the attitudes of the protagonist 
parties (CD, Senate, S.62, p.2182, 31 October 1974). 
3 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 1975. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.93, p.640, 25 February 1975. 
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Prime Minister of having given approval for Indonesia to take over 
East Timor. 1 
In reply, Morrison said that Australia believed the people of 
Portuguese Timor should be allowed to make their own choice about 
their future. However, in a movement away from his earlier 
position, he considered that it was not yet time for an act of 
self-determination. In a speech remarkably similar to his statement 
to the House of Representatives four months earlier, Morrison 
insisted that Australia continued to have no 'special interest' in 
developments in East Timor, yet indicated it had been in close 
contact with both Indonesia and Portugal about the future of the 
colony. Furthermore, he postulated that the Australian Government's 
position was clear and well understood by Indonesia; and that 
Australia would be seriously concerned if there was any unilateral 
action by Indonesia which could prevent an act of 
self-determination. 2 While Morrison was particularly critical of 
Peacock's motives in prompting the debate -- charging that his 
actions were 'a cheap political gimmick', subverting the close and 
delicate negotiations in which Australia was engaged with both 
Indonesia and Portugal3 -- it appeared to have succeeded in forcing 
the Government's hand when, in a reference to the 'natural 
interests of Indonesia', Morrison stressed the importance of 
Indonesia's concerns in the matter. 4 
Whitlam was not present during this debate. While he was said 
to have been preoccupied with other matters, the official reason 
for Morrison's presence was that the Minister for Science had 
spoken on the matter of East Timor before. The Prime Minister, 
however, did not want to enter the fray. It would not only have 
upgraded a sensitive situation that he wanted contained and 
resolved, but also added fuel to the fire of confusion that 
Ibid., p.641. 	A point taken up strongly and without compromise by Sinclair in a subsequent speech, Ibid., 
p.646. 
Ibid. , p.644. This argument was taken up by a subsequent 
ALP speaker, M. Cross, and indicated the growing number of 
Government MPs who did not share the Prime Minister's stance 
on this issue. 
Ibid., p.645. 
Ibid., p.644. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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embraced not only Australian policy makers, but also their 
Indonesian observers. Notably, while the urgency debate petered 
out, this activity in the Parliament revealed that there was a 
widening division in the higher echelons of the government on this 
issue, with differences emerging in particular between Whitlam and 
his Foreign Affairs spokespersons in both parliamentary Chambers -- 
Willesee, Wriedt l and Morrison. In the course of the first half of 
1975, Whitlam was seemingly at pains to contain the issue in 
perhaps the only forum he was able to do -- the Parliament. While 
other arenas were erupting, including the Labor Caucus and the 
community (see next Chapter), Whitlam chose to ride out the storm 
until the Parliament went into recess in July. 2 
In the meantime a delegation from the Labor Caucus' Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee visited Timor. One of two 
delegations to the colony that month (the other was organized by 
the CIET; see Chapter Ten) it was led by Kerin, and included 
Messrs Clayton, Fry and Gunn from the House of Representatives and 
Senators Gieltzelt and Mackintosh. Although hosted mainly by 
Fretilin leaders, the delegation met with the leaders of each 
1 In the Senate, Senator K.S. Wriedt was fielding a barrage 
of questions from the Opposition in its efforts to obtain 
information on the reports of an impending invasion, 1 to 
pressure the government for a clear statement of policy, 2 
as well as to focus specifically on inadequacies in the 
government's position. 3 Throughout, Wriedt held firm to the 
view that Australia's policy was, and had always been 'for 
a measured self-determination for Timor'. 4 Whether Wriedt 
had a sound understanding of developments in East Timor, or 
was simply following Whitlam's lead, and keeping a tight 
rein on information, was less than clear. 5 
1. Questions from Senator J.C. Carrick (Lib, SA) and Sir Magnus Cormack to Wriedt, CPD, 
Senate, Vol.S.63, 26 February 1975, pp.385 and 444. 
2. Question from Senator A.G. Poyser (ALP, Victoria) to Wriedt, Ibid., 6 March 1975, p.705. 
3. Question from Senator Sir Magnus Cormack (Lib, Victoria) to Wriedt, Ibid., 27 February 
1975, p.519. 
4. Ibid., 6 March 1975, p.705. 
5. Question from Senator Sir Magnus Cormack (Lib, Victoria) to Wriedt, Ibid., 26 February 
1975, p.444. In this regard see Ibid., Vol.5.65, 27 August 1975, p.280 Question from 
Liberal Senator, Carrick; Ibid., 28 August 1975, p.359; Ibid., 11 September 1975, p.741, 
Question from CP Senator, Maunsell. For a clear example of Foreign Minister Willesee's 
inability to answer, see Ibid., 30 September 1975, p.776. (Question from Sir Magnus 
Cormack). 
2 	The House of Representatives went into recess on 9 July and 
the Senate on 22 July 1975. 
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aspiring party within East Timor. It also had discussions with 
Portuguese officials, including the Governor who requested the 
Australian Government to reopen its consulate. During discussions 
with the Foreign Affairs Minister and representatives from his 
department upon their return, the delegation called for Australian 
assistance for the Timorese and the setting up of an 
Australian-Timorese Friendship Society. 1 Through a letter from 
Senator Gietzelt, 2 it also called for the reopening of the 
consulate. One of the delegation, Ken Fry, held the firm view that 
the coalition between UDT and Fretilin commanded strong support 
among the East Timorese and that the flurry of activity in 
Australia crystallized by the February invasion scare had so 
influenced the Indonesians that it seemed highly unlikely that they 
would resort to the use of force in the imposition of a solution. 3 
None of these arguments, however, impressed Whitlam. 
If there were any doubts that the Australian Government would 
shift on this issue then more were to arise following the second 
talks between Whitlam and Suharto held in Townsville in early April 
1975. Neither leader gave the media an account of the discussions 
that took place, but both pronounced themselves 'satisfied' with 
them, although the Australian and Indonesian policy positions were 
no nearer to a resolution of the inherent conflict between 
integration and self-determination. Whatever the precise terms of 
the understanding that was reached in Townsville, as we noted 
earlier, a significant change was apparent before the end of the 
month in the Indonesian attitude to the coalition parties. By the 
end of May, six weeks after UDT and Fretilin leaders had visited 
Jakarta, and one month before the scheduled talks in Macao on the 
decolonization process, UDT withdrew from the coalition for 
unspecified reasons. 4 The talks represented the penultimate 
attempt by Portugal to maintain control over the Timorese 
decolonization process. However, boycotted by Fretilin, 
essentially in a reaction to the collapse of the coalition, they 
proved unable to solve the now seriously mounting obstacles to 
1 	The Australian, 24 March 1975. 
2 	The Australian, 4 April 1975. 
3 	Viviani, N.,,HAustralians and The Timor Issue", p.211. 
4 	See pp.302-307, Chapter Seven. 
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Portugal's plans for decolonization. 
These events straddled, as detailed earlier, a period of 
intensifying Indonesian pressures involving, on one level, 
broadcasts over Radio Kupang, following UDT's withdrawal from the 
coalition, alleging that both Fretilin and UDT were communists and, 
on another, the temporary banning of journalists from entering 
Indonesian Timor. By the end of July, tensions intensified with 
renewed inter-party strife in Timor following the failure of the 
Macao talks. Indonesian pressure on Timor politics continued and 
the scene was set for a prolonged struggle of attrition. On 12 
August, UDT mounted its ill-fated coup. The day after its 30th 
Anniversary independence celebrations on 17 August, Indonesian 
spokespersons began to promote the unequivocal theme that Indonesia 
had a 'moral obligation' in East Timor, citing the civil 
disturbances that Malik had long said would not be tolerated by the 
Indonesian Government. 
This, then, was the scene that greeted the opening of 
Parliament in August 1975. Within a few days both chambers were in 
an uproar over these developments, and this intensity was sustained 
until the dismissal of the Whitlam government on 11 November. 
The Post-UDT Coup Debates  
On 26 August, a day after the decisive counter-offensive by 
Fretilin, prodding by Mulvihill and Maunsell in the Senate l and 
Fraser and Sinclair in the House of Representatives, 2 preceded a 
statement by Whitlam3 in response to the changing situation in East 
Timor, as well as to pressures within the ALP and, more broadly, in 
the Australian community (see below). While Whitlam stated that 
the Australian Government stood ready to contribute to any 
practicable humanitarian action, it remained: 
opposed to Australian military involvement, ... does not 
regard itself as party principal [and] ... continue[s] to 
hold that the future of the territory is a matter for 
resolution by Portugal and the Timorese people themselves 
with Indonesia also occupying an important place because 
CPD, S.65, 19 August 1975, p.17; Ibid., 26 August 1975, 
p.200; Ibid., 26 August 1975, p.205. 
2 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.96, pp.483 and 486, 26 August 1975. 
3 	Simultaneously read in the Senate by Senator Wriedt, Ibid., 
Senate, S.65, 26 August 1975, pp.215-217. 
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of its predominant interest. 
Moreover, with regard to the belief that Australia should arbitrate 
between the conflicting parties, bearing in mind the welfare of the 
Timorese people: 
the government does not think these views reflect the 
best approach for Australia. It believes that acceptance 
of these views could lead to a situation where Australia 
was exercising a quasi-colonial role in Portuguese Timor 
and might lead to the point ... where we were assuming 
some de facto responsibility for the territory. 
Finally, Whitlam considered that the responsibility for bringing an 
end to the conflict rested with Portugal. In the government's view, 
'Portugal cannot simply wash its hands of Portuguese Timor'. 1 
Clearly, Whitlam had not moved from the position he had 
adopted in the first Whitlam-Suharto talks, eleven months earlier. 
But more than this, he was making it implicitly clear that 
Indonesia's interests transcended those of the Timorese people. In 
this context, Whitlam was not only prepared to continue to call on 
the ineffective Portuguese Government to resolve the crisis, but 
also to rule out any kind of Australian role in, for example, a 
negotiated ceasefire between the warring parties in East Timor. 
This particularly angered Peacock who, in his reply, accused 
the government of washing its hands of the Timor situation. 
However, although suggesting a role for ASEAN and advocating 
Australian support for the matter if brought before the UN, the 
shadow Foreign Affairs Minister did not put forward an Opposition 
policy on East Timor. Instead, while agreeing with Whitlam's point 
relating to Australian military intervention, he was guarded in his 
remarks, and engaged only in low-key criticism of the government's 
handling of the problem. 2 
While there seemed to be a convergence in the positions 
adopted by Whitlam and Peacock, it also seemed that there were 
elements from both sides of the House of Representatives that were 
having difficulty in reconciling their views of where solutions lay 
to the whole problem of East Timor. Others, predominantly in the 
Opposition, were poised to exploit the Timorese tragedy for 
domestic political advantage. Yet, there were also those who 
sensed that the issues involved were rather too serious for 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.492, 26 August 1975. 
2 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.96, pp.509-511, 26 August, 1975. 
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partisan politics. Of those searching for a solution, R.I. Vines l 
and Drs. J.F. Cairns 2 and R.E. Klugman3 pressed strongly for further 
information. In strongly worded questions to the Prime Minister 
they continued to argue, nevertheless, in the name of 
humanitarianism, for the right of the Timorese people to choose 
their future -- as did Morrison, Gietzelt and Fry. 4 
Conflicting Interpretations  
Those who exploited this situation introduced a completely new 
strain into the Opposition's criticisms which compel closer 
analysis. With the support of J.M. Fraser, the National Country 
Party leader, J.D. Anthony raised, in a question to Whitlam, the 
spectre of a communist takeover in Timor. The NCP leader seemed to 
have the moral support, if not the active encouragement of the new 
Opposition leader when he unveiled to the House of Representatives 
his vision of a communist coup in the Portuguese colony. 5 Fraser, 
in an obvious attempt at sabre-rattling, reviving the politics of 
fear that had worked so well for the coalition in the past, put it 
to the Parliament: 
Is he [Mr Whitlam] concerned at all at the possible 
establishment of communist control in Portuguese Timor so 
close to Australia? 6 
In terms of the cautious approach taken by Peacock to date, this 
was a blow. It not only undermined that approach, it also exposed 
the Opposition to the possibility of being committed to an 
interpretation of the struggle in East Timor as one between 
communist and anti-communist forces -- an interpretation which the 
Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesperson had not been willing to 
The Liberal Member for Stirling (WA), Ibid., pp.564-565, 
27 August 1975. 
2 	The Labor Member for Lalor (Victoria), Ibid., p.565. 
3 	The Labor Member for Prospect (NSW), Ibid., p.574. 
4 	Harris, personal interview with Fry, November 1981. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.685, 28 August 1975. 
6 	Ibid., p.689. 
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embrace. 1 
Anthony's criticisms brought a stinging reply from Whitlam 
and, repeating a challenge which government members had directed to 
Peacock during the previous Tuesday's debate, asked: 
Do honourable members [of the Opposition] suggest that we 
should put troops into Portuguese Timor ... that we 
should offer an army and a police force to Portugal ... 
that we should afford a proxy army and a proxy police 
force in Portuguese Timor? 2 
While Anthony, in response to Whitlam's pointed challenge in the 
House of Representatives, had not suggested that Australia 
intervene militarily in the colony, he did not scotch the 
suggestion either. In an interjection that highlighted the rift in 
the Opposition (between Anthony and Peacock in particular), Anthony 
was stung to reply, 'You will wait and do nothing, will you?' 3 
Anthony's interpretation in the House of Representatives 
caught many within the Opposition ranks by surprise, and his 
subsequent comments outside the Parliament pleased few. 4 He found 
it 'frightening' that there was a prospect that Portuguese Timor 
could turn communist, and advocated a three-way diplomacy between 
Indonesia, Australia and Portugal to enable a preliminary 
peacekeeping force to go into the colony. This would stop the 
fighting, and pave the way for UN forces, who could hold the 
situation on the island until the Timorese people were able to 
exercise self-determination. Anthony also embraced the notion of 
joint Australian-Indonesian intervention, indicating that Portugal 
1 	Peacock made reference to the question of communist 
influence in his speech, on 26 August 1975, in very cautious 
terms, suggesting that it was made more out of deference to 
the susceptibilities of some of his colleagues, than to any 
firmly held beliefs he himself had. (CPD, H.R., Vol.96, 
p.509, 26 August 1975). 
2 	Ibid., p.686, 28 August 1975. 
3 	Ibid. 	In the debate on the previous Tuesday, Peacock 
received a similar challenge from government backbencher, 
Dr R.T. Gunn (Kingston, SA) when he questioned whether 
Peacock was advocating military intervention in East Timor. 
Peacock stated flatly that, 'the use of force by Australia 
in Timor or anywhere else is currently a non-question' 
(Ibid., p.509, 26 August 1975). 
4 	Harris, personal interviews with former Prime Ministers 
Gorton and, surprisingly, McMahon. 
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had clearly signalled its agreement with this course of action. 1 
In making these comments, Anthony went as close as anyone in 
the Opposition to supporting Australian military intervention 
outside the machinery of the UN. His rationale lay in a 
preoccupation with security, and the prospects of the East Timor 
situation unsettling the political and strategic situation in the 
region. 2 However, in relation to intervention, he was clearly out 
of step with Peacock, who made reference to Communism in the 26 
August debate in the following terms: 
the Opposition recognizes the basis of genuine concern on 
the part of Indonesia in terms of the turmoil in Portugal 
itself, in Angola and now in East Timor which forms part 
of the island archipelago of Indonesia, as well as in 
terms of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and the 
Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia. 3 
His statement was carefully encased in terms related to the 
Opposition's appreciation of Indonesian fears, while Anthony spoke 
of his own. Moreover, Peacock moved to differentiate between 
Soviet and Chinese Communism -- something lacking from Anthony's 
outlook. 
While there had always been those in the Opposition parties 
who felt compelled to reduce every issue to black and white -- 
characterized a combination of political opportunism and 
ideological obscurantism -- it is arguable that Peacock and Anthony 
shared the same motives. It would be tempting to characterize this 
rattling of sabres as an attempt to massage the politics of fear 
that had remained dormant for some years. On the other hand, while 
the prospect of an independent East Timor -- with ties to China or 
the Soviet Union -- was causing Indonesia great concern, the 
question remained as to whether this concern could be accepted as 
justification for unilateral military intervention. To accept it 
would be to turn one's back on past Australian decisions not to 
accept that Indonesian actions could be justified by claims of a 
threat to its security or that of the region (for example, the 
incorporation of Sarawak and Sabah in the Malaysian Federation, and 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 August 1975; the Canberra 
Times, 29 August 1975. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 29 August 1975. Anthony expressed 
concern at the possibility of another Soviet naval base 
being established in the Indian Ocean area. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, p.509, 26 August 1975. 
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confrontation), thus posing a dangerous if not subversive 
precedent. Clearly, however, these events brought out an old 
division within the Opposition parties over foreign policy, which, 
as long as Whitlam chose not to put the fears of the conservatives 
to rest, threatened to continue while the Timor conflict remained 
. unresolved. 
In the meantime, the lines of debate in Australia had 
hardened. While Australian domestic criticism of Whitlam's stand 
mounted (see later), it was sporadic and lacked the same intensity 
within the Parliament. The Prime Minister continued to fend off 
questions related to the conflict that continued in East Timor, 
reaffirming his position early in September. 1 He was to stand by 
it until the domestic events of early November which saw his 
government dismissed on 11 November 1975. Throughout this final 
period, Whitlam also expressed strong objections to the 'communist' 
tag that had been attached to Fretilin, 2 with support from Kerin 
who argued that to say so was not only 'stupid, it is dangerous and 
it is wrong'. 3 As Whitlam put it: 
nothing could be better calculated to stir suspicion and 
to arouse preventive action by some of our neighbours ... 
If honourable gentlemen opposite wish to arouse fears and 
to stir action by Indonesia they are going the right way 
about it. If there is a reaction by Indonesia, then 
Australians can thank [Fraser and Anthony]... for 
branding any incoming administration in Timor as 
communist. I cannot imagine anything more irresponsible, 
more against Australia's interests, more against the 
interests of other countries in the region and ... the 
people of Timor themselves. 4 
Meanwhile, during late August-early September, important changes 
had taken place in East Timor. As we noted earlier, Fretilin 
consolidated its position militarily and announced a de facto  
1 	Ibid., p.825, 2 September 1975. 
2 	Ibid., p.824, 2 September 1975; Ibid., p.1390, 30 September 
1975. 
3 	Labor Member for Macarthur (NSW), Ibid., p.784, 28 August 
1975. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.96, pp.824-825, 2 September 1975. Peacock 
attempted to dilute the ideological tenor of the debate in 
early October, although he maintained his criticism of 
Whitlam's contradictory attitude to the Timor problem, while 
pointing out the firming divisions within the government 
ranks (Ibid., Vol.97, pp.1659-1660, 20 October 1975). 
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administration, as the remnants of Portugal's colonial 
administration departed. Then, towards the end of September, UDT 
and Apodeti merged to form the Anti-Communist Revolutionary 
Movement (MAC) and were duly embraced by Indonesia. From this 
point on, the die appeared to be cast. By early October it was 
clear that Indonesia was militarily active in East Timor, 1 and 
pressures were mounting in Australia for the Whitlam Government to 
mediate, as students, trade unions, church people, aid 
organizations and Members of Parliament engaged in demonstrations 
and protests against both Indonesian activities and Australian 
policies (see later). Central here were the tragic deaths of the 
five journalists, and official attitudes to the affair. 
Deaths of the Journalists  
An important indication that the Whitlam government was 
obdurately committed to the course it had chosen was in its initial 
response to the deaths in mid-October of five Australian-based 
journalists at Balibo. 2 Australian Embassy officials, R. Johnson 
and J. Starey, were despatched to Timor on 17 and 20 October 1975, 
respectively. The former went to recover the bodies and to gather 
details of the tragedy, although he did not manage to go farther 
than Kupang and could not establish the facts surrounding the 
incident . 3 
While Starey managed to reach Dili, he, too, was unable to 
gather any information. Although Foreign Affairs Minister Willesee 
set this investigative process in motion on 17 October --a process 
that involved Ambassador Woolcott securing Malik's cooperation in 
unearthing details of the deaths 4 	Whitlam publicly persisted 
with the view that the government had no knowledge of any military 
See Chapter Seven. 
2 	"Australian Journalists in Timor", Backgrounder, Department 
of Foreign Affairs, 24 October 1975, p.15. The deaths of 
these journalists created considerable interest for some 
time; although based on circumstantial evidence, accounts 
meriting examination are Jolliffe, J., "How did these 
Australians Die?", the National Times, 8-13 March 1976, and 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.166 ff. 
3 	The Age, 23 October 1975. 
4 	Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.234. 
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activity on the part of Indonesia in the territory. 1 In the 
meantime public pressure was mounting for a clarification of the 
circumstances surrounding the deaths, and for stronger government 
action (see later). 2 This, together with a widening perception 
that the Indonesians were militarily active in East Timor, and 
deepening (and broadening) public and political opinion, exerted 
pressure on Foreign Affairs Minister Willesee, on 30 October 1975, 
to review Australia's policy on Timor. 
Up until that time, and since Whitlam's 26 August statement on 
Australia's position on Timor (read simultaneously by Wriedt in the 
Senate), the Senate's activities had been overshadowed by the 
tumultuous events taking place in the House of Representatives. 
Nevertheless, Opposition Senators experienced the same frustrations 
as their party colleagues in the other chamber in securing 
information on, and Australia's policy towards, events in 
CPD, H.R., Vol.97, pp.2296-2297, 21 October 1975, in 
response to a question from Fry, the Labor Member for Fraser 
(ACT). A third attempt was not mounted until April 1977, 
with two unnamed diplomats reporting in June that they 'did 
not uncover any information that adds significantly to that 
already available to the government'. On the fate of the 
territory, the two diplomats were more certain when they 
concluded that 'Integration (with Indonesia) appears to be 
clearly an irreversible fact'. (East Timor: Officials' 
report, Backgrounder, Department of Foreign Affairs, No.94, 
24 June 1977, pp.7-9). This was unacceptable to the 
Australian Journalists' Association, which felt it had 
'become clear that the Australian Government has no 
intention of conducting a serious investigation of its own' 
into evidence the AJA itself had gathered, and called on the 
International Commission of Jurists to assist in an enquiry. 
It also advocated the appointment of an Australian jurist 
to handle an investigation, to be funded by the media barons 
(the Sun (Melbourne), 22 July 1977; the Age, 27 July 1977). 
2 	The Department of Foreign Affairs itself noted at the end 
of October, 'Statements have been made to the effect that 
the Australian Government and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs have been unconcerned or inactive regarding the case 
of the five Australian journalists, missing believed killed 
in Balibo, East Timor.' Department of Foreign Affairs, 
"Report Outlinging Investigation into Deaths of Five 
Television Reporters in Balibo, East Timor", Canberra, 31 
October 1975, quoted in Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.237. 
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Portuguese Timor. However, one issue -- that of refugees -- 
dominated the Senate during September, with Senator J. McClelland 
bearing the brunt of Opposition probing. Whether it was due to Sir 
Magnus Cormack's criticism relating to Willesee's absence from the 
Parliament during the unfolding of events in East Timor, or the 
shift in Senate interest as it heightened in October -- 
particularly in relation to the journalists' deaths -- Willesee 
chose to remain in Australia, lifting the burden from Wriedt and 
McClelland in accounting for events in East Timor, in absorbing 
Australian domestic reactions and in defending the government's 
policy. In any event, the deaths of the journalists was to have a 
profound effect on the Foreign Affairs Minister who, in his 30 
October statement, delivered the Whitlam government's first 
criticism of Indonesia's role and actions in East Timor. 
The matter of the journalists was first raised in the Senate 
on 21 October 1975 by Senator A.G. Poyser 2 , in an attempt to pry 
information from the government on vague reports that Australian 
television crews were missing in East Timor. Willesee's response 
was similar, in almost all respects, to the one given by Whitlam in 
the House of Representatives earlier that same day, and therefore 
was no more informative, except in one respect. The Foreign 
Affairs Minister indicated that, in keeping with government 
procedures, warnings had been issued to the pilots of the aircraft 
chartered by the Channel 7 and Channel 9 crews -- those reported 
In response to a question from the writer as to whether or 
not the Whitlam government ever signalled to the Indonesians 
a distancing between Australia and Indonesia, the former 
Foreign Affairs Minister indicated that no such signal was 
given. He believed it unlikely that 'Whitlam would have 
tolerated any signal to be made clear to Suharto'. (Harris, 
correspondence with Willesee, November 1986). Dr. Viviani, 
however, his private secretary at the time, considered 
Willesee's 30 October statement was such a signal, and one 
that had to be given publicly because Australia's 
Ambassador, Woolcott, would not give it privately. (Harris, 
interview with Viviani, Brisbane, November 1986). That the 
Whitlam government did distance itself from the Suharto 
regime in 1974 was a theme pursued by J.A.C. Mackie in 
"Australia-Indonesia relations" Current Affairs Bulletin, 
1 October 1976, p.17. In fact, Mackie indicated to the 
author that Woolcott had told him that he (Woolcott) was so 
instructed, at the political level. 
2 	ALP, Victoria, CPD, Senate, S.66, 21 October 1975, 
pp.1248-1249. 
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missing. 1 An indication of the fate of the journalists was again 
asked of Willesee, but not before criticism from the Liberal's 
Senator Missen on the inadequate level of information that was 
reaching the Parliament on the turmoil in East Timor. 2 It was at 
this point that Willesee's impressions of events of the previous 
eighteen months were revealed when he told the chamber: 
It is now well over 12 months since I first started 
talking to Dr Mario Soares at the United Nations. The 
situation has gone through a lot of stages ... in which I 
think a lot of the parties have acted very unwisely. If 
cool had been maintained and the original Portuguese idea 
had been followed of setting up a constituent assembly, 
moving into a parliamentary situation and then abiding by 
what the Timorese people said ... without interference 
... that would have been the sensible course. 3 
Of the whole deteriorating situation, and the disappearance of the 
journalists he concluded: 
It is a very difficult and a very sad situation. We are 
all upset, and nobody more than I, over the disappearance 
of Australians. When you are in the box seat these 
things are just not nice to deal with. 
By the end of the month, it had become clear in the Parliament that 
the journalists were Australian, and that they had perished on 
either the 15 or 16 October. Moreover, a number of disturbing 
accounts had come to light as to the circumstances surrounding 
their deaths. 4 This gave rise, on 29 and 30 October, to a battery 
of questions, 5 prompting the Foreign Affairs Minister to make his 
ministerial statement to the Parliament on the afternoon of 30 
October. 
In what was described as 'a welcome step towards reality' and 
'a conditional rebuke' to Indonesia, 6 Willesee put it to the 
1 	CPD, Senate, S.66, 21 October 1975, p.1249. 
2 	Ibid., 23 October 1975, pp.1423-1424. 
3 	CPD, Senate, S.66, 23 October 1975, p.1424. 
4 	Reflected in questions from Senators G.S. Davidson (Liberal, 
SA) and A.T. Gieltzelt (Labor, NSW), Ibid., 29 October, 
pp.1530-1532. 
5 	See, for example, question from Senator Carrick regarding 
the 'overt or covert support' - both politically and 
militarily - within Australia for Fretilin (Ibid., 30 
October, pp.1598-1599; question from Senator D.J. Grimes 
(ALP, Tasmania), Ibid., p.1600. 
6 	The Canberra Times, 31 October 1975. 
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Parliament that, were all the parties to wish it, the Wbitlam 
Government would be prepared to offer an Australian venue for 
roundtable talks. However, not before indicating that: 
the Government has viewed with concern widespread reports 
that Indonesia is involved in military intervention in 
Portuguese Timor [but]... the position of the Australian 
Government is clear. We deplore the fighting and ... 
believe that a solution to the problems in Portuguese 
Timor should be sought through peaceful means and free of 
external intervention. 
The Foreign Affairs Minister indicated that it had been pointed out 
to Indonesia that the Australian Government held firmly to these 
views, and that Indonesia had been urged to pursue its interests 
through diplomatic means. Moreover, Willesee added his long held 
view that 'Portugal's inability, or reluctance to retain control 
opened the way to a struggle for supremacy among a number of 
essentially immature, rival political factions'. The Foreign 
Affairs Minister concluded with the caveat: 
It is in this situation of drift ... that we view the 
various policy pronouncements, newspaper reports and the 
like from Jakarta and Timor itself. Were there substance in 
these reports, the Australian Government would be extremely 
disappointed/ and we have so informed the Indonesian 
authorities.' 
In what was the last substantial statement the Australian 
Government made on the East Timor issue, 2 Willesee had moved away 
from his former tacit position towards a stronger affirmation of 
the principle of self-determination. According to his private 
secretary, 3 the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister favoured taking 
a stronger public stand. However, he was hamstrung by three 
elements: an awareness that there would be resistance from his 
Prime Minister; 'by Department of Foreign Affairs advice that it 
was impolitic to confirm reports of Indonesian military involvement 
CPD, Senate, S.66, 30 October 1975, pp.1609-1610. Quoted 
in part by Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", 
p.220. Also quoted, more fully, by Jolliffe, J., East 
Timor, p.256. 
2 	While Willesee continued to respond to questions in the 
Senate as they related to subsequent events in the 
territory, the issue was never raised again in the House 
of Representatives following Whitlam's response to Fry on 
21 October 1975. (CPD, H.R., Vol.97, p.2296, 21 October 
1975). 
3 	Viviani, N., "Australians and The Timor Issue", p.220. 
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when the Indonesians were busy denying such reports'; and by the 
actions of Australia's Ambassador Woolcott, who had earlier 
delivered the statement to Indonesian authorities without the 
crucial leading paragraph, which was critical of Indonesian 
intervention in Timor. In the words of the Ambassador, and 
reflecting the government's rationale for its policies in the 
preceding twenty months, such a statement had the potential 'to 
stir up a hornet's nest in Australia ... as well as producing a 
cold reaction [in Indonesia]...'. While he stressed that the 
paragraph could 'stimulate hostility to Indonesia within the 
Australian community, which has been our policy to minimize,' 
Woolcott was particularly concerned that 'If the Minister said or 
implied in public the Indonesian Government was lying we would 
invite a hurt and angry reaction'. 1 
B. 	The Fraser Administration: Growing Hostility and a Hardening 
of Attitudes  
In early May 1976, Senator Arthur Gietzelt informed the 
chamber: 
I think it is a matter of regret that on the question of 
East Timor... we have not debated or publicly aired the 
views that each of us may have on the developments and 
the tragic events that have taken place there over the 
last few months... for never in modern history have an 
indigenous people been treated as brutally and found 
themselves outside the normal channels of assistance 
which is available to most other people and countries. 2 
Indeed, up until that day, when the New South Wales Senator 
initiated an emergency debate on East Timor, the parliamentary 
forum had been relatively restrictive. Yet, throughout the first 
session of the Thirtieth Parliament of 1976, there had been 
attempts to generate debate, paralleling deepening divisions in 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives, over five 
distinct issues: self-determination for the East Timorese, the 
UN's role (including such humanitarian issues as aid and refugees), 
the deaths of the five Australian journalists, and Indonesian and 
Australian policies on East Timor. 
This was part of a cable, sent by Woolcott to the Foreign 
Affairs Department in Canberra, which was leaked and 
examined in the Canberra Times (31 May 1976) by Bruce 
Juddery. Quoted more fully in Jolliffe, J., East Timor, 
p.257. 
2 	CPD, Senate, S.68, 5 May 1976, p.1533. 
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Deepening Divisions  
The East Timor issue under the new Fraser government first 
came under the scrutiny of the House of Representatives in 
mid-February. In a response to that aspect of the Governor-
General's speech related to foreign policy, Liberal backbencher 
D.M. Connolly l introduced two themes. The first concerned the 
increasing Soviet presence in Australia's primary area of interest, 
Southeast Asia. The second related to the Fraser government's 
inheritance of a "no win' situation' in Timor, and one created by 
a Labor Prime Minister prepared to acquiesce to the Indonesians. 2 
These two themes dominated the debate in the House of 
Representatives in the months ahead, while variations in detail and 
modifications were evident in the Senate. In their broadest 
interpretation, these themes often converged, submerging the 
Australian parliamentary debate into the party political fighting 
reminiscent of the Vietnam days. 
An early example of this was provided by Dr P.A. Richardson, a 
newly elected Liberal backbencher from Western Australia. 3 In an 
indictment of the Whitlam government's foreign and defence 
policies, he was critical of the role that ideological 
considerations played in such policies. Richardson considered that 
in possessing an 'idealistic, unrealistic, optimistic and, worst of 
all, simplistic world view', the Labor government had ignored the 
realities of an increasing Soviet presence in the region and of the 
Timor crisis, 'the first shattering of any dream that Australia 
faced a long-term period of tranquility'. Richardson then moved 
quickly to mesh the two with his view that: 
Member for Bradfield, NSW. CPD, H.R., Vol.98, p.76, 18 
February 1976. 
2 	In the Senate, the Liberal Member for the ACT, Senator J.W. 
Knight was more circumspect, stressing the intention of the 
new government to pursue 'a balanced and realistic foreign 
policy', including initiatives in the United Nations to end 
the 'bloodshed' in East Timor. Fundamentally, and 
reflecting a view held by other government backbenchers, 
while he considered Indonesia was of great importance to 
Australia, the new government's 'commitment to fundamental 
rights and freedom' should not be overshadowed by the 
relationship (CPD, Senate, S.67, 18 February 1976, p.43.). 
3 	Liberal Member for Tangney, WA. Ibid., H.R., Vol.98, 
pp.442-443, 2 March 1976. 
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It has been fortunate for us that others prevented East 
Timor becoming a bankrupt socialist coconut republic, 
probably dependent upon Russian aid that would be offered 
in return for naval facilities and other concessions. 
The implications for the security of Indonesia and 
Australia would, to say the least, have been disturbing 
if this scenario had unfolded... It does not need great 
perception to see the potential tragedy of East Timor 
fulfilled there a dozen times over, with totalitarian 
economic sinkholes ruled by Soviet catspaws threatening 
the stability and democratic institutions of their more 
stable and developing neighbours, both black and white. 1 
In his first statement to the Parliament on foreign policy matters, 
the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Peacock took the opportunity to 
address these concerns, as well as the tenor of this emerging 
debate. While only brief, he put the government's four-point 
policy on Timor, 2 and assured the House of Representatives that he 
had conveyed it to his counterpart in Jakarta in mid-January. 
While he reassured the Parliament that the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship could absorb 'the existence of quite serious 
differences', 3 Peacock's greatest concern was that the Timor debate 
had become an ideological dispute. 
While Peacock expressed his regret at such a development, -- 
as he had when Fraser and Anthony raised the spectre of Communism 
seven months earlier4 -- it did not put a brake on other government 
members. J.R. Martyr, 5 in a shift of focus, turned to the 'Timor 
moratorium' which concerned him, not only because: 
This stalking horse is from the same stable as the 
Vietnam moratorium which turned our streets into centres 
of violence and potential violence, where political power 
was exerted through sheer weight of an ostensible 
non-violence [sic] that was both aggressive and 
essentially corrupt.... 
but also because it represented 'another attempt on the part of 
Communism in this country to take foreign policy decisions out of 
the hands of the properly elected Government and into the streets 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.98, p.442, 2 March 1976. 
2 	Ibid., p.568, 4 March 1976. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.98, p.569, 4 March 1976. 
4 	
See Chapter Seven. 
5 	The Liberal Member for Swan, WA. 	CPD, H.R., Vol.98, 
pp.922-924, 23 March 1976. 
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and the backrooms of the Left' . 1 In what was an adjournment debate 
that continued late into the evening, Martyr attacked the Fretilin 
leadership and their campaign to mobilize support around Australia, 
as well as organizations like the Campaign for an Independent East 
Timor (CIET), which had established links with the Australian 
Communist Party and the Trade Union movement around Australia. He 
dismissed Fretilin as a nationalist body and as a force in East 
Timor, both politically and military. The reality then for Martyr 
was that: 
The East Timor moratorium is simply not a spontaneous 
rising up of concerned Australians anxious to support a 
genuine independence movement in a small nation. It is a 
careful scheme organized by the Communist Party, 
Communist and left wing led unions and student 
organizations, left wing aid agencies 2 and a handful of 
hard core Fretilin activists in Australia. Is this 
picture not all too familiar? It is designed not only to 
support the Fretilin and a Communist takeover in East 
Timor, but also to embarrass this Government and weaken 
our ties with Indonesia. 3 
Martyr's view drew strong criticism, not only from the Opposition 
but also from within his own ranks. Young4 considered it was 
'representative of the extremist right-wing reactionary views that 
are being expressed under the cloak of the Liberal Party'. Chipp 5 
judged that it was damaging for the House of Representatives, 
particularly on the government's side, to label Fretilin as an 
CPD, H.R., Vol.98, p.922, 23 March 1976. 
2 	Martyr was particularly critical of the involvement of the 
churches in this moratorium, particularly as they were 
active through the Australian Council for Overseas Aid 
(ACF0A) and the Action for World Development Program (AWDP). 
The core of his criticism related to the use of donations 
from the churches -- essentially given for welfare and 
humanitarian purposes -- for political use; ostensibly 'to 
promote a communist led movement aimed at subjecting a whole 
people and a country to communism' (CPD, H.R., Vol.98, 
p.924, 23 March 1976). 
3 	Ibid., p.923. 
4 	M.J. Young, the Labor Member for Port Adelaide, SA. Ibid., 
pp.924-926. 
5 	Recently demoted -- and free to express such views -- from 
his position in the first Fraser Ministry (18 December 1975 
- 12 January 1976) as Minister for Social Security, Minister 
for Health and Minister for Repatriation and Compensation. 
Ibid., pp.1054-1055, 25 March 1976. 
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entirely communist movement, and one to be destroyed. In a 
sensible speech that attempted to balance the strong views held and 
expressed by some of his colleagues, Chipp argued strongly for 
Fretilin's nationalist credentials, and was clearly concerned that 
dragging the Timor debate into an ideological abyss would ensure 
that 'we will lose all sense of objectivity and perhaps fall into 
the same trap that we fell into when the Vietnam war was going on'. 
In a plea to commonsense, Chipp concluded: 
I would like to think that in the future when we look at 
matters of self-interest we do not simply say that if 
East Timor becomes independent it may do a deal with the 
Russians... Let us not, as we did on some occasions during 
the Vietnam conflict when we shouted out slogans about 
domino theories and so on, be led by cliches espoused by 
members of either the extreme Left or the extreme Right... 
let us have the debate without acrimony. 1 
However, Chipp's words fell on deaf ears because, on the other side 
of the House of Representatives, Young was joined in his criticism 
by Fry. In his first speech to the Parliament on East Timor, 2 Fry 
found Martyr's views 'highly offensive and highly inaccurate', and 
attempted to redress Martyr's perceptions of the Timor moratorium 
and those involved in it -- particularly the churches and aid 
agencies. What was also of concern to Fry was Martyr's return to 
'all the old bogies about the Fretilin forces being communist 
dominated', and his 'audacity to support a fascist aggression with 
no justification whatsoever, against the poor defenceless 
half-starved people' of East Timor. 3 
The Role of the UN 
Meanwhile, Peacock was to spend this period fending off 
Opposition probes into the roles of the United Nations and 
Australia in events in East Timor, particularly as they related to 
pressuring Indonesia to withdraw militarily and to giving the East 
Timorese the opportunity to determine their own future. 4 In the 
1 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.98, p.1055, 25 March 1976. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.98 pp.1082-1084, 25 March 1976. 
3 	Ibid., pp.1083-1084, 25 March 1976. 
4 	See for example Questions to Peacock from G.M. Bryant, the 
Labor Member for Wills (Victoria), Ibid., p.254, 25 February 
1976; Ibid., p.534, 4 March 1976. 
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Senate, Senator R.G. Withers, 1 had taken over Wriedt's role in 
arguing the government's position, with an early adjournment debate 
on refugees from East Timor -- initiated by Senator J.A. Mulvihill 2 
and in response to pressure from the Portuguese community in Sydney 
-- drawing in the Minister for Social Security (Senator M.G.C. 
Guilfoyle) 3 . This ushered in a period in the Senate when both sides 
of the Chamber demanded further information on the Indonesian 
invasion of East Timor; 4 on reports of the subsequent massacring 
of the East Timorese people; 5 and on the respective roles of the 
UN and Australia in putting pressure on the Indonesian Government 
to admit the International Red Cross and a UN mission of 
observers . 6 
Senator Withers, like Wriedt before him, provided 
unsatisfactory answers, and his poor performances incited Labor's 
Senator Primmer to launch a major assault on Indonesia's actions in 
East Timor, and the government's silence over the matter. While 
Fry was in the House of Representatives insisting that he was being 
'covertly inhibited and harassed in seeking to obtain the free flow 
of information' on events taking place in East Timor, 7 his 
colleague in the Senate was scathing in his criticism of the 
complicity of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in condoning Indonesia's actions. The Victorian Senator 
was far from constrained, accusing Indonesia of 'mass genocide' and 
Liberal, WA, Minister Administrative Services, Leader of 
the Government in the Senate, and Minister representing the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Senate. 
2 	ALP, NSW. CPD, Senate, S.67, 18 February 1976, pp.78-82. 
3 	Later, Dame Margaret. 
4 	See, for example, question from Senator Missen (Liberal, 
NSW) to Withers, CPD, Senate, S.67, 19 February 1976, p.92. 
5 	Question from Senator C.G. Primmer (Labor, Victoria). 
Ibid., p.9, 419 February 1976. Senator Withers responded 
in March, Ibid., pp.350-351, 2 March 1976. See Senator 
Primmer's continued prodding on the question of the 
massacring of the East Timorese, Ibid., p.1033, 6 April 
1976. 
6 	See Chapter Seven, also question from Senator J.N. Button 
(Labor, Victoria), Ibid., pp.131-132, 24 February 1976. 
7 	See above. 
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questioning whether Indonesian officers involved in the invasion 
were trained in Australia and using Australian military equipment. 
In a scathing attack he accused the Indonesians of being 
'neo-fascists... extreme right wing militarists', and argued that 
their expansionist activities demanded that the Australian 
Government review its policy towards them. 1 Moreover, quoting from 
a press release issued by the Campaign for Independent East Timor 
(CIET),Primmer accused the Australian Government of complying with 
the advice contained in Woolcott's cable, was critical of 
Portugal's policies, and accused a handful of right-wing figures 
within Australia2 of complicity in the UDT Coup. Primmer concluded 
with strong criticism of the new government's swing back to 'the 
cold war theories of the 1950s and 1960s', conjurring up notions of 
'a mythical enemy out there -- the red or the yellow peril...'. 3 
For the next five weeks, the Parliament was abuzz with 
revelations of Australian Government obstructionism regarding the 
UN representative's (Dr Guicciardi) visit to East Timor, 4 the 
supplying of arms, originating in Australia, to Fretilin, 5 and the 
government's efforts to halt attempts by relief ships to take 
humanitarian aid to East Timor° . The confiscation of a radio 
CPD, Senate, S. 67, 24 February 1976, p.149. 
2 	Michael Darby (MP), and former Brigadier Bernard J. Callinan 
-- a director of British Petroleum (Australia), a prominent 
member of the National Civic Council and the Australian 
Democratic Labor Party, and a former captain in the 
Australian Commandos in Timor during the Second World War. 
(CPD, Senate, S.67, 24 February 1976, pp.150-151). 
3 	Ibid., p.151. 
4 	Question to Senator Withers from Senator Primmer, Ibid., 
p.133, 24 February 1976. 
5 	Question from Senator Sir Magnus Cormack to Senator Withers, 
Ibid., 16 March 1976, p.466; question from Senator Button 
to Senator Withers, Ibid., 25 March 1976, p.779. See also 
questions from C.M. Connolly to Peacock, CPD, H.R., Vol.98, 
p.1467, 7 April 1976. 
6 	Question from Senator Sir Magnus Cormack to Senator Withers, 
CPD, Senate, S.67, 6 April, p.1034. Question from Fry to 
Peacock, CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1578, 27 April 1976. Both 
questions related to Trade Union attempts to ship this aid. 
See also Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue: 
II", p.249, on aid agency and church pressures on the 
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transmitter near Darwin, 1 considered to be unlicensed and receiving 
communications from Fretilin in East Timor, was also raised in the 
Parliament. Then in early April, an Adjournment Debate on Amnesty 
International spilled over into an examination of Indonesia's 
actions in East Timor, and the tabling of an all-party petition by 
Senator Gietzelt, the President of the Parliamentary group 'Friends 
of Timor'. The Senate was also informed that the petition had been 
cabled to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that day. 2 
By the end of April, the Parliament had become embroiled in a 
bitter debate over allegations by an Australian planter, Rex 
Syddell -- evacuated from Timor earlier in March -- that Fretilin 
troops had killed the five Australian journalists. This gave rise 
to an intense Grievance Debate in the House of Representatives in 
late April, and to a Matter of Urgency Debate in the Senate in 
early May, 1975. 
The Journalists  
In addition to tabling the petition, Gietzelt took the 
opportunity to direct stern criticisms toward Rex Syddell and his 
allegations that Fretilin were responsible for the deaths of the 
five Australian-based newsmen. In a speech that lasted over forty 
minutes, Gietzelt left no doubt about his contempt for the man, his 
background and notoriety, and for his allegations. 3 He also 
extended this contempt to include the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, in particular Woolcott whom he considered was 'one of the 
guilty men.., who have blood on their hands in this issue'. 4 
government in this regard. 
1 	Questions from Senator Primmer to Senator Withers, CPD, 
Senate, S.67, 24 February 1976, p.133; Senator Button to 
Senator Withers, Ibid., 26 February 1976, p.255; question 
from Senator Primmer on the same matter to Senator Carrick 
(Minister 	representing 	the 	Minister 	for 	Post 	and 
Telecommunications E.L. 	Robinson), 	Ibid., 	18 March 1976, 
p.619 (Carrick's response tabled six days later, Ibid., 24 
March 1976, 	p.712). 
2 CPD, 	Senate, 	S.67, 7 April 1976, pp.1167-1170. 
3 CPD, 	Senate, 	S.67, 7 April 1976, pp.1168-1170. 
4 Ibid., 	p.1171. 
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Gietzelt was joined by Senator Bonner l who considered, in less 
colourful terms, that the Whitlam and Fraser governments were 
equally to blame for events in East Timor, and that a group 
representing a cross-section of Australian society should be 
allowed to visit East Timor to disburse humanitarian aid (an idea 
put to him by Fretilin leaders during his visit, with Fry and 
Gietzelt, to East Timor in 1975). However, and perhaps due to the 
strain of what had been a long parliamentary session now drawing to 
a close, Bonner was impelled to conclude: 
I believe that we as Australians have failed the East 
Timorese people dismally. From here on I do not know 
what the answer is. I would be a fool to be so 
presumptuous as to try to say what I believe is the 
answer in East Timor. I say this, and I say it with 
great humility: we as Australians have failed those who 
were our allies during our greatest crisis. I believe 
that all of us, both the previous Government and those 
who were in the Opposition and who have since become the 
Government, should hang our heads in shame. 2 
In the meantime, Foreign Affairs Minister Peacock was proposing to 
visit Indonesia. Foreshadowed at the time of his talks with Malik 
in January, these subsequent discussions were a major step in his 
attempts to rebuild the relationship, and took place on 13-15 
Apri1. 3 Peacock not only increased Australia's aid over the next 
three years to $86 million (compared with $69 million in the 
triennium to June 1976), but attempted 'to reaffirm the importance 
the Australian Government attached to Australia's close relations 
with Indonesia'. 4 Peacock's return -- with Indonesia's agreement 
to give thought to the resumption of Australian aid to East Timor, 
and the possibility of allowing Australian officials to enter the 
Liberal Senator for Queensland. Ibid., pp.1173-1175. 
2 	CPD, Senate, S.67, 7 April 1976, pp.1173-1175. 	Senator 
Cotton (Liberal Member for NSW, and Minister for Industry 
and Commerce) closed the debate in the early hours of April 
with a summary of the evening's debate. However, he 
concluded, 'In all these things I want to see the total 
version of the facts to make my own judgement on the 
matter', reflecting a view held by many in the Australian 
Parliament. 
3 	AFAR, April 1976, p.219 and May 1976, p.254. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April 1976. 
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territory to enquire into the deaths of the journalists l -- was 
well received by the Australian press. 
It seemed that the gap between the two countries was closing. 
However, it was aggravated once again by two events: news of 
Indonesia's intention to conduct an act of choice among the East 
Timorese along the lines of the West Irian 'Act of Free Choice' in 
1969, 2 and allegations by a former KOTA leader, Jose Martins, that 
while he did not claim to have seen it happen, the Australian 
journalists had been killed by troops led by Indonesians. 3 While 
the former caused a storm in the community, 4 the circumstances 
surrounding the deaths of the journalists raised questions and 
debate in both Chambers of the Parliament upon its reopening on 27 
April. 
In the Senate, Martins' allegations provided Gietzelt with the 
opportunity to take up where he left off before the recess, 
demanding that Woolcott be recalled and a proper enquiry be 
conducted by either the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, or by the Senate itself. 5 Senator M.A. 
Colston° demanded information about the precise manner or 
circumstances in which the journalists died, while in the House of 
Representatives, T. Uren7 hammered the Foreign Affairs Minister, 
calling for the government's position in view of the now 
AFAR, May 1976, p.254. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 24 April 1976. 
3 	The Age, 26 April 1976, The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April 
1976. For a detailed account of these allegations and 
attempts to bring him to Australia by the AJA (Victorian 
Branch), see Jolliffe, J., East Timor, pp.282-289. 
4 	Viviani observed that it 'provoked immediate protests in 
which a conference of trade unionists, teachers, students, 
church people, and aid agencies called for an end to all 
Australian aid to Indonesia...'. Viviani, N., "Australians 
and the Timor Issue: II", p.251. 
5 	CPD, Senate, S.68, 27 April, pp.1245-1246. 
6 	ALP Senator from Queensland. Ibid., p.1304. 
7 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1574, 27 April 1976. 
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conflicting stories concerning the deaths. 1 In both Chambers the 
government's response was predictably defensive, with Withers 
tabling documents that 'set out in the fullest possible manner what 
the government knows about the tragic events which took place at 
Balibo... 1 . 2 Withers explained, however, as Peacock did in the 
House of Representatives in response to continued probing from 
Uren, that due to the lack of any kind of material evidence, the 
government was hamstrung in conducting a full enquiry into Martins' 
allegations . 3 
In a further bid to deflect this criticism, Peacock spoke of 
the inevitable distress which the public debate over the deaths was 
undoubtedly causing relatives and friends of the dead journalists, 4 
and that the Indonesians had complied with his request to allow an 
investigatory team (from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, as it 
turned out) to visit East Timor. 5 This still did not satisfy Uren, 
who was now joined in his criticism in the House of Representatives 
by Whitlam and Bryant. 6 
In the first parliamentary defence of his government's Timor 
policies since losing office, and in response to Peacock's 
J.S. Dunn, who had claimed in early March that 60 000 
Timorese (or 10 percent of the population) had been killed 
(the Canberra Times, 4 March 1976), subsequently alleged 
that the journalists had been killed by Indonesian troops, 
confirming Jose Martins' claims. (CD, Senate, S.68, 27 April 1976, p.1304). 
2 	Ibid., pp.1304-1306. One document was a letter sent by 
Peacock to the AJA earlier that month. The second was a 
briefing paper put together by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. 
3 	CPD, H.R. Vol.99, pp.1574-1576, 27 April 1976. 
4 . This point was put in very strong terms by D. Chipp early 
in May when he informed the House of Representatives that 
the 'cheap politicking' aroused by the issue was distressing 
the parents of the deceased journalists. Ibid., p.1841, 4 
May 1976. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1575, 27 April 1976. In a response 
to a question later on whether or not the government would 
hold a judicial enquiry into the deaths, Peacock said he 
would put all the findings arising from the investigation 
'before the House and the Public'. Ibid., p.1735, 29 April 
1976. 
6 	Ibid., pp.1734-1738 and pp.1738-1739. 
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description of him as a person 'trapped by his own duplicity', 
Whitlam was keen to take the floor and to have it on record that, 
as Prime Minister, he had initiated enquiries into the deaths of 
the five Australians with the Indonesian President. 1 Peacock 
acknowledged this, but was quick to add it was the first and only 
action he had taken on the issue apart from giving 'either tacitly 
or avowedly ... support to a degree of Indonesian nationalism'. 
Peacock, now political point scoring, added that, rather than 
accept the matter as settled, the Fraser government -- as Whitlam 
had as Prime Minister, essentially in response to advice from his 
Ambassador (Woolcott) -- would not be prepared to accept Indonesian 
assurances, and reaffirmed the principal points of his policy. 
Peacock insisted: 
We have done [this] ... not only at the government-to-
government level and through the media here but also 
through the United Nations on three occasions in the 
short period we have been in office. What a stark 
contrast to what you have done! ... Your [record] ... was 
one of amoral non-activity. Ours is one of probing on 
principle . 2 
The debate became extremely heated during nearly an hour of 
question time -- dominated in the main by clashes between Whitlam 
and Peacock over their respective governments' attitudes. 
This Opposition pressure, however, sustained and intense as it 
was, did not faze the government. The first casualty was Whitlam 
who, later in the day, initiated a Grievance Debate in which he 
accused Peacock of taking 'a particularly miserable and in fact 
despicable line in the insinuations he had made', knowing 
'perfectly well that the refutation of what he had been insinuating 
and alleging cannot be published for about 20 years'. 3 While 
Whitlam concluded that history would confirm Suharto's undertaking 
that Indonesia would not resort to arms over the Timor issue while 
he was Prime Minister, Peacock was not deterred, now gaining 
strength from Whitlam's reactions. Nor was the newly elected M.J. 
Nei1. 4 Both continued to upgrade the criticism, not only of the 
1 	Ibid., p.1736. 
2 	Ibid. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1743, 27 April 1976. 
4 	The Liberal Member for St. George (NSW) having defeated W. 
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Whitlam government's policy but also of the former Prime Minister's 
notion that Suharto had kept his word to him. 
While it was clear that both Peacock and Whitlam were throwing 
political mud at each other, the bitterness of the debate obscured 
the extent to which both protagonists were in basic agreement on 
the Timor issue. Both saw stable and continuous relations with 
Indonesia as a fundamental objective of foreign policy; both were 
of the belief that the absorption of East Timor into the Republic 
of Indonesia was inevitable and -- with qualification as to how it 
was done -- desirable; and both were encouraged in this view by 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thus, in view of this 
fundamental coincidence of views, both Whitlam and Peacock were 
clearly overtaken by the imperatives of domestic politics. 
In this context Peacock was striking from a position of 
strength. Having been in Opposition in the period leading up to 
the invasion, he could not be saddled with Australian policy of 
that period. Now, nearly six months later, with the Indonesian 
action a fait accompli, he could shrewdly chide the Indonesians -- 
albeit with restraint -- while generally being seen to be a 
defender of principle in international affairs. Taking such a 
stand not only enabled Peacock to secure concessions from 
Indonesia, but also to secure a favourable response from the 
Australian press, which considered his policies had 'the merit of 
principle and firmness'. 1 Whitlam, on the other hand, was deeply 
vulnerable on East Timor, and was fast sinking into the quagmire of 
his own rhetoric as it related to international morality. The 
former Prime Minister was finding it difficult to defend, on 
grounds of realism, the kind of policy he had always found time to 
deplore, on grounds of principle. 
In what could be described as reflecting an element of 
despair, Whitlam attempted to shift the focus away from himself -- 
simply engaging in the next stage of hitting back at the government 
-- when he alleged a former coalition government Minister for Civil 
Aviation (revealing later in Townsville it was the late Sir Shane 
Morrison for the seat. CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1751, 29 April 
1976. 
The Age, 19 April 1976, the Australian, 17 April 1976 and 
the Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 1976 quoted in Viviani, 
N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.251. 
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Paltridge) had accepted a bribe in consideration for the ordering 
of Lockheed aircraft in the late 1950s. 1 However, Whitlam only 
succeeded in generating a uproar in the Parliament 2 and press, 3 and 
in isolating himself even further from his parliamentary 
colleagues. 4 In particular, it provided the government (especially 
Prime Minister Fraser) with the opportunity to continue flaying 
Whitlam; with the result: 
Apart from Mr Whitlam's ruddy complexion glowing a shade 
brighter, he sits there soaking up the punishment like an 
old prize-fighter who no longer feels the blows. 5 
Continuing calls for Self Determination 
The following week, in what was a shift of tactics and focus, 
the Opposition again put the Timor issue before the two Chambers: 
in the House of Representatives, as a matter of Public Importance 6 
on 4 May, and in the Senate, as a Matter of Urgency7 the next day. 
Both debates were initiated by the Opposition, and embroiled twelve 
politicians from both sides of each Chamber. 
In the House of Representatives, Uren moved an urgency motion 
calling on the Fraser government to use all leverage available to 
it to bring about a genuine act of self-determination in East 
Timor. While Uren did 'not want to turn this urgent and tragic 
situation into a party political wrangle', he was intent on 
focusing attention of the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
in events leading up to, and including, the invasion. Uren 
asserted: 
1 	See the Canberra Times, 30 April 1976 and CPD, H.R., Vol.99, 
pp.1744-1745, 29 April 1976. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, 29 April 1976, p.1746 ff. 
3 	See the Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 1976, the Age, 5 May 
1976 and 6 May 1976, the Canberra Times, 6 May 1976. 
4 	MHRs Uren and Fry (Labor), Connolly (Liberal) and Thompson 
(NCP). Senators Gietzelt, Button, Wheeldon and Primmer 
(Labor), and Senators Sir Magnus Cormack, Scott, Knight and 
Chaney (Liberal). 
5 	Peter Bowers in the Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 1976. 
6 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, pp.1849-1857, 4 May 1976. 
7 	CPD, Senate, S.68, 5 May 1976, pp.1533-1552. 
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It would seem that in some high corridors of power in the 
Foreign Affairs Department it has been decided for these 
two-thirds of a million people that they should be 
incorporated into the vast nation of Indonesia....' 
As a former prisoner-of-war on the island, Uren considered that 
Australians owed the people of East Timor a moral debt for their 
assistance to Australian troops during the Second World War. 
Moreover, the former Labor Minister questioned the value and 
importance of a relationship with a country whose 'gross violations 
of human rights' compelled Australian foreign policy makers to: 
engage... in a shoddy regional political exercise at the 
expense of its principles. Australia is in the process 
of betraying a country and a people to whom it owes a 
considerable debt. And why? Because of some phony 
excuse of the worst type of expedient diplomacy. 2 
For Uren, one aspect of that diplomacy involved the Department of 
Foreign Affairs withholding information on activities in East 
Timor. Specifically: 
a silent group of Foreign Affairs officials ... 
skillfully sought to protect their own pet project of a 
certain kind of relationship with the Suharto 
government . 3 
Uren's Labor colleague, Ken Fry, was another who pulled few 
punches, directing criticism at the Fraser government, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesians, whose role he 
considered had been based on 'blatant lies, deceit and 
misrepresentation from the beginning'. On another level, he 
focused on the UN, and the impotence of Japan and America, both of 
which he considered had the economic leverage to put some pressure 
on Indonesia, but chose instead to turn their backs on the issue. 4 
In response, government backbenchers Connolly and Thomson 5 
predictably steered attention back to the Whitlam government's 
policies. While Thomson reiterated that it was the Whitlam 
government which had sown the seeds of what was happening in Timor 
by approving Indonesia's actions, Connolly considered the change of 
1 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.99, p.1849, 4 May 1976. 
2 	Ibid., H.R., Vol.99, p.1850, 4 May 1976. 
3 	Ibid., p.1851. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1855-1856. 
5 	NCP Member for Leichhardt, Queensland. Ibid., p.1857. 
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attitude of the Labor Party on East Timor was a great act of 
hypocrisy. In contrast, he argued that the Fraser government had 
moved decisively to set out Australia's attitude, and reaffirmed 
Peacock's four points on East Timor. 1 
The Sydney Morning Herald2 -- one of the few Australian 
newspapers to commene on these proceedings in Parliament -- was 
sympathetic to this view and considered the Opposition's tactics to 
be 'stone-throwing in glass houses'. While it considered that 
neither the Fraser nor Whitlam governments had emerged with much 
credit from their performances over the issue, it considered that 
Uren's adoption of 'a lofty moral tone' was, 'rather more than a 
hint of stone-throwing...'. The editorial agreed with the basic 
tenets of Uren's statements. However, it reminded its readers that 
it was the Whitlam government which had placed Australia in such a 
position of humiliation, and concluded: 
Australia's policy has been, even at the cost of losing 
self-respect, to avoid any possibility of a breach with 
Indonesia. Good relations are important - but not at any 
price. 
Such comments could also have applied to a debate in the Senate the 
following day. In initiating the debate, Senator Gietzelt pursued 
the same arguments presented by Fry and Uren in the House of 
Representatives. 4 He was particularly critical of 'the 
1 	Ibid., pp.1852-1855. 
2 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 May 1976. 
3 	Most newspapers accounted for the debate, although few, if 
any, provided any kind of commentary or analysis. The 
Australian press seemed to be preoccupied with the upcoming 
State (NSW) election -- which saw the rise of Wran and the 
demise of Willis -- and residual issues left over from the 
Whitlam era of government, including charges of fraud 
against Dr J. Cairns' former secretary Juni Morosi, and the 
'Loans Affair'. Peter Hastings, of the Sydney Morning 
Herald, was involved with a series of articles on 
Australia's defence, subsequently published on 6-7 May 1976. 
4 	Senator Gietzelt moved: 
'That in the opinion of the Senate the following is a matter 
of urgency: 
The situation in East Timor and in particular: 
(a) The military action of Indonesia and its consequent 
effects upon the Timorese people. 
(b) The need for Indonesia to respond to the decisions of 
the United Nations. 
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pro-Indonesian officials within the Department of Foreign Affairs', 
the circumstances that led to the deaths of the journalists and the 
fact that information concerning these deaths was kept from the 
Australian Parliament and people. Senator Sir Magnus Cormack 
turned this argument around and centred attention on Whitlam's 
silence, both in Australia and Indonesia, following his discussions 
with Suharto in 1974 and 1975. 1 He was particularly critical of 
the Victorian Trade Union leader, Halfpenny, for initiating the 
collection of money to buy food and medical supplies, and the 
chartering of a boat to take them to the East Timorese people. For 
Cormack the proper way to get relief supplies to East Timor was 
through the International Red Cross. 2 Cormack spent a good deal of 
his time focusing on the revolution in Portugal, the way the 
Communist Party had taken over the armed forces and the subsequent 
shipping of arms to trouble-spots like Mozambique and East Timor. 
It was clear to him that the armed forces of East Timor had been 
infiltrated by the Communist Party. 
While Labor's Senator Button conceded that the Whitlam 
government may have misinterpreted the situation in East Timor 
before the civil war commenced, he was convinced that no good would 
come of the Fraser government trying to make political mileage out 
of the Labor Party's treatment of the situation. 3 Upon this, 
Senator Knight called on all Opposition Senators who were 
dissatisfied with the government's initiatives, to detail what 
actions they would deem proper to be taken. 4 The debate then 
seemed to come the full circle with Labor Senator Primmer arguing 
(c) The denial of self-determination for the people of 
East Timor and the inadequacy of the steps taken to 
ensure the right to determine their own future. 
(4) The failure of the Australian Government to make a 
concerted effort to provide adequate communication 
with the people of East Timor and to provide 
appropriate humanitarian aid' (CPD, Senate, S.68, 5May 
1986, p.1533). 
CPD, Senate, S.68, 5 May 1976, pp.1538-1540. 
2 	At the time the ICRC was banned by Indonesia from entering 
the stricken areas of Timor. 
CPD, Senate, S.68, 5 May 1976, pp.1540-1543. 
4 	Ibid, p.1547. 
3 
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that Labor Senators could only make such decisions on information 
supplied by the Department of Foreign Affairs, and, to this point, 
they had failed to do so because they claimed they did not know. 1 
While the motion was subsequently lost, the issue was kept 
buoyant by these debates. Moreover, it was clear that all the 
government had to do to counter Opposition criticism and to deflect 
attack was to highlight the vulnerability of the Labor government's 
role. This gave rise to a: 
growing polarization of Australian opinion on the Timor 
issue. On the one hand there was in the press increasing 
support for Mr Peacock's strategy of mending the 
bilateral relationship and for toning down criticism of 
Indonesia. On the other, Timor activists extended their 
attacks on the Indonesian Government to include the 
nature of that government's rule.... 2 
These debates also reflected the deep division within the 
Parliament, perhaps less marked in the Senate than in the House of 
Representatives. Labor's Senator Button spoke strongly and 
eloquently on this and other important points. In a view he shared 
with Gietzelt, he considered that the Australian Parliament had 
remained silent, which was out of character in view of the 
assistance it had provided in other humanitarian issues, and where 
it concerned the well-being of people from other nations. Button 
put this silence down to the widely-held hope that the issue would 
simply disappear, and the tendency to see the issue as one used by 
the Left and the Right for political point scoring. This was 
underpinned by what he regarded was a realpolitik view of 
international relations: 
Grand design strategies are played by the dice men of 
international relations and the argument goes something 
like this: It is desirable in an area such as Southeast 
Asia that there not be small nation states [and]... from 
the point of view of Australia that we should be able to 
deal with our immediate neighbour, Indonesia, without the 
embarrassment of an independent state anywhere in 
between; it is desirable from the point of view of the 
whole region, having regard to a genuine desire, which I 
think is shared by all parties, for stability in the 
area, that there should not be any area in which any form 
of instability is allowed to arise. 
However, the difficulty of this view, for Button, and one which lay 
at the bottom of much of the criticism of both the Whitlam and 
Ibid., pp. 1550-1551. 
2 	Viviani, N •, "Australians and the Timor Issue", pp.251-252. 
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Fraser governments' policies, was that it clashed with: 
the reality of the anticipations and the feeling and 
concern in the world-wide community for the principle of 
self-determination ... which qualifies any other 
judgements which we might seek to make. 1 
The Abating Storm 
There was no escaping the fact that the debate in both 
Chambers embraced only the few who had stolidly maintained their 
momentum throughout the previous two years. Furthermore, due to a 
rising interest in domestic political issues under the new Fraser 
government, the press gave the debate decreasing coverage, and it 
was to prove in the following two years to be an important factor 
in an erosion of the wider parameters of support. Fundamental to 
this was the return to the view, held by a majority of those who 
maintained an interest in East Timor, particularly among the more 
moderate and conservative of Australians, that stressed the 
importance of a stable relationship with Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, the campaign in the Parliament continued. On 6 
May 1976, Uren continued his attack on the government, insisting 
during Question Time, 2 and an Adjournment Debate3 late in the day, 
that Jose Martins' interpretation of the deaths of the five 
journalists be judged not only by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
-- who Uren considered had, at the higher echelons, 'conspired to 
mislead the Australian Government and the Australian people on this 
issue' -- but also by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence. For Uren, Martins' claim not only cast doubt 
on the Department's explanation of events but 'raised grave 
suspicions about [its] involvement in the tragic aftermath of the 
Balibo invasion'. In essence, he did not want Caesar judging 
Caesar. 4 
1 	CPD, Senate, S.68, 5 May 1976, pp.1541-1542. These themes 
were central to speeches made by Senators Harradine 
(Independent, Tasmania) and Mulvihill two weeks later in an 
Adjournment Debate. However, they drew little response. 
Ibid., 18 May 1976, pp.1674-1679. 
CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1995, 6 May 1976. 
3 	Ibid., pp.2075-2076, 6 May 1976. 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.2076, 6 May 1976. Uren was bitterly 
challenged by Senator Knight, himself a former diplomat, 
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Meanwhile, with Indonesian activities in East Timor giving 
rise to a greater degree of Indonesian control and, later, on 31 
May 1976, an 'Act of Free Choice', Australian trade unions and the 
Catholic Bishops were unsuccessfully attempting to send aid to East 
Timor. Although the latter stirred comment in both Chambers, it 
was the 'act' which created the greatest anger. In a question to 
Senator Withers on the following day, Senator Gietzelt described 
the 'act' as a 'sham', and contradicting UN decisions regarding 
East Timor's right to self-determination. The NSW Senator 
questioned, in particular, Australia's absence from the 'charade', 
and wondered whether it reflected the government's recognition of 
'the immorality and illegality of the whole ceremony and the 
proposed integration decision° -- themes he pursued vigorously two 
days later in a thirty minute speech to the Senate. 3 
This speech reflected a sense of urgency, which was 
overshadowed at times by the rancor of a man who was facing defeat. 
Gietzelt called on the government to do everything in its power, 
including suspending aid to Indonesia, to prevent East Timor from 
being incorporated formally into Indonesia. Gietzelt considered 
the act of integration to be a farce and a pantomime, and directed 
criticism towards three areas: the culpability of both Labor and 
Liberal governments -- in particular the failure of the Whitlam 
government to debate the issue in Cabinet; comments made by the 
Queensland Premier, Bjelke-Peterson; and the role of Richard 
early in June, who asked whether it was more a case 'that 
the deceit referred to (by Uren] was the result of decisions 
made by the Labor Government last year'. (Ibid., Senate, 
S.68, 2 June 1976, p.2195). Knight's attack brought on a 
strong challenge from Senator Georges (Labor, Queensland) 
who criticized the role of the caretaker government under 
Fraser. (Ibid., 2 June 1976, p.2197). 
1 	On 31 May, the Popular Assembly of East Timor, which 
consisted of local leaders and chiefs, met and unanimously 
approved the incorporation of East Timor into the Republic 
of Indonesia. Reminiscent of the West New Guinea 'Act of 
Free Choice', the ceremony was short (a matter of hours) and 
attended by diplomats (witnesses from seven countries, 
excluding Australia) and foreign journalists. On 18 July, 
Suharto signed the document which formally integrated Timor 
into the Indonesian Republic. 
2 	CPD, Senate, S.68, 1 June 1976, pp.2105-2106. 
3 	Ibid., 3 June 1976, pp.2330-2335. 
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Woolcott. Gietzelt was particularly critical of the Queensland 
Premier, whom he described as a 'public soft-core warmonger', and a 
man who: 
condones murder and atrocities taking place in that 
part of the world... He confirmed that he had been in touch 
with President Suharto several times before East Timor was 
invaded by Indonesian troops. This pompous, arrogant, 
hypocritical person, who represents the conservative forces 
in this country, takes out of the hands of the Australian 
government its right to make a determination about a foreign 
affairs issue. 1 
While Gietzelt found a strong ally in the Age, 2 the remainder of 
the Australian press was quiet, reflecting an increasing movement 
on its part towards a toning down of criticism, not only of the 
Fraser and former Whitlam governments, but also of Indonesia. In 
the House of Representatives, the reaction was strong, but 
short-lived, as Parliament went into recess within days. Bryant 
questioned Peacock derisively on the legality of the 'act' of 
integration, 3 while K. Johnson4 found it 'farcical' and Dr. Cairns 
called on the government to vigorously protest 'the obvious and 
planned failure of the government of Indonesia to be associated 
with any act of self-determination'. 5 
Despite this limited though vocal criticism, the government 
continued to ride out the abating storm. This left Peacock only to 
again remind the Parliament° of his vocal criticism of Indonesia's 
course and the government's voting record on East Timor in the UN. 
Although deemed commendable by many in the press, 7 this was not 
accompanied by more concrete expressions of disapproval. In 
1 	Ibid., 3 June 1976, p.2332. See Bjelke-Peterson's remarks 
in the Age, 4 June 1976. 
2 	See the Age stories of 4 June 1976 and 5 June 1976 and 
editorials of 3 June 1976 and 4 June 1976. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.2701, 1 June 1976. 
4 	Labor Member for Burke (Victoria), Ibid., p.2702, 1 June 
1976. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.99, pp.2701-2702, 1 June 1976. 
6 	Ibid, pp. 2701-3, 1 June 1976. 
7 	The Nation Review, 7-13 May 1976; the Canberra Times, 24 
May 1976 and 31 May 1976; the Australian, 1 June 1976. 
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domestic terms, the Fraser government was happy to be perceived to 
have asserted its independence, making a small, but welcome, 
demonstration in favour of the principle of self-determination. 
Beneath the surface of Peacock's responses to these criticisms in 
the House of Representatives, however, lay a hope that the strain 
in relations with Indonesia could soon be eased, perhaps through a 
UN decision to accept East Timor's integration as a fait accompli, 
thus permitting Australia, in time, to accept such an outcome. 
However, in external terms, the broader strategy had its costs, as 
it was now antagonizing the powerbrokers within the Indonesian 
Government. 
The Prime Minister was prepared to explain this situation to 
the Parliament thus: 
Australia has a deep interest in maintaining sound and 
close relations with Indonesia. The broad relationship 
is of great importance to both countries. Relations are 
such that both countries can state their views plainly. 
Both countries have broad interests in the stability of 
and the avoidance of great power conflict in Southeast 
Asia. It is against this background that we have stated 
our views on Timor. We support a genuine act of 
self-determination in Timor. The very fact that we have 
stated our views on Timor plainly is a mark of the 
underlying strength of the relationship. 
Adding, perhaps more for Indonesian consumption but reflecting 
Fraser's understanding of the domestic constraints on his 
government's Indonesia policy: 
The question which faces Australia in common with other 
democracies is whether we are going to meet the challenge 
of cooperation and mutual restraint required from all the 
diverse groups in our society... A foreign policy that 
ignores the realities of the international situation is 
irresponsible. A foreign policy that ignores the 
intelligence and goodwill of the people, that does not 
trust its people sufficiently to explain and seek support 
for its actions, cannot succeed. 1 
This dictum was to be put to the test throughout the next two 
years. During this time, in January 1978, the Fraser government 
recognized East Timor as Indonesian territory. 2 
CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.2739, 1 June 1976. See also Roy Milne 
Lecture, 27 September 1976 in AFAR, Vol.47, No.9, 
pp.471-480. 
2 	Backgrounder, Department of Foreign Affairs, 27 January 
1978, p.2. 
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Australian Movement Towards Accommodation  
In the meantime, the Australian Government was reticent• about 
explaining and finding support for its actions, indicating a 
movement towards accommodation with Indonesia. This movement could 
be traced in 1976 through two artful, though major decisions in 
September and October: to channel Australian Government aid 
through the Indonesian Red Cross and the seizure of a 
Fretilin-linked radio transmitter in Darwin. Both came to light 
under constant prodding in the Parliament by an increasingly vexed 
Opposition and against a background of increasing hostilities in 
East Timor. 
On 26 August, Opposition backbencher, A.W. Jarman l questioned 
whether the government was prepared to assist in alleviating the 
dislocation and suffering of the people of East Timor. In his 
response Peacock could only indicate that while the government was 
prepared to offer $250 000 in aid, it had no way of channelling 
this aid through to the East Timorese. It was not until September, 
under questioning from Uren, that the government confirmed that it 
would, and through the Indonesian Red Cross. It was to serve two 
purposes: 
to try to ensure the protection of the rights and 
interests of those people and to preserve to the maximum 
the harmonious relations with Indonesia that we have 
traditionally and customarily enjoyed. 2 
This was a major shift from a policy which earlier had stated that 
only the ICRC could channel Australia's aid to the East Timorese 
people and was quickly seized upon by A. Whitlam. 3 Given the 
standing of the ICRC in relation to the Indonesian Government, he 
ALP Member for Deakin (Victoria). 	CPD, H.R., Vol.100, 
pp.600-601, 26 August 1976. 
Sinclair, in response to Uren, in the absence of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ibid., p.708, 7 September 
1976. On 6 September, Hamish McDonald had written that the 
Fraser government was preparing to abandon its four-point 
policy, and that tacit recognition of East Timor's 
integration with Indonesia would be given before or during 
Fraser's impending trip to Jakarta in October. (the Sydney 
Morning Herald, 6 September 1976). See also Bruce Juddery's 
report of 6 September 1976 in the Canberra Times. 
1 
2 
3 	ALP Member for Grayndler (NSW), and son of the former Labor 
Prime Minister. CPD, H.R., Vol.100, p.792, 8 September 
1976. 
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questioned whether the decision represented either de facto  
recognition of or a major step towards formal recognition of 
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The Foreign Affairs 
Minister was equally expeditious, and keen to dispel such an 
interpretation with the view that: 
I am not here to delineate the relationship between the 
Indonesian Red Cross and the Indonesian government, but 
it requires far more than that for a de jure recognition, 
and that is not to be canvassed. The premise of the 
government is that there is a humanitarian problem.... 1 
This position was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister under 
questioning from Bryant later in September, 2 and gave rise to a 
strong rebuke from Uren, ably and subsequently supported, again, by 
an embittered Bryant. 3 Questioning the effectiveness of the 
Indonesian Red Cross, Uren saw such a decision as one made by an: 
appeasing Australian Government meekly accept[ing] that 
we cannot insist upon the International Red Cross relief 
operation. We have to direct our relief efforts through 
the Indonesian Red Cross. We have to ignore the fact 
that the Indonesian Red Cross has had a blatantly 
partisan role in East Timor. The mass of East Timorese 
who need aid will not get any real aid from the 
Indonesian Red Cross, and the Fraser government will not 
protest. It ignores our moral obligations to the East 
Timorese people. 4 
For Uren and Bryant, this decision was yet another example of a 
government under pressure from bureaucrats. In this instance, it 
was the Department of Foreign Affairs, which was 'trying to 
manoeuvre the government into abandonment of Australian principles 
... for the sake of so-called good relations with Indonesia 1 . 5 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.100, p.793, 8 September 1976. The Australian 
Defence Minister, K.J. Killen, also came under fire from 
B.W. Graham (Liberal, NSW) who criticized the Fraser 
government's arrangement for the delivery of military aid 
in the form of patrol boats. Killen took, clearly, great 
delight in deftly informing the House of Representatives 
that this aid, 'with the offensive capacity of a Manly ferry 
in dry dock', had been authorized to be given to the 
Indonesians by the Whitlam government. Ibid., pp.113-114, 
16 September 1976. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
CPD, 	H.R., 	Vol.100, p.1365, 23 September 1976. 
Ibid, pp.1406-1408. 
Ibid., 	p.1406. 
Ibid. 
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This questioning of government policy by the Opposition was 
marked by some bitter exchanges, particularly between Fraser and 
Whitlam. 1 It culminated in Whitlam declaring, in only his second 
major statement on East Timor in Opposition: 
It is time to deflate the pretensions and expose the 
nauseating hypocrisy of the Fraser government on the 
question of East Timor [Fraser's]... aspersions against me 
and my government were utterly without foundation ... it is 
the Fraser government which has spoken with two voices on 
this issue. It is the Foreign Minister who has engaged in 
double talk and double dealing. 2 
Peacock's behaviour, in particular, angered Whitlam who considered 
that Peacock 'parades like a show pony and struts like a peacock at 
question time but has nothing to say in debates'. Indeed, of the 
five discussions in the House of Representatives on important 
matters of foreign policy during 1976, Peacock had spoken only on 
one of them. Fraser also was not prepared to answer questions on 
East Timor. As the Prime Minister indicated to the House of 
Representatives on 7 September, in view of the fact that he was due 
to visit Indonesia in October, and that Peacock had been to 
Indonesia several times throughout the course of the year, 'no 
statement about major matters concerning Australia and Indonesia 
will be released between now and that time'. 3 
Whitlam's vulnerability was also evident outside the 
Parliament. In Caucus during the same week, Senator Gietzelt and 
Uren spearheaded a left-wing effort to ensure that the ALP took a 
tough stand over the Timor issue. In a motion to the national 
executive, the two requested that the Portuguese Government be 
approached to withhold recognition of the recently held 'act'. 
See for example, CPD, H.R., Vol.100, pp.1365-1366, 23 
September 1976. It was also revealed by Paul Kelly in the 
Nation Review (27 September 1976) that Fraser had gained 
access to a cable sent by Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik 
to a counterpart 'of another country', stating he had told 
Whitlam of the possibility that force would be used to 
settle the Timor problem. Whitlam allegedly replied that 
this should be done 'as quickly as possible'. Kelly 
suggested that this 'ammunition' would be used by Fraser and 
Peacock to implicate Whitlam on the Timor question. 
2 	This drew a detailed and mocking criticism from M. Neil 
(CD, H.R., Vol.100, pp.1420-1421, 23 September 1976). 
3 	In response to a question from Hamer, Liberal Member for 
Isaacs (Ibid., p.708, 7 September 1976). 
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With the motion supported by Wriedt, Bowen and Beazley, it was 
passed unanimously, without any debate on the matter by Whitlam. 1 
It was emerging that Whitlam, once the chief architect of 
Labor's foreign policy and the principal reason why the Timor issue 
was never raised in the Whitlam Cabinet, was no longer shaping the 
Opposition's attitude on Timor. Two ironies emerged from these 
developments. First, that Whitlam found it within himself to level 
severe criticism at the Fraser government for remaining silent on 
the issue, while frustrating attempts by the Labor Opposition in 
the Parliament to exact information and policy direction from the 
Fraser government. Second, that Whitlam was now in a situation in 
which the more the ALP left-wing and Caucus pressed the Timor 
question, the more difficult the Opposition leader's public 
position became. 
Gietzelt and Wriedt (Opposition Leader in the Senate) although 
active in the party room, were relatively quiet in the Senate 
chamber throughout this period. Due to a preoccupation with 
domestic issues, the matter was not subjected to debate until 
mid-November, at which time Gietzelt continued his assault on 
Australian government policy and the Suharto government. 2 In the 
meantime, Senator Withers was successful in deflecting Opposition 
grilling on the issue, including, in early October, questions 
related to the seizure of the radio transmitter in Darwin. 3 While 
this particular incident ruffled few feathers in the Senate or the 
The Nation Review, 27 September 1976. Subsequent National 
Conferences in Perth (1977) and Adelaide (1979) were to 
'condemn ... the Indonesian invasion of East Timor', called 
for a withdrawal of Indonesian forces, recognized DRET, and 
indicated that a future Labor government would suspend 
military aid to Indonesia, while recognizing the government 
of East Timor (if it was the choice of the East Timor people 
after a genuine act of self-determination). See Australian 
Labor Party, Platform, Constitution and Rules, 32nd National 
Conference (1977), and 33rd National Conference (1979), 
p.125 and pp.75-76 respectively. 
2 	CPD Senate, 5.70, pp.2092-2097, 17 November 1976. 
3 	The Age, 2 October 1976 and the Australian, 2 October 1976. 
Questions were raised by Senators Missen and Button 
Senate, S.69, 5 October 1976, p.969 and pp.1015-1016). 
Button's question drew a predictable though lengthy response 
from Senator Carrick who indicated that the seizure took 
place because 'there were reasonable grounds to suspect a 
breach of the Wireless Telegraphy Act'. 
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press (see Chapter Eight), it was a different story in the House of 
Representatives where the Opposition, unsuccessful in pressing the 
government for an explanation and more information, 1 initiated a 
Grievance Debate on 7 October. 2 
While these two major decisions (Red Cross and transmitter) 
were fundamental to the raising of this debate, it was the subtle 
but crystallizing changes in Fraser's policy towards the East Timor 
question and his trip to Indonesia on 7-11 October, ostensibly to 
address the Indonesian Parliament, that provided the catalyst for a 
graver and more acrimonious debate on 12 October 1976. 
In responding to Opposition questioning over the Red Cross 
and transmitter issues before he left for Jakarta, Fraser found it 
necessary, in most instances, to simply say that government policy 
had been stated and that there was no need to repeat it. 3 What 
Fraser was not saying, however, was whether this policy was still 
in force. Another subtle change became more evident with 
government explanations regarding the seizure of the radio 
transmitter. In this instance, it lay in the Acting Foreign 
Affairs Minister's (Sinclair) response to Short, 4 in which Sinclair 
deliberately referred to the Fretilin forces still fighting in East 
Timor as 'insurgents' -- by definition, those who attempt to 
overthrow a legitimate government. As the only government in East 
Timor was the one set up by the Indonesians, the subtle change in 
Australia's policy was complete, and it came on the eve of Fraser's 
1 	Questions from Messrs Beazley (CPD, H.R., Vol.101, p.1455, 
5 October 1976), Short (Ibid., pp.1460-1461, 5 October 
1976), James (Ibid., p.1541, 6 October 1976), and Birney 
(Ibid., p.1627, 7 October 1976). Broader questions were 
directed at the government by Dr J. Cairns (Ibid., p.1456, 
5 October 1976), and Uren (Ibid., p.1535, 6 October 1976 and 
p.1620, 7 October 1976). 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.101, pp.1629-1640, 7 October 1976. This was 
initiated by Uren who argued Fraser's trip amounted to 'a 
tragic example of appeasement ... ignor[ing] the feelings 
of the East Timorese, a large number of 
democratically-minded Australians and the vast body of world 
opinion'. He was supported, in detailed speeches, by Messrs 
James and Bryant. (Ibid., pp.1632-1640, 7 October 1976). 
3 	See, for example, his response to a question from Uren. 
Ibid., p.1535, 6 October 1976 (See above). 
4 	CPD, H.R., Vol.101, pp.1460-1461, 5 October 1976 (see 
above). 
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departure for Jakarta.' 
By this time it was increasingly evident that the Australian 
press were anxious to see the lines of communication between the 
two countries mended. Typical of this view was the Age which 
considered the best course open to the Australian Prime Minister, 
'would appear to lie in going some way towards de facto  
recognition'. 2 For the Mercury, he had no choice: 
The present Australian policy ... is sound, sensible, and 
diplomatically logical. But it is effective only as a 
debating point. No matter how 'correct' the policy, it 
was declared after the world had been presented with a 
fait accompli. No diplomatic declaration by Australia or 
the UN will change the fact that Indonesia has taken East 
Timor by force. 3 
Thus, it was against such a background that Fraser made his first 
official visit to Indonesia. The discussions between the two 
leaders progressed smoothly, 4 and it emerged from their joint 
communique that they agreed to disagree on the East Timor issue. 5 
However, no sooner had Fraser and Peacock left Indonesian soil than 
a spokesperson for President Suharto, the Indonesian State 
Secretary General Sudharmono, said that the Indonesian Government 
considered Australia's four-point Timor policy was a thing of the 
past and that Fraser's speech to the Indonesian Parliament implied 
that Australia had recognized Indonesia's integration of East 
It could be suggested one other signal lay in the fact that 
Peacock, already careful not to say anything about the 
issue, did not make one reference to it during his major 
policy speech to the United Nations General Assembly the 
previous week. Peacock was due to fly directly to Jakarta 
to meet, along with his Prime Minister, President Suharto. 
See Statement at 31st Session of UNGA, 29 September 1976. 
AFAR, Vol.47, No.9, September, pp.480-485. 
2 	The Age, 7 October 1976. 
3 	The Mercury, 7 October 1976. 
4 	See accounts by Warren Beeby, the Australian, 9 October 
1976; Michelle Gratton and Michael Richardson, the Age, 9 
October 1976, 10 October 1976 and 11 October 1976. 
5 	The Communique is reprinted in AFAR, Vol.47, No.10, 
pp.537-540. See also Vivian!, N., "Australians and the 
Timor Issue: II", pp.254-255. 
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Timor. 1 
This gave rise to a strong parliamentary debate on 12 October 
1976, watched closely and unsympathetically by the Indonesian 
leadership. 2 In the early afternoon the leader of the Opposition, 
Whitlam, put a motion to the effect that: 
this House of Representatives expresses its want of 
confidence in the Fraser government because it cannot 
pursue and express a coherent and principled foreign 
policy.' 
Within days the Age's Claude Forell was compelled to correctly 
comment: 
The spectacle of the Australian government and Opposition 
squabbling over Timor is rather like two brothers 
quarrelling over the grave of a distant relative. They 
cannot restore him to life and they dare not avenge his 
death, even if they so wished, which in reality they do 
not. Neither is willing to admit his own impotence to 
prevent the killing or to atone for his failure to 
mitigate its violent and tragic circumstances. Each is 
moved not so much by grief or anger or remorse as by the 
urge to blame the other and justify himself, and to 
appear more righteous or realistic than the other. We 
have been watching a sickening display of futility and 
hypocrisy, a shedding of crocodile tears over spilt 
blood...." 
Criticisms of the foreign policies pursued by the other paved the 
way for allegations and counter-allegations between the two parties 
about secret understandings on Timor between Whitlam, Fraser and 
the Indonesian Government. Whitlam described the Prime Minister's 
visit to Indonesia as a 'vaudeville' performance, and argued that 
the Prime Minister clearly had gone to Indonesia to recognize the 
integration of East Timor into Indonesia. 5 He then called on his 
parliamentary adversary to clarify Australia's policy on East Timor 
'with utmost urgency'. For his part, Fraser simply said there had 
1 	The Age, 12 October 1976. The Canberra Times, 12 October 
1976. 
2 	See the Age, 16 October 1976, the Australian Financial  
Review, 18 October 1976 and the Australian, 12 October 1976 
by, respectively, Richardson, McDonald and Beeby on 
Indonesia's reactions. 
3 	CPD, H.R., Vol.101, p.1718, 12 October 1976. 
4 	The Age, 14 October 1976. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.101, pp.1718-1719, 12 October 1976. 
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been no major change in Australian policy. 
While Fraser had stressed in Jakarta -- in his speech to the 
Indonesian Parliament and in the communique -- that it was the 
future which was important, he did not specifically refer to the 
future in his response to Whitlam, preferring instead to 
concentrate on the past and Whitlam's involvement in it. Fraser 
gave as much as he received; he pulled no punches, drawing on a 
wide variety of accounts that had emerged through debate over the 
preceding year, including the leaked Malik cable, to condemn 
Whitlam for his role in the Timor issue. 1 
While the government used its numbers in the House of 
Representatives to gag the debate after two hours, subsequently 
defeating the censure motion by 83 votes to 32 votes, the debate 
drew in Uren and Sinclair, 2 and was described by Douglas Wilkie, a 
seasoned political analyst, as a good example of: 
Australia mortifying itself with charges and 
counter-charges of hypocrisy as MPs undress each other in 
public and hang out their dirty linen ... They rupture 
themselves trying to straddle the cynicism of power 
politics and the need for vote-catching on a note of 
moral righteousness. 3 
The following day the Opposition continued to question the 
government, with as little success as their colleagues in the 
Senate. 4 Deputy Leader Uren, together with two backbenchers, called 
on Killen, Fraser and Sinclair to establish whether Indonesia had 
reinforced its military in East Timor during October. 5 Maintaining 
1 	Ibid., pp.1723-1727. 
2 	Ibid., pp.1727-1734, 12 October 1976. 
3 	The Sun, 13 October 1976. 
4 	On the day of the debate in the House of Representatives, 
Senators Wriedt, Georges, Wheeldon, Bonner and McClelland 
fired questions at the government which were deftly 
sidestepped by Senator Withers (pp, Senate, S.69, 12 October 1976, p.901). Before the week was out, Senators 
Georges and Cavanagh now joined by Senator O'Bryne, 
attempted to maintain the momentum, however with little 
success. (Ibid., 13 October, pp.1151-1153 and Ibid., 14 
October, p.1188 and pp.1194-1196). 
5 	Questions from Nicholls (ALP Member for Bonython, SA), to 
Killen (CPD, H.R., Vol.101, p.1804, 13 October 1976), James 
to Fraser (Ibid., p.1808, 13 October 1976) and Uren to 
Sinclair (Ibid., p.1806, 13 october 1976). 
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the government's obstinacy, no one answered the question. Killen, 
Australia's Defence Minister, merely said rather pompously that the 
question was 'exquisitely worded for the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs': while Sinclair, making no reference to the question, 
said that the government was worried about the people of East 
Timor, and for that reason Australia was sending aid through the 
Indonesian Red Cross. In what was described as a major blunder, 
however, Sinclair added: 
In no way is it our concern for the actions taken by 
Indonesia, other than in the way we can help the well-being 
of the people of East Timor. 1 
Recognizing that his remark would be particularly embarrassing at a 
time when the government was maintaining that it had not changed 
its policy on Timor -- which included withdrawal of Indonesian 
forces and a genuine act of self-determination -- Sinclair 
corrected his answer, indicating that he had not intended to 
suggest Australia was not concerned, rather he meant that 'It is 
not within Australia's capacity to determine' actions taken by 
Indonesia. 2 When the question was put to the Prime Minister he 
also chose to ignore it and spoke on the same matter as his 
National Country Party colleague, adding later that he believed: 
The Opposition is doing everything it possibly can to 
prevent the government carrying out its policy to see 
that the aid gets through to those who need it. It has 
opposed the policy of providing aid through the 
Indonesian Red Cross ... the suggestion of talks with 
Indonesian officials concerning refugees and family 
reunion. This is part of the policy of the Opposition to 
prevent aid being given to those who need it.' 
In what were his final words on the issue during these heady days 
following his return from Jakarta, Fraser reaffirmed that Australia 
would not be giving de facto recognition to the Indonesian takeover 
of East Timor: 
at this stage ... because we want Indonesia to understand 
and to know the views we had of certain actions are views 
that continue ... if the government continued to restate 
the policy on Timor at this stage it put at risk the aim 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.101, p.1806, 13 October 1976. 
2 	Ibid., p.1807, 13 October 1976. 
3 	Ibid., p.1810, 13 October 1976. 
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of good relations with Indonesia.' 
If there were any doubts as to the Australian Government's motives 
throughout this period, then the Australian Financial Review 2 tried 
to relieve them with revelations in mid-October that the 
Indonesian Justice Minister, Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was 
attempting to induce the Australian Government to accord de lure 
recognition of Indonesia's integration of East Timor before the 
middle of the following year. Such inducement included a 
favourable settlement of the disputed Australia-East Timor offshore 
border and, confirmed by Lieutenant-General Ali Murtopo, 3 the 
renewal of petroleum and mineral exploration leases to Australian 
companies in Timor, including BHP, Timor Oil Ltd., and 
Woodside-Burmah. 4 
It was also revealed at this time that the 
Australian-Indonesian Business •Cooperation Committee was pressing 
the government to recognize Indonesia's takeover of East Timor. 
The AIBCC's President, Kelman, had made representations to the 
government and warned it that its continued opposition to 
Indonesia's incorporation would further damage Australia's 
relations with the Suharto government. Moreover, and of direct 
interest to the AIBCC, he considered further tension over East 
Timor could do long-term damage to Australia's business and trade 
interests . 5 
Circulated by the Indonesian Foreign Minister in Jakarta, 
Kelman's remarks came within days of Peacock re-entering the debate 
for the first time since early September. In response to a 
question from Uren, the Foreign Minister had all but conceded 
Australia's recognition of the Indonesian takeover. While he 
The Age, 15 October 1976. 	Quoted in Viviani, N., 
"Australians and the Timor Issue: II", p.255. 
2 	Michael Richardson, Australian Financial Review, 19 October 
1976. 
3 	Deputy Chief of the State Intelligence Coordinating Body 
(Bakin) , and a key adviser to President Suharto. 
4 	These revelations gave rise to sardonic questioning by 
Garrick of the Prime Minister in the Parliament (CPD, H.R., 
Vol.101, p.2085, 21 October 1976). 
5 	The Age, 23 October 1976. 
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reaffirmed that the government had not given de facto recognition 
he considered that Australia had to accept certain realities; that 
there was a: 
need for a careful balancing of our interests and 
responsibility. Our country's foreign policy, if it is 
to be viable, must take into account the regional 
environment in which it is to function and although 
preserving our position on principle, it has not and does 
not serve Australia's interests to place itself on a 
massive collision course with its largest regional 
neighbour... [Thus], we must take into account 
Indonesia's view that East Timor is now part of Indonesia 
and that this situation is not likely to change. This is 
Indonesia's view. 1 
While Peacock's statement received a mixed reaction in the 
Australian press, 2 it was a precursor to further movement on the 
part of the government towards accommodation during November. This 
was signalled at three levels: a Cabinet decision to stop the 
Australian Telecommunications Commission's (Telecom) Northern 
Territory outback radio receiving messages from or forwarding 
messages to East Timor; a decision to abstain on the United 
Nations' East Timor resolution, adopted by the Fourth Committee, 
and calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from the 
territory; and finally, a decision to deny entry visas to several 
Fretilin 'Ministers'. These decisions were strongly denounced in 
Australia, particularly the Cabinet's decision on Telecom, which 
gave rise to a number of questions and some heated speeches in an 
Adjournment Debate in each of the Parliamentary Chambers. 3 
The Australian Government found little difficulty in providing 
legal or quasi-legal grounds to justify these decisions. In 
CPD, H.R., Vol.101, p.2016, 20 October 1976. 
2 	For example, the Advertiser (22 October 1976) indicated 'it 
was a welcome and refreshing experience to have a statement 
[of] ... Australia's position in such clear terms ...', and 
the Courier Mail (22 October 1976) suggested it represented 
'a not-very-successful attempt to clear away the 
shilly-shally and stalling of Australian policy on this 
issue'. 
3 	In the Senate, questions were raised by Senators Georges 
and Gietzelt (CPD, Senate, S.70, 17 November 1976, p.2024 
and p.2031). In the House of Representatives, a question 
was put forward by Uren (Ibid., H.R., Vol.102, p.2757, 17 
November 1976). 
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response to questioning from Uren, 1 Foreign Affairs Minister 
Peacock indicated, on the first matter, Telecom Australia had 
discovered that it had no right to handle overseas messages. 
Further, Telecom had been receiving and passing on messages 
received from the Darwin outpost radio. These messages, according 
to Peacock, emanated from a Fretilin transmitter in East Timor. 2 
These reasons did not bear close scrutiny in the press, nor 
did Peacock's explanation to the National Press Club on the second 
matter in Canberra on 18 November, the day after the vote was taken 
in the UN. Peacock was seemingly on firm ground when he argued 
that the resolution that was adopted differed in important 
particulars from the measures which Australia supported in the 
months immediately following the invasion of East Timor: it did 
not call on all parties to cease fighting, only on Indonesia; it 
did not contemplate a peaceful solution to the conflict; and it 
spoke not of 'self-determination' (with its implied possibility of 
'integration') but only of independence. Thus: 
We are aware of the view that the resolution failed to 
make a balanced appeal for the avoidance of further 
bloodshed, we had reservations about the language and 
elements of judgement involved in the resolution. We 
thought some of the steps that we proposed were 
unnecessary.' 
Notwithstanding Peacock's exposition -- which did not offer an 
explanation of why the Fraser government failed to condemn 
Indonesia's failure to abide by those early calls, particularly in 
view of Australia's stated policy which the Fraser government, 
while refusing to state it afresh, insisted had remained 
operative -- Australia's behaviour in the UN indicated that Fraser 
and Peacock were pursuing a dual policy. On one hand, they were 
publicly sustaining the view that the government's attitude had not 
Senator Carrick responded simultaneously and in kind, in 
response to a similar question from Senator Gietzelt in the 
Senate (Ibid., Senate, S.70, 17 November 1976, p.2031). 
2 	Senator Carrick preferred to indicate to the Senate that 
it was 'not possible to say at this stage that the 
transmissions are associated with Fretilin or any other 
group' (CD, Senate, S.70, 17 November 1976, p.2031). 
3 	The Canberra Times, 19 November 1976. Senator Withers 
repeated this, verbatim, in the Senate. It was in response 
to a question from Senator McIntosh (Ibid., p.2109, 18 
November 1976). 
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changed since it took its principled stand in favour of 
non-intervention and self-determination in December 1975. On the 
other, it was passively accommodating Indonesia's integration of 
East Timor, to the extent that Indonesian spokespersons appeared to 
care little about publicly implying that the Australian 
Government's official policy amounted to 'duplicity') 
On the third matter, it was the government leader in the 
Senate, Senator Withers, who confirmed that the government would 
refuse visas to two leading members of Fretilin. In mid-October, 
Opposition backbencher, Fry, had sought the Prime Minister's view 
regarding possible Fretilin requests to enter Australia. Fraser 
indicated that 'any movements into and out of Australia would be 
judged on the normal criteria which applied'. 2 While Rogero Lobato 
and Mans Alkartiri claimed to be Ministers of the exiled East 
Timor Government, wishing to come to Australia on 
'government-to-government' business, Senator Withers confirmed that 
the visas, in this instance, could not be issued, as the Australian 
Government did 'not recognize the Fretilin movement as a government 
and [thus] did not propose to enter into official discussions...'. 3 
Critical questioning continued unabated in the Parliament, 
straddling the period of these decisions and issues, the first 
anniversary of the Indonesian invasion, and the final days before 
the closing down of Parliament for Christmas 1976. In a statement 
to the House of Representatives on 7 December, Fry reflected on the 
year since the invasion: 
Twelve months after the expedition of aggression which 
set out to create stability in East Timor, we find the 
area of instability which is likely to continue 
indefinitely. What has been the role of the Australian 
Government and the Australian people? I suggest it has 
been one of continuing appeasement ... The situation has 
now been reached where Indonesia is dictating the policy 
of the Australian Government ... The Indonesian 
Government stands condemned for its brutal aggression ... 
for its blatant disregard for the UN resolution to 
withdraw and to allow the Timorese people the fundamental 
1 	This was an interpretation of one part of General 
Sudharmono's comments following Fraser's departure from 
Jakarta. See Viviani, N., "Australians and The Timor Issue: 
II", p.255. This is examined more fully in Chapter Eight. 
2 CPD, H.R., Vol.101, p.1841, 14 October 1976. 
3 The Age, 18 November 1976. 
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right of self-determination... We, as Australians stand 
condemned.... 1 
The Dunn Report  
Indonesian brutality was to emerge as a major issue in the 
Parliament throughout the following year, fuelled by assertions and 
counter-assertions over the duplicity of both the Whitlam and 
Fraser governments. Integral to two major debates in each of the 
parliamentary chambers was the James Dunn Report, which alleged 
Indonesian atrocities following the 1975 invasion, and gave rise to 
an inquiry in Washington by a Congressional Sub-Committee on Human 
Rights. 
While such a hearing was a major and positive step for those 
pressing the issue, it failed to draw Congressional disapproval of 
Indonesia's actions in the former colony. Nevertheless, it did 
anger the Indonesians, prodded the Australian press into action 
and, to a degree, internationalized the East Timor issue. 
Moreover, this course of events was a setback for Peacock's careful 
rebuilding of the relationship, as was a censure motion in the 
Parliament over his discussions in Bali with Indonesian officials 
twenty months earlier. These developments served only to frustrate 
Indonesia which viewed Australia's recognition of its role in East 
Timor as facilitating wider international acceptance. 
J.S. Dunn was an Australian public servant 2 and former 
Australian Consul in Dili (1962 to 1964). With the backing of 
ACFOA and the assistance of Australian Catholic Relief and 
Community Aid Abroad, he visited Portugal early in 1977 with a view 
to interviewing refugees who had fled the conflict in East Timor 
and wanted to settle in Australia. During the course of interviews 
with several hundred East Timorese, Dunn obtained a dossier of 
disturbing eyewitness accounts of excesses that had been committed 
by Indonesian troops in the former Portuguese colony. Submitted to 
Foreign Affairs Minister Peacock on 11 February 1977, the Dunn 
Report was also circulated widely in Australia, and created 
Ibid., H.R., Vol.102, pp.3430-3431, 7 December 1976. 
2 	Director of Foreign Affairs Group in the Legislative 
Research Service in the Australian Parliamentary Library. 
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immediate interest in the Senate l with many in the Chamber 
motivated by what Senator Primmer considered to be 'frightening 
allegations'. 2 Primmer was joined by Georges in calling for a 
Senate Select Committee to investigate the allegations, especially 
that aspect which focused on the deaths of the Australian 
journalists. 3 What also concerned these politicians was that the 
Dunn Report was supported by reports and statements made by Labor 
parliamentarian, Gordon Bryant -- following a visit to Portugal at 
the same time4 -- and by Jose Martins, brought to Australia by the 
AJA in mid-1976. 5 
The broad level of immediate concern generated by the Dunn 
Report was evident in late February when the executive of the 
parliamentary group of Amnesty International circulated, in both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, a non-party political 
petition to be sent to US President Carter, who at that time was 
stressing human rights as a major issue in his new administration's 
foreign policy. 6 On 11 March, with 95 MP's signatures, the 
petition was sent to Carter. By late March, Dunn had been called 
to give evidence before Donald Fraser (the head of the US House of 
Representatives international relations sub-committee) and the 
House of Representatives International Relations Sub-Committee on 
Questions had been raised by Senators Brown and Wheeldon 
about the deaths of the five Australian journalists (CPD, 
Senate, S.71, 16 February 1977, p.60 and p.64). Senators 
Primmer and Knight raised matters the following week related 
to recognition of Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor 
(Ibid., 22 February 1977, p.221-222) and whether or not the 
Australian Government had been aware that such atrocities 
had taken place (Ibid., 23 February 1977, p.282). 
2 	Ibid., S.71, 22 February 1977, p.264. 
3 	Moves had been underway in the Labor Caucus to have the 
issue of the atrocities referred to the Senate Select 
Committee (the Canberra Times, 22 February 1977). 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 1977. 
5 	Jolliffe, J., East Timor, p.286. 	See also Senator 
Gieltzelt's statement, CPD, Senate, S.71, 23 February 1977, 
p.346. 
6 	CPD, Senate, S.71, 24 February, p.435. 
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Human Rights. 1 
While Peacock made minimal reference to East Timor and the 
Dunn Report in a major statement on foreign policy when the House 
of Representatives opened in mid-March, 2 the government moved 
quickly to isolate itself from Dunn when, on the same day, 
Indonesia threatened mass demonstrations against the Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta if allegations of Indonesian atrocities in Timor 
were allowed to continue. In a brief but blunt statement, 
Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Malik indicated that if Dunn 
chose to make such representations then Indonesia may be forced to 
take up in public the cruel treatment of Aborigines in Australia. 3 
Moreover, the Indonesian Government took the extraordinary step of 
summoning Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia, Woolcott, to its 
Foreign Ministry to issue him with a reprimand. 4 
Indonesia's main concern lay less with its relationship with 
Australia than its relations with the United States; its principal 
fear was that such allegations could reinforce American criticism 
of it on the human rights issue, by now more prominent in both 
Congressional and Administration circles. By implication, this 
could result in Congress cutting back on American aid to Jakarta, 
particularly military assistance. 5 In any event, this left Peacock 
to defuse the row. In the Parliament the following day he said 
that the Indonesian threat of retaliation was an 'off-the-cuff' 
remark. Moreover, he indicated that Dunn, although a foreign 
affairs adviser to federal parliamentarians, was 'acting in a 
purely private and unofficial capacity. Neither he nor his report 
has any official status'. 6 
Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue: II", p.257. 
2 CPD, H.R., Vol.104, p.203, 15 March 1977. There had been 
an earlier but brief sitting of the House of Representatives 
between 15 and 24 February 1977 during which there was 
little reference to developments in East Timor. See only 
question from Garrick to Eric Robinson on Communications 
with Timor (CD, H.R., Vol.103, p.328, 22 February 1977). 
3 	The Canberra Times, 16 March 1977. 
4 	The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1977. 
5 	Ibid. 
6 	CPD, H.R., Vol.104, p.243, 16 March 1977. 
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While the government's response was low-key in view of the 
manner of Indonesia's protestations and threats, it was, 
nevertheless, consistent with its past attitude to Indonesian 
provocation on the Timor issue, as were refusals by both Fraser and 
Peacock to comment on the matter outside the Parliament. Such a 
situation, however, was unacceptable to government backbenchers and 
members of the Opposition, and it gave impetus to a series of major 
and rowdy debates in both Parliamentary Chambers. 
In the House of Representatives, Whitlam, Uren, Bryant, Fry 
and Hayden mounted a strong and at times bitter attack on the 
government's policy and the attitude of the Indonesian Government. 1 
Uren was particularly caustic. He accused the Fraser government of 
lies, and levelled damning criticism at the continuation of its 
military assistance programme with Indonesia, at a time when: 
The United States [had] recognized the serious 
implications of giving military aid to aggressors which 
use this military aid against the small and weak nations. 
[Moreover] ... when the United States Congress has begun 
to sift the facts on East Timor, the Fraser government is 
making play on its relationship with its great and 
powerful friend -- Indonesia. 2 
What particularly outraged the Opposition were Indonesia's threats 
of reprisals. Accordingly, Peacock was called upon for assurances 
that Dunn would have the full protection of the Australian 
Government while travelling overseas the following week. 3 In other 
developments, Fry demanded the recall of Ambassador Woolcott, 4 
while Hayden, by now considered in some circles to be a Labor 
leadership contender, made his strongest statement on the issue. 
1 	CPD, H.R., Vol.104, pp.210-234, 15 March 1977. 
2 	Ibid., p.221. 
3 	Question from Uren to Peacock, Ibid., p.243, 16 March 1977. 
Questioned similarly in the Senate by Senator Primmer, 
Senator Withers indicated that while the Foreign Minister 
found some of Dunn's allegations disturbing, he believed 
that others were 'clearly exaggerated and unsubstantiated'. 
Ibid., Senate, S.72, 16 March 1977, p.188. 
4 	Fry considered Woolcott should be replaced with someone who 
would not be 'seen as being so identified with Indonesia on 
the Timor question and who is prepared to concentrate on 
explaining our point of view to the Indonesian Government 
rather than trying to tell the Australian Government the 
best way that it can accept the Indonesian point of view on 
Timor'. Ibid., H.R., Vol.104, p.263, 16 March 1977. 
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The Opposition defence spokesperson considered that while 'the 
seizure of a territory adjacent to Australia is a serious enough 
matter in itself ... persistent reports of brutal treatment of the 
civilian population deserves our closest attention'. 1 
Hayden, like Uren, questioned Australia's policy of 
appeasement, and whether Australia could continue to ignore such 
developments in East Timor because of concern at the possible harm 
to the relationship that an Australian initiative might engender. 
Of particular concern was that an Australian posture of appeasement 
would backfire if international pressures were brought to bear on 
the situation. Such a posture would not only affect Australia's 
integrity and sincerity in international relations, but also its 
credibility in Jakarta. 2 
While many of the government backbenchers defended the Fraser 
administration's policy3 -- with the view, in many cases, that it 
had inherited the Timor 'mess' 4 and that Fretilin was a communist 
grouping trying to 'gain a foothold on the mainland' 5 -- the 
government faced a revolt in the Senate over its decision to oppose 
a committee of enquiry into the East Timor situation, and 
widespread dissatisfaction in the Coalition itself over what was 
considered a soft government line on Timor. Believed to have been 
taken at the Cabinet level, the decision outraged Coalition MPs, 14 
of whom had signed the parliamentary petition to President Carter. ° 
In an indication of the difficulties that the government faced, 
Senator Bonner accused the Fraser administration of appeasing the 
1 	Ibid., p.259. 
2 	CPD, H.R., Vol.104, p.259, 16 March 1977. 
3 	Ibid, p.218 ff, 15 March 1977. This debate also embroiled 
Dr. Klugman, Brown, Cohen, Calder, Keith Johnson, Hodgman 
and James. Bryant also placed on record a letter he 
delivered to the Prime Minister of Portugal (Dr. Soares) 
in January requesting he reject Indonesian demands that his 
government approve East Timor's integration into Indonesia. 
Ibid., p.400, 17 March 1977. 
4 	See Connolly's comments Ibid., p.227. This was a point 
vigorously pursued by Neil, Ibid., p.234. 
5 	CPD, H.R. Vol.104, p.219, 15 March 1977. 
6 	The Age, 18 March 1977. 
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Indonesian Government, and indicated he would cross the floor of 
the Senate Chamber if the inquiry was not held. It was against 
this background that Labor's Senator Gietzelt moved the same day to 
call on the Senate 'to rise above party politics ... and set in 
motion the machinery for an important proper review of the tragedy 
in Timor'. 1 
But not everyone in the Senate shared these views. Pressure 
was mounting within the government for Dunn's removal from his 
position in the Parliamentary Library. 2 A member of the joint 
foreign affairs and defence committee, Senator Young, accused Dunn 
of involving himself in the politics of, and displaying a bias 
against, Indonesia in an interview Dunn had made in The Netherlands 
on 10 March -- a bias which Young considered Dunn would carry with 
him to the Congressional hearing in Washington. 3 
In a similar, though broader theme, Senator Sim, the Liberal 
Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence, warned that Dunn's evidence had the potential to worsen 
the now serious rift in Australia's relationship with Indonesia. 
He stressed Indonesia's importance as an influential member of 
ASEAN -- an association that was the most important element in 
Australia's Asian policies, particularly in the economic arena. 
Acknowledging the dilemma that faced Australia's foreign policy and 
the underlying difficulty in applying moral values to international 
relationships, Sim considered that there was a need for Australians 
'to understand the Asian people whose human rights were so much 
different to ours'. 4 
Such a view was fundamental to these events in the parliament 
and exposed the difficulties which the Fraser administration faced 
in trying to pursue a two-pronged East Timor policy of 'realism' 
and 'principle'. While the Indonesian Government was impatient and 
annoyed by the continuing debate within Australia over the Timor 
issue, Dunn's activities and the resultant parliamentary debate 
1 	CPD, Senate, S.72, 17 March 1977, p.317. 
2 	Early stirrings came from Senator Sir Magnus Cormack. 
Ibid., 9 March 1977, p.9. 
3 	CPD, Senate, S.72, 15 March 1977, p.122. See also the Age, 
16 March 1977. 
4 	The Canberra Times, 18 March 1977. 
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touched a special nerve of self-interest. In essence, Dunn had dug 
up the Timor skeleton which Fraser had tried to bury on his 
Indonesian visit five months earlier. But while Dunn continually 
insisted that his role had been strictly private, there seems 
little doubt that Indonesia preferred to represent him as having 
official status. In this way its diplomatic bluster created more 
embarrassment for the Fraser Government. 
For many, Dunn's investigations were seen as the most thorough 
and most widely circulated record of the events that had taken 
place in East Timor following Indonesia's invasion, and they tended 
to corroborate other reports filtering out of the territory about 
Indonesia's excesses. 1 While it has been noted that Dunn 'had 
taken great pains to satisfy himself that the witnesses he spoke to 
were not exaggerating their accounts', 2 details of Dunn's 
allegations were predictably less than convincing to some observers 
-- particularly those that suggested that 100 000 people had been 
killed either in the civil war which preceded the invasion or in 
the invasion itself. 3 On the other hand, accounts related to the 
committing of atrocities gained credence from the fact that the 
Brawijaya divisional troops who took over Dili on 7 and 8 December 
were hastily withdrawn back to Java, where their officers were 
reportedly disciplined. 4 
The Indonesian response was inevitably and correspondingly 
sharp, Foreign Affairs Minister Malik giving Australia 'a dirty 
little kick in the diplomatic testes ...': 5 a threat of mass 
demonstrations, the lodging of a strong protest and a statement 
that Dunn's testimony to the Congressional hearings would serve 
only to harm Indonesia's relations with other countries, 
particularly the United States. Herein lay Indonesia's major 
concerns. First, that the issue was being internationalized, and 
1 	Nicol, B., Timor. The Stillborn Nation, p.314. 
2 	Ibid., p.316. 
3 	See, for example, Arndt's careful assessment of the evidence 
in Arndt, H.W., "Timor: 	Vendetta against Indonesia", 
Quadrant, December 1979, pp.13-17. 
4 	Hastings, P., the Sydney Morning Herald, April 1972. 
5 	Michael Barnard in the Age, 19 March 1977. 
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second, that Dunn's information raised the possibility (a 
possibility explored by Senator McIntosh in the Australian 
Parliament) that the Indonesian use of American military equipment 
in Timor -- which was prohibited by United States laws -- would be 
made public. 
Canberra's reaction to such bluster revealed the lengths to 
which the Fraser administration was prepared to go to accommodate 
Indonesia. But the problems inherent in Australia's Indonesia 
policy arose from two related causes and they were repeatedly 
canvassed throughout the parliamentary debate. On one level, as we 
noted earlier, successive Australian governments had insisted that 
the relationship should be a 'special' one -- rather closer and 
more important than those with other regional neighbours. Whitlam, 
in particular, stressed the importance of Australia's regional 
policies and, in the wider search for its own independent policies, 
of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia: On another level, 
and arising out of this, the Fraser government had been anxious, 
particularly after the Prime Minister's visit to Indonesia in 
October, to submerge the differences which erupted over Timor under 
this wider 'close' relationship -- continuing to at least 
acknowledge Australia's different views on the issue. 
As stated in Chapter Seven, during his trip to Jakarta, Fraser 
adopted the diplomatic expedient of simply pointing to -- but not 
restating -- Australia's earlier Timor policy, which included the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops. Moreover, Fraser made much of the 
total relationship, of which Timor was only a part, and of the 
future, as distinct from the past. While this was tidy in 
diplomatic terms, Fraser's strategy ran into problems, including 
Indonesia's attempt to take even more ground than the Australians 
were willing to give, and some domestic political flak, especially 
within the Parliament. 
However, the change of emphasis had been made and 'realism' 
transcended 'principle'. The government would ride out the storm 
and, in time, the- Timor issue would fade. Then the Dunn Report 
emerged, the Indonesian's reacted and Australia's uneasy realism-
principle mix had come unstuck again. This left Peacock to again 
mend fences, avoiding at all costs any statement that could further 
provoke Indonesian anger. But for those divided in the Parliament 
See Part Three, p.284. 
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over Australia's policy of acquiescence and over whether it was in 
either Australia's long-term interests or the interests of 
relations between the two countries, the next ten months were to 
prove crucial. 
Australian Government Duplicity 
Over these months the question of alleged Indonesian 
atrocities and criticisms of duplicity on the part of the Fraser 
and Whitlam governments in Indonesia's actions were central to the 
debate on a proposed select committee on East Timor, moved by 
Labor's Senator Gietzelt. In rejecting such an inquiry the 
government put forward four major arguments. The first, put by 
Senator Withers, 1 was that East Timor was not a special case, that 
there had been other examples in the world of internal and external 
aggression -- for example Angola and Chile -- and that, therefore, 
the Australian Parliament should not be particularly concerned 
about East Timor. The second was that Australia's relations with 
its nearest neighbours were important, and that such an inquiry 
could upset the basis of such relations. 2 The third canvassed the 
notion that such an inquiry could inhibit the availability of aid 
to, or the ability of refugees to leave from, East Timor. 3 The 
final argument stated that the Senate did not have the capacity to 
conduct such an inquiry successfully. 4 
To the Opposition, such arguments were specious. 5 First, 
CPD, Senate, S.72, 24 March 1977, pp.523-527. Withers, 
pursued all four arguments in his speech, with individual 
government Senators pursuing each argument as a major theme 
in their subsequent speeches. 
2 	See Senator Scott's speech, CPD, Senate, S.72, 24 March 
1977, pp.530-534. 
3 	See Senator Knight's speech, Ibid., pp.745-750, 31 March 
1977. 
4 	Refer to Wither's speech, Ibid., p.524. Withers argued 
that the case presented by Gietzelt did not come within the 
scope of a Senate Committee; he also considered that any 
proposed committee would not have the power to seek and 
obtain evidence outside Australia. 
5 	See the following speeches by: Senator Gietzelt, Ibid., 
17 March 1977, p.316-317 and, 21 April 1977, p.921-923; 
Senator Wheeldon, Ibid., 24 March 1977, pp.528-530; Senator 
Button, Ibid., 24 March, pp.534-536; Senator McIntosh, 
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there were overpowering historical, legal, strategic and 
humanitarian reasons that impelled Australia to take a special 
interest in East Timor. Second, while it was desirable that 
Australia have good relations with its neighbours, such relations 
should not cause Australia to ignore the implications of actions by 
any of its neighbours. In this context, many in the Opposition 
considered good relations between countries, if they were to be 
creditable, involved directness, honesty and mutual respect. 
Third, there was no evidence to suggest that the Indonesian 
Government had threatened that, should such an inquiry go ahead, no 
one would be allowed into East Timor. Thus, it was difficult to 
sustain the argument (as the government was) that an inquiry would 
inhibit aid to East Timor and Australia's ability to evacuate 
refugees from the former colony. Finally, the opposition totally 
rejected the notion that the Senate did not have the capacity to 
conduct such an inquiry. It was argued that the Senate was not 
only competent to hold such an inquiry but had proven so in other 
inquiries into Australia's affairs with other countries, including 
Indonesia: 
The debate continued until late May, but the vote to set up 
the inquiry was lost, despite Senators Bonner and Missen crossing 
the floor of the Senate to vote with the Opposition. 2 While many 
involved in this debate, from both sides of the political fence, 
pleaded for a bipartisan approach to the matter of an inquiry, 3 
there were those who found it an appropriate occasion for political 
Ibid., 24 March, pp.540-542; Senator Keefe, Ibid., 31 March 
1977, pp.739-745; Senator Grimes, Ibid., 31 March 1977, 
p.750-753; Senator Wriedt, Ibid., 21 April 1977, pp.908- 
910; Senator Georges, Ibid ., 21 April 1977, pp.920-921. 
 
Government members also found difficulties with 
these government propositions. See, for example, 
Missen's speech, Ibid., 24 March 1977, pp.536-540; 
Bonner's speech, Ibid., 31 March 1977, pp.733-739; 
Knight, Ibid., 31 March 1972, pp.747-750; 
Kilgariff, Ibid., 31 March 1977, pp.753-755. Only 
Bonner and Missen, however, crossed the floor to 
Opposition in voting. 
many of 
Senator 
Senator 
Senator 
Senator 
Senators 
join the 
2 CPD, Senate, S.73, 26 May 1977, pp.1488-1489. 
 
3 See speeches by Opposition Senators Gietzelt, Wheelden, 
Button, Keefe, and by Government members Knight, Missen, 
Bonner, and Kilgariff. 
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point-scoring. 1 Others were genuinely concerned that if such an 
inquiry was held, Indonesia's reaction would sink any prospect of 
Australian humanitarian assistance being received by the East 
Timorese people. 2 Such concerns were also shared by members of the 
House of Representatives. By this time, however, many had had 
their attention turned to Peacock by allegations in late March that 
the Foreign Affairs Minister, at a meeting with two Indonesians in 
Bali on 24 September 1975, 3 had urged Jakarta to annex the then 
disputed Portuguese colony, by force. 
Speaking during a Grievance Debate, Fry indicated that he had 
received information from a credible source which disclosed that 
the Foreign Affairs Minister had told Harry Tjan and Jusuf Wanandi 4 
that a Liberal government would not complain about an Indonesian 
incorporation of East Timor, and that he had hoped Indonesia would 
act swiftly and efficiently. Moreover, Fry said it had been 
suggested that Peacock's views had been used by hawkish generals to 
persuade President Suharto to agree to the proposed invasion. 5 
Earlier in the day Fry had put a series of questions along 
similar lines to Peacock who, in his reply, not only considered 
that what was implicit in Fry's allegations was the very antithesis 
of the views he had been expressing at the time, but that Tjan and 
Wanandi had undertaken to brief him 'without my knowledge'. 6 By 
early May, Peacock faced charges of misleading the Parliament over 
his response to Fry's allegations, following the leaking of a 
1 	Refer to speeches by Senators Scott and Sir Magnus Cormack, 
CPD, Senate, S.72, 21 April 1977, pp.910-915. 
2 	See speeches, for example, by Senators Kilgariff and Knight. 
3 	Whitlam had raised the issue of Peacock's visit during a 
Grievance Debate in April 1976. CPD, H.R., Vol.99, p.1744, 
29 April 1976. 
4 	Respectively, a member of the staff of Indonesia's Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies, and private 
secretary to General Ali Moertopo. Jusuf Wanandi was also 
head of the centre. 
5 	CPD, H.R., Vol.104, pp.806-807, 31 March 1977. 
6 	CPD, H.R., Vol.104, p.795, 31 March 1977. 
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secret diplomatic cable on 1 May 1977. 1 The cable, sent from 
Woolcott to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(A.P. Renouf) on the day of the meeting, indicated Woolcott was 
under the impression that his Foreign Minister arranged the Bali 
meeting before leaving Canberra with the then Indonesian Ambassador 
to Australia, Mr Her Tasning. 
Armed with this information the Opposition subjected Peacock 
to a censure motion and called for his resignation. During some 
heated scenes, the Opposition also managed to involve Fraser in 
clashes over leaked and retained documents and varying versions of 
the real policies of the Fraser and Whitlam governments. While 
these events began in Question Time, and continued into personal 
explanations and on to the censure debate, only the Opposition 
leaders -- Whitlam and Uren -- made speeches, before the leader of 
the House of Representatives, Sinclair, gagged the debate; Peacock 
survived the censure motion on party lines. 2 
Whatever doubts there may have been about the roles taken at 
the crucial period in late 1975 by Whitlam, Fraser and Peacock, the 
perplexity over what the Labor and Coalition groups could and 
should have done about East Timor continued to be reflected in the 
Parliament in the reaction to Indonesia's refusal in September to 
issue visas to members of a parliamentary fact-finding delegation 
wanting to visit East Timor. 3 The delegation was to have been led 
by M. Hodgman who had forwarded a submission on to the Indonesian 
Ambassador to Australia, Mr Nurmathias, on 25 July. The submission 
remained formally unanswered for six weeks at which time Hodgman 
presented Nurmathias with a petition signed by 80 members of all 
parties in the Federal Parliament protesting against Indonesia's 
obscurantist attitude on the matter. 
The Indonesian response was immediate. No delegation would be 
permitted to enter into East Timor until there was a 'normalization 
1 	Ibid., p.1446-1456, 3 May 1977. See also the Courier Mail, 
3 May 1977; the Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 1977; the 
Herald, 3 May 1977; the Age, 3 May 1977. 
2 	81 votes to 32 votes. CPD, H.R., Vol.105, p.1455, 3 May 
1977. 
3 	Ibid., p.737, 6 September 1977; Ibid., p.808, 7 September 
1977 and pp.1316-1318, 20 September 1977. The Mercury, 1 
September 1977; the Age, 1 September 1977; the Age, 7 
September 1977, the Canberra Times, 7 September 1977. 
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of the economic situation in East Timor'. Hodgman, supported by 
James and Neil, bitterly condemned such a position, and revealed 
later that the Indonesian Embassy subsequently wrote to him to 
indicate that it was their view that such a fact-finding mission 
would be 'an intervention in [Indonesian] affairs'.' While this 
caused a furor in the Parliament it was short lived and discussion 
was confined to the determined efforts of those few 
parliamentarians who attempted to keep the issue alive. By the 
time the Parliament went into recess in early November the Timor 
issue had receded from prominence in the parliamentary arena. 
Before the Parliament again met, Peacock announced, on 21 January 
1978, Australia's de facto recognition of the Indonesian 
integration of East Timor. From this point onwards, and in the 
face of bitter condemnation from both sides of the House of 
Representatives and Senate, the Australian Government spoke of the 
Timor problem as being a matter that was, in the interests of the 
Australia-Indonesia relationship, best laid to rest, although it 
rallied to Indonesia's defence in the Parliament whenever 
allegations of Indonesia's harsh occupation policies were made. 2 
Conclusion 
Throughout the first period (1974-1975), Whitlam's Timor 
policy came under increasing scrutiny in the Federal Parliament. 
However, before the debate generated by the invasion scare in 
February 1975, the Opposition leadership was complacent, to say the 
least, in its attitude towards developments in East Timor. While 
this may point to a measure of consensus between the Labor 
government and Opposition on Australia's policy interests in the 
issue, this was to quickly change. Important here were the 
activities in the second half of 1974 of Fretilin's Ramos Horta 
who, while having limited success in lobbying MPs across the broad 
The Age, 1 September 1977. 
2 	See for example Adjournment Debate in the Senate in early 
November 1979, Ibid., 6 November 1979, pp.1924-1935; and 
Matter of Urgency Debate, Ibid., 8 November 1979, pp.2052- 
2058. Refer also to Adjournment Debate in the House of 
Representatives, Ibid., H.R., Vol.116, pp.1878-1882, 10 
October 1979; and "Discussion of Matter of Public 
Importance" in November 1979, Ibid., pp.2896-2907, 13 
November 1979. 
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political spectrum, secured the interest of Andrew Peacock. 1 
While such an alliance coincided with carping criticism from 
Peacock of government policy, such criticism -- in October 1974 and 
February 1975 -- together with that emanating from an increasingly 
disturbed government backbench, failed to impress Whitlam. While 
many Labor MPs had difficulty in reconciling their own government's 
policy with Australia's traditional support for self-determination, 
the Prime Minister did not and, like Hasluck nine years earlier 
over developments in Indonesia following the coup, discouraged any 
debate on the matter. This included absenting himself from the 
Parliament and leaving it to a handful of Ministers to explain the 
government's case -- many of whom did not share their leader's 
position on the matter. A second dilemma they faced, however, and 
one that was evident in the Opposition's ranks, was in reconciling 
arguments for self-determination with Indonesia's interests, and 
the importance of Australia's relationship with Indonesia. 
As the crisis deepened, Whitlam maintained his firm grip on 
the issue, not only in the parliamentary forum but also within the 
Cabinet and Caucus arenas. 2 The parliamentary delegation, whose 
findings following their visit in March 1975 were well received by 
both the Labor Caucus and Opposition, had less success with Whitlam 
and failed to shake the Prime Minister's resolve to see East Timor 
integrated into Indonesia. 
By August 1975, attitudes in the Parliament began to gravitate 
around ideological and politico-strategic perceptions (on both 
sides of the political fence) of where Australia's interests lay in 
the East Timor issue. Up until then, discussion had steered away 
from such factors. Following the UDT coup, however, they emerged 
as critical elements -- predominantly in the views of the 
Opposition. It was inevitable, therefore, that the subtle 
convergence between the substantive positions of both Whitlam and 
Peacock would be grossly overshadowed by the views of conservative 
leaders such as Anthony and Fraser -- a situation that would not 
have been lost on Indonesian observers in Jakarta. 
The underlying irony of those events, and arising principally 
from Whitlam's insistence on keeping a tight lid on the issue, was 
See Chapter Seven. 
2 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.202. 
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that it served only to cloak the Parliament in a veil of ignorance 
of developments taking place in East Timor. This made for an 
undisciplined, misconceived, and at times totally unsophisticated, 
parliamentary debate. A bipartisan understanding in the Federal 
Parliament of developments in East Timor together with a clear 
signal from the government of the day at the policy level would 
surely have cast doubts in the minds of those Indonesians who were 
planning, with the Australian Government's knowledge, 1 a military 
solution to the 'Timor problem'. 
In such a situation, however, with Whitlam continuing to 
ignore ALP backbench and Opposition pressures for the Australian 
Government to take a firmer and, as the civil war worsened, 
compassionate role in events in East Timor, many of these 
parliamentarians were compelled, as they had been earlier in the 
year, to seek their own understanding of developments in the 
territory -- principally through visits as members of a 
parliamentary delegation. In this context, these delegations -- 
like those in the late 1960s and early 1970s -- provided MPs from 
across the political spectrum with the opportunity to obtain 
firsthand knowledge of events and to return to stimulate 
parliamentary and public interest in the Timor issue. Many 
parliamentarians2 provided a major focus for broadening discontent 
in Australia with the government's policy, and it was only a matter 
of time before: 
groups involved in the Timor issue made their pressure 
effective; they lobbied MPs on both sides of the House 
of Representatives with conspicuous success on the Labor 
side, they laid siege to Minister's offices, organized 
demonstrations and meetings with foreign diplomats and 
1 	See Dale van Atta and Brian Toohey, 'The Timor Papers', 
part 1, the National Times, 30 May - 5 June 1982 and Hall, 
Richard, The Secret State, Cassel Australia Ltd, Sydney, 
1978, pp.149-150. 
2 	These included, from the March 1975 delegation, Messrs. 
Kerrin, Fry, Gun, and Clayton; and Senators Gietzelt and 
McIntosh. All were members of the Labor Caucus' Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee which had widespread contacts 
in the bureaucracy, with professional and semi-professional 
groups and the wider community. Gietzelt was also the 
Chairman of the all-party Friends of East Timor 
parliamentary group. Fry and Gietzelt were again to return 
to East Timor in September 1975, accompanied by the Liberal 
MP, Senator Bonner. 
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propagandized in universities and work places.... 1 
Yet, even though this high level of parliamentary interest was 
sustained throughout 1975, emerging as an important dimension of 
wider dissenting opinion on the East Timor issue, in the final 
analysis, it can only be assessed to have been unsuccessful, 
because it failed to change the government's policy. Two factors, 
however, mitigated against success. First, the issues surrounding 
the East Timor imbroglio were far from clear to the majority of 
those parliamentarians who took an interest. Moreover, Australia's 
East Timor policy was Whitlam policy and he took few into his 
confidence, not even his Foreign Affairs Minister, when discussing 
these issues. 2 Second, with the government moving from one 
domestic crisis to another, many in the Labor party were 
constrained in directing any criticism at their leader's handling 
of the East Timor issue and thus undermining the Labor government's 
prospects for survival in office. 3 
In the period from the Indonesian invasion until Australia's 
recognition of East Timor's integration into Indonesia in January 
1978, the new Fraser government was faced not only with an 
irreversible fait accompli, but also a growing hostility towards 
Indonesia's East Timor policy within Australia. As already 
discussed, many within the Federal Parliament had been infuriated 
by Indonesia's actions and Whitlam's mitigating role. The 
increasingly ambiguous stance adopted by the Fraser administration, 
however, served only to exacerbate this prevailing bitterness, and 
paved the way for a two year debate filled with acrimony and 
political vilification. 
During this period three separate strands of feeling on the 
East Timor issue can be distinguished. There were those who 
recognized the former Portuguese colony's inalienable right to 
self-determination (and later, independence) on legal and, 
principally, humanitarian grounds. This stand was represented by 
Labor's Fry and Uren as well as by Baume and Bonner in the Liberal 
1 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue, p.209. For 
an alternative view of the effectiveness of the Australian 
Timor Movement see Jolliffe, J., "Timor: A Year of 
Struggle", Arena, Nos.42-43, 1976, p.7. 
2 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.202. 
3 	Ibid., p.211. 
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Party. Alongside, were two other views: one, represented by 
Martyr and Harradine, which stressed the ideological elements of 
the issue and another, which represented a pragmatic view, such as 
those expressed by Chipp and Button. 
Earliest criticisms emanated from the government side, and 
focused on Fretilin and the East Timor moratorium within Australia. 
Inevitably, many of its arguments revealed strong ideological 
sentiments, and the resulting debates embroiled spokespersons from 
across the political spectrum in some bitter exchanges. The 
conservatives, however, were divided on the merits in conducting 
the debate on such terms. The tenor of speeches made by 
conservative representatives such as Martyr and Harradine concerned 
many, and was resisted by members within the coalition (and the 
Opposition) on party and moral grounds. 
Chipp, in particular, as in the 1960s, was concerned that much 
of the sentiment which marked the ideologically driven Vietnam 
debates of that period would re-emerge and engulf the objectivity 
required for a level-headed analysis of the East Timor situation. 
While Chipp found support from some quite unlikely quarters amongst 
Opposition backbenchers, he failed to dampen a hard core of 
dissenters within the Opposition ranks. 
At the forefront here was Ken Fry, whose essentially 
humanitarian views contrasted markedly with the ideologically-based 
offerings from the government's backbench. However, in shifting 
the focus of debate away, for instance, from Fretilin's political 
credentials, the Opposition tended to concentrate increasingly on 
the nature of the Suharto regime. This gave rise to strong anti-
Indonesian sentiments within the Parliament, with Indonesia's 
motives in relation to East Timor being seen to be territorially 
expansionist. Views such as these embroiled members from both 
parties, overshadowing those held by the few who critically and 
objectively appraised the prospects for an effective role for the 
UN in the East Timor situation. 
In this context, Prime Minister Fraser's efforts to hinder the 
work of the UN representative ran contrary to bipartisan and, in 
some instances, individual efforts to have the UN involved. This 
created a furor in the Parliament, with many on the government 
benches entangled in the moral dilemma of reconciling their private 
position on a role for the UN with the need to adopt a collective 
position that publicly endorsed Fraser's actions. Such a dilemma, 
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however, was overshadowed by government criticisms of the Whitlam 
government's role in, and vulnerability on, the East Timor 
embroglio. 
In the event, the ambiguities of Fraser's position were not to 
cause the government any major embarrassment in the parliamentary 
arena. However, the bitterness of the debate surrounding the Labor 
government's role served to obscure the degree to which both the 
Fraser administration and the Opposition were in agreement on the 
underlying objective of any Australian foreign policy initiatives 
on East Timor -- stable and continuing relations with Indonesia. 
During this period, the government's resolve in pursuing such a 
foreign policy goal found increasing acceptance on the part of the 
press, which saw little was to be gained in harsh and continuing 
criticism of Indonesia. 
Yet, the cross-party alliance of opinion that had emerged was 
not insignificant in influencing the government's policy. That is 
to say, the Fraser administration was constrained from responding 
immediately to Indonesian overtures that it should recognize East 
Timor's incorporation into the Indonesian State. This left Fraser 
to pursue many of the tactics employed in the parliamentary arena 
by his predecessor: deferring explanations of government policy to 
other government spokespersons, while attempting to blanket the 
Parliament in ignorance of developments concerning, and taking 
place in, East Timor. While Fraser, like Whitlam before him, faced 
a hostile forum, he confronted, by virtue of its links to the wider 
Timor lobby, a far better informed Parliament. 
However, it became clear that while Indonesia's actions found 
little support publicly or privately in the Parliament, a concern 
for the Australia-Indonesia relationship soon transcended any 
concerns related to the plight of the East Timorese, and the Fraser 
government emerged more determined in its public support for 
mending the relationship, while becoming less willing to provide 
any solutions. The Labor Party, on the other hand, became more 
closely identified with broadening opinion against Indonesia and 
the conduct of its East Timor policies. Similarly, the two sides 
were divided over East Timor's right to self-determination -- a 
division symbolizing acute differences of view about whether 
Indonesia was to be treated as a major aggressive power in the 
region or as a vast Asian country which was important and vital to 
Australia's strategic interests. Such a division was also evident 
458 
in the wider community throughout this five-year period and it is 
to an examination of the matters held strongly at issue by groups 
and individuals within it, that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
MORALITY AND PRAGMATISM: THE MANIFESTATION 
OF AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY OPINION 
This chapter focuses on other major contributors to the widening 
debate on the East Timor issue between 1974 and 1980. It is 
concerned with the nature of the groups and individuals involved, 
the opinions expressed, and with the ways in which these opinions 
were presented. The prolonged period of development within East 
Timor, and the circumstances surrounding it, permitted extensive 
and varied attitudes to emerge. An assessment of this is made not 
only on how the matter was approached but on whether there was a 
successful raising of the level of public awareness of the 
underlying issues involved, and whether this had an impact on 
government policy. In completing this picture of public opinion on 
the East Timor issue, the chapter again focuses on some of the 
groups and individuals of the earlier period, 1 as well as on those 
elements that emerged in response to the circumstances surrounding 
the fate of the former Portuguese colony. 
COMMUNITY OPINION  
Continuing Notions of Threat  
As noted in Chapter Six, there was a lessening in 
consciousness by the Australian public in the early 1970s of any 
Indonesian threat. By 1976, those who perceived a threat 
approached almost half the electorate, but were outnumbered by 
those who did not. In the following years, however, there was a 
revival of this threat consciousness, with the number of people 
convinced that Australia's security was endangered by some 
countries returning to the levels of 1967. 2 However, a dissipation 
A study of the AIA's Annual Reports (1975-1980) indicates 
that no interest was expressed (or documented) in the East 
Timor issue or any other major Indonesian issue which is 
under review in this thesis. It is therefore, not examined 
during this later period. 
2 	Huck, A., "A Note on the Volatility of Threats", p.89. See 
also tables in Chapter Six. 
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in the preoccupation with China, that marked the 1960s, had been 
paralleled by a rise in concern about the Soviet Union. By 1978, 
concern about Indonesia varied little from that about China. 
In a poll taken in April 1974, Indonesia was considered by 
seven percent (7%) of the population to pose a threat to 
Australia -- the majority of whom were professionals with tertiary 
education -- an attitude which ran against the general patterns of 
that period. By 1976, the community's fear of external aggression 
had grown rapidly with the Soviet Union, China and Indonesia seen 
as the outstanding potential aggressors. 1 Respondents who 
considered that a threat existed were asked to rank Australia's 
five most likely external aggressors. The countries least 
frequently excluded from the ranking, scored the highest. On this 
basis, only 12 percent (12%) excluded the Soviet Union, 17 percent 
(17%) excluded China and 28 percent (28%) excluded Indonesia. 
Moreover, the fear of threat was stronger among younger people and 
significantly stronger among women, Liberal voters, middle-income 
earners, clerical and 'lower' white-collar workers. 
While it appears that Australians' historical perceptions of 
an external threat are influenced by the government in office at 
any particular time -- declining with the accession of the Labor 
government and rising with the return of the L-NCP government -- 
Indonesia's close third position as the next greatest potential 
threat seems unrelated to this, because there are no indications as 
to how (at this particular time) those who were polled saw 
Indonesia's actions in East Timor. 
East Timor  
In this context, a poll taken six months earlier in September 
1975 and held in the wake of the UDT coup at the height of the 
civil war conditions that ensued, revealed that of the 86 percent 
(86%) who had a view on the Timor issue, two out of three stated 
that the former colony should become independent rather than part 
of Indonesia (28 percent). Moreover, while there were at least two 
out of three Australians who were against Australia sending troops 
to the small island, opinion was two to one against Indonesia 
1 	51 percent (51%) of Australians feared an external threat 
in a survey conducted in March 1976. This compared with 
36 percent (36%) in February 1974 and 42 percent (42%) in 
August 1971. 
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taking it by force, even if a left-wing group was to gain control 
there. 
While it is significant that a high proportion of Australians 
supported East Timor's right to self-determination, the high 
proportion of those who were undecided (44 percent) indicates the 
confusion and uncertainty that existed within the general community 
about the basic issues involved. The significant majority (75 
percent of both ALP and L-NCP voters) which was against any kind of 
Australian or Indonesian -military intervention is, in historical 
terms, perhaps surprising. In a poll conducted in May 1975, on the 
issue of communism on the Asian mainland, most Australians believed 
that communist rule would be detrimental for the people of Cambodia 
and South Vietnam, and that it would lead to attempts at a similar 
communist takeover in nearby countries. 1 
A second poll was conducted in February 1976, following the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor and the accession of the Fraser 
government. The significant majority who strongly opposed 
Indonesia's actions was made up almost equally of ALP (49%) and LCP 
(51%) supporters, while a high proportion of respondents (38% of 
ALP voters and 31% of LCP voters) remained undecided. Again, this 
reflected the confusion surrounding the issue, which was now under 
the scrutiny of the Fraser administration. Such a lack of support 
for Indonesia's East Timor policy (13 percent of Labor voters and 
18 percent of L-NCP voters) was not unexpected when the vitriolic 
press and parliamentary debate being waged at the time are taken 
into account. However, while this poll reflected an extremely 
negative view and showed that party differences were insignificant, 
it was extremely limited and narrow. No questions, for example, 
were put to the general public on other aspects of the East Timor 
imbroglio, including the scope for a solution. 
Nevertheless, any policy decisions that the Fraser government 
had to make on East Timor took place in a climate which, according 
to the polls, was one of substantial public disapproval of 
Indonesia's actions. Furthermore, a 1977 poll revealed that an 
undercurrent of hostility toward Indonesia was evident in public 
opinion. While 36 percent of Australians considered Indonesia to 
be 'aggressive', only six percent considered her 'trustworthy' and 
only two in five Australians believed that she was of any 
1 	APOP (The Gallup Method), No.05/5/75, p.2. 
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importance to Australia. 1 Such opposition can be broadly accounted 
for in terms of a concern about Indonesia's perceived intentions in 
the region. However, while the Timor issue was increasingly seen 
as having national interest and as a territorial one by other 
opinion holders over this 1974-76 period (in which historical 
factors reinforced security fears) by denying any kind of military 
role for Australia, there is no evidence to suggest that a desire 
existed within the wider community to assert Australia's interests. 
NON-GOVERNMENT LOBBY GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS : THE SEEDS OF 
DISSENSION 
1. 	The Solidarity Groups  
In November 1974, following the first meeting in September 
between Suharto and Whitlam in Wonosobo and the visit of Fretilin's 
Ramos Horta (who had come to Australia to make contact with likely 
supporters inside and outside the Australian Parliament) the 
Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET) was formed in Sydney. 
This first organization to be established specifically with a 
concern for the future of Portuguese Timor, emanated from the 
Southern African Liberation Centre (SALC), 2 with the support of the 
trade union and peace movements. 
Largely made up of students and trade unionists, the CIET 
quickly established branches in most major centres in Australia, 
including Darwin, where it was soon active in monitoring broadcasts 
from Timor. While many of the activist unions in Sydney were 
associated with the CIET (including the Amalgamated Metal Workers 
Union, waterside workers and railway unions), its activities 
overlapped with those of the anti-Vietnam war and Springbok (South 
African Rugby) movements. The Campaign quickly organized 
demonstrations along the same lines, with the most notable being 
the occupation of the Indonesian Embassy in September 1975. The 
catalyst here was Ramos Horta who, in attempting to mount a 
parliamentary delegation to East Timor, had been successful in 
finding support among MPs, trade unionists, churchmen and the 
1 	The Acre, 12 April 1977. See Appendix D. 
2 	The CIET shared an office with the centre - which was 
concerned at the time with the then Portuguese colonies in 
Africa and, by extension, with Portuguese Timor - in the 
Sydney business district. 
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voluntary aid organizations) 
In view of Australia's proximity to East Timor, it was 
inevitable that those Timorese political activists who were able to 
reach Australia would seek out (and rely upon) the many individuals 
and groups which were increasingly taking an interest in the East 
Timor issue to channel information about the struggle to regional 
and international forums. By late 1975, the solidarity group, 
CIET, a nucleus for the many groups which had been galvanized into 
action by the deteriorating situation in East Timor (including the 
support groups the Friends of East Timor (FOET) and the Melbourne-
based Australia-East Timor Association (AETA)), utilized such 
pressure effectively. With public opinion polls 2 indicating a 
strong degree of popular support for the East Timorese claims for 
self-determination, the solidarity groups were on fertile ground. 
Popular support derived initially from memories of the role 
played by the East Timorese in Australia's fight against the 
Japanese in the Second World War and in the crucial period leading 
up to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, this feeling spread 
rapidly throughout the community. The CIET had successfully 
harnessed this public interest and, as information mounted that 
Indonesia was undertaking activities to undermine the independence 
movement in East Timor, was joined by a widening array of groups 
and individuals. This included groups such as Community Aid Abroad 
(CAA), the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), the 
Australian Union of Students (AUS), conservative elements within 
the trade union movement, and the churches. On another level, 
individuals emerged to lend their support to East Timor's claims, 
including James Dunn, parliamentarians Fry and Hodgman and a 
handful of academics. In the context of Australia's East Timor 
policy, the invasion scare of February 1975 had served to sustain 
the momentum of this dissenting opinion. Moreover, while such 
dissension cut across the political spectrum, it was unified by a 
small but powerful nucleus of: 
'conscious radicals', 3 for whom the moral issue of self- 
1 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.205. 
2 	See above and Appendix D. 
3 	A reference to a term from Alan Hughes' Psychology and the 
Political Experience, London, Cambridge University Press, 
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determination was a paramount consideration and these 
appeared to outnumber those who had latent anti- Indonesian feelings related to the nature of the Suharto 
regime, its treatment of political prisoners, and its 
domestic political and economic policies. 1 
However, there were also active groups and individuals, such as 
B.A. Santamaria and the Australia-Indonesia Business Cooperation 
Committee (AIBCC), who stressed the importance of Indonesia -- and 
the Australian-Indonesian relationship -- over and above the 
nationalist claims for independence by a small group of political 
activists from East Timor, and who were increasingly seen by this 
opinion to be left-wing and a destabilizing influence in the 
region. These groups and individuals are now examined in detail. 
2. Non-Government Aid Agencies  
As already noted in Chapter Six, the agencies in the field of 
overseas aid had taken a strong interest in Portuguese Timor as far 
back as the early 1970s. This interest had centred on the issue of 
East Timor's right to self-determination and, by 1975 and in the 
wake of the invasion scare, had extended into a campaign designed 
to put pressure on the Australian Government. 2 At the ACFOA Annual 
Council meeting, held in August 1975, and two weeks after the UDT 
coup in East Timor, this pressure was increased, with the Council 
resolving to call on the Whitlam government to express its support 
for the principle of 'independence of choice' for the East Timorese 
people and to oppose the presence of any external influence on the 
territory. In what was its first public statement on the East 
Timor situation and on the issue of self-determination, ACFOA also 
(unsuccessfully) called on the Australian government to provide 
economic assistance to the territory, reopen its Consulate in Dili 
and offer facilities to mediate in the conflict. 3 
1975. 
Viviani, N., "Australians and the East Timor Issue", p.209. 
2 	Up until this time, the aid agencies -- including many of 
the ACFOA member agencies -- were examining ways to render 
practical assistance to the process of decolonization in the 
former Portuguese colony and to ensure that the Timorese 
could exercise the right to self-determination. 
3 	Hill, H., "The NGOs and East Timor", Development Dossier 2, 
Second Edition, July 1980, p.10. 
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Although they were active in the political arena in Australia, 
there were no ACFOA member agencies in East Timor. The first aid 
agency to move into the war-torn territory was the Australian 
Society for Inter-Country Aid - Timor (ASIAT), which had been 
formed in August 1975 by a Sydney pediatrician, Dr John Whitehall. 
He had been to East Timor earlier in the year, accompanied by other 
members of ASIAT, 1 and had held discussions with the leaders of 
each of the political groupings about the viability of establishing 
a rural health scheme in East Timor. These talks continued when 
Ramos Horta was in Australia in June 1975 and by early September 
ASIAT had five functioning doctors in East Timor. Although all the 
Portuguese doctors had left at the time of the UDT coup, the 
Timorese nurses and medical assistants had remained in Dili, thus 
enabling the ASIAT team to reorganize Dili's medical services 
within days of its arrival. ASIAT was soon joined by a delegation 
of members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
which proceeded to provide emergency treatment for casualties of 
the civil war. The ICRC's activities quickly broadened as it set 
up a tracing service to assist people in their search for missing 
relatives and undertook visits to prisoners-of-war being held 
captive by Fretilin troops. 2 
Both ASIAT and the ICRC were able to report on the success of 
their activities when ACFOA convened a conference in Melbourne in 
September 1975. These groups were joined at the conference by a 
parliamentary delegation recently returned from a visit to East 
Timor. 3 The meeting was attended by representatives of all the 
major aid organizations -- Freedom from Hunger, Austcare and 
Community Aid Abroad -- the RSL, the Catholic and Protestant 
agencies and the CIET. Discussion centred on what the role (if 
any) of ACFOA's member agencies in East Timor should be. It was 
decided that all non-governmental aid should be given in 
consultation with Fretilin and that a 'Task Force' should be set up 
on East Timor. The first action of the Task Force was to appoint 
an investigating team to visit the stricken territory to survey 
1 	Bill Bancroft and right-wing politician, Michael Darby. 
2 	Hill, H., "The NGOs and East Timor", p.11. 
3 	The delegation had consisted of Ken Fry and Senators 
Gietzelt and Bonner. 
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both their urgent and long-term needs and to provide guidance on 
the possible roles of the voluntary agencies.' 
Upon the team's return at the end of October, its main 
conclusions were presented to the Task Force. Its main concern 
centred on the humanitarian needs of the East Timorese, including 
'the restoration of peace in the vicinity of the Indonesian border, 
and ... The urgent need to reduce the widespread bloodshed that 
would result from a full-scale attack on East Timor'. 2 In this 
context, it was recommended that ACFOA urgently pressure the 
Whitlam government to state its unqualified support for self-
determination and to apply pressure on Indonesia to stop its 
'active support and encouragement of military activities around the 
border area'. Moreover, the team urged that long-term assistance 
in the areas of agriculture, health care and education be given, as 
well as arranging for the provision of Australian volunteers in the 
fields of agriculture, animal husbandry and diesel engineering, for 
two-year assignments in the territory. 3 However, an immediate 
concern was the need for food (grain, rice, flour and milk powder), 
medical supplies and petrol -- the latter to facilitate the 
distribution of supplies to the outlying reaches of the territory. 
ACF0As response was immediate and a Timor Relief Appeal was 
launched. With the support of CAA, Australian Catholic Relief, 
Austcare, Freedom from Hunger and the Australian Council of 
Churches it had raised over $150 000 by early November and 
organized a barge -- the 'Alanna Fay' -- to transport items which 
were identified by the investigating team as being needed in East 
Timor. 4 While this began a period during which ACFOA member 
agencies worked closely with the Fretilin administration, and East 
1 	"Report on visit to East Timor for the ACFOA Timor Task 
Force", Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Canberra, 
October 1975, p.l. The team consisted of James Dunn 
(leader), Director of the Foreign Affairs Group, Legislative 
Research Service, Parliament House; Neil O'Sullivan, 
Projects Officer, CAA; Rev. John Mayor, Secretary, Division 
of World Christian Action, ACC; Father Mark Raper, S.J. 
Director, Asian Bureau Australia. 
2 	Ibid., p.2. 
3 	Ibid., p.3. 
4 	For a detailed description of this relief operation see 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor, pp.189-196. 
467 
Timorese church leaders, nuns and priests, the general enthusiasm 
shared by this small group of humanitarian workers was tempered by 
mounting concerns about the security situation. This concern was 
the determining factor in the Australian contingent's decision on 2 
December to evacuate East Timor. 1 
However, with their departure and that of the ICRC, went any 
further opportunity to work with the East Timorese because on 7 
December, Indonesia invaded and closed off the territory 
indefinitely. On that evening, an Australia-East Timor Association 
(AETA) was formed, and by mid-December, the ACFOA executive had 
called on the Australian Government to help establish, in East 
Timor, a zone of neutrality for refugees, as well as to assist in 
relief distribution. It also called on the Australian Government 
to pressure Indonesia to allow the return of the ICRC to East. 
Timor, to call on the warring parties to observe the Geneva 
conventions and to provide facilities for refugees to be brought to 
Australia. Further, ACFOA called for the suspension of military 
aid to Indonesia until the military activities in East Timor 
ceased. In effect, although these demands were ignored, they were 
to provide the main focus for the many forms of activities of the 
volunteer agencies for the next three years. 
On one level, the distribution of aid was a major concern. 
However, most of this activity, while it involved other groups, 
including the Catholic Bishops and trade unions, was frustrated by 
Australian Government blockades. 2 On another level, the agencies 
took up the issue of human rights. Spurred by the Dunn Report, 
they lobbied the Australian Government to address some of the major 
aspects of Dunn's findings, especially the violent circumstances 
surrounding the invasion and its aftermath and the appalling 
conditions in which the Timorese were living in Portugal. In this 
The ICRC had secured such a guarantee from the UDT and 
Fretilin in August. However, it was unsuccessful in 
securing similar guarantees from Apodeti and Indonesia. For 
details of the background to the eventual evacuation see 
Jolliffe, J., East Timor, pp.226-228. 
2 	Diesel fuel and petrol was part of the shipment carried by 
the 'Alanna Fay' but it caused difficulties with Australian 
authorities as an unofficial blockade of fuel for the 
territory had been in force for some time. An Indonesian 
blockade throughout 1976 continued to close access to the 
territory. See Jolliffe, J., East Timor, pp.189, 255 and 
296. See also the Age, 17 May 1976. 
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context, a number of ACFOA agencies took up the question of family 
reunions as a way of assisting the Timorese community. 1 By the 
late 1970s, 2 ACFOA and some of its member agencies had become 
involved in helping the Timorese circumvent the legal and 
bureaucratic difficulties associated with bringing out their 
relatives from Portugal or Timor. 
In the meantime, the voluntary agencies continued to press the 
government for the return of the ICRC to East Timor. 
Significantly, the Fraser government effectively dropped this 
demand from its Four-Point policy when, in October 1976, it gave 
financial aid to the Indonesian Red Cross (IRC). In July 1979, 
however, ACFOA reported that the IRC -- the only organization 
1 	For an examination of attempts to reunite Timorese families 
between 1975-1979 see Walsh, P., "Timorese Family Reunions: 
Politics before People", Development Dossier, No.1, pp.26- 
30. 
2 	ACFOA continued to be vocal in its criticism of Australia's 
military aid and in its submission to the Harries Committee 
(on Australia's relations with the Third World, November 
1978), it included a large section on such aid and continued 
to argue that it be suspended until Indonesia ceased its 
operations in East Timor. ACFOA were also critical of 
government policy in its response to the Fraser government's 
Green Paper on 'Immigration Policies and Australia's 
Population' issued earlier in 1978. The Council described 
as 'quite inhumane and inexcusable' Australia's treatment 
of Timorese refugees, and that the then Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Michael Mackellar, had 
reneged on earlier statements regarding the acceptance of 
refugees (see East Timor Report No.1, CIET, Manuka, January 
1978). 
Individuals too played pivotal roles. The CAA's David 
Scott, for instance, was one of the last Australians to 
leave East Timor and on his return, levelled strong 
criticisms at the Australian and Indonesian roles in events 
in East Timor. By January 1976 he was in New York assisting 
Ramos Horta in his approach to the UN Security Council to 
force an early withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East 
Timor. In a letter to the Australian written while in New 
York, Scott recorded the widening interest and concern on 
the part of members of the UN, including China and Russia, 
and noted Indonesia's worsening international image -- 
arising not only from its actions in East Timor but also its 
record in relation to political prisoners. See the 
Australian, 17 May 1976 and Scott's letters to The Canberra  
Times (3 December 1976) and the Age (19 November 1976), in 
which he levelled criticism at B.A. Santamaria and 
Australia's 'continued complicity' in developments in East 
Timor. 
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permitted by Indonesia to channel overseas aid l -- was ineffective, 
and that such aid was being misappropriated. 2 Late in 1979, the 
Indonesian Government moderated its hard-line policy and permitted 
the ICRC and the Catholic Relief Services of the United States 
(CRS) to begin work in East Timor. 
Up until the UDT coup of 6 August 1975, the majority of ACFOA 
member agencies had not taken a political stand in relation to 
developments in East Timor. However, the nature of ACFOA's 
involvement began to change with the events surrounding the coup 
and its aftermath, and the public position it adopted at its Annual 
Council meeting on 23 August 1975 marked a significant departure 
from its traditional views. The resolutions that were adopted and 
the strategy that was employed to pressure the Australian 
Government were supported by everyone present, except the 
Australian Red Cross which, in an indication of the uneasiness over 
such a direction, subsequently withdrew from ACFOA in protest. 3 
The impact of its campaign, however, was significant and had a 
bearing on the climate of relations between Australia and 
Indonesia. Moreover, while a number of the voluntary agencies 
played a central role in it, other sources of support were very 
much in evidence, particularly on the part of trade unions and the 
churches, 4 as well as the press. 5 In addition, considerable 
parliamentary debate was engendered, primarily through the 
activities of Fry, Uren, Bonner and, later, Hodgman. All shared 
the views of ACFOA and all were particularly critical of their own 
political parties. 
The contribution which the voluntary organizations made was 
significant because it sustained public interest in the East Timor 
issue (and continued in its attempts to do so by monitoring 
A small programme was also being run by the local Catholic 
church. 
2 	Aid and East Timor, Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 
July 1979. See also the Age, 2 August 1979. 
3 	Eldridge, P.J., "Indonesia and Australia", p.154. 
4 	See below. 
5 	See Chapter Eight. 
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developments in the territory) 1 , even in the face of a declining 
interest and activities on the part of the solidarity groups. 
While this continued activity met with limited success -- the most 
notable advance being the opening up of East Timor to the ICRC -- 
there were adverse consequences, not least those related to the 
damage done to ACFOA's standing with Indonesia. 2 ACFOA, and the 
solidarity groups, were criticized by the government and by some 
supporters of Indonesia's actions in the territory for encouraging 
the East Timorese to continue in a fight that they had no hope of 
winning. However, it could be argued that ACFOA's actions in this 
campaign, while not falling strictly within the guidelines of an 
aid organization, were a logical outcome of its earlier activist 
work in East Timor. 3 
3. 	NGOs  
The Trade Union and Church Movements  
Although the Australian trade union movement displayed limited 
public concern over Indonesian issues between 1966 and 1975, 4 it 
emerged as an important component of dissenting opinion on East 
Timor. At the forefront were the maritime unions which had been 
drawn to the East Timorese cause through the activities of Fretilin 
members who had held waterfront rallies. As early as March 1975, 
the trade unions had mounted a delegation 5 with the Australian 
Union of Students (AUS) to visit East Timor to survey developments 
and conditions there. The group was in the territory at the same 
See, for example, ACFOA's East Timor Report, No.6, March 
1984. 
2 	Eldridge, P.J., "Indonesia and Australia", p.154. 
3 	Hill, H., "The NGOs and East Timor", p.13. 
4 	See Chapter Six. 
5 	The delegation included Jill Jolliffe (AUS), J. Birch (CSIRO 
physicist and an active member of CAA), K. Wilson (Secretary 
of the Newcastle Trades Hall Council), W. Williams 
(aboriginal Legal Rights field officer from South 
Australia), T. Rowse (sociology tutor from Flinders 
University) and M. Aarons (ABC journalist). 
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time as the Labor Party delegation and they travelled extensively: 
On its return the group called on the Australian Government to 
reopen Australia's consulate in Dili, and sought direct Australian 
aid for the territory as well as the establishment of an 
Australian-Timorese Friendship Society. 2 
While this failed to move the Australian Government, union 
interest was sustained by mounting information about Indonesian 
military activities in the territory. This finally prompted the 
unions to impose bans on Indonesian ships in Australian ports, just 
as, a generation before, the union movement had banned Dutch ships 
in support of Indonesian independence. 3 The first such action took 
place in Darwin on 21 October 1975, when the local branch of the 
Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) imposed a ban on the Modensatu. 4 
While this was in protest against Indonesian attacks on border 
towns in East Timor, bans imposed the following day on the 
Tamboura, by Melbourne tug crews, 5 were in response to the deaths 
of the five Australian journalists. 6 
This action angered the Indonesians, in particular Foreign 
Minister Malik, who called on the unions to end their boycotts and 
warned, 'we praised Australian Labor in backing Indonesia's 
independence struggle during the revolution and now they should not 
be so easily influenced by incorrect information which can affect 
1 	Union delegates addressed trade union meetings in the 
territory and undertook to: nurture the trade union 
movement in East Timor through a programme of reciprocal 
visits between the Australian and East Timor union 
movements; support their struggle for independence, and to 
internationalize their cause in the trade union arena; and 
to examine issues of wages, social service matters and 
skilled training. 
2 	The Australian, 24 March 1975. 	See also Roulston, J., 
"Indonesia warned against interference in Timor" (A Special 
Report), AMWU Monthly Journal, July 1975. 
3 	For an account of this see Viviani, N., "Australian 
Attitudes and Policies", pp.121-123. 
4 	The Tribune ("Wharfies, Seamen, Ban Indonesian Ships"), 29 
October 1975. 
5 	Members of the Seamen's Union. 
6 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.219. 
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the good relations they have created'. 1 However, the unions were 
not deterred and a week later in Sydney, the Garsa II (of the State 
Shipping Line, Jakarta Lloyd) had a ban placed on it by the Sydney 
Branch of the WWF in protest against Indonesia's military support 
of the UDT and Apodeti. 2 Further Indonesian protestations, 
including a threat to cease Indonesian civil shipping operations to 
Australia and a call on the Australian Government to intervene, 
failed to discourage the unions' activities. In protest against 
Indonesia's military occupation of the small administrative town of 
Atabai, a meeting of national maritime unions in Sydney late in 
November resolved to impose bans on all Indonesian-registered ships 
in Australia as well as any ship carrying war materials to 
Indonesia. 
The invasion of East Timor saw this activity intensify. By 
early 1976, 3 the national WWF and the Transport and Postal Workers 
Unions were at the forefront of action taken in protest against 
Indonesia's military activities in East Timor, with over forty 
unions joining to raise funds to purchase a relief ship to go to 
the war-stricken territory. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, 
The Age, 27 October 1975. 
2 	The Age, 30 October 1975. In Adelaide, a boycott was also 
imposed on the Gunung Kerintji by the local maritime unions. 
3 	In early 1976, the CIET held a 'Conference for an 
Independent East Timor'. Early differences centred on 
whether the campaign should aim at gaining maximum support 
for the DRET; seek much wider union bans on Indonesia; 
force the federal government to break all ties with 
Indonesia; organize aid in the form of food and medical 
supplies for DRET or whether attention should be given to 
how the struggle of the East Timor people fitted into 'the 
general struggle for independence and for social change'. 
It was resolved that the immediate task was to provide 
political and practical support for DRET. Accordingly, the 
Conference decided to build public awareness of the true 
situation in Timor and develop a mass movement as quickly 
as possible in support of DRET, 'paying particular attention 
to the involvement of the trade unions'. In this regard, 
it was felt that 'such policies and actions (including that 
of the ACTU) appear to fall short of what most rank and file 
would desire and certainly far short of what is required'. 
The Conference also resolved to organize a National Day of 
Protest on 18 March 1976, leading to a National Conference 
on 20 May 1976. (Conference of an Independent East Timor, 
Report, John Diggins and Wally Stubbings, undated, QT&LC, 
South Brisbane). 
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it brought a degree of unity to a disparate grouping of Australians 
who were intent on assisting the East Timorese. The group now 
included the unions, the Roman Catholic Bishops and ACFOA, all of 
which were at the centre of the relief ship attempts. 1 
While links between the churches and the trade unions had 
earlier been forged through mutual concern about Indonesia's 
political prisoners, 2 the churches also undertook to initiate their 
own campaign of protest over developments in East Timor. An 
examination of the ACC's Working Documents 3 revealed that, as early 
as September 1975, the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, had been 
called on by the ACC to press for UN assistance for Portuguese 
decolonization efforts. In the following months this pressure 
continued and, after the Indonesian invasion, concern was expressed 
not only over Indonesia's actions but also at the lack of 
opportunity to assist refugees caught up in the fighting. 4 
In a series of resolutions during its 28th General Meeting in 
July 1976, the ACC formally called: 
on the Federal Government to take action consistent with 
its publicly stated position on East Timor, namely to 
press for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and 
facilitate United Nations supervision of an act of self-
determination ... and further to provide humanitarian 
relief if necessary by Australian Government transport 
for the people of East Timor regardless of their 
political allegiance . 5 
Moreover, the Council resolved that the heads of the member 
churches be requested to bring the issue to the attention of their 
"Back the Union Ship to Break Indonesian Relief Blockage", 
Pamphlet, Authorized by the Trade Union Peace and Solidarity 
Committee, East Timor Newsletter, 1/76. 
2 	See Chapter Six. 
3 	A copy of a summary of some of the works carried out by or 
through the council, its divisions and working groups in 
recent years is held by the writer. 
4 	Five Anglican Bishops sent a telegram to the Prime Minister, 
Fraser, asking the government to take action on the 
evacuation of these refugees and the setting up of a neutral 
zone. The Australian, 31 December 1975. 
5 	Australian Council of Churches, Minutes, 28th General 
Meeting, Brisbane, 9-13 July 1976, Resolution 39, p.21. 
474 
local MPs; 1 that they be kept abreast of developments in East 
Timor by the Division of World Christian Action; 2 that the Council 
of Churches in Indonesia be informed of the ACCs willingness to 
provide relief and aid funds for the East Timorese people; and 
that they be asked how this urgent task could be achieved. 3 
In the meantime, in February 1976, the Executive of the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) endorsed the 
recommendations made by the maritime and waterfront unions, banning 
any handling or working of Indonesian registered vessels and 
placing a ban on the loading of any military supplies destined for 
Indonesia. In addition, it called on the Fraser government to 
cease the training of Indonesian Armed Forces personnel until the 
East Timor issue was resolved. 4 
Throughout the next two years, the churches and trade union 
movements continued to work for a resolution to the East Timor 
problem. The Roman Catholic Bishops continued to lobby the 
Australian and Indonesian Governments for the safe passage of 
relief ships and workers going to East Timor 5 and the annual 
assembly of the Presbyterian Church voted unanimously to call on 
the World Council of Churches to support diplomatic moves to allow 
self-determination in East Timor. However, the Victorian Branch of 
the Presbyterian Church went further in backing the right of the 
East Timorese to independence from Indonesia. It accused Indonesia 
of 'butchery' in the killing of over 60 000 East Timorese in the 
wake of the December invasion, and levelled strong criticism at the 
Australian Government for failing to take a stand against 
Indonesia, warning that such a failure marked a watershed in 
Australia's future relations with Asia. 6 
Ibid., Resolution 40, p.21. 
2 	Australian Council of Churches, Minutes, 28th General 
Meeting, Brisbane, 9-13 July 1976, Resolution 41, p.21. 
3 	Ibid., Resolution 43, p.21. 
4 	Noted in Australian Council of Trade Unions, Executive 
Report... The Australian Congress of Trade Unions, Sydney 
12-16 September 1977, p.8. 
5 	The Age, 17 May 1976. 
6 	The Age, 13 October 1976. 
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At the ACTU Congress of 1977, the Australian Building 
Construction Employees and Builders Labourers' Federation saw 
Indonesia's activities in East Timor as blatant acts of 
aggression, 1 while the Firemen and Deckhands' Union of NSW2 
condemned Indonesia's occupation of the territory as a continuing 
denial of human rights. Such appeals were supported in full by the 
Trade Union Congress which resolved to maintain its bans on 
Indonesian shipping. 3 Similar concerns were expressed and urgent 
resolutions adopted by the ACC Executive Committee in Adelaide at 
the 29th General Meeting in June 1978, although it placed greater 
stress on the need to take whatever steps were necessary to assist 
East Timorese refugees, including facilitating family reunions and 
resettlement in Australia. 4 
By 1980, the ACC expressed its dismay at the continuing 
failure to reunite Timorese families, many of whom had been 
separated for five years. 5 Indonesia's reluctance to allow 
departures from Timor -- due to their concern that new arrivals 
would talk about their experiences following the Indonesian 
invasion, as well as engaging in anti-Indonesian political activity 
-- had retarded the family reunion programme. As agreed upon by 
ACTU, Agenda Paper ... The Australian Congress of Trade 
Unions, 1977, Resolution 88, pp.32-33. In early 1976, the 
Builder's Workers Industrial Union lobbied the T&LC 
(Brisbane) to hold a public reception on Wednesday 10 March 
1976 to enable trade union officials to meet two 
representatives of DRET --Arango and Silva (The Democratic 
Republic of East Timor had been proclaimed on 28 November 
by Xavier do Amaral) -- as part of its drive for 
international acceptance. The union's secretary (J.A. 
Sherrington) considered 'Receptions have been put on for 
less important people', and indicated while it was prepared 
to underwrite the costs involved, it would also approach 
other unions, including the AMIEU, WWF, SUA and the Ships 
Painters and Dockers Union (Correspondence dated 1 March 
1976 to F. Whitby, General Secretary of the T&LC, Brisbane). 
2 	Ibid., Resolution 89, p.33. 
3 	Ibid. See also Executive decision of May 1977, in ACTU, 
Executive Report, 1977, p.21. 
4 	ACC, Minutes, 29th General Meeting, Adelaide, 1978, 
Resolution 74, p.21. 
5 	ACC, Minutes, 30th General Meeting, Sydney, 1980, Resolution 
64, p.21. 
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Fraser and Suharto at their October 1976 meeting in Jakarta, an 'in 
principle' agreement on reunions was announced in March 1977. Of 
the 625 people settled on in July 1978 for reunion in Australia, 
less than half had arrived in Australia two years later. 
Predictably, the Australian Government's responses to Indonesia's 
intransigence over family reunions were governed above all by 
foreign policy considerations related principally to sustaining the 
Australian-Indonesian relationship. 1 
Curiously, the trade union movement did not address this 
particular aspect of the East Timor situation. 2 Just as 
surprising, the ACC did not pursue its campaign through its 
established contacts with the Indonesian Council of Churches (ICC). 
The Australia-Indonesia Mission Group (AIMG) met in Jakarta in 
March 1980 and it was only then that special attention was given to 
the possibility of a church team visiting East Timor. 3 However, it 
was not until 1981, at the fifth meeting of the AIMG in Newcastle 
(Australia), that the issue of reunion was raised. 4 
Whether these developments reflected flaws in their respective 
campaigns, an ICC adherence to the Indonesian Government's policy 
line or a waning of interest in the face of the Australian 
Government's gradual but firm and eventual movement toward 
accommodation with Indonesia, the East Timor issue had been 
receding from prominence in the public arena. Although the support 
which had been coming from sections of the trade union movement was 
substantial, by late 1977, some of the trade union bans that had 
been in place since the closing months of 1975 had been lifted and 
others were in danger of being lifted. 5 Moreover, while there was 
1 	See, for example, protracted statement by Peacock in the 
House of Representatives, CPD, H.R., Vol.117, p.737-738, 6 
March 1980, and Ibid., p.1106, 25 March 1980. 
2 	An examination of ACTU Agendas and Minutes between 1975 and 
1980 failed to reveal any reference to East Timor refugees 
or family reunion. 
3 	See Resolution 65, ACC, Minutes, Sydney, July 1980, p.21. 
4 	ACC, Working Documents, Vol.1, 31st General Meeting, 
Brisbane, 1982, p.1/03. 
5 	Within months of imposing a ban in February 1976, on mail 
from Australia to Indonesia, the Amalgamated Postal and 
Telecommunications Union 	(APTU) 	lifted it, 	after 
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enthusiastic support on the wharves from rank and file workers 
during the maritime union bans on Indonesian flagships, support at 
the federal level was weak and the bans that were placed were too 
narrow to be effective. 1 The maritime unions, too, were 
unsuccessful in applying trade embargo, as the bulk of important 
trade to Indonesia was not handled by Indonesian flagships but by 
Dutch and Scandinavian ships. In a reflection of these 
frustrations at the time, one radical newspaper editorialized: 
the ACTU has so far failed to ban all trade, which is the 
most effective weapon. There are also disturbing reports 
that some sort of bans aren't as solid as they could be. 
The answer here lies with every unionist. We can't 
afford to wait for the union leadership to act. 2 
representations were made from wives of Australian 
businessmen and Embassy staff in Jakarta. In late 1975, 
the Canberra Trades and Labour Council (whose members had 
earlier held talks with Ramos Horta) placed a black ban on 
the Indonesian Embassy and the homes of military and air 
attaches. These bans were maintained through a full-time 
picket line made up of members of the Canberra Branches of 
the CIET and AETA. The bans lapsed at the end of the summer 
holidays because, as the membership consisted mainly of 
students and teachers, the schools and tertiary institutions 
had reopened. The picket was unable to continue without 
stronger assistance from the unions. See The Canberra  
Times, 19 December 1975 and the Tribune, 21 July 1976. 
1 	One example related to the shipment of copper 
telecommunications wire which in early 1976 came into an 
Australian port on a non-Indonesian flagship bound for 
Jakarta. Militant waterside workers delayed the ship's 
departure for a considerable period of time but were forced 
to allow it to leave because it did not come within the 
terms of the ban, and the federal level would not support 
their on-the-job decision to delay it. The Tribune, 21 
March 1976. See also Hill,H., The Timor Story, p.18 and 
footnote 122 for other examples. 
2 	The Battler (International Socialists), 6 March 1976. This 
reticence to act was evident on the part of the Trades and 
Labor Council in Brisbane. An examination of their East 
Timor files indicated that approaches from a variety of 
sources for assistance in the East Timor cause were often 
fended off. For example, on 28 June 1977, Whitby (The 
General Secretary of the T&LC) received an approach from 
D. Larkin of the Queensland Branch of the A-ET Association 
requesting the T&LC to send a delegation to the forthcoming 
National East Timor Activities Consultations (to be held in 
Melbourne on 23-24 July). Set up essentially as a response 
to the acute situation in East Timor at the time, one item 
of the talks was 'to look specifically at trade union 
activities in relation to East Timor'. Whitby was not 
forthcoming with assistance. While, he said that the T&LC 
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In a broader appraisal of the solidarity groups, generally, and 
their inability to realize their potential as an Australia-wide 
lobby group, Jill Jolliffe was particularly critical of the trade 
union movement. Jolliffe correctly considered that the movement's 
East Timor activities were relatively minor, with few in its rank 
and file membership playing an active role in the solidarity 
groups. 
Division and reticence was also evident within the church 
movement, both domestically and internationally. On one level, 
ideological considerations had created a schism in the Catholic 
Church. While senior figures sympathized with the concerns of 
their colleagues in Timor over the perceived left-winged 
Fretilin -- most notably the conservative Bishop, Ribario -- 
Catholic priests like fathers Raper 2 and Walsh3 were taking a deep 
interest in the plight of the East Timorese. Similarly, a concern 
that longstanding Indonesian contacts and, more notably, Indonesia-
based projects not be jeopardized, restrained the Protestant 
churches in Australia from accommodating pleas from the Christian 
'supports the holding of the consultations, it cannot see 
its way clear to financing representation [although] ... we 
would appreciate being kept posted on developments'. 
Approaches were made also from Senator Bernie Kilgariff who 
called for an 'indication of your attitude towards extending 
the hand of friendship to Timorese refugees in Portugal and 
Timor who wish to come to Australia' (Cable: 1830hrs, 2 
December 1976, Ref. BRA 475 = ABG 180 = SDN A253 =). Peg 
Penberthy, Secretary of the AETA also made approaches to the 
T&LC, on one occasion calling for funds to sponsor a 
combined AETA/CIET Rally at King George's Square, Brisbane 
on 16 October 1976 at which 'messages would be read by Tom 
Uren, Ken Fry and other leaders' in commemoration of the 
deaths of the five Australian journalists. The union sent 
twenty dollars. Penberthy was still active into 1977, 
writing to the T&LC asking it to publicize talks to be given 
by Senator Bonner (at the Catholic Education Centre in 
Brisbane on 25 February 1977) and James Dunn, Palmos Rooms 
of the Greek Progressive League, 84 Vulture St, West End on 
23 June 1977). The latter activity was an attempt to appeal 
to a 'cross-section of the community'. 
See arguments put by Jolliffe, J., "Timor: 	A Year of 
Struggle", Arena, Nos.42-43, 1976. 
2 	A Jesuit priest from the Asian Bureau of Australia, and a 
member of the ACFOA 'Task Force'. 
3 	A Sacred Heart priest and a member of Action for World 
Development. 
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community in East Timor. 1 On another level, perceived Australian 
hostility toward Indonesia gave rise to conflict between the 
Australian and Indonesian delegations at the WCC Conference in 
Nairobi. This conflict failed to be resolved at a succeeding 
conference in Jakarta a year later, which is not surprising in view 
of the pro-Indonesian government position adopted by the Indonesian 
Council of Churches. 2 
AIBCC  
While world recession and an unsettled domestic political 
situation in Indonesia had, by the mid-1970s, created a difficult 
climate for the conduct and further nurturing of Australia-
Indonesia business interests, by 1975, private business initiatives 
in establishing commercial and industrial links with Indonesia had . 
increased significantly. With the Australian Government giving 'a 
high political priority ... to promoting a favourable environment 
for Australian trade and investment in Indonesia', 3 over 150 
individuals and companies were now members of the AIBCC. 4 Since 
then, however, developments in Indonesia -- particularly the 
emergence of economic nationalism 5 -- has seen Australian 
investment slow down dramatically. Nevertheless, optimism about 
Indonesia's long-term prospects remained -- an attitude better 
understood by viewing the Australia-Indonesia nexus in the context 
of the wider regional and global economic dimensions. 6 
Also, some of Indonesia's senior military figures were 
Christians (including General Murdani) and had strong and 
enduring links with the WCC. 
2 	Eldridge, P., Indonesia and Australia, pp.133-134. 
3 	Ibid., p.13. 
4 	For a detailed examination of the AIBCC and Australian 
business links with the government in Indonesia see 
"Australian business links with the military junta of 
Indonesia: a sample study", Timor News, Trades Hall 
Research Centre for Newcastle CIET, Newcastle, June-July 
1977 (Special Issue). 
5 	See Chapter One. 
6 	Eldridge, P., Indonesia and Australia, p.119. Eldridge 
stresses the Asia-Pacific region, and the Australia-
Indonesia-Japan nexus in particular. 
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It was against this background that, on 15 October 1976, the 
AIBCC convened a meeting in Canberra to consider ways of turning 
the tide of public opposition to (and of pressing the Australian 
government to formally recognize) East Timor's integration into the 
Indonesian Republic. Present at this meeting were representatives 
of some of Australia's largest companies, together with senior-
level public servants, principally from the Departments of Overseas 
Trade and Foreign Affairs. Officials from the Indonesian Embassy 
in Canberra, as well as Australian MPs also attended the meeting, 
which was held behind closed doors, and it was the Indonesian 
Government that, within a week, revealed details of its 
proceedings. On 21 October, Indonesian officials circulated copies 
of cables received from the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra to 
journalists in Jakarta, summarizing the substance and outcome of 
the talks. 1 
Reports of these cables were quickly picked up by papers in 
Australia. The Age quoted the new President of the AIBCC and 
Deputy General Manager of the major sugar company CSR, Mr Kelman as 
stating that the AIBCC had made 'strong representations' to the 
Australian Government to give 'tacit' recognition of Indonesia's 
integration of the territory of East Timor. Moreover, it was 
indicated that he had said that East Timor was no longer an issue 
and that the Australian business community was unhappy with the 
government's position on the issue. Kelman also warned that 
further tension over East Timor could do long-term damage to 
Australia's business, trade and strategic interests. 2 
As far as public records reveal, this had been the second 
attempt by the AIBCC to influence government policy over the East 
Timor issue. In October 1975, Kelman had despatched a cable, on 
behalf of the member-companies of the Committee, to the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Senator Willesee, with copies to Prime 
Minister Whitlam3 and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
CSR (Sydney), of which Kelman was Deputy General Manager, 
raised this leaking with Ian Porteous of the AIBCC in 
Canberra in a telex (No. CSR AA20285) dated 22 October 1976 
(in possession of the writer). 
2 	The Age, 23 October 1976. 
3 	The contents of the cable were contained in a letter from 
the Secretary-General (W.J. Henderson), in which he also 
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Overseas Trade, Frank Crean. 1 In a letter of thanks to Willesee's 
written response of 17 October 1975 -- in which the Foreign 
Minister gave his 'assurance that the Australia/Indonesia 
relationship will be one of the foremost factors in ... the 
formulation of Australia's policy towards the Portuguese Timor 
problem' 2 	Kelman took the opportunity to again press the 
government. On this occasion, however, he directed attention at: 
reports that we are receiving from Asia ... that there is 
a widespread misunderstanding of the official position 
that the Australian Government is taking with regard to 
the Timor problem. 
In what was a clear indication of the AIBCC's concern about the 
confusion that divisions within the Australian Government were 
creating in Indonesia, he stressed: 
In the interests of Australia's long-term relationship 
with Indonesia we believe that it is important for the 
Australian Government to remove some of the apparent 
ambiguities from its present policy towards East Timor. 
In its discussions with Indonesian officials we believe 
that the Government should also seek to put into proper 
perspective the activities of certain minority groups in 
Australia. 3 
In the meantime, with members of the AIBCC expressing a general 
concern about the possible impact of the issue on Australia's 
industrial and commercial links with Indonesia, Kelman produced a 
paper for circulation to all AIBCC members. Against a background 
of developments taking place in East Timor, the paper outlined: 
the Timor problem as we see it, the position that the 
AIBCC has adopted with regard to this issue and our 
efforts to exert a moderating influence in order to 
preserve the excellent relationship that we currently 
enjoy with Indonesia. 4 
indicated, 'I trust, Prime Minister, that the point of view 
which we have expressed is consistent with your own 
approach'. Letter to the Hon. E.G. Whitlam QC, MP Prime 
Minister, dated 10 October 1975. From AIBCC file no. IA-
1201/168. (Copy of letter with the writer). 
Since 14 July 1975 (the Second Whitlam Ministry). 
2 	This is a passage in a letter from Kelman to the Foreign 
Minister dated 10 November 1975 (copy with the writer), in 
which Kelman thanks Willesee for such an assurance. 
3 	Ibid. 
4 	Covering letter signed by Kelman and entitled 'The Problems 
in East Timor', dated 11 November 1975 (copy with the 
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While it did not wish to become publicly involved in political 
affairs -- because of the investment and commercial links between 
the two countries represented by the AIBCC -- it considered that it 
had 'an obligation to make known privately to the Australian 
Government the views and concerns of its members'. In this regard, 
although it considered a political settlement involving Portugal, 
Indonesia and representatives from East Timor most likely to take 
place (it did not rule out completely any kind of military 
intervention by Indonesia) the AIBCC were particularly concerned by 
the anti-Indonesian activity of what it considered were 'minority 
groups' within Australia. Further, this concern extended to a 
failure on the part of the Australian Government to oppose them. 
Pointedly, the AIBCC argued that this: 
is being seen in Indonesia and Asia generally as 
indicating tacit approval, or at least non-disapproval, 
by Australia of the Fretilin cause. 
writer). The paper itself noted developments in Portuguese 
Timor following the coup in Portugal, and the civil war in 
the territory following the UDT coup. In particular, it 
noted Indonesian military assistance to the UDT/Apodeti 
forces in their fight against Fretilin (in this context it 
considered the 12-point memorandum of understanding arising 
from the Rome talks would be seen by Fretilin as a 
'Portuguese sellout' and as generally 'strengthening the 
likelihood of an ultimate Indonesian takeover of East Timor' 
- p.2.). 
The two major issues for the AIBCC centred on what 
East Timor's future status should be and how it could be 
achieved. It saw Australia's position as having three 
primary concerns: (1) stability within the Southeast Asian 
region; (2) continuation of good relations with Indonesia; 
and (3) support of the principles of other States (pp.5-6). 
The paper noted anti-Indonesian demonstrations in 
Australia, the trade union movement's actions against 
Indonesia and reports of private Australian military support 
for Fretilin and Indonesia's 'significant concern' at such 
a development. It also noted Indonesia's attempts to press 
the Australian Government to intervene in the strikes 
mounted by the waterside worker's union, and the Australian 
Government's reticence to do anything about them. Finally, 
the paper identified Indonesia's three major concerns: East 
Timor could (1) be used as a base by a communist government; 
(2) be used as a refuge and base by Indonesian and other 
Asian dissidents; (3) give encouragement to secessionist 
movements in Sulawesi, the Moluccas and West Irian. 
Finally, the report indicated that the 'AIBCC has already 
made representations to the Australian Government and will 
continue to do so as and when necessary, until the crisis in East Timor is satisfactorily resolved' (p.9). Background 
Paper, "The Problem in East Timor", AIBCC, 6 November 1975. 
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It was important that ambiguities not only be removed from 
government policy, but also that the activities of the dissident 
groups be put into perspective by the Australian Government, while 
not lending its support to any inflammatory statements that could 
have a permanently damaging effect on the relationship. 1 
Many of these sentiments formed the basis for discussions at 
the AIBCC meeting which was held in October 1976. On that occasion 
it directed its comments to the new Fraser government, which it 
considered, like the Whitlam administration, did not fully 
appreciate that 'the tensions generated by the East Timor issue ... 
could do long-term damage to Australian business and other 
interests in Indonesia... ,2•  Moreover, in an indication of its 
limited success in lobbying either governments, Kelman went on: 
let us learn from the mistakes of East Timor -- for the 
issue contains a number of important lessons for us. It 
has highlighted the need for much closer liaison between 
business and government and other interested parties in 
responding to developments overseas. Only in this way 
will the government be quite sure that its policy 
contains the necessary strands of realism needed to make 
implementation of its policy most effective. 
Further, the AIBCC president considered that Australian governments 
generally needed to account for the position and interests of 
Australian business interests overseas, which were an important 
extension of Australia's domestic economy. And, in a sharp warning 
to the Fraser government, Kelman urged it 'to ponder carefully 
these lessons in the future formulation and implementation of its 
foreign policy'. 3 
While such statements received immediate and considerable 
coverage in the Australian press, with exposure of the meeting 
undoubtedly intended to bring further pressure on the Fraser 
government, it failed to do so, with those involved quickly closing 
1 	Ibid., p.9. 
2 	Kelman, Address (to AIBCC luncheon), 15 October 1976 (AIBCC 
File No.1A401; copy with the writer), p.2. 
3 	Ibid. It could also be assumed that the pressure on Fraser 
continued to be applied by Reid who, while no longer 
President of the AIBCC, was still active in Australia-
Indonesia business ventures, and who was in Jakarta at the 
time of the Prime Minister's visit to Indonesia during the 
same month. Fraser also officially opened a new James 
Hardie factory near Jakarta (Reid was Chairman of Hardie Asbestos Ltd.). 
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ranks: Kelman refused to comment, most of the commercial media 
lapsed into silence and CSR disowned its Deputy General Manager, 
denying his statements reflected the company's views. 1 
Nevertheless, the deeper reality of the activities of the 
AIBCC related strongly to the wider regional and global economic 
nexus emphasized by Eldridge, 2 and it was the interests represented 
in such a nexus that drove its campaign of lobbying of both the 
Whitlam and Fraser governments. In essence, the AIBCC had one 
principal objective -- to bring about an environment that would 
continue to sustain Australia's economic ties with Indonesia. 
Under normal circumstances these links were: 
assured by trade -- by direct investment, by a bilateral 
integration in which Australia's semi-processed materials 
are manufactured into finished products in Indonesia and 
by grants of aid ... aimed at establishing the 
infrastructure necessary for foreign firms in Indonesia. 3 
Returned Services League (RSL)  
In the mid-1970s, the RSL continued to see Indonesia as having 
a particularly strong role in Western strategic interests. On the 
wider canvas, it considered that detente had failed to produce an 
environment of understanding and cooperation between the super 
powers or an attendant reduction in world tension. Integral here 
was the Soviet Union's pursuit of 'its ultimate aim of world 
communism 14 Of particular concern to the RSL were the Soviet 
activities in the Indian Ocean and it considered that the 
achievement of closer ties with the ASEAN States -- in particular 
military cooperation -- was a major priority for Australian 
policies if this threat was to be overcome. 
By the end of the decade, the RSL was expressing major concern 
about what it considered had been a period of 'serious 
deterioration in the international situation, especially in 
1 	Tribune, 27 October 1976. 
2 	See above. 
3 	Sharp, N., "Timor: Indonesia Sows the Land", Arena, No.41, 
1976, p.15. 
4 	RSL, 61st Annual Report, 1976, p.21. The RSL's Defence 
Paper (by Major-General D. Vincent) was reproduced in 
Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1977, pp.22-28. 
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Australia's own area of strategic interest'. 1 Now, more than at 
any time since the height of the Vietnam War, with the Soviet Union 
ensconced in Indo-China through its military alliance with Vietnam, 
the RSL saw the necessity for developing closer economic, political 
and, in particular, defence cooperation with the ASEAN States if 
the independence of the region was to be preserved. 2 
A fundamental ingredient to the success of such a strategy, 
however, was a friendly Indonesia. While the RSL considered 
Indonesia should 'be in no doubt that [Australia's] ... position 
and military posture are factors to be respected', it nevertheless 
saw her as being essential to Australia's security. In this 
context, the RSL was extremely critical of the marked deterioration 
in the relationship, which it described as 'inept', and placed the 
blame with the Australian Government and the Australian media. In 
a view broadly similar to that expressed by the AIBCC, the RSL 
argued: 
The media ... does not show any outstanding sense of 
measured responsibility in this matter equating to the 
national self-interest; for example, its treatment of the 
Timor affair, which did nothing to improve our relations 
... or take us one step further forward in ensuring the 
security of the nation. To this end, Government itself 
must bear some responsibility in that it seems unable to 
communicate its objectives ... related to the safety and 
security of its own people. 3 
While the RSL had generally supported government policy towards 
Indonesia up until this time, it was now at the forefront of public 
pressure on the Fraser administration to steady the relationship. 
Yet, in relation to attitudes towards Indonesia, the ambiguities 
that were evident in RSL attitudes during the earlier period still 
remained, 4 paralleling noticeable divisions within the RSL 
1 	RSL, 65th Annual Report, 1980, p.13. 
2 	Ibid., pp.14-15. 
3 	RSL, 64th Annual Report, 1979, p.17. 
4 	In 1978, for example, the RSL considered one of the major 
factors which should govern the development of Australia's 
defence policy was an Indonesia which was 'showing itself 
to be increasingly insensitive to the attitudes of its 
neighbours and appears to aspire to long-term predominance 
in South-East Asia' (RSL, 63rd Annual Report, 1978, p.18). 
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movement. 1 
On the whole, however, as a forceful advocate of a strong 
Indonesia, the RSL displayed little sympathy for the plight of the 
East Timor people. While sentiments of the role that the East 
Timorese had played in Australia's Second World War campaign were 
strong in the RSL, with former commandos even visiting the 
territory during 1974-1975, it did not publicly support East 
Timor's right to self-determination. In fact, the organization was 
quick to focus on the political credentials of Fretilin which it 
saw as moving decidedly to the left. 2 In view of the RSL's 
historical disposition towards communism, it seemed inevitable that 
this still influential lobby group would call for, and approve of, 
swift action to contain developments in the former Portuguese 
colony. 
The RSL and the AIBCC were the most prominent groups 
advocating the maintenance of Australia/Indonesia relations, over 
and above any concern for East Timor's right to self-determination. 
While they shared this common attitude, it was based on two 
different but interlocking premises, which were considered 
fundamental in any calculations concerning the substance and course 
of the relationship. These considerations derived as much from 
features of Indonesian political life as from its geographic 
proximity to Australia. First, Australian policy makers needed to 
frame policies in terms of the dynamics of a regional system of 
interlocking, economic-political alignments. Second, within this 
broad framework of policy, a realistic understanding of Indonesia's 
potential to be an ally or an enemy was fundamental. Such a view, 
which was based on a continuing fear that Indonesia may once again 
1 	At the 65th Annual Congress, for example, the South 
Australian delegation put a motion that the RSL 'oppose any 
further aid of a military nature to Indonesia'. The motion 
was lost. RSL National Congress, Official Minutes, RSL 
National Headquarters, Canberra, September 1980, p.51. 
2 	The writer was told by James Dunn that senior officials of 
the RSL were called to a dinner given by the Indonesian 
Ambassador to Australia in mid-1975 during which they were 
given a briefing on the situation in East Timor. The 
Indonesians had identified the emergence of communist 
elements in the Timorese nationalist movement and told of 
the implications of such a development for regional 
security. 
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display the expansionist and aggressively nationalistic foreign 
policy tendencies that marked the final years of Sukarno's rule, 
was also prevalent amongst a number of prominent individuals. 
4. 	Prominent Individuals  
While well-informed observers were generally far less alarmist 
than the ill-informed about the potential of such dangers from Asia 
generally, few of the former have had many illusions that, since 
the end of the Second World War, Southeast Asia, especially 
Indonesia, was a region of potentially alarming instability which 
would always present a genuine threat to Australia's security 
interests. 
One who stood out here was B.A. Santamaria l who, with other 
conservative commentators -- including the then Queensland Premier 
Joh Bjelke-Peterson, Dennis Warner and Professor Arndt -- gave 
strong support to Indonesia's actions in East Timor. Santamaria 
was a powerful and influential advocate of the view that 
Indonesia's strategic importance to Australia, and indeed of ASEAN, 
was crucial. Thus, while he essentially saw the Timor issue in 
security terms, a strong ideological element drove much of his 
criticism of Australian governments throughout the 1974-1980 
period. A person whose contribution to the Australian discussion 
of interests and politics was marked by a 'most starkly Hobbesian 
view of things', 2 Santamaria's approach was also conditioned by a 
perception of what he considered was a history of weaknesses in 
Australian foreign and defence policies that began with the Menzies 
government and with issues such as West New Guinea. 3 
Santamaria was under no illusion that Indonesia's acquisition 
of East Timor was anything other than a takeover by a military 
B. A. Santamaria, the intellectual founder of the Democratic 
Labor Party, has been a leading official of the National 
Civic Council for over thirty years, and holds a 
conservative (Nationalist and strongly anti-Communist) 
Catholic point of view on international issues. 
2 	Harries, Owen, "Santamaria and Foreign Policy", Quadrant,  
July 1975, p.21. 
3 	Santamaria, B.A., "The Timor Crisis", News Weekly, 3 
September 1975, p.3. See also Viviani's examination of 
Santamaria's views during that period in her "Australian 
Attitudes and Politics Towards Indonesia", pp.134-135. 
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power, or that the East Timorese were given any more meaningful 
'act of free choice' than the people of West New Guinea. However, 
there were limits to Australia's influence in Jakarta and, if it 
were willing, its ability to act. This, according to Santamaria, 
was underlined by two contradictory calculations. On the one hand: 
Nothing must be done to incur the disapproval of Peking 
or Moscow - or the Communist-lining faction of the ALP in 
the trade unions. On the other hand, there must be no 
confrontation with the vigorously anti-communist rulers 
in Jakarta. 1 
From this, Santamaria argued that major complications arose for the 
region when UDT attempted to establish a regime 'free from the 
Communist elements bedeviling Portugal and Portuguese Angola', and 
it was met with resistance by the 'Maoist Fretilin'. Santamaria 
identified Fretilin as the group that provoked the civil war in 
East Timor -- a war which had 'ferocious racialist overtones, 
marked by atrocities of the same kind as those committed in Vietnam 
and Africa'. 2 
However, such conduct did not affect the attitude of the 
Australian trade union movement, particularly the left-wing 
waterside workers. Santamaria was strongly critical of this group 
which he argued assumed control over Australia's foreign policy by 
imposing its ban in Darwin on the freighter scheduled to deliver 
cargo to Timor 'lest it should fall into the hands of the 
'reactionary' elements of the UDT'. Santamaria was equally 
critical of the Australian media, whose call on the Australian 
Government to pressure Indonesia to allow the East Timorese to 
decide their own future, he considered was 'sheer hypocritical 
nonsense' and drawing only 'meaningless gestures' from the 
government, by way of showing concern without committing itself to 
anything. 3 
Early in 1976, Santamaria sustained this pressure when he 
wrote of Foreign Minister Peacock's visit to Jakarta to secure 
"The Timor Crisis", News Weekly, 3 September 1975, p.13. 
Santamaria also wrote that the Australian Government was 
concerned not to alienate the 'brutal African dictatorships 
which its 'Third World' policy has sought to cultivate'; 
further, it lacked the military capability to do anything 
anyway. Ibid., p.16. 
2 	Ibid. 
3 	"The Timor Crisis", News Weekly, 3 September 1975, p.13. 
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assurances for his four-point policy on Timor: 
Whitlam's Timor policy was an unenviable inheritance for 
any Foreign Minister ... Nevertheless, it does very 
little good to keep on presenting the East Timor 
situation in terms of abstract concepts - 'acceptable 
standards of international conduct', and so on.' 
For Santamaria, acceptable standards of international conduct had 
no relationship either to what he believed to be the facts of the 
situation in East Timor or to moral judgements (however valid) 
based on developments as they unfolded on the war-stricken 
territory. To the NCC leader, the facts were: Indonesia had 
effectively overcome the Maoist group, Fretilin; cruelty and 
barbarianism had taken place, but on both sides of those fighting 
in East Timor; East Timor had been placed in the hands of a pro-
Indonesian Government; and Indonesia was prepared to allow the 
International Red Cross to administer relief assistance to the 
territory. As far as he understood it, the rest was public 
relations. In this context, he saw the actions of Fretilin leaders 
bperating freely in Australia as attempts to embroil Australia with 
Indonesia on the empty plea that Australia should defend the rights 
Df small nations. 2 
While he was critical of Fretilin's activities both in East 
rimor and Australia, Santamaria was particularly disturbed by the 
activities of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), its allies 
and, to his regret, the Christian groups -- AWD and CAA -- which 
took up the Fretilin cause. Santamaria also levelled criticism at 
the CIET which he considered had questionable links to the CPA, and 
the AETA which was based on the development agencies, including 
:AA. The national moratorium which was organized for 18-20 March 
1976, with marches in all capital cities, was seen by Santamaria to 
De the product of careful organization by this nucleus of left-wing 
groups, as well as by unions and student organizations under its 
3ontrol. It was designed not only to support Fretilin but to 
mbarrass the Australian Government and weaken its ties with 
Endonesia. 
The Fraser government's response to these developments equally 
listurbed Santamaria. It was his view that the task facing the 
government was to establish firm public support for the opposite 
The Australian, 30 April 1976. 
2 	"Australia's Foreign Policy", News Weekly, 10 May 1976. 
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policy, by informing Australians about Fretilin's spurious make-up, 
its role in East Timor and about the groups and individuals in 
Australia who were intent on destroying Australia's relationship 
with Indonesia. Instead, the Australian Government was pursuing a 
dual policy: 
On the one hand, [it] kept talking about 'acceptable 
standards of international conduct' - language that puts 
the Indonesians in the dark. On the other hand, [it] 
increased ... economic aid to Indonesia, encouraging the 
accusation that Australia was squaring off. 
Santamaria considered that, inevitably, policies intended to 
placate both sides would, in the end, create enemies of both. 1 
Santamaria continually stressed that the issue involved two 
imperatives: a hostile Indonesia would be disastrous to 
Australia's security interests; and Fretilin's agitation was not 
directed towards defending the rights of a small state, but was an 
attempt to impose a 'now-defeated' Marxist faction on East Timor, 
regardless of its effects on Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia. Such imperatives required the urgent attention of the 
Australian Government at a time when it was increasingly clear that 
the issue was becoming less a campaign for East Timor than one 
against Indonesia. 
In this context, Dunn's allegations of 1977 were simply a 
renewal of the anti-Indonesian campaign that had, by late 1976, 
begun to quieten. Santamaria discredited such allegations as 'the 
result of a kind of joint operation involving Mr Bryant MHR and Mr 
Jim Dunn', and was particularly scathing in his criticism of Dunn, 
whom he described as a person whose 'authority is persistently 
inflated by constant reference to the fact that he was former 
Consul in East Timor, and is head of the Foreign Affairs Research 
3roup attached to the Parliamentary Library'. Santamaria argued 
that Dunn's allegations (earlier stories had reported 60 000 to 
100 000 Timorese as having been killed by the Indonesian military) 
needed to be authenticated by a more objective authority. In any 
event: 
Whatever the subjective sincerity of particular 
individuals, the ultimate objectives of the present 
campaign are directed to the defeat of the Indonesians in 
Timor, a breach between the Australian and Indonesian 
governments, and the weakening, if not the overthrow, of 
1 	"Timor", News Weekly, 9 February 1977, p.16. 
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the Suharto government.... 1 
In late 1977, Santamaria expressed the view that when the Fraser 
government came to office it could have been expected that 
Australia's relationship with Indonesia would have been 
strengthened rather than weakened. However, he considered that a 
critical point had been reached as the extreme left-wing campaign 
against Indonesia, while manipulating the Timor situation, had 
finally involved eighty federal MPs in a policy that was utterly 
opposed to Australia's strategic interests. Essentially in this 
matter, the extreme left was far more effective than the elected 
government and was determining Australia's attitude towards 
Indonesia and, more importantly, Indonesia's attitude towards 
Australia. In such circumstances, the time had come for the 
government to take the matter in hand before 'the widening gulf 
becomes unbridgeable'. Two months later, the Australian Government 
announced de facto recognition of East Timor's integration into 
Indonesia. 
While James Dunn's early involvement in the issue saw him urge 
the Whitlam government to do something concrete about promoting its 
stated policies in favour of peaceful self-determination, his 
investigations into conditions in East Timor saw him become deeply 
and emotionally involved in the prevailing humanitarian questions. 2 
Phis compelled him to define events in Timor in terms of 
Indonesia's brutal involvement there and his report of early 1977 
brought reality to a situation that was slowly receding from public 
prominence. These killings reshaped his approach to the East Timor 
issue and his understanding of the roles of the Australian and 
Indonesian Governments. 
Following a visit to the territory in 1974, Dunn had been 
impressed by an increase in the level of political awareness since 
his time there in the early 1960s. In December 1974 he met with 
Ramos Horta who was in Australia lobbying support for independence 
and aid. Following the UDT coup in August 1975, Dunn was not only 
concerned to see a settlement reached, so ending the fighting and 
Ibid. 
2 	Dunn did not see himself as motivated by ideological 
considerations and often expressed this view to the writer. 
Ironically, when he was Consul in Dili between 1961-1964, 
James Dunn considered that East Timor's future in all 
probability lay with Indonesia. 
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human suffering in the territory, but also an ending of the 
conditions and general disruptions created by the war which would 
make it extremely difficult to implement any kind of short- or 
long-term economic aid programmes. Moreover, he was bitterly 
convinced that the civil war in Timor had been inspired by 
Indonesia in order to integrate the territory. Dunn was greatly 
disturbed by the human suffering and the generally depressed 
economic and social conditions that would prevail in East Timor. 1 
As a member of the ACFOA team which visited East Timor in mid-
October 1975, he was particularly disturbed to find that there had 
been no contact between the parties to the conflict (Fretilin, UDT 
and Portugal) and no effort had been made to establish any contact. 
As far as Dunn was aware, Fretilin had requested negotiations -- on 
20 September and 25 October 1975 -- although, on both occasions it 
appeared that mutually acceptable conditions were never arrived at 
and the impetus for any contact lost momentum. Whether this was 
due to incompetence, misunderstanding or conscious design, Foreign 
Affairs Minister Willesee claimed that the failure to negotiate was 
due to Fretilin's intransigence. 2 On the other hand, Dunn believed 
that the Fretilin leadership had been effectively isolated by a 
combination of skilful Indonesian propaganda and diplomacy and by 
Portugal's inaction. This, together with the perception that they 
had been the 'victims of an act of aggression -- a cruel injustice 
which outside powers were choosing to ignore', saw a hardening of 
attitudes within the Fretilin leadership. 
However, while they may have had success in the military 
arena, the leadership lacked the wider political and diplomatic 
perspectives that were necessary to successfully articulate their 
case on the international stage. With their limited view of the 
outside world, a fundamental and persistent tenet of Fretilin 
thought was the belief that boundless enthusiasm and goodwill were 
sufficient ingredients for success and that it inevitably followed 
that the world had to see the justice of their cause. This soon 
gave way, however, under the weight of the realization that 
progress would not be smooth and support not forthcoming. Such a 
reality found expression in the failure of the Portuguese-Fretilin 
Dunn, J., "The Political Situation in East Timor", Appendix 
1, Report on Visit to East Timor, (ACFOA), 1975, pp.16-17. 
2 	CPD, Senate, S.66, 30 October, p.1610. 
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negotiations of mid-1975 and it gave rise to a bitter, more self-
reliant demeanor on the part of Fretilin's leaders. Moreover, 
Fretilin's political inexperience was exacerbated by the military 
conflict, which was imposing strains and tensions on the 
leadership, and the inevitable possibility of a struggle within 
Fretilin, over power. 
Despite all this, Dunn was of the firm view that, 
notwithstanding their inexperience, Fretilin's experience as an 
administrative power towards the end of 1975 had been a compressed 
learning process. In particular, he thought Fretilin had been 
surprisingly effective in its skeleton administration of the 
territory -- the distribution of food had been equitably carried 
out, the basic services in Dili were functioning more or less 
normally and the general populace appeared to be quiet and 
orderly. 1 
5. 	The Atrocities Debate  
In August 1975, stories of widespread killings and atrocities 
during the civil war began to emerge. In the following six months 
reports were confirming the details of such stories, with the most 
damning indictments coming from UDT leader and Deputy Executive of 
the 'Provincial Government of East Timor', Lopes da Cruz. 2 He was 
reported to have stated that more than 60 000 people -- most of 
them women and children -- had been killed since August 1975. He 
also admitted that there had been reprisals against Fretilin 
supporters, often as revenge for Fretilin cruelties while in de 
facto power. 
These allegations caused widespread consternation and stunned 
James Dunn, especially as his assessment had put the number of 
deaths during the civil war at less than 2 000. 3 However, by early 
1 	Dunn, J.S., "The Political Situation in East Timor", p.18. 
2 	One of the earliest reports took the form of some letters, 
published by the Northern Territory News, on 29 January 
1976, from two elderly Dili residents, to relatives in 
Darwin. One letter stated '...more people were killed and 
more devastation caused in Dili itself than was done by the 
Japanese in the Second World War'. It added that many 
families had been slaughtered and others were missing. 
3 	Harris, S., personal interview with Dunn, Canberra, November 
1981. 
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1976 while he believed these events had to be viewed in their full 
horrifying perspective, 1 he was critical of the figures put forward 
by da Cruz. Although Dunn admitted that the fighting produced 
excesses from both sides, he was critical of the Indonesians, 
accusing them of indiscriminate killing. Rather than actions that 
could be dismissed as merely an unfortunate result of 'excesses' by 
unruly elements of the Indonesian forces, 2 they were to be 
condemned for what they were -- the 'worst atrocity in the recent 
history of Southeast Asia...'. 3 Dunn was angered and extremely 
bitter and could not understand, let alone accept, Indonesia's 
objective of bringing about the integration of East Timor through 
military means; nor could he accept the call by so-called 
pragmatists in Australia, that Australia accede to such an 
objective. By early 1977, as we noted earlier, both he and Labor 
MP, G. Bryant, had produced reports confirming Indonesian 
atrocities in East Timor. 4 
The Dunn Report, as it became known, 5 created a furor in 
Australia, embroiling politicians and giving rise to 
representations to President Carter and human rights activist, 
Congressman D. Fraser, who, scheduling a hearing on East Timor 
before his Congressional sub-committee, asked Dunn to testify. 
Indonesia's embittered reaction and calls within Australia for 
Dunn's removal from the parliamentary library only served to 
sharpen the ensuing debate. 6 While Dunn's findings prompted two 
additional hearings before the Fraser sub-committee during the 
The Age, 20 March 1976. 
2 	The Brawidjaja Division was ordered back to Indonesia 
following such 'excesses' (the Sydney Morning Herald, 14 
February 1976). 
3 	Harris, S., personal interview with Dunn, Canberra, November 
1981. 
4 	Dunn was asked by aid and church organization in January 
1977 to interview newly arrived East Timorese refugees in 
Portugal. He had discussions with individuals as well as 
groups and he documented accounts of mass executions, 
torture, looting and rape. 
5 	See Chapters Seven and Nine. 
6 	See Chapters Eight and Nine. 
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niddle of 1977, as well as a Congressional fact-finding mission to 
Fast Timor, the eventual outcome of this approach to the Congress 
as not a success for those who had supported it. Nevertheless, 
:he Australian Government's policy of merely looking the other way 
as beginning to be placed into a different perspective, largely 
3ecause of Dunn's actions in developing an awareness in Australia, 
3f Indonesia's brutal actions. 
S. The Academic Community 
When examining the extent and nature of Australian academic 
interest in Indonesian issues during this period, one is struck by 
:he paucity of contributions specifically on the East Timor issue. 1 
)f the handful of Australian contributions to the debate, however, 
:hose who featured were J.A.C. Mackie, 2 N. Viviani, 3 P. Eldridge, 4 
Ind H. Arndt. 5 
Two important writings to appear in 1976 came from Mackie° and 
Although referring to Indonesianists, this point was made 
rather firmly by Viviani in "Australians and the Timor 
Issue", p.25, f.103. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian relations", Current 
Affairs Bulletin, Vol.53, No.5, October, 1976; "Australia 
and Southeast Asia" in Coral Bell (ed.), Agenda for the 
Eighties, ANU Press, Canberra, 1980. See also "Australia's 
Foreign Policy, From Whitlam to Fraser", Dvason House  
Papers, Vol.3, No.1, August 1976. 
3 	See Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue" (1976) 
and "Australians and the Timor Issue: II" (1978). 
4 	Eldridge, P.J., "Recent Trends and Issues in Australia- 
Indonesia relations", Politics, XIII (1), 1 May 1978; his 
two monographs: Aid. Basic needs and the Politics of Aid 
in Indonesia, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash 
University, Melbourne, 1980; and Indonesia and Australia:  
the politics of aid and development since 1966 (1979). See 
also his "Aid in the end is a political process" (1979). 
5 	See Arndt, H.W., "Timor: 	expediency or principle?", 
Quadrant, May 1976; 	and "Timor: 	Vendetta against 
Indonesia", Quadrant, December 1979. 
6 	See Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian relations". 
Mackie was then Research Director at the Centre of Southeast 
Asian Studies at Monash University. 
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Viviani l respectively and together they provided detailed and 
balanced elaborations on some of the major political and security 
considerations underlying the East Timor issue. Mackie was 
particularly concerned with Australia's ambivalent attitudes 
towards Indonesia historically. On one level Australia had always 
displayed a concern to establish good relations with its nearest 
Asian neighbour; yet, at another level, there existed in Australia 
the tendency to view Indonesia with suspicion and apprehension 
whether in racist, ideological or security terms. While it is 
against such a background that Mackie proposes four major 
principles (which he argued should form the basis of the direction 
and substance of Australia's relationship with Indonesia 2), he 
focuses attention principally on the controversial East Timor 
issue. For Mackie, the degree of controversy and anti-Indonesian 
sentiment generated by the issue had less to do with the intrinsic 
importance of the issues than with the range of emotions involved, 
including the: 
idealistic advocacy of the principle of self- 
determination for the Timorese [,] ...ideological 
antagonism towards the Suharto regime and spluttering 
Australian nationalism. There has been, too, a good deal 
of traditional ignorance and anxiety about what the 
Indonesians are up to. 3 
He discounted Indonesia's reasons for its concerns over East 
See Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue". At the 
time, Dr. Viviani was a Research Fellow at the Australia-
Japan Project, Australian National University. 
2 	First, Australians cannot afford to antagonize Indonesia 
on sheer realpolitik grounds. Second, both Australia and 
Indonesia would need to work at the relationship and not 
leave it 'to chance and the fluctuating pressures of 
politics, either international or domestic'. 	Third, 
Australia should not become too closely identified with one 
particular faction or party within the Indonesian 
Government. Finally, Australia should move away from the 
practice of thinking about the relationship in purely 
bilateral terms (Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian 
relations", pp.17-18). See also his "Australia's relations with Indonesia: principles and policies" (1974). Mackie 
continued to advocate these principles five years later in 
his "Australia and South-east Asia", pp.137-141. 
3 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian relations", p.9. 
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Timor, 1 motivated more by domestic considerations, including 
Suharto's perception that having 'let East Timor slip out of 
Indonesia's grasp, his political opponents would be eagerly 
spreading stories that such a thing would never have happened in 
Sukarno's time'. 2 
In any event, Mackie sensibly puts the arguments against any 
Australian involvement in the issue. First, Australia's national 
interests demanded that it not be drawn in if it risked 
antagonizing Indonesia. Second, an economically dependent mini-
state would be 'troublesome' to Australia and Indonesia. Third, if 
Indonesia chose to incorporate East Timor, then Australia would not 
be in any position to stop it. While Mackie acknowledged the moral 
aspects of the arguments put by those opposing Indonesia's East 
Timor policies, he saw 'a blatant discrepancy between our 
moralistic rhetoric (both official and unofficial) and our 
inability or reluctance to do anything substantial in support of 
it'. He singled out the press and politicians who, when Australia 
had 'to make invidious choices between odious realpolitik and noble 
principles [, wanted]... to have it both ways'. 3 Mackie was also 
critical of both the Whitlam and, more particularly, Fraser 
governments, and argued that there was no room for ambiguity in 
Australia's Indonesia policies. 4 
Like Mackie, Viviani also levelled criticism at both 
governments. Whitlam's initial judgement in September 1974 that 
East Timor's integration into Indonesia was preferable to its 
independence, 'foreclosed Australia's options in the dispute and 
deprived it of flexibility ...'. 5 Moreover, Fraser's drawnout 
policy of conciliation of Indonesia served only to provoke 
An independent East Timor could open up the way for 
communist subversion in the archipelago; and fear of 
secessionism in the archipelago. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian relations", p.19. 
3 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian Relations", p.21. 
4 	The difference between Whitlam and Fraser was that Whitlam 
'did not talk one way while acting in quite another'. 
Mackie, J.A.C., "Australia's Foreign Policy, from Whitlam 
to Fraser", p.5. 
5 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", pp.222 and 
224. 
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Australian public opinion, while alienating the Suharto 
government.' Viviani's sober account of the direct conflict 
between government policy and public opinion over the Timor issue 
reflected many of the complexities highlighted by Mackie. In 
particular it revealed that: 
foreign policy issues involving Indonesia attract strong 
Australian public attention and involvement, even if the 
issue is not directly related to Australian security 
interests. This is so partly because of her proximity, 
and partly because of the volatile mixture of a strong 
sense of idealism in foreign policy ... with a latent 
antagonism towards Indonesia.' 
Further, Viviani was of the view that the East Timor issue revealed 
how 'temporary and fragile' the growth of public approval of the 
Indonesian Government had been, since the 1960s. 3 
It is interesting to note that while Mackie considered that 
there had been very little informed public discussion about the 
underlying principles which should guide Australia's Indonesia 
policies, Viviani was focusing attention on the increasing 
governance of the relationship by a doctrine of 'asymmetry' under 
the careful but deliberate tutelage of an elite of pro-Indonesian 
lobbyists within the Department of Foreign Affairs. 4 In effect, 
Viviani argued that such a doctrine dictated that Australia's need 
for good relations with Indonesia would override the merits of any 
dispute. 5 
Eldridge addressed this issue in a major paper he published in 
Politics in 1978. 6 While the need for friendly relations with 
Indonesia had for many years been asserted as necessary to 
Australian foreign policy, essentially on geo-political grounds, 
Eldridge uniquely argued that the domestic political implications 
for Australia had yet to be spelled out. In this context, the 
doctrine of 'asymmetry' was not only 'based on assumptions about 
1 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue: II", p.255. 
2 	Ibid., p.259. 
3 	Ibid. 
4 	Refer to Chapter Seven, p.322. 
5 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", pp.200-201. 
6 	Eldridge, P.J., "Recent Trends and Issues", p.44, ff. 
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the stability of the Suharto government which are slowly being 
undermined by changes within Indonesia', but it was also ensuring 
that greater pressure was on Australia to be politically 
adaptable. 1 
This argument can be identified in the writings of Mackie and 
Viviani, although neither considered that political upheavals or 
social breakdown were as imminent as Eldridge stated, and other 
critics of the regime, often implied. Nonetheless, Mackie's 
prognosis on the relationship centred on the need for Australian 
policy makers to: 
preserve a steady course, neither too distant nor 
excessively friendly, in relation to any Indonesian 
government, regardless of its political or ideological 
colouring or our own liking or disliking of the policies 
it pursues. 2 
In view of comments he had made some 15 years earlier, 3 it is 
ironic that Mackie, like Brown, 4 should still be arguing that 
Australia needed, through a network of mutual interests and 
institutional ties, to build up a less fragile relationship with 
Indonesia -- one that would absorb the traumas generated by issues 
such as East Timor or Irian Jaya. 5 For Mackie, strains on the 
relationship derived essentially from the domestic arena where, as 
Viviani correctly points out, anti-Indonesian Government sentiment 
increasingly dominated the East Timor debate. 6 
It was with this particular aspect of the Timor issue that 
Arndt took particular exception. While a significant contributor 
to the debate on Indonesian issues in the earlier period, Arndt had 
throughout this period been conspicuously quiet. A strong defender 
of Indonesia immediately following the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor, Arndt played little part in the debate until 1979, at which 
1 	Ibid., p.49. 
2 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Australia and South-east Asia", p.140. 
3 	See p.17 of thesis. 
4 	Brown, C.P., "Australia-Indonesia Relations", in N. Viviani 
(ed.), Australia and Asia: The Capricorn Papers pp.79-80. 
5 	A reference to the Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea situation 
and the OPM rebel problem on the border. 
6 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.225. 
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time he considered it necessary to address some of the major issues 
in what he considered was a 'no-holds-barred propaganda war against 
Indonesia' in Australia.' 
Arndt had in 1975 warned against the damage being done to the 
kustralia/Indonesia relationship by 'an alliance of left-wing 
ideologists with a small band of misguided idealists'. 2 In what 
ould only be considered a lone stand by the Canberra academic, 
krndt set out to critically examine and challenge the arguments 
that had underwritten much of what he considered was anti-
Indonesian sentiment during the previous five years. In a 
::arefully documented piece in Quadrant, and one which contained 
nany of the criticisms put forward some years earlier by 
3antamaria, and to a lesser degree, ideologically at least, by 
iastings, 3 Arndt focused attention on the roles played by groups 
3uch as the CIET and ACFOA, as well as individuals like James Dunn, 
Ken Fry and Tom Uren. He ridiculed allegations that the East Timor 
People had been victims of an Indonesian policy of 'genocide', and 
Levelled particularly strong criticism at the Australian press, 
Arndt, H.W., "Timor: Vendetta against Indonesia", p.13. 
2 	The Canberra Times, 19 February 1975. See also Arndt's 
piece in the Bulletin, 18 December 1979, p.77. See also his 
"Timor: expediency or principle?" 
3 	Hastings described Whitlam's East Timor policy as a 
'debacle', and considered that it represented a failure by 
the Australian Government to anticipate 'the tremendous 
pressures induced on Indonesia to seek a military solution' 
once Portugal had shown it would abdicate all responsibility 
for the territory (the Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 
1977). Hastings shared with Denis Warner (the Sunday Times, 
4 April 1976) the view that a period of decolonization was 
required if East Timor were to be a viable State, otherwise 
it would not only 'serve as a beacon light to flickering 
secessionist movements in eastern Indonesia' but also 'as 
a launching pad for subversive activities against the 
republic' (Ibid.). Hastings was extremely critical of anti-
Indonesian 'broadsides' being conducted in Australia and, 
while not placing them on the same moral and intellectual 
level, was particularly scathing in his remarks about the 
likes of Dunn and fellow humanitarian and politician, 
Michael Hodgman. Indeed, Hastings spent a good deal of time 
rebutting Dunn's allegations over Indonesia's atrocities. 
Hastings, like Santamaria, considered himself a pragmatist 
and as far as he was concerned, a good deal of the anti-
Indonesian sentiment, whether it be from the right (Hodgman) 
or left (Uren), was ideological. See, for example, the 
Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 1978. 
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which he felt had been so effective in promoting the anti-
Indonesian campaign being waged by the CIET that 'the general 
public in Australia has heard little if anything of the other 
side' . 1 
While he acknowledged that sympathy in Australia for the East 
rimorese claim to independence was well-meaning, he believed that 
such a step would have been unrealistic, for many of the reasons 
put forward by the Whitlam government. In the final analysis, 
while he was convinced that Indonesia had a good case for absorbing 
East Timor when it did, Arndt considered that Suharto should have 
earlier negotiated with Portugal for a transfer of the territory 
or, failing that, moved in before the Fretilin coup. Nevertheless, 
Arndt believed Indonesia: 
faced by the threat to its national security interests 
which it saw in that coup, and in the consequent risk of 
a communist satellite state being established on the 
island ... did no more than any other power (including 
Australia?) would have done in similar circumstances.' 
Arndt also paid a good deal of attention to the motives and 
attitudes behind the anti-Indonesian campaign which gained momentum 
in Australia in the mid-to-late 1970s. He put it down to the wider 
campaign being waged by Communists in Australia to: 
consistently attack...anyone who stood in the way of 
communist expansion in Asia... To them, the East Timor 
tragedy has been another welcome stick with which to 
belabour the hated 'fascist' Suharto regime and to 
influence wider sections of public opinion against it. 
But as Arndt correctly argued (as did Viviani), public opinion was 
susceptible to anti-Indonesian sentiment which, combined with 
latent racism, showed 'that many Australians need not be greatly 
provoked to reveal an ingrained distaste for and sense of 
superiority over their Indonesian neighbours and are only too ready 
to believe the worst of them' . 3 
Arndt, H.W., "Timor: Vendetta Against Indonesia", p.14. 
This point had been raised by Viviani who argued that: 'The 
activist anti-integrationists captured the media' s attention 
thus creating the probably correct impression that they 
represented the major thrust of interested opinion'. (See 
Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.225). 
2 	Ibid., p.16. 
3 	Arndt, H.W., "Timor: Vendetta Against Indonesia", p.17. 
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This brief survey of academic interest in the East Timor issue 
indicates that there continued to be an enduring concern to 
document some of the major arguments arising from the state of the 
Australia/Indonesian relationship, as well as to record the 
processes and pressures at work in the conduct of Australia's 
policies during the East Timor crisis. However, the most sustained 
and critical attention occurred after the key events had happened, 
and after any chance which Australia may have had to influence the 
course of events had passed. 
An important figure in assembling and making available her 
account of what transpired both within and outside the 
parliamentary arena was Dr. Viviani. Viviani had been on the 
personal staff of the Foreign Minister, Senator Willesee, and she 
provided some provocative insights into the forces at work in the 
formulation and conduct of Australia's East Timor policies during 
the Whitlam government. Generally, however, this handful of 
academics played a relatively modest part in the debate on East 
rimor in foreign policy terms. They provided an additional forum 
for debate on the issue but did not go beyond that role and its 
limited influence. 
Conclusion  
Three aspects of community opinion, and the opinion of this 
collection of groups and individuals, had particular significance. 
First, while the broader East Timor question generated a widespread 
uneasiness in the Australian community, Indonesia's actions in the 
territory raised deep-seated Australian sensitivities about 
Indonesia. These views were from across the political spectrum 
and, generally, put the cost of incurring Indonesian resentment 
much lower than did the Australian Government. Representative of 
such views were those held by James Dunn and the trade unions. 
On the other hand, there were those who argued that 
kustralia's interests were best supported by a policy of sympathy 
and support for the Suharto Government. They included those who 
had established close links with the Indonesian Government, 
including figures such as Santamaria and Arndt, as well as the 
kIBCC. Generally speaking, they contend that Indonesia was 
compelled to intervene in East Timor for primarily strategic 
reasons -- arising from Portuguese disinterest in its former 
colony, Timorese irresponsibility and left-wing provocation in and 
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outside East Timor -- and that dissenting opinion within Australia 
was insensitive to Indonesia's strategic outlook, and to Indonesian 
values and, to a lesser degree, cultural perspectives which inform 
such Indonesian actions) 
Second, while the solidarity groups performed an important 
function as a nucleus for the many groups and individuals that 
emerged in support of East Timorese self-determination, the 
Australia-wide movement failed to realize its full potential as a 
lobby group. 2 While such a view contrasts strongly with those put 
by Viviani, 3 Dr Viviani's observations do not provide us with 
evidence of the existence of a fully developed organized movement. 
While the former Willesee staff member considered that diversity 
among the groups in the Australia Timor movement had made their 
pressure effective, and a temporary alliance was formed between the 
left and right over the issue, individuals like J.S. Dunn and many 
of the groups that emerged in the course of the issue, whether from 
the trade unions or church movements, did so spontaneously and 
independently of any formal movement. Moreover, as Viviani 
correctly states, while there was widespread sympathy for the 
plight of the East Timor people, because of 'their public silence, 
it is difficult to judge how large a group of Australians was in 
favour of Timor's integration with Indonesia 1 . 4 
This is all the more critical when it is remembered that while 
public opinion polls revealed that a high proportion of Australians 
took a dim view of Indonesia's actions, there were also a large 
number of Australians who did not know what to make of the issue. 
However, as the record showed, it was the experience of the left 
that unless solidarity groups built at least some links with a 
broader movement, their voices would become isolated and lost. 
Conversely, if the formal movement was unable to organize these 
groups into a solid, enduring structure, then doubts could be 
raised as to whether the strategy they pursued was the correct 
1 	This is developed further in the Conclusions. 
2 	Jolliffe, J., "Timor: A Year of Struggle", p.7. 
3 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.209. 
4 	Ibid., p.225. 
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one. 
What then are the reasons for the contradictions between the 
observations of Viviani and Jolliffe? Dr Viviani's more Canberra-
oriented view was mainly concerned with the effect of the Timor 
movement on the Parliament, government departments and embassies. 
It was Jolliffe's view that the movement in Australia consisted 
only of those individuals and groups who were actual members of the 
solidarity groups. In this regard, criticism could be levelled at 
the trade union movement whose activities, Jolliffe believed, were 
minimal indeed. 2 Yet, if only a few rank and file members of the 
anions were active in the solidarity groups, it raises the question 
of what should have been done about linking the solidarity groups 
to mass organizations of the Labor Movement and other community 
organizations. While it attempted to do this, the Timor movement 
did not confront this issue with any outstanding success. 
Third, the government also came under pressure from those 
individuals and groups who favoured Indonesia's actions in East 
rimor. The AIBCC and B.A. Santamaria were representative of such 
opinion, believing that Australia could not afford to antagonize 
Indonesia and that it should be prepared to pay considerable costs 
to maintain Indonesia's economic and, in particular, political 
goodwill. In this regard, there was a strong measure of congruence 
between this opinion and both the Whitlam and Fraser governments. 
where this group dissented from government policy was in its 
criticism, on pragmatic grounds, of the damage being inflicted on 
the wider diplomatic relationship with Indonesia by Australia's 
stance on the East Timor issue, particularly under the Fraser 
administration. 
See, for example Footnote 3, p.472, which details the 
discussion about the strategies to be employed to mobilize 
support for the self-determination issue. 
2 	Jolliffe, J., "A Year of Struggle", p.7. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
This study has examined Australia's Indonesia policies during the 
period 1965 to 1980. It has described the influences that have 
shaped these policies and in doing so brought into play the broad 
constellation of political forces that, in one way or another, are 
involved in the making of foreign policy. 1 So far, the chapter 
conclusions have summarized the broad features of what is a complex 
story. It remains, therefore, before reconsidering the questions 
raised in the Introduction and reassessing their implications for 
the formulation of future Australian policy towards Indonesia, only 
to elaborate on some general points of significance that have 
emerged. The first relates to the methodology employed. 
As a study of foreign policy, this thesis has sought to 
explain the decisions of successive Australian Governments in their 
relations with Indonesia. However, an analysis of Australia's 
Indonesia policies required a framework that would facilitate the 
organization of the information gathered in such a way as to 
illuminate the relationship among some of the key variables, while 
accommodating the fact that international politics increasingly 
reflects a complex interaction of global, regional and State 
components. Thus, the method used here has been an adaption of 
J.D. Singer's level-of-analysis framework -- an important 
conceptual and methodological research tool in the study of 
international relations. As such it represents an interpretative 
approach and one based on two assumptions: first, an understanding 
of international relations suffers when only one level-of-analysis 
is utilized; and second, the levels of analysis are interdependent, 
with each level yielding, as this study has shown, a different 
perspective on the factors influencing Australia's foreign policy 
behaviour towards Indonesia. Thus, it has been possible to 
identify a series of approaches to the development of the 
kustralia/Indonesia relationship. 
This relationship has always been a complex one. In the 1950s 
One of the earliest influences on the writer was T.B. 
Millar's "On Writing About Foreign Policy", Australian 
Outlook, Vol.21, 1967, pp.71-84. 
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and 1960s, Indonesia's aggressive nationalism and strengthening 
alignment with communism challenged Australian strategic thinking 
and it tested yet to mature Australian diplomacy. During 
confrontation, more than during Indonesia's West Irian campaign, 
Australia's tempered military response was, as Beddie suggested, 1 
based more on an awareness of a balanced power relationship than a 
concern that there be no diplomatic rupture, such was the 
characteristically peculiar nature of relations between the two 
countries. Nevertheless, even though existing links were 
sustained, Australian policy makers remained cautious. 
This caution prevailed through the events of late 1965 and 
well into 1966, when a distinct change in the Indonesian 
Government's ideological and nationalistic outlooks created the 
conditions for an improvement in what was by the mid-1960s a 
particularly fragile bilateral relationship. The Australian 
Government, however, remained cautious -- there was always the 
thought that a sharp reversal of policies may be accompanied by 
much less change in underlying attitudes than many might expect -- 
and adopted a low-key response to these changed but far-teaching 
circumstances. 
The merit in such a strategy came under intense scrutiny from 
the Australian press and political arenas. As presented in Chapter 
Four, press discussions tended to sensationalize developments in 
Indonesia, with few contributing to any meaningful policy exchange. 
With the emergence and consolidation of the Suharto government, 
this gave way to sensible appraisals of the major issues arising 
from Indonesia's continuing internal disorders. Of particular 
concern to the Australian press was Indonesia's desperate need for 
economic rehabilitation and it became increasingly critical of the 
government's apparent tardiness in assisting the New Order 
government. Similar concerns were also expressed in the Australian 
Parliament, where an early bipartisan interest in Indonesia's 
future was soon overshadowed by the Parliament's ongoing debate on 
Australia's security and, in the context of the conservative 
parties' preoccupation with communism, Indonesia was rapidly seen 
to have a significant new security role in the region. Inevitably, 
this set the tone and shape of the debate on Indonesian issues 
until the early 1970s. 
See the introduction to Part One. 
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In the meantime, changes in Australia's international 
environment had stimulated a fundamental reassessment of regional 
security issues, the outcome of which saw a perceptible shift in 
emphasis to the notion of security based on regional cooperation 
rather than on great power guarantees. As presented in Chapter 
Two, Indonesia was emerging as a significant feature of this 
reassessment and, under pressure from the United States, Australia 
was now prepared to assist in measures for the stabilization of its 
northern neighbour -- measures that were to enable Indonesia to 
take its place in a post-Nixon doctrine Southeast Asian 
international order. 
Throughout this period, Australian Government attitudes and 
policies towards Indonesia at first attracted little comment from 
the wider community, other than that which emerged in the context 
of changes stimulated by the British and American decisions to 
withdraw from the region. The most interesting aspect of community 
opinion at this time was the coexistence of an uneasiness about 
Indonesia's potential as a threat, with a concern for its stability 
and welfare. This conflict was in evidence also by now in debates 
being generated in the Parliament and the press over the features 
and future direction of Indonesia's 'New Order'. By the mid-1970s, 
with major changes in our international environment nearing 
completion, well-informed and concerned parliamentarians and 
journalists were raising a number of contentious issues arising 
from the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Suharto 
government. This reflected, rather than generated, wider community 
debate at the time, where dissenting views had focused on moral and 
humanitarian issues such as political prisoners, aid and 
corruption. This discussion had its antecedents in the immediate 
period leading up to and including the West New Guinea issue, and 
it raised the notion of the levels of costs which Australia was 
prepared to accept in the maintenance of what was being argued 
Dfficially and firmly as an increasingly important strategic 
relationship. 
International pressures at play on Australian foreign policy 
were now significant and they had emerged as major factors in the 
conduct of Australia's West New Guinea policy and Australia's 
attitude toward Indonesia's 'Act of Free Choice' -- the successful 
Dutcome of which was perceived by western strategists to be of 
najor importance to Indonesia, which was now at a crucial stage of 
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development. The issue illuminated the conflict between principle 
and national interest, and the Australian Government's pragmatic 
approach to it outraged a large cross-section of public opinion 
which was at odds not only with the questionable morality of the 
government's policy of 'non-interference', but also with the 
pusillanimous way it expressed its support for Indonesia, over and 
above the interests of the people of West New Guinea. 
As discerned in Chapter Six, articulate opinion throughout 
this period was distinguished by a great variety in the nature of 
the groups and individuals involved, in the kinds of opinions 
expressed (see later) and the ways in which these were set forth. 
The general effect was to enrich and complicate the policy 
dialogue, but the perceptible influence on policy was non-existent. 
Nevertheless, a high degree of congruence existed between the 
government and those elements of articulate opinion such as the 
AIBCC and H.W. Arndt, who successfully cultivated direct contact 
with the conservative parties. Unlike those individuals and groups 
such as Eldridge and the non-government lobby groups who adopted an 
increasingly dissenting position on Indonesian issues and 
Australia's now entrenched relationship with Indonesia, this group 
of opinion -- aided by the Australian press -- created a climate of 
opinion in which the government was encouraged to sustain its 
Indonesian policies. 
These policies were underwritten by an approach that stressed 
pragmatism, and which claimed that Australia should maintain good 
relations with Indonesia because of its strategic significance in 
the Southeast Asian region. On this basis, in 1969, the West New 
Guinea issue was not allowed to obscure the nature of Australia's 
interests in the region, necessitating a distinction be drawn 
between principle and pragmatism. By the mid-1970s, with 
Portuguese rule in Timor in a state of collapse, Australia was 
again faced with a dilemma of similar dimensions. Like the West 
New Guinea issue, the same distinction was drawn between principle 
and pragmatism. But, again, as with that issue, while the 
government pursued the pragmatic approach, the conduct of 
Australia's policy left much to be desired. 
Whitlam's concern for the significance of the relationship 
oompelled him to adopt an isolationist posture. While he 
personally believed in self-determination, Whitlam did little to 
indicate that such an option was a viable one for the East Timorese 
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to pursue. Such an approach came under intense scrutiny in the 
press and the Australian Parliament, and served only to inflame 
public opinion, the nucleus of which had laid dormant since 
pursuing, as part of its ongoing wider activities, issues and 
causes such as West New Guinea, Vietnam and South Africa (Springbok 
rugby). 
While East Timor did not figure prominently in Australia's 
press coverage of Indonesian issues before events leading to 
Indonesia's invasion of the territory in December 1975, reports of 
these events played an important part in influencing Australian 
perceptions of developments taking place in East Timor. Equally 
important, these reports provided background knowledge and 
impressions which helped in clarifying later developments and 
official interpretations of them. Such first-hand reports emerged 
as an important source of information on developments taking place 
in East Timor and often differed in substance to official versions 
being given in Jakarta and Canberra. However, as sustained and 
critical as this reporting was, it occurred after the event, thus 
negating any influence Australia may have had. 
A major development for the press in the pre-invasion period 
was the deaths of the five Australian journalists. While this 
tragedy generated larger moral questions about Indonesia's role in 
East Timor, and the Australian Government's willingness to 
acquiesce to them, it became a recurring theme in (and a major 
factor in the shaping of) Australian news coverage of the East 
Timor issue. While this inevitably portrayed Indonesia in a bad 
light, it indicated less that reporters were ideologically pre-
disposed against Indonesia than the fact that such an incident, 
together with other aspects of Indonesia's behaviour, deeply 
influenced their perceptions. Similarly, by the time of the 
invasion, there was a strong anti-Indonesian consensus in the 
public views of many politicians. 
Until then, there had been a measure of consensus in the 
Parliament regarding Australia's interests in the East Timor issue. 
However, with the outbreak of civil war, attitudes in the 
Parliament began to reveal undercurrents of ideological and 
politico-strategic thinking of where such interests lay, 
particularly on the part of the Opposition. This tended to 
overshadow the similarity in positions being adopted by the major 
political parties and embroiled the Parliament in a totally 
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undisciplined, ideologically driven debate reminiscent of that 
generated by the Vietnam issue -- the sentiments of which would not 
have been lost on observers in Jakarta. 
Nevertheless, the Parliament had emerged as an important 
dimension of opinion on the East Timor issue, which was rapidly 
bringing together all major dissenting groups and individuals, and 
attracting a wider range of public opinion than was traditionally 
concerned with Indonesian issues. With community opinion at this 
time sensitive to developments taking place in East Timor as well 
as retaining a strong measure of distrust of Indonesia, the 
solidarity groups that emerged in 1974-1975 in support of East 
Timorese self-determination, and then independence, were on fertile 
grounds. The invasion scare of February 1975 crystallized many of 
these groups into action, with the CIET throughout that year 
providing a vehicle for the diverse groups which were emerging over 
the East Timor issue and drawing support from across the political 
spectrum. However, while developments in the territory galvanized 
this alliance -- by December involving parliamentarians and non-
government lobby groups, including the ACC, students, aid agencies 
and trade unions -- and fuelled a build-up of a considerable head 
of steam, nobody was able to pressure the Whitlam government into 
changing its position on East Timor. 
However, the same could not be said about this activity during 
the period of the Fraser government, because the basic feature of 
L-CP policy was its domestic orientation. The ambiguous nature and 
conduct of the government's policy after Indonesia's invasion of 
East Timor did little to improve the relationship between Australia 
and Indonesia, while serving to sustain the core of support for 
East Timor's right to self-determination generated throughout the 
previous eighteen months. Although the breadth of support was 
beginning to shrink and was accompanied by increasing calls from 
the press, individuals and groups for the Australian Government to 
recognize Indonesia's takeover of East Timor, this hardcore of 
support remained firm throughout the 1976-1978 period. While it 
lacked any credible alternatives to existing policy, it was 
successful in continuing to be effective in embarrassing the Fraser 
government, and held it back from formally supporting Indonesian 
policy. 
Australia's recognition was a matter of timing -- something 
that Indonesia chose not to fully understand. While Jakarta 
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conveyed the impression that it did not conceive of any real 
distinction between official opinion and officially tolerated 
private opinion, there was always a slow movement towards 
recognition that was inherent in the nature of Fraser's policy. 
The Fraser government was compelled to tolerate dissident opinion 
from all levels and quarters but in the long run, this had no 
effect on the outcome. Fraser was faced with doing as much as he 
could to keep good faith with Jakarta until he thought it was time 
that domestic (and international) opinion would accept recognition 
of the Indonesian position. 
The following discussion now reconsiders the questions posed 
in the Introduction to this thesis. The analysis of Australian 
attitudes and policies undertaken in this study suggests that 
geostrategic considerations have dominated official Australian 
thinking about the substance and aims of Australia's relations with 
Indonesia, in the same way that they have influenced Australian 
decisions about Indonesia. Since 1966, many diplomats and 
political leaders have tended to stress 'Indonesia's ... strength 
due to her size, population, physical location as a neighbour, 
control over sea lanes and natural resources -- also her potential 
as a market and outlet for investment') Inevitably, such an 
outlook has compelled Australian governments to pursue two major 
policy objectives: to maintain Indonesia's stability and goodwill, 
while promoting a favourable political climate for the development 
of trade and investment. Fundamental to these objectives has been 
the major assumption that Australia's long term interests will be 
best served by a policy that was both supportive and sympathetic to 
the 'New Order' Government. This, in turn, would afford Australia 
access to, and influence over, policymakers in Jakarta. 
This has had a number of major effects. First, a 'special 
relationship' has been pursued by successive Australian governments 
as a means of securing Australia's political and strategic 
interests in the region. Such a strategy, which inevitably placed 
emphasis on the notion that Australia's relations with the 'New 
Drder' government 'are (or should be) the most important 
Eldridge, P.J., "Recent trends and issues in Australia-
Indonesia relations", p.44. 
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consideration affecting Australian foreign policy',' took on 
particular meaning in the late 1960s, during a period of turbulent 
change in the international order. Because of its excessive 
preoccupation with security as well as with its 'natural' 
alignments with Britain and America, Australia had given little 
serious attention to such a proposal. It was only when doubt was 
cast upon the security of these alignments, during such a crucial 
period, that the Australian Government was prepared to deepen its 
relations with Indonesia. This saw an improvement in the 
Australia/Indonesia relationship during two distinct phases: the 
first coincided with the change of government in Indonesia and was 
for the purpose of peaceful coexistence and the second was brought 
about by the changing strategic situation in the region. When it 
was assured that the Suharto government was in control, the 
Australian government was swift in providing firm, even uncritical 
support, and participated in measures designed to stabilize 
Indonesia and assist it to fulfil its newly appointed role in the 
post-Nixon doctrine regional order. 
In general, such a strategy was embraced enthusiastically by 
political leaders and Australian diplomats alike, with the latter 
emerging to play a dominant role in effecting it. 2 Moreover, 
Australia increasingly accepted Indonesia's claims to leadership in 
the Southeast Asian region. But this has created a dilemma for the 
relationship that has evolved, because in terms of Indonesia's 
ability to exert influence and power in the region it was not: 
one between equals. This asymmetry in power resides in 
Indonesia's geopolitical location, its control role in 
the regional balance of power, and in its potential 
military and economic power. This means that for 
Australian diplomats, any check or setback in the 
bilateral relationship is disproportionately more costly 
to Australian interests than to Indonesian interests. 3 
In other words, Australia's Indonesia policy is also based on the 
assumption that Indonesia is more important to Australia than 
Australia is to Indonesia. In these circumstances, where the 
ourden of ensuring a successful relationship rests with anxious 
policymakers in Canberra, Indonesia is able with relative ease to 
1 	Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian relations", p.14. 
2 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.200-201. 
3 	Ibid., p.201. 
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successfully apply pressures on Australia. 
This is all the more disturbing and ironic when it is 
considered that such a doctrine has been the product less of 
geopolitics than deliberate policy, and of the influence that was 
brought to bear by a small but powerful pro-Indonesian group within 
the Department of External Affairs/Foreign Affairs, on both the 
government and the public, to have it accepted as official 
Australian policy. 1 And to a large degree such a strategy had, in 
much of the period up to 1975, been successful. 
However, while Australia's Indonesia policies secured such 
bipartisan support (for reasons that could have also had as much to 
do with public apathy towards such matters), dissenting opinions 
within Australia were giving rise to subtle but distinct swings in 
Australian attitudes towards Indonesia. These attitudes -- and the 
second major effect of the Australian Government's objectives -- 
while tending to take up specific issues such as political 
prisoners, West New Guinea and military aid, have increasingly 
focused on the authoritarian nature of the Suharto government. 
Aware of Indonesian sensitivities to such criticism, Australian 
diplomacy has been directed to a 'fire brigade' role -- dampening 
down the issues in Jakarta while successfully reassuring Indonesia 
that such negative public opinion did not reflect official 
government views. With the emergence of East Timor, Australian 
diplomacy once again set about dampening the issue -- thenceforth 
the role of Richard Woolcott. 2 . Where the Whitlam government was 
not prepared to accept the costs of an outright rupture in the 
relationship with Indonesia, the Fraser government was, until such 
costs outweighed the gains from its dissent over Indonesia's 
actions. When viewed in its totality, the dominant theme of the 
rimor issue was the importance of power, rather than morality, in 
international relations, and regional security in particular. And 
ooth emerged as dominant aspects in the view and perspectives 
generated by the debate over Australia's disturbed relationship 
with Indonesia. 
Whether we focus on the views of the politicians, the 
1 	Ibid., p.201 and Eldridge, P.J., "Recent trends and issues 
in Australia-Indonesia relation", p.44. Refer to Chapter 
Seven, p.322 (footnote 3), and Chapter Ten, p.498. 
2 	See Chapter Seven. 
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journalists, or of some academics, they all shared a common 
characteristic -- ambivalence. On one level, Indonesia was seen as 
a major factor in the regional security equation. This view was 
reflected more in the opinions of commentators such as B.A. 
Santamaria and organizations such as RSL, who perceived Indonesia 
as a barrier against communism, especially since the American 
military withdrawal from the region and the fall of South Vietnam. 
Amongst the academics there were those (including Mackie, Arndt and 
Viviani) also who saw Indonesia as a major factor in the security 
of the region, but did not see it as being expansionist -- a view 
held, on another level, not only by those on the left (including 
elements within the ALP, the trade union movement and organizations 
like the CIET), but also by elements on the right. This entrenched 
view of Indonesia portrayed her as a power which annexed West New 
Guinea, and incorporated East Timor in such a way as to confirm the 
suspicions of some Australians that sooner or later, Indonesia 
would seek out Papua New Guinea: 
However, while several considerations influenced Indonesia's 
policy towards East Timor -- an historical fear of sucessionism, 
the influence of the 'hawks' in Jakarta (and their increasingly 
negative perception of the domestic political dynamics in East 
Timor) and, related to this but more importantly, a concern that an 
independent East Timor on its border might become a regional 
'Cuba' 2 -- the historical record does not support the view that 
policy makers in Indonesia are likely to pursue expansionist 
policies for their own sake. Nevertheless, the record does show 
that, motivated by a concern for its own security, Indonesia has 
taken limited military measures to achieve what it perceived to be 
important national security objectives. 
The delusion that Australia has always been a benevolent and 
unaggressive power has played a subtle but important role in the 
underlying belief of some Australians that perhaps Indonesia is the 
reverse. Yet there are fundamental reasons for such views. First, 
Australia's geographic and cultural isolation has made it difficult 
1 	See, for example, Sharp, A., "Timor: Indonesia sows the 
wind", Arena, No.41, 1976. 
2 	These influences are examined by J.A.C. Mackie in more 
detail in Mackie, J.A.C., "Does Indonesia Have Expansionist 
Designs on Papua New Guinea?" in R.J. May, (ed.), The 
Indonesia - Papua New Guinea Border, pp.50-57. 
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for Australians to come to terms with the political realities of 
the pluralist societies which make up the sovereign states which 
have emerged in Southeast Asia. 1 As a result, our relations with 
Indonesia -- in particular since its independence -- have been 
built on a mixture of false Australian hopes and assumptions 2 and 
they have tended to overshadow the fact that important differences 
in political and cultural values exist between the two countries. 3 
But this emphasis on such differences can be taken too far. 
rhose -- whether Santamaria, Arndt or the AIBCC -- who consider 
that Australia's national interests are best supported by a policy 
that is sympathetic and supportive of the Suharto government, also 
argue that such a policy approach is eroded by critics of that 
government. Arndt, for example, believed that: 
The CIET through its unrestrained abuse and wild charges, 
has played on and re-awakened the culture-bound 
prejudices against Asians in general and Indonesians in 
particular ... it is, also, only too evident that many 
Australians need not be greatly provoked to reveal an 
ingrained distaste for and sense of superiority over 
their Indonesian neighbours and are only too ready to 
believe the worst of them. 4 
Furthermore, such criticisms, it is argued, are not only hostile 
but insensitive to Indonesian cultural and political perspectives, 
and values. Similarly, while Mackie acknowledges that differences 
do exist in the political and cultural values of the two States, he 
contends that each should accept that the judgements of each 
country has a basis in its own political culture. However, 
cultural explanations such as these tend to conceal the concrete 
strategic, political and, to a lesser degree, economic interests 
dhich lie at the heart of Indonesian and Australian political 
Camilleri, J.A., An Introduction to Australian Foreign 
Policy, Jacaranda Press, Milton, Queensland, 1979,pp.22-29. 
2 	The major example here is that Australia played an important 
part in assisting Indonesia to gain its independence from 
the Dutch. See George, M., Australia and the Indonesian 
Revolution. 
3 	Viviani, N., "Australia-Indonesia Relations - Bilateral 
Puzzles and Regional Perspectives", Australian Outlook, 
Vol.36, December 1982, p.30. 
4 	Arndt, H.W., "Timor: Vendetta Against Indonesia", p.17. 
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behaviour, 1 and their particular responses to the East Timor 
question. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties which the relationship endured 
luring the 1950s and 1960s gave way to a period of euphoria in the 
1970s, by which time Sukarno's aggressive nationalism and pro-
communism had been well and truly replaced by Suharto's 'New Order' 
-- a reliable, friendly, anti-communist neighbour dedicated to 
regionalism abroad and economic reform at home, and a country with 
whom we could have a 'special relationship'. Within a few short 
iears, this wave of contentment crashed onto the hard rocks of 
reality in Indonesian political life -- the Malari Affair, the 
suppression of Indonesian activists, the Pertamina scandal, 
-.:orruption and East Timor. 2 While many of these issues aggravated 
sections of Australian public opinion, the Timor issue united more 
Dpinion than at any other time, including during either the West 
qew Guinea or confrontation issues. 3 The Timor issue brought to 
:he surface, from both sides of the political fence, a strong 
neasure of 'latent antagonism towards Indonesia 1 . 4 Those on the 
right, including politicians such as Bonner and Hodgman, viewed 
[ndonesia's actions in East Timor not only as a denial of human 
rights but also in terms of Australia's historical preoccupation 
vith 'threats from Asia 1 . 5 Those on the left, including Uren and 
7ry, characterized them not only in terms of a denial of human 
rights but also of corruption, political prisoners and fascist 
jenerals. 
But, many political issues are, in essence, a struggle between 
)rder and justice. In general, the events of the dispute 
alustrated that Australia's political traditions compelled many to 
new the East Timorese claims for self-determination as a simple 
natter of justice and Indonesia's actions as abhorrent. Yet, while 
This idea is drawn from Robison, R., "Explaining Indonesia's 
Response to the Jenkins' Article: Implications for 
Australian-Indonesian Relations", Australian Outlook, 
Vol.40, No.3, December 1986, p.136. 
2 	Peter Hastings, the Age, 30 January 1981. 
3 	Viviani, N., "Australians and the Timor Issue", p.225. 
4 	Viviani, N., "Australia and the Timor Issues: II", p.259. 
5 	Arndt, H.W., "Timor: Vendetta against Indonesia", p.17. 
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many in Australia were quick to moralize and admonish Indonesia, 
and the press and a good many of Australia's politicians were ever 
ready to criticize and to render advice, few were capable of coming 
to terms with Indonesia's enormous strategic and political dilemma 
over East Timor. 1 To this extent, all the contrived efforts to be 
understanding, sensitive and friendly, and to think in terms of 
some need for a 'special relationship' with Indonesia, have been 
bankrupt. 
Whilst differences exist between Australia and Indonesia in 
cultural and regional perspectives, because there is no real 
political and (to a lesser degree) economic substance in the 
relationship, relations between the two countries will have to 
endure difficulties, and the emphasis (particularly for Australia's 
part) will continue to focus on managing the relationship (ie) 
developing mutual understanding and tolerance. While the force of 
the asymmetry argument is hard to deny in pure geo-political terms, 
negative impacts can be mitigated, and Australia's interests would 
be well served, by 'replacing our obsessiveness and anxiety with a 
calm, friendly and low profile stance, directing the bulk of our 
energies towards the development of trade, investment and the 
provision of educational services for the region. ,2 
Mackie, J.A.C., "Australian-Indonesian relations", pp.20-21. 
2 	Robison, R., "Explaining Indonesia's Response to the 
Jenkins' Article: Implications for Australian-Indonesian 
Relations", p.136. See also Mackie, J.A.C., "Australia and 
South-East Asia" in Coral Bell, (ed.), Agenda for the 
Eighties, Canberra, ANU Press, 1980, p.141. 
APPENDIX A 
Australia's trade with Indonesia 
Imports 	 Exports 
Total 	From Indonesia 
Oil* Other 	Total Total 	To Indonesia 
$Am 	$Am % $Am 	% 	$Am 	% $Am 	$Am % 
1965-66 	2939 	56.7 1.9 5.1 	0.2 	61.8 	2.1 2721 	5.4 0.2 
1966-67 3045 53.5 1.8 3.1 0.1 56.6 	1.9 3024 6.9 0.2 
1967-68 	3264 	52.4 1.6 3.0 	0.1 	55.4 1.5 3045 	13.9 0.5 
1968-69 3469 	55.7 1.6 4.3 0.1 60.0 	1.7 3374 	20.7 0.6 
1969-70 	3881 43.7 1.1 5.2 	0.1 	48.9 	1.3 4137 	35.3 0.9 
1970-71 4150 	15.6 0.4 6.9 0.2 22.5 	0.5 4376 	39.1 0.9 
1971-72 	4008 4.4 0.1 9.9 	0.2 	14.3 0.4 4893 	57.2 1.2 
1972-73 4121 	1.4 •• 12.2 0.3 13.6 	0.3 6214 	74.6 1.2 
1973-74 	8080 - - 18.8 	0.2 	18.8 	0.2 8726 	175.3 2.0 
1975-76 8241 	3.1 •• 21.4 0.3 24.5 	0.3 9640 	161.3 1.7 
1976-77 	10411 4.4 •• 45.8 	0.4 	50.2 	0.5 11652 	180.5 1.5 
1977-78 11167 	29.1 0.3 55.0 0.5 84.1 	0.8 12270 	196.3 1.6 
1978-79 	13757 	49.3 0.3 49.9 	0.4 	99.2 	0.7 14233 	217.4 1.5 
* 	Includes petroleum products, none for 1975-1976, 	1977-1978, 	$A4.5 milion in 1978-1979. 
Source: Arndt, H.W., 'Economic Relations Between Australia and Indonesia', in J.A.C. Mackie (ed.), 
Indonesia: The Making of a Nation, ANU Press, Canberra, 1980, p.744. 
APPENDIX B 
Australia-Indonesia Trade: share in each country's total trade 
Indonesia Australia 
1974 1975 1973-74 1978-79 
$USm $USm $Am $Am 
Exports Imports 
Total 7426.3 100.0 11643.2 100.0 Total 6085.0 100.0 13757.0 100.0 
To Australia 22.8 0.3 106.9 0.9 From Indonesia 16.6 0.3 99.2 0.7 
of which: 	oil 4.9 0.1 71.5 0.6 of which: 	oil 0.6 • 	• 49.3 0.3 
other 17.9 0.2 35.4 0.3 other 16.0 0.3 49.9 0.4 
Imports Exports 
Total 3841.9 100.0 6690.4 100.0 Total 6914.4 100.0 14233.0 100.0 
From Australia 129.7 3.3 218.0 3.3 to Australia 106.5 1.5 217.4 1.5 
Source: 	Arndt, H.W., 'Economic Relations Between Australia and Indonesia', in J.A.C. Mackie 
(ed), Indonesia: The Making of a Nation, p.743. 	 0 
ril-YEAVIJ_LA 
Australian Economic and Military Assistance:  
Regional/Indonesia (Tables 1-4) * 
TABLE 1 
AID DISBURSEMENTS: 1974/75-1931/82 TO INDONESIA ($Ana.) 
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Projects and technical 
assistance 
12.4 18.1 16.4 20.3 27.5 28.0 32.1 38.0 
Training 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.1 1.7 2.2 2.45 2.9 
Food 9.2 5.2 4.4 5.9 6.3 8.25 4.5 1.7 
TOTAL 22.9 24.6 22.5 28.3 35.5 38.4 39.1 42.6 
* 	Source: 	Harris, S.V., "Aid to Indonesia" 
World Review, Vol.22, No.1, April 1983. 
APPENDIX C  
TABLE 2 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC AID ($'000) 
1946/65 	1965/66- 	1972/73- 	1976/77 	1977/78 	1978/79 	1979/80 
1971/72 1975/76 
1980/81 1981/82 
Indonesia 	 13.4 	68.5 	92.1 	 22.5 	28.3 	35.5 	38.40 39.10 42.70 
Other ASEAN states 	25.9 	47.7 	48.6 	 16.8 	23.0 	16.12 	17.0 19.6 31.95 
PNG 	 127.97 	723.371 	701.201 	226.4 	219.4 	- 	237.2 	235.6 245.1 252.9 
Source: 	Statistical Summary, Australian Official Developing Assistance to Developing Countries (1981-1982). 
Statistical Section, Australian Development Assistance Bureau. 
Functional Classification of Australian Official Development Assistance to Developing Countries (1975/76 to 1980/81). 
Statistical Section, ADAB. 
APPENDIX _C 
TABLE 3 
DCP ASSISTANCE TO REGIONAL COUNTRIES (SAW 
PNG 
Indonesiab 
Singaporea 
Malaysia 
Thailandc 
Philippines 
Others (Asia/Africa) 
TOTAL 
1963/64- 1972/73- 1975/76- (cst) 
1971/72 1974/75 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 
7.784d 44.698 11.511 14.178 15.240 16.654 17.543 
14.436 20.064 7.183 9.589 11.935 8.627 10.159 
6.852 3.337 1.973 .394 .699 1.175 1.236 1.196 
39.596 13.440 11.980 3.963 9.589 3.909 3.954 4.400 
.062 .083 .053 .107 .650 1.206 1.906 
.084 .199 .090 .804 1.161 1.917 1.343 
.089 .067 .0.48 .087 .247 .114 .300 
46.448 39.232 79.064 23.242 35.053 34.317 33.708 36.847 
a 	Included in 'DCP' with Malaysia until 1966/67. 
Limited expenditure on Indonesia included in votes on Defence and Service Departments, 1968-1972. 
Assistance to Thailand and Philippines charged to SEATO Aid under Department of Foreign Affairs Funds prior to 1972/73. 
ci 	Commenced 1974/75; also transfer of Australian defence assets ($74.0m). 
Source: DCP Assistance to ASEAN Countries, (Annex 13), Department of Defence, Canberra, 1983. 
APPENDIX C  
TABLE 4 
RECENT DCP EXPENDITURE - INDONESIA ($m) 
1978/79 1978/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Nomad Projects I and II 1.613 .715 .155 .090 
Nomad Project III - 1.300 6.101 3.387 
16 Metre Project .209 .206 .001 - 
Attack Class Project I and II .074 .023 .091 1.383 
Sabre Project .424 .174 .057 .003 
Sioux Helicopter Project 1.613 .141 .081 .276 
Survey and Mapping Project 2.408 3.377 1.958 1.900 
Field Communications Project .179 .024 - - 
Research and Development Project .099 .034 .006 .090 
Language Training Project .150 .142 .058 .155 
Nomad Maintenance Project - - .039 .179 
C130 Maintenance Project .001 .774 .357 .055 
Landrover Project - 1.276 2.007 .084 
A 
Tanjung Uban Naval Base Equipment - - - .132 
Training in Australia .220 .769 .681 .634 
Miscellaneous .193 .633 .343 .259 
TOTAL 7.183 9.588 11.935 8.627 
AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON QUESTIONS RELATED TO INDONESIA: 1966-80 
ISSUE: INDONESIA AS A THREAT 
Poll No./ 
Date 	 Survey Focus(1) 	 Total 	Countries 
Responses (%) 
Some 	No 	Can't 	 North 
Countries Say 	China 	Russia 	Vietnam Japan Indonesia Men 	Women ALP 	DLP 	LCP 
194(2) 
November 1967 
Which countries threaten 
Australia 
1928 51.6 32.0 16.4 30.8 13.0 9.4 4.1 7.1 8.1 6.2 6.2 9.4 7.9 
203(2) 
Apd11969 
'bid 2092 50.7 36.0 12.9 30.1 16.3 9.0 7.4 7.8 7.7 7.9 5.6 12.7 9.1 
209(2) 
February 1970 
Countries likely to • 
threaten AustralA 
in next 10 years 
2092 53.6 36.1 103 27.1 15.0 6.9 7.8 10.2 11.3 9.1 8.6 15.6 11.5 
ANOP(4) 
July/August 1971 
Threat to national 
security 
• 
2121 42.5 44.5(5) 13.0 26.5 13.0(6) 12.0 7.0 Not availal, le 
68(2) 
April 1974 
As for 209 1905 57.6 29.4 12.9 20.9 11.5 13.3 6.3 7.2 8.4 6.1 6.2 1.0 8.9 
Morgan GP (2) 
June 1975 
Ibid 1905 57.6 29.0 13.0 21.0 12.0 13.0 6.0 7.0 otavalial le. 
ANOP(7) 
March 1976 
External threat (8) 1500 51.0 38.0 11.0 31.0 28.0 21.0 Not avallal le. 
Herald Survey 
May 1980 
_ 	  
Countries threatening 
Australian security 
2000 63.0 34.0 3.0 14.0 40.0 zoo) 6.0 11.0 15.0 8.0 11.0 
12.0 
Lib 
14.0 
NCP 
There are four major organisations in Australia that conduct polls: The Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty. Ltd. produces the Morgan Gallup Poll which is published in the 
Australian weekly news magazine the  Bulletin as well as (at federal election times only) in the  Australian and the  Weekend Australian. The organisation is the Australian 
Gallup Poll affiliate and has been conducting polls ever since it was formed in 1941 by Roy Morgan. Up to and including the 1969 federal election it was the only organisation 
that conducted political polls regularly. Until 1973, the poll was known as the Australian Gallup Poll and was published in various newspapers throughout Australia. McNair 
Anderson Associates Pty. Ltd. does the fieldwork and data processing for Australian Public Opinion Polls (using the Gallup Method). These polls are published widely in Australia 
and have by far the greatest exposure of any Australian poll. The organisation has been conducting polls since 1973 when it secured the APOP Gallup contract in place of Morgan 
Research. The organisation is the result of a merger in 1973 between McNair Surveys and the Anderson Analysis, which was formed in 1944 by Bill McNair and George Anderson. 
ANOP (Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls) produces a poll of the same name. Before 1980, it was published at different times in the  National Times and the  Australian and 
reported on the ABC's  Four Corners. The organisation began taking polls in 1971. Irving Saulwick and Associates produces the Herald Survey/Age Poll, which is published in 
the  Sydney Morning Herald and theAse. It has been conducting polls since 1971, continuously under the direction of Saulwick but originally under the name of Australian Sales 
Research Bureau (ASRB). The poll was also conducted with Beacon Research Company Pty. Ltd. and the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne. 	tn 
n) 
ISSUE: FOREIGN AID/AID TO INDONESIA 
Responses (%) 
Poll No./ 
	
Total 
	
Men 	Women 	ALP 	DLP 	I.CP 
Date 
- 
185(2) 
September 1966 
Should aid to Indonesia 
be increased 5572 Increase 
Maintain 
Reduce 
No 
Opinion 
12.6 
51.8 
24.1 
11.6 
16.7 
49.4 
25.5 
8.3 
8.5 
54.1 
22.7 
14.6 
11.5 
47.0 
28.5 
12.9 
18.3 
48.4 
24.5 
8.8 
13.3 
56.6 
20.8 
9.4 
200(2) Flow much aid should we give 
. 
October 1968 to Indonesia 6130 $13m pa. 21.4 61.3 65.5 67.6 59.1 61.0 
$10m p.a 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 
$6m p.a. 36.8 31.0 42.2 36.4 33.0 38.6 
$3m p.a. 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.2 
Nothing 22.6 26.7 18.6 27.3 203 18.2 
No idea 14.6 10.6 18.5 14.0 15.9 13.9 
APOP(11) Should Government aid be • 
July 1978 increased 1993 Increased 26.0 27.0 25.0 Not avai able 
Decreased 25.0 29.0 21.0 Not aval able 
Maintained 44.0 40.0 49.0 Not avai able 
No 
Opinion 5.0 4.0 5.0 Not aval able 
Agree 	Agree Disagree Disagree Don't 
Total 	strongly in part strongly in part 	know 
Age Survey (1°) Aid topeedy countries 
8
8
8
8
8
 
29.0 46.0 10.0 14.0 1.0 
April 1972 Aid to Australia's needy first 74.0 20.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 
Money does not get to needy 41.0 34.0 10.0 4.0 11.0 
Send food not money 52.0 24.0 11.0 10.0 3.0 
Only to national interest c-ountrles 26.0 24.0 18.0 29.0 . 	3.0 
- 
ISSUE: ATTITUDE TOWARD ASIA/ASIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD AUSTRALIA 
Responses % 
Poll No./ 
	
Total 	Country • 	Too 	About Don't 	Un- 	ALP 	LCP 
Date 	 Survey Focus 	 Friendly Right 	Know 	friendly 
APOP (11) 
05/11/74 
November 1974 
Government attitudes 
to various countries 
2124 South Africa 
Taiwan 
USA 
Russia 
China 
Indonesia 
7.0 
15.9 
11.0 
21.0 
34.0 
7.0 
36.0 
40.0 
61.0 
43.0 
43.0 
55.0 
25.0 
24.0 
8.0 
20.0 
15.0 
25.0 
32.0 
21.0 
20.0 
11.0 
8.0 
13.0 
23.0 
13.0 
7.0 
12.0 
9.0 
12.0 
39.0 
26.0 
30.0 
10.0 
6.0 
13.0 
APOP (111 
02/7/76 
July 1976 
Countries Australia 
should build up friendship with 
1990 USA 
China 
Japan 
Indonesia 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Russia 
None of these(12) 
Don't know 
Ordered 
42 
38 
36 
34 
31 
31 
27 ' 
10 
3 
Impor- Demo- 	Aggres- 	Trust- 	On way 	Likely 
tant 	cratic 	sive 	worthy 	up 	threat 
Age Poll 	• Countries important 2003 Japan 87.0 43.0 11.0 30.0 43.0 20.0 
April 1977 to Australia Indonesia 38.0 6.0 36.0 6.0 15.0 34.0 
China 51.0 6.0 33.0 12.0 35.0 41.0 
India 16.0 8.0 5.0 12.0 8.0 4.0 
Vietnam 11.0 2.0 27.0 4.0 8.0 15.0 
Philippines 19.0 8.0 5.0 14.0 10.0 4.0 
PNG 49.0 34.0 4.0 31.0 31.0 3.0 
Thailand 14.0 4.0 6.0 9.0 6.0 4.0 
None 3.0 30.0 21.0 36.0 13.0 23.0 
APOP (11) 
Mi.:ty 1979 
Countries friendly to 
Australia 
1915 Japan 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Hong Kong 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
China 
Most friendly Should 
35.0 
15.0 
9.0 
8.0 
8.0 
not available 
develop better 
relations with 
17.0 
15.0 
38.0 
ISSUE: TIMOR 
Poll No./ 	 Survey Focus 	 Total 	 ALP 	Aust. 	LNCP 	DLP 	Men 	Women 
Date 	 Party 
Gallup Poll Knowledge and thoughts 1694 Read about fIghtin 
87(2) on Timor-Indonesia relations Yes 86.1 90.7 81.6 
September 1975 No 13.9 9.3 18.4 
Future of Timor 
Independent 38.7 43.0 '34.4 
Indonesia 17.2 22.6 11.9 
Undecided 44.1 34.4 53.6 
Keeping Peace 
Send Australian 
troops 18.9 13.5 14.5 22.5 35.0 
Keep out 67.8 74.2 73.0 64.8 57.1 	• 
No opinion 13.3 12.3 12.5 12.7 7.8 
Indonesian Takcov 
Favour 23.2 28.9 26.2 26.9 46.0 
Oppose 45.5 47.6 58.8 44.4 32.3 
Undecided 31.3 33.5 25.0 28.7 21.6 
Gallup Poll 
105 (2) Favour or oppose 1744 Favour 15.3 13.3 17.4 27.6 18.8 
February 1976 Indonesia's takeover Oppose 49.5 48.6 56.5 51.1 36.5 
of East Timor Undecided 35.2 38.0 26.1 31.3 44.8 
ISSUE: COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN SELECTED SE ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Poll No./ 
Date 
APOP 11) 
05/5/75 
May 1975 
Responses (%) 
Similar 
attempts 
thought 
Total 	likely in 	 ALP 	L-NCP 	Men 	Women 
2003 Thailand 59.0 49.0 68.0 61.0 57.0 
South Korea 49.0 40.0 56.0 52.0 45.0 
Malaysia 46.0 37.0 55.0 48.0 39.0 
Taiwan 41.0 32.0 48.0 39.0 43.0 
Indonesia 40.0 30.0 48.0 39.0 41.0 
Australia 29.0 18.0 37.0 25.0 32.0 
Survey Focus 
Would the Communist takeover 
of Cambodia and South 
Vietnam lead to attempts 
on other S.E. Asian 
countries 
ISSUE: LANGUAGE 
Poll No./ 	 Response 
Date 	 Survey focus 	 Total 	Language 
Gallup Poll What language, other than 1978 French 24 
06/4/77 English should be Italian 24 
April 1977 taught in Australian schools Japanese 22 
Indonesian 20 
German 19 
1. Due to the length of questions and limited space herein, we will only refer to the broad subject matter. 
2. Gallup poll (Ray Morgan). 
3. This poll called for a "yes" or "no" response to the question of the likelihood of Australia being "menaced by any other country". 
4. Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls. 
5. The biggest threat was seen to be from rebellion in Communist countries (41%). 
6. The Russian Navy. 
7. Australian National Opinion Polls. 
8. A survey commissioned by the Japanese Embassy In Australia. 
9. Now Vietnam. 
10. Australian Sales Research Bureau Ply Ltd. 
11. Australian Public Opinion Polls (the Gallup Method). 
12. The list also included Philippines, India, Taiwan. 
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